II

SOME POINTS IN BUDDHIST DOCTRINE[1]

By LEDI SADAW

1.

Threefold[2] is the omniscience of the Exalted Ones, the Buddhas: they know, exhaustively and as it really is, everything knowable; they know similarly the many methods of teaching about things knowable; they know similarly the individuals who are to be taught and enlightened: their prepossessions and predilections, their tendencies and power to choose, their inherited traits and their habits, their acts and attainments in previous lives. Now in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, the first five books[3] show

[1] The following is a selection of passages of general philosophic interest from the Pali essay on the Yamaka, published as an appendix to the second volume of that work (1912). In attempting a task of some difficulty, I have had the valuable aid of a searching correction of the whole of the translation in MS. by Mg. Shwe Zan Aung, who, as a master of Pali, English, and Abhidhamma, is exceptionally competent to advise, and who was also able to refer to the author for sanction and criticism. The first nine pages were rendered into provisional English for me by the kindness of Mr. D. B. Jayatilaka, who was unfortunately compelled, by the imminence of Oxford examinations and by his subsequent return to Ceylon, to abandon the translation. In the passages selected, the meaning has, I think, been faithfully rendered, while the form has been treated more freely, with slight excisions now and then.—C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 221, PTS edition.

[3] *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi, Vibhanga, Dhātukathā, Puggala-Paññatti, Kathāvatthu.*

their knowledge of the true and ultimate meaning of things knowable. More particularly in the last of these is the heresy of the personal entity (*puggaladiṭṭhi*) purged away.

But furthermore, among the many methods used to set forth knowledge, as above stated, there is one which is a purge for complexities in the meanings of philosophical terms for knowable things, in the process [in time and space] of knowable things, and as regards the thorough understanding of them. This purge is the Yamaka method of teaching. The book of this method is placed next after the Kathāvatthu, so that students of Abhidhamma may apply the purge to the divers perplexities arising from matters treated of therein.

If[1] it be here objected that a system which solves doubt by purging complexities should confine itself to portions of doctrine which give rise to perplexities, and not include portions which are free from the same, we make this defence: the Dhamma is taught in two ways: in formulas suitable for memorizing over long periods of time, and in instruction imparted directly and specifically to *individuals*. By the former method the matter is analyzed either in outline or in detail, without regard as to whether perplexities may arise or not. But by [the method for] the individual, his special perplexities are met by the clearing away of some complexity.

Now the great field of Abhidhamma instruction is one of formulas. Hence in the portions stating these everything formulable finds a place, both that which is disputable and that which is indisputable, that which may be answered as well as questions not valid and unanswerable. For the memory this [exhaustive symmetry] is more serviceable. Then, in the succeeding expository portions, only the answerable matter is selected and repeatedly dealt with. Moreover, anything that takes printed shape[2] in a book is set down in full to ensure its preservation, even though, as in the case of a lengthy Sutta, it may be borne in mind in condensed form.

[1] *Yam.*, II., 222: *Ettha* . . .

[2] *Yam.*, II., 223.

2.

Of Mūla and its Synonyms.

The book of the Yamaka deals first with what are called [literally] "roots." This order shows the radical importance, among the conditions of mental phenomena, of the nine so termed—to wit, greed, hate, dulness, etc.[1]—as the basic principles[2] of all the conditioned happening in personal experience.[3] In this connection no fewer than ten equivalent terms are given, namely, root, condition, germ, cause, source, rise, food, object, relation, genesis—definitely testifying to the radical importance of the *mūla*'s. For these, forming a special group of causal circumstances, bring about the occurrence of those phenomena to which they are severally related as the basic principles of their respective correlates. For[4] as the roots of a tree absorb nutriment from earth and water, and nourish the tree up to its summit, keeping it from falling through winds or floods for, it may be, a hundred or even a thousand years, even so, while greed, or hate, or stupidity is firmly established as a "root," by way of attachment, or antipathy, or delusion respectively in connection with sense-objects, do acts of body, speech, and mind, related to those roots, and evil in character, remain fixed on those objects. And an individual of such a character lives in pursuit of those objects for ten, twenty, thirty years, or even a lifetime, or even one life after another. The same is true of the opposite kind of roots, the effects of which are of a beneficent character.

