BUDDHISM AND THE NEGATIVE

By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS

We know that in the Pali scriptures the things that are good, the things that should be, the right life, the perfect state, are often worded negatively. We know in a general way that Buddhism expressed not only bodily but also spiritual hygiene in negative terms. But I have not met with any work, at least not in English, in which this characteristic, partly Indian, partly Buddhistic, has been treated with as much emphasis as it deserves. It is just possible that this is actually the case —I say so with diffidence—and that the lack of emphasis is due to an underestimation of how very pervasive a characteristic it is. Underestimated also appear to be both the conditions and the consequences of it. To treat of it fully would mean writing a history of Piṭaka doctrine. But some points can be raised in shorter compass: the fact, namely, of the emphasis, some causes of it and some effects of it.

The Buddhist code of fundamental morals is one of five negative injunctions: the believer is enjoined to abstain from—literally, take no pleasure in (*paṭivirato; veramaṇī*)—taking life, and so on. Here, of course, Buddhism is no exception among other old and even younger codes. Jesus tried without success to reword the Mosaic, mainly negative, code with 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' for we still go on in the old negative way. We have yet to frame a positive code for more duties than that owed to the Highest and that to parents. We have yet to come to: Ward your fellow-man as yourself. Ward his property as your own. Ward a man's wife as mother, sister; ward the children as your own children. Let speech be truthful, kind, courteous, helpful. Keep sober. Some day we may take over the Buddhist Sīlas in this positive form, but if we adopted them in their present negative wording, we should be scarcely better off than we are. And if those Buddhists whose scriptures are the Pali Canon

were more familiar with those scriptures than they are, they would know that they have ready to hand a worthier and more positive wording of the Sīlas in the Suttas, in words expressly ascribed to their Founder.[1]

But the Buddhist use of the negative, in things bearing on man's present and ultimate welfare, goes far beyond the injunction wherewith the moral precept aims mainly at restraining the wicked and the weak. In the progress and consummation of the holy life there is an amazingly small number of positive terms, but there is an abundance of negative terms, both directly and indirectly negative. In the positives we have *magga*, *arahaŋ*, *attha*, *hita*, *ānisaŋsa*, *bhāvanā*, *sambodhi*, *santi*, *sacca*, *saggа*, and a very few more might be found. But we come at every turn against the negatives, such as, for the Goal: *nibbāna*, *nirodha*, *nissaraṇa*, *amata*, *khaya*, *anuppāda*, *vimutti*, *ākuppa*, *akutobhaya*, *acala*, and others; for the Way: *niyyānika*, *nekkhamma*, *pahāna*, *nibbidā*, *alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha*, *avyāpāda*, *anabhijjhā*, *animitta*, *suññata*. *appaṇihita*, and others. The saints are *nibbuta*, *anāsava*, without *chanda*, *khīṇāsava*, *paripuṇṇasankappa*, *katakaraṇīya*, *brahmacariyavissuta*, *pannadhaja*, *ohitabhāra*, *nittaṇha*, and more might be added. All of these expressions might be considered as summed up in the phrase *sammā dukkhass' antakiriyāya:* 'for the right making an end of ill.' Once or twice the Founder is made to summarize his teaching; once it is in these words: 'Both in the past and now do I, even I, declare just this: ill and the making ill to cease.'[2] And that which he was said to have thought out under the Bo-tree was the 'making to cease' the 'coming-to-be' (*nirodha-samudaya*). Earnest disciples were taught that ill could only be ended if becoming (*bhava*) ended.[3] The word 'life' was neither appreciated nor depreciated, for in doctrine it was not used! The saint is shown awaiting the end of this span of life with the resignation of a weary labourer waiting for his wage[4]

[1] *Dīgha Nikāya*, 'Brahmajāla S.' But this finer setting I have never heard of as being systematically used, as is the purely negative one.

[2] *Majjhima*, i, 140.

[3] *Saŋyutta*, ii, 117.

[4] *Theragāthā*, ver. 606=654=685=1003.