Now it is when we have realized the coming to pass of phenomena as necessary results from antecedent causes that the three "harbours of error," [5] and the doubts under

[1] *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi*, §§ 1053-62.

[2] Suggested by S. Z. A. for *suppatiṭṭhabhāvasādhaka* : "capable of accomplishing a well-established state of being."

[3] Read *ajjhattasantāne*. [4] *Yam.*, II., 224.

[5] *Titthāyātanāni*. "*Tittha*" means (1) heretical teacher, (2) stratagem, (3) landing-stage, (4) water in a vessel, (5) erroneous view. As

which we distinguish eight, and again sixteen, forms, are thoroughly suppressed. Which are these "harbours of error"? [1. Fatalism, or sufficient causation in the past. 2. Special creation, or providence. 3. Indeterminism.]

Firstly, (1)[1] the view that whatever pleasures or pains, whatever prosperity or adversity is experienced, whatever good or evil is wrought, all occurs as the result of deeds[2] done in past lives. (2) The view that all such experiences are the results of the creative fiat of a supreme and solely stable authority. (3) The view that all such experiences happen without any antecedent, condition, or cause, being self-determined. The acceptance of any one of these three views involves the rejection of causes operating as causes in the present. For instance, all personal efforts, personal vigour, prowess, wisdom, energy, are thereby declared useless and meaningless.

In our religion, on the other hand, we hold that all those "harbours" are rejected when we discern, that the experiences of this life [pleasant, painful, good, or otherwise] are of a conditioned, causally induced nature, the causes, such as greed and the rest, being operative in the present.

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(5) it is defined in the *Abhidhānapadīpikāsūcī* thus: *sattā ettha etāsu dvāsaṭṭhiyā-diṭṭhīsu taranti, uppilavanti, ummujjanimujjaṃ karonti.* Ledi Sadaw writes to me thus: "In the expression *aññatitthiyā,* I am not satisfied with your definition of *tittha* as the place where people 'float and sink'; nor with either of the two alternatives in the Anguttara Commentary: *titthabhūtāni āyatanāni titthāyatanāni. Titthānaṃ āyatanāni titthāyatanāni.* Hence I have explained the phrase differently in this essay, but I omitted to explain *tittha* itself. My own view is that *tittha* is compared to a harbour, not because people 'float and sink,' but because they there embark and disembark. In the definition, '*taranti etthāti titthaṃ,*' *taranti* is equivalent to both *uttaranti ceva otaranti ca.* The three chief heresies are called *āyatanāni,* because all the sixty-two heterodox views which are like harbours are found *in* them."—*Note by* S. Z. A.

[1] *Anguttara N.* (*Tika-N., Mahāvagga*), i. 173 ff.; *cf. Vibhanga,* p. 367.

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 225.

[We teach that] the previous *kamma*, referred to in the first of those three views, is the predominating cause of our present state. It is like the seed of the mango-tree, the chief concomitant conditions—namely, the "root" states—being like the roots of the mango-tree. Organs and objects of sense, etc., like earth and water to the tree, are the conditions of support and nourishment. All personal efforts, etc., are so many constructive causes modifying our present state, like the pains bestowed on the mango-tree by the owner.

But creation by an overruling [providence], and the absence of a cause are opinions wholly rejected by the word of the Buddha.

As to the eight and the sixteen forms of doubt, the former category is contained in the *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi*: "Doubt as to the Buddha, the Norm, the Order, the training, the past, the future, the past and future, the existence of an assignable cause of things causally arisen."[1] . . . Of these, doubt as regards the past is, in the Suttantas,[2] expanded under five heads—*e.g.*, "Did I exist in the past or not?"[3] Similarly doubt as regards the future: "Shall I exist?" . . . is expanded under five heads. And doubt as regards the present is expanded under six heads—*e.g.*, "What and how am I?" Hence we get [under the aspect of time] a sixteenfold category.