—the sentiment of the little Pagan dirge in the Shakespearean play *Cymbeline*—but he is dumb about positive good to follow. Life is resolved into birth and dying, and the thing to make cease was the being reborn and the being redead. These were the milestones of the woes of all the worlds. And the man who has spiritually rejected, cut down at the root, the body of his desires and craving, 'made it like the stump of a palm-tree, made it something that has ceased to become, so that it cannot grow up again in the future'[1]—he alone is happy. So are the arahants happy. That there was safety ahead in the way of the worlds towards the Goal was merely the outlook of the converted beginner in the Way. His was the slogan: *Khīṇanirayo 'mhi:* Perished for me is purgatory![2] not that of the saint: *Khīṇā jāti:* Perished is birth! The positive 'Way' (eightfold path) of the first message had been converted—? perverted—by a monastic world into a mainly backward-looking way of four stages and four moments of realization or 'fruition.' The saint had got to the last and had 'crossed over.' His was not the joy of those weary, errant Greek troops beholding the sea: *Thalatta! Thalatta!* It was more the complacency of the coast-spectator in Lucretius. He was safe, but his view was seaward at what he had come through. He was not looking landward at what lay before him. That 'before' was as the track of bird in air untraceable.[3] Or when he, when she, spoke of it, it was all in terms of riddance:

> This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
> This never-ageing, never-dying Way;
> No sorrow cometh there, no enemies,
> Nor is there any crowd; none faint or fail;
> No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment.[4]

He was in Nirvana; of the 'beyond' he did but say, it was 'utter Nirvana': *parinibbāna.* It was ineffable:

> Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion.
> That whereby we speak of him, that exists no longer.
> Wholly cut off are all forms of our knowing;
> Cut off the channels of speech, ev'ry one.[5]

[1] *Sayyutta*, iii, 127, *&c.* [2] *Sayyutta*, ii, 70.
[3] *Psalms of the Brethren*, ver. 92; *Dhammapada*, ver. 92.
[4] *Psalms of the Sisters*, ver. 512. [5] *Sutta-Nipāta*, 1074 *f.*

His happiness was on the one hand so retrospective, and on the other so barred from any forward view into the future, that it is a very type of the attitude which would define happiness or well-being in terms of riddance of pain. It may have been with such ' as with one who after long toil and much peril reaches home, and is content with that for the day, whatever life may give or ask for on the morrow. They had won up out of the maelstrom of *saŋsāra* . . . to something ineffable, that now is, but is not to be described in terms of space or aftertime; and resting they sang.'[1]

It may be said that this is the unworded consummation for the few, for those who, after long ages of slow maturing, were mature.

Yes, this is true; and so sure do they appear about the maturity that, in the anthologies, we come across only two poems by monks,[2] and none in the (fewer) poems by women, in which is worded any yearning for a higher growth, a fuller perfection than the state to which they judge they have attained. It is a very wonderful phase in human evolution to find men and women so very worthy, at the threshold of that second house of which their leader used to speak,[3] the house of the hereafter, showing this serene but tired complacency. Something in their teaching had occurred to quench imagination, and turn all faith and joy and musing to looking backward.

But, the critic goes on, the teaching for the many, for the pious layman, is more positive, less austere, more human, more suited to those who have not turned their back on the world that they know, on life as they know it.[4]

This again is true. No creed may be said to sit so lightly and pleasantly over man's conduct and ritual observance as the Buddhist layman's Sāsana. It may seem to some to be the creed of world-orphans. It is so. Yet it is less so than it seems. The Buddhist also seeks the unseen warding, for is

[1] *Psalms of the Sisters*, xxxi.
[2] *Suppiya* (Th. xxxii), *Tālapuṭa* (cclxii).
[3] *Majjhima*, i, 279; ii, 21; iii, 178.
[4] *Cf.* De la Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925.

not the deified teacher one in a chronic process of ever-warding Buddhas ? Is not the teaching, in some way not understood, but accepted in faith, a world-gift to man for his salvation ? Are not the holy almsmen, albeit very unequal as to holiness, an ever-present influence, warding off ill, producing merit ? The layman could afford to word the good, the well, positively. Worlds lay before him, but by a worthy life here he could earn the guarantee that they would be bright, not dark. Unlike the monk, he could afford to speak of things pleasant as pleasant (*sukhaṃ sukhato*), and not as in very truth painful.[1] He could speak calmly of death, for it was not the end-all, but just the common lot.

All this we know. And if the worthy Buddhist is not consistently cheerful over that common lot when brought up against it, neither are we when we, like him, find nothing better to comfort ourselves withal. Small blame to his inconsistency ! The blameworthy thing for him and for us is to find nothing better than just that ' common lot ' to lean upon.

But there is one point about this more cheerful lay-gospel that should not be overlooked. It worded the very ' man ' better than did the gospel of the saint, the monk. There is no denial of the ' man,' the self (*anatta*) in such discourses to lay-disciples as that to Sigāla,[2] to the thirty kumāras (who were advised to seek the ' man ': *attānaṃ*),[3] to Visākhā,[4] to Citta,[5] to the king,[6] to Anāthapiṇḍika.[7] There is here no robbing the word man (*puggala*) of having any reality; it is not made a merely conventional label. The cloistered academician came to do this; ' man,' ' woman ' was a case of ' naming something that exists (body and mind) by something that does not exist.'[8] No such sophistication existed for the layman. He was indeed reminded that things are transient, and that ills are the common lot. But the third monkish slogan, *Anatta*—a word at first concerned only with anti-brahmanic protest—was not brought into his gospel, to worry and undermine his con-

[1] *Sutta-Nipāta*, 759. *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 86.
[2] *Dīgha*, iii. [3] *Vinaya*, i, 23. [4] *Anguttara*, i, 205 *f.*
[5] *Saṃyutta*, iv: ' Gāmani-saṃyutta.' [6] *Kosala-saṃyutta.*
[7] *Vinaya*, ii, 156. [8] *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, viii, 14.

viction that there was really and truly a man, who worked karma of thought, word and deed, and who reaped the harvest thereof here *and hereafter.*

Together with this more direct, less sophisticated wording of the 'man,' the Buddhist lay-sāsana, be it noted, worded more rationally than did the monk, the good, the 'well' of man. This, positively worded as *hita*, *attha*, *ānisaŋsa*, 'both his own and others' (*attano ca parannañ ca*), was to be sought both here and hereafter. Before him lay, not a way of gradual cessation aimed at in the monk-sāsana, but the two goings or ways, the well-going (*sugati*) and the ill-going (*duggati*). Neither was eternal, though either probably lasted long. Certainly the former, the *sagga-loka*, did. And how far Nibbāna—word as vague as our heaven—was in any way distinct therefrom, he did not ask. Not till Milinda made out a case of a distracted mankind in suspense about it very long afterwards, do we come across any worrying over the subject.[1]

Nor had that other word for the monk's ideal—*vimutti* (liberation)—any charm for the layman. Negative term though it be, it has come to appeal strongly to us, who are the heirs and, in our literatures, the witnesses, of ages of struggles for liberty—national, religious, social. Scarce any word thrills many of us more strongly than just this word of riddance, as in popular oratory or in the people's songs: '*Liberté, liberté chérie!*'—'Dear land of liberty!' From a very different outlook it could thrill the Indian monk no less, the Buddhist nun no less. In her thrilling we can also see riddance of domestic and social disabilities, but for both sexes the liberty is chiefly spiritual, that is, of the very man, the very woman. The thing they had got rid of seemed to them so fearfully positive —fearful even as fire in the turban, fire in the house, fire in the jungle—that the very riddance itself stood for salvation, for peace, for being well. The other Indian riddance-word of salvation—purity (*suddhi*)—does not reverberate in the early Dhamma as does the pæan of liberty. As an ideal it does not appear to have been in the Founder's own original gospel. It will probably have been one of the many floating

[1] *Mln.*, 323.

ideas developed in the growing Order among the more pronounced monastics; not the pioneer world-helpers and men of new thought, but the veritable worldlorn recluses sheltering in the Order.

But it did not appeal to the Indian layman. As a religious slogan it does not appear in the Vedas. *Mokṣa* is a later development, due either to Buddhism, or to a condition precedent of Buddhism. We must come down to the Śwetâśvatara and Maitrī Upanishads to find it. It is true that Aryans can thrill to a negative catchword—witness the word *amata* ('ambrosia,' 'immortal'); but the idea of being spiritually set free is too unworldly to come to the front in any world save that of the recluse.

Here then we have two negatives of utmost importance in the gospel of the Buddhist: 'man' and 'man's well.' The one, at first treated of negatively, came to be regarded as a fiction; the other 'is,'[1] but is entirely ineffable. And we have the 'man of the many' (*puthujjana*), the man of the world's work, rejecting those negatives and using the ideas in a positive sense. Working with his fellows he is not, in the long run, satisfied to build on negative ideas. But let the apologist of the dual gospel in Buddhism remember this: It is the gospel of the recluse which is, and will be looked upon by people of other lands and other creeds as the original, the venerable, the genuine Buddhism. Not because the layman's gospel is not worthy; not because there is not great worth in some later developments of Buddhism. But the Pali Canon holds the field yet as the archetype in Buddhist literature. And, in that, the life, the welfare, the world of the monk outweighs and dwarfs altogether the life, the welfare, the world of the 'manyfolk.' With monks as recorders, as editors, as 'libraries,' nothing else could well have been expected.