Now with regard to [the eighth form, in the former category] doubt as to the arising of phenomena from assignable causes, known as causal genesis:[4] this refers both to the law itself and to the particular cases of it. For instance, take what is called the eye, or sight.[5] How does it arise? As a result of something done in the past, or by the creative act of a god, or without cause or condition, or from what other reason? This is doubt as to causal genesis. Again it is declared that sight is in turn a phenomenon, an element, a sphere of sense, and happens by

[1] *Dh. S.*, § 1004.
[2] *Saṃyutta N.*, ii. 26 ff.
[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 226.
[4] *Paṭicca-samuppādo.*
[5] *Cakkhu* = both eye and sight.

way of cause, but is not a self, a vital principle, an entity, a person. Is this so? Is it not so? Is it different? Such is doubt respecting an assignable case of causation. So for hearing and other faculties.

Here the orthodox exposition is as follows: This is the condition[1] of that; this is the condition of that. This (*a*) is the condition whereby they (*b*, *c*, *d*) are specifically conditioned.

For instance, that which we call decay and death, what conditions it? That which we call birth. And what conditions that? That which we call "becoming."[2] Or, [in general terms once more]: *that* being present, *this* becomes; from the happening of *that*, *this* happens. *That* not being present, *this* does not become; from the cessation of *that*, *this* ceases.[3] Thus are the twelve items [in the formula of causation] to be expounded, assigning assignable conditions in a particular class of instances. And the term *paṭicca-samuppāda* means "happening," "manifestation," when the respective condition or cause of happening has been obtained.

A man walks through a great bazaar bearing a bright mirror in his hand. As he goes, images of all objects, animate and inanimate, on both sides of him appear in the mirror. Those images depend upon the presence of (*a*) the mirror, (*b*) the position of certain objects facing it, and (*c*) the light falling between. The images[4] were not in the mirror previously, nor have they come from this or that object. Previously non-existent, they arise at successive moments, and as the man passes by they cease at successive moments, vanish, become annihilated. This [process]

[1] Or cause (*paccayo*). *Paccayo* is more literally "relation," and the statement is that (*a*) is in a particular relation to (*b*), etc. But as cause, condition (*hetu*) is the first and most impressive of all the twenty-four relations among phenomena, *paccayo* is used here as synonymous with *hetu*.—Tr.

[2] Or "karmic tendency-to-become." By *bhava* here we understand *kammabhavo* (S. Z. A.). *Cf. Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 190.

[3] *Majjhima N.*, ii. 32; *Saṃyutta N.*, v. 388. [4] *Yam.*, II., p. 227.

is the *paṭicca-samuppāda* of the images, and the images themselves are termed *paṭicca-samuppanna*. Thus must we understand the causal genesis of all conditioned things, and all things as causally brought to pass.

Hence the following application: In the course of any one day, at different moments, when various objects of sense are presented at the six doors, the impressions arising in consequence are, at some time or other, associated in consciousness with one or more of the different "roots"—namely, with greed by way of infatuation,[1] with hate by way of malevolence, with dulness[2] by way of bewilderment; or, again, it may be, with sensuous ideas, with the renunciation [of them], with ill-will or with affection, with faith, with selfishness, with moral or immoral conduct, each one of these thoughts provoking corresponding acts and speech.

Now here the sentient organism may be compared to the mirror, the world to the bazaar, and objects of sense to all the commodities exposed therein. And as the threefold conjuncture of mirror, position in space, and light, so is the organism,[3] its external impressions, and its capacity of attention, whereby conscious experiences from moment to moment arise and cease.

He who sees rightly after this fashion what is the nature of causal genesis, and of phenomena happening causally, has to understand that the notion "I" is different from a phenomenon.[4] And when he sees that there is no personal entity (*puggalo*) whatever, doubts respecting this present state as to *whether* there is an "I," *what* is the "I," etc., are removed. Similarly with respect to both past and future. Given [favourable] conditions, phenomena, arising now here, now there, cease now here, now there. There is no such thing as a phenomenon come hither from thence,

[1] Or passion, lust (*rajjana*).

[2] S. Z. A. prefers "nescience" (*moha*).