The monk-world of the Order even reduced to secondary emphasis and importance—and that at a very early stage—the very heart and root of Gotama's message: the appeal to everyman, as wayfarer in a Way of the worlds to the Goal, to choose himself the way to go by the innate will in him to

[1] *Mln.*, 270: *atthi nibbānaṃ*.

seek the better, the best. Here we have a positive idea, a positive word. And this in spite of the fact that no fit word for either will or choice was to hand. Into this I have gone elsewhere.[1] The manifesto of the WAY has ever been regarded in the Piṭaka tradition as a word, an occasion of the highest moment, and rightly so. And let this not be so much overlooked as it is, that, unless we see in the noble figure of the Way a substitute used by inspired genius groping for a word, to serve for the man seeking by inward prompting his good, his well, and choosing what seems the best way to it, there is no moving force about it at all. Now, on the one hand, the editors made of the Way, not *the* gospel, but *one factor only* in a doctrine of over-emphasized Ill. I refer, of course, to the doctrine of the Four Truths. They made, as monks would, omnipresent Ill in the forsaken world their gospel; and, on the other, they split up the Way into a fourfold path of what we might call negative progress—namely, of milestones[2] of how far there was riddance of all the worlds, of life as we know it. The gospel of the Way was a great opportunity for transforming the truth, that man, the very man, is of the Divine nature, into a truer conception of that nature—namely, of Will working in and with man's will. But this was too far a cry for a world which can even now see in deity, in man, mainly Mind, not yet mainly Will.

It may yet be objected that the reduction of the Way to a relatively decentralized place occurred when it was first taught —in the first 'sermon.'

That is so in the edited version we have to-day. Oldenberg was content to see nothing 'inorganic' in that version of the Way-word, as against Deussen, who did.[3] Deussen saw in its mechanical form an historical parallel to the grouping of many golden sayings, uttered over it may be many months, in the Sermon on the Mount. I am with Deussen, that there has been editing. But not regrouping of materials from other

[1] 'Man the Willer,' *Bulletin of Sch. of Oriental Studies*, 1925, *&c.*

[2] The Four Paths, and Four Fruits.

[3] Oldenberg, *Buddha*, 6th ed., 148 *n.*; Deussen, *Allgem. Gesch. der Philosophie*, i, 3, 138, 156.

utterances. So short is it as it is, that had the bringing in of matter taken place, the original sermon would be reduced to three sentences. But there clearly has been a reduction of a discourse, remembered in *these* words by one listener, in *those* words by another, to a fixed wording. Not of the whole discourse, but of just those sayings which *came to appeal most forcibly to the monk:* Ill, and riddance of Ill. And I hold this may well have happened in Gotama's lifetime, and sometimes in a wording and with an emphasis of which he may not have approved.

That this could not be will only be maintained by those who would see, in Gotama the very *man*, that quasi-deified Bhagavat and Tathāgata *idea* which became the worship of a later day. To his own day a friend, a brother, a leader, a counsellor and helper, he could also be considered by some as a dictatorial tiresome old man.[1] Tenderly, reverently warded he will have been, as are they whose efficiency is rated as over, but he had with wide sympathy and appreciation encouraged all sincere expressions of opinion in the Order, and there were many stalwarts at work in it, whose ways and words are now too much merged in the shibboleth 'Buddhavacana.'[2] These would not all be meek repeaters of what he held most worth while. Is not that lonely last tour with only his cousin significant of one who could no more trust his following to teach just that? Sir Charles Eliot rightly alludes to the 'pathetic pictures of an old man's fatigues' as hall-marked by truth.[3] But to me the loneliness of him on that tour is one of the most poignantly pathetic facts in the world's literature.

Let us return to our negativisms and their defects.

1. Negation of the 'man' (*puruṣa*, *puggala*) finds expression in the word *anattā*. The doctrine was, in the first use of it, a protest, not without reason, against what had become a distorted emphasis in the brahmanic teaching. *Puruṣa*, worded as *Ātman* (*attan*), was in fixity, immutability, power

[1] *Dīgha*, ii, 162.