[3] *Ajjhattakāyo.*

[4] In the Buddhist view nothing non-phenomenal exists. Hence the non-existent "I," which is but a name or notion, is "different from" the existent phenomena.—S. Z. A.

nor one that will go hence thither. That the "I" and a "phenomenon" are different must be understood. And where it is perceived that there is no personal entity[1] whatever, then all doubts as to whether *I* have existed in the past, or whether *I* shall exist in the future are put away. As in our present state there is, so in the past has there been, so in the future will there be, just a succession of purely phenomenal happenings, proceedings, consisting solely of arisings and of ceasings, hard to see, hard to understand, subtle, profound, because the procedure is ever obscured by our notion of continuity.[2]

That this is true of the past and of the future we infer from what we see of this procedure in the present. And he who reaches this conclusion transcends evil destiny and the continual round. For it was said by the Exalted One: "It is through not knowing, not understanding, this doctrine [of causation], Ānanda, through not penetrating it, that this generation has become like a tangled skein, like a matted ball of thread, like unto muñja-grass and rushes, unable to overpass the woeful way of the Downfall of the Constant Round. . . ."[3]

Just as in the hot season, the dried-up leaves of the forest trees, smitten by strong winds, are loosed from their stem, and fall year by year, scattered hither and thither in disorder, even so do they, the prey of divers delusions, fare through the round of saṇsāra, loosened again and again from the stem of life, and falling on to a woeful doom. No certainty is theirs when they shall next be born, but like the leaves are they, smitten by the winds of age and death, hurled about by the blasts of divers karmas, scattered here and there along the Woeful Way. However they wish or imagine in their thoughts, death brings no fulfilment thereof, as they fall thus and thus. So are we to understand the Downfall here spoken of. Some firmly believe[4]

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 228.

[2] *Santati-paññattiyā;* a notion arising from the succession of the phenomena.—S. Z. A.

[3] *Dīgha N.*, ii. 255.

[4] *Yam.*, II., p. 229.

that at their death here on earth they will be annihilated, that there is no after-life. Nor even in their case does such a doom befall them; they too are involved in the dread doom of the Waste. They who look to attain by good fortune some godship in upper planes, held high by the world or by their own folk, they too fall hence without attaining. They too who believe in the efficacy of rite and ritual to ensure them, because of some penance or austerity practised, the rebirth of an absolutely happy self in upper planes, they too fall hence without attaining. They too who believe in [the effect of] karma know that they fall thus hence, and they too fall; and they who know it not, they too fall. All men deceasing fall thus, and the gods no less—they of the Kāma-world as well as the unintelligent among the Brahmā gods, they who have won to the highest sphere of becoming down to them that are in the great purgatory of Avīchi. As it was said by the Exalted One:

> By merit's glowing heat exalted high,
> Reborn in worlds of sense and of desire,
> And winning e'en to highest spheres of life,
> They come again to depths of woeful doom. . . .[1]

But they who know, who understand, who can discern the law of causation, they overpass this catastrophic fate. For them there is no falling away into the doom of the Waste. Why? Because he who discerns the law of causation wholly puts away the doubtings of error, and stands firm in the knowledge of, and insight into things as they really are. This is the advantage of knowledge in the analysis of conditions.

If these remarks on the nature of the *mūlas* be found somewhat discursive, we admit that the teaching might have been set forth in outline, even as it was, in the Suttanta, by the Thera Assaji to Mahā Thera Sāriputta: "Whatsoever phenomena have arisen from antecedent conditions, those conditions and the cessation thereof have been declared by the Tathāgata."[2] But we are here

[1] *Vibhanga*, p. 426.

[2] *Vinaya*, I. (*Mah. Kh.*, i. 235); *Vin. Texts*, i. 146.

engaged upon Abhidhamma exposition, wherein one must keep in view,[1] not those who are listening on any one occasion, but the general course of the doctrine according to the spirit and the letter. Thus will the teaching make for increase of analytical knowledge in those Ariyan students who have learned the doctrines, and for the acquisition some future day of analytical knowledge by ordinary folk.

To these matters we shall presently recur.

3.