[2] See the writer's 'The Unknown Co-founders of Buddhism,' *J.R.A.S.*, April, 1927.

[3] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, i, 161.

to will, identical with the world-spirit. Hence to be wise, to be 'fulfilled,' he had not to grow, to become (*werden*); he had to realize what was already there. He was not so much a growing plant as a jewel or star to be cleared of all that hid or dimmed.

But in time this doctrine of protest degenerated into the harmful dogma, never worthily reasoned out, that the 'man' is not only not immutably divine, but non-existent; that there is no one who thinks, speaks, acts, but that there is only thinking, speaking, doing. That 'Buddha denied the existence of the soul' is an oft-made statement which historical criticism will come to reject. Gotama's first utterance as teacher is an appeal to the inmost nature of the very man, to the wayfarer, 'you and I, in the long way,' as he once stressed it. But he had no inspired message about the nature of that very man (*attā*); he confined himself to saying: 'he is not just the body, not just the mind.' Had he but gone on to say: 'these are what he uses,' a world of misunderstanding might have been avoided. Perhaps he did say so, but it suited the compilers of the sayings, in a desperately difficult job, to retain the negative emphasis. That was in keeping with so much else.

We must read not only what has been recorded, but between the lines, and in accordance with the early conditions if we would evoke real historical pictures. For instance, it is clear that the stereotyped way, in the Suttas, of rejecting *attā* can only refer to the old idea of man identified with Godhead, but edited by monks at a time when there was no further any question of protesting against Brahmanism.

If we translate *attā* by God, or immanent God, the formula acquires sense; we are thus taken back to the beginning of the movement.

Pali literature is still for us a very new study. Its bulk is after all considerable, and it is not easy to find its measure, its sense of values, the history of growth in it, if it has, as is now mostly the case, to be studied *as a by-product of Sanskrit*. There is much taking up or rejecting *en bloc*. The evolution of the brahman as an animate book, the evolution of the

mantras he handed on as such—we cannot get at the back and base of these. But the evolution of the Pali, the evolution of its animate libraries—this is of more recent growth, and will repay more analytical handling than it gets. Mainly we can only surmise, yet we can get nearer to the conditions under which the phenomena of Order and of Piṭakas came to be and to grow. And we can be more discerning accordingly.

For look again at the oft-occurring ill-fitting *anattā* riposte: 'man is transient, mutable, subject to ill; how then can he be *attan* (*Ātman*)? When the books were finally revised, this anti-brahman protest was a thing of the past. It is applied to the later denial of the man. As such it puzzles the listener: 'Who then,' he asks, 'will reap my manless karma?'[1] Had Gotama been faithfully recorded as teaching that questioner, can we, weighing one passage with another, doubt but that he would have taught the 'man,' the you and I, faring on, journeying on from world to world, the man who to body and mind is as Jetavana to the faggots, borne thence to the (funeral) fire, the man who, in his actions, grows or sickens, who stands after each dying before Yama, his fellow-man—all devas were fellow-men—to be confronted with that karma, the man neither body nor mind? Already in the Piṭakas the 'man' is tending to be merged in the five 'groups,' replacing Gotama's '*kāya, citta.*'[2] In the Commentaries man has become nothing more than these, and the excellent word for his personality—*attabhāva*—is treated as a mere concession to the conventions of the 'manyfolk.'[3] In the Abhidhamma we are at an intermediate stage between Sutta and Commentary (as written); and there we can see[4] how needful it had become to buttress the degraded theory of the 'not-man' with every stone of support that could be brought together.

2. In the negative naming of the end, the goal of man's long wayfaring, there is no analogous history of degradation. It is chiefly an unworthy emphasis on what has been and

[1] *Majjhima*, iii, 19; *Saṇyutta*, iii, 88; cf. *Kindred Sayings*, iii, p. viii.
[2] *Saṇyutta*, ii, 94.
[3] *Asl.*, 308; *Vis. Magga.*, 310.
[4] *Kathā-vatthu*, i, 1; cf. *Bud. Psy.*, 1924, ch. xii.