Of the Name as Term and Concept.[2]

"Name" has a twofold aspect—to wit, name as determined by convention or usage, and name in its ultimate meaning. For the great majority who are ignorant of the nature of ultimates, names considered merely as signs are practically unlimited in number; for example, self, life, human, god, Sakka, Brahmā, elephant, horse, and so on, village, town, house, carriage, cart, jar, cloth, bed, flour, and so on, body, head, hand, foot, hair, nail, tooth, skin, flesh, sinew, and so on. But names as revealed by the discernment of the Buddhas, who know what is ultimate fact, are names under an ultimate aspect; for instance, consciousness, cognition, contact, feeling, extended element, cohering element,[3] the aggregates (*khandhā*), field of sense, elements, truths, causal genesis, and so on; impermanent, ill (sorrow), non-self, non-entity, non-soul, and so on.

In saying "entity," "person," we give a name not to the aggregates [of a living organism] in any ultimate sense, but only to our idea corresponding to the form or appearance[4] presented by those aggregates. And this idea or concept of an appearance does not exist objectively

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 230.

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 234 (last line). On the dual import of *paññatti*, see *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 4 ff; 120, *n.* 2; 198 ff.

[3] In their "conventional" sense, "earth" and "water." *Cf. Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 155, *nn.* 1, 2.

[4] *Santhāna—i.e.*, the name given to a thing as it appears to the mind, but not as it really is.—S. Z. A.

[independently of mind]. Hence in this "name," neither the meaning nor the name itself has any real existence. Yet the great majority perceive and imagine, when they recognize the name, that there actually is what is named self, or soul, or entity, or person. And for this reason we term name "conventional" when it is merely determined [as a designation] by popular usage. But when, not resting upon mere customary usage, people consider those ultimates, the aggregates, as self, soul, entity, person, then they exceed [the scope of] customary usage and mishandle it. Regarding the not really existing conventional notions: "entity," "person," etc., as inseparable from the [five] aggregates of matter, feeling, etc., and therefore as real, they make one or another of those aggregates the real substance, the base, the *nidus* of the non-existent entity. Proceeding thus, they consider that one or the other of those five aggregates is the self, the substance, etc., of the non-substantial empty, void entity. Those who vividly see the *material* aggregate as self[1] say: "The material aggregate (*rūpakkhandha*) [in its totality] is the entity and conversely." It is "I," and "I" am that.[2] The same may take place with the other aggregates. Or they may regard the material qualities in the head or other members to be several selves, which have the appearance of "head," etc.

The forms we call round, or circular, or long, or short, or square, or minute in appearance have no independent being as such, but are merely concepts[3] or terms.[3] But people, imagining that this or that appearance has a real existence, consider that the "self" and "pith" of this or that appearance is matter in which it is supposed to inhere. They consider a substrate of matter as the base of a non-substantial appearance or form. Or they consider that [taking any of the qualities named above] matter is "round"; or "round" is matter, judging that material quality and roundness are one and the same thing. Again, among external objects, they judge that the material

[1] *Cf. Majjhima-N.*, i. 300; *Sayyutta-N.*, iii. 16, 42, etc.

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 235.

[3] *Paññattimattay.*

quality in a tree is an essence for what appears as tree, and so on for the several features of the tree: branch, bud, leaf, blossom, fruit, etc.

In these opinions in which an entity (*satto*) is identified with material quality (*rūpaṇ*), when a person is spoken of as tall or short, a head as round or flattened, etc., the self-notion is ascribable to visible quality;[1] when a person is spoken of as stiff or flexible, the self-notion is ascribable to extended material quality;[2] when a person is spoken of as bound or as loose, the self-notion is attributable to cohesive material quality;[3] when a person is spoken of as hot or cold, the self-notion is attributable to heated material body; when a person is spoken of as moving, vibrating, suffusing, going, stopping, sitting, lying, contracting, extending, etc., the self-notion is attributable to mobile material quality.[4] When a person is said to be happy, unhappy, joyous, melancholy, the self-notion is ascribable to the aggregate of feeling. When a person is said to be clever, skilful, expert within his own sensuous