has been got rid of. To recall the Greek soldiers, it is as if, on sighting the sea, they had shouted, No more land! and not, The sea! the sea that was the home brought nearer. We see the same Indian weakness in naming the perfect condition of body; the wording, as 'not-disease' (*ārogya*), what our stronger positive words of the West call *hygieia*, *salus*, health, *santé*. It found a complement to that negation about the bodily state in a negation about the very man, self, or spirit when utterly well. In *nibbāna* is implied extinction of the heat of spiritual fevers. Even the slightly more positive *sītibhāva*, the saint's coolness, does but indicate riddance of fever. There is no positive emphasis on what the man is becoming, or will have become. Here and there we meet with 'growth' (*vuddhi*); the notable causative of a noble word *werden* (*bhāvanā*) we also meet with. But when the long work in all that process is consummated, when the man is fulfilled (*paripuṇṇa*), when he will have become that which he has willed to be: 'WELL,' for this word, daughter of 'will,' there is no name. We do not even find, as we might have expected, the simple compound *subhāva*. *Sotthibhāva* is nearly non-existent. *Arahatta* is weakened to mean 'worthiness to receive offerings.' We may, we should appreciate the reserve in early Buddhism which refused to commit itself to any description of that Goal. Who, at this time of day, is content with the worth of such descriptions in other scriptures? But it does not follow that the forward view is fitly worded only by a negation. We may rest too easily complacent in the contentment shown by the Indian over his *néti, néti!* It hints at that racial weakness which found no word for 'will,' whence we derived our 'well'—which never developed its Aryan root *war* in the way we developed the twin root *wal*.

Men cannot eviscerate a gospel of so much as did the early Buddhists without suffering vital loss. In the 'Way' the utmost was done to remedy the Indian lack of a word for 'will,' for 'choice.' But the unworthy wording of the 'man' and of his faring home was a mistake of its own making. In the far East more positive conceptions went some way to

remedy matters. But in so-called Hīnayāna Buddhism the twofold negation yet reigns, so much so that the former half of that negation (*anatta*) is by some actually held to be its chief characteristic.[1] Certain features it presents to-day are deepened in significance when they are considered as possible consequences of that survival. May it not be true that, if the 'man' be unworthily worded, the 'will' by which he seeks the ultimate Well as his real home will be also inadequately worded, and interest in his higher growth, nay, in his ultimate Well, will become blotted out?

Consider! Early Buddhism negated man, the willer through body and will, and worded quite unworthily any concept of a Well in which the man might find the One in whom he willed, whom he chose, and towards whom he moved. To-day we witness how it has gone on losing substance as a religion, how it impresses the outsider as a system of ethics on the one hand, and on the other as a system warding a world of the past: world of a dead social cleavage, dead language, dead literature.

For the Way of the worlds, the larger life of both the seen and the unseen, has faded out of its perspective. Its ancient gospel threw open the gates to the long vistas:

Apārutā tesaṇ amatassa dvārā!

Around and about its votaries there were devas, no longer unapproachable deities, but fellow-men of other worlds, warding, watching, advising, praising, reproving. Clairvoyance, clairaudience[2]—to see and hear as could those devas—was from the first never banned as devilish, but was welcomed as means of access to fellow-men both here and over there. Ever was man in a Way, not of earth only but of the worlds. All of these opportunities and vistas, all that made his cult a very living religion—the having heed to the unseen—the 'Hīnayāna' Buddhist has virtually laid on the shelf among the venerable things of his past. His attention as layman and as monk is concentrated on this one only of his many lives. The just-so-

[1] M. Walleser: 'Wesen und Werden des Buddhismus' (*Festschrif Jacobi*, 1926).

[2] Mistranslated as 'heavenly, or celestial eye and ear.'

much as was given him about the way of the worlds of our life he has lost, and he has learnt nothing since wherewith to word it more worthily, more truly.

If he be monk, his forward view is still more blurred. For as monk he has ever worded not only 'man' and his goal unworthily, but 'life' as well. He never had any hope in the life of the worlds, for everywhere this meant rebirth, redeath of a body. And body, he held, was, with mind, essentially the 'man.' Hence birth and death stood out overlarge, overfearful. He believed in a life of perfected growth only when his life had been cut off from sharing in the life of the worlds. He had no 'very man,' whose growth is not the growth of any of his bodies.

Life, man, will, *werden*, well: herein was weakness, herein was a falling behind. In all five words Europe can show, in naming, an advance on early Buddhism. As to whether a worthy use is made of them, and not in many respects a misuse, it is not here the place to discuss.

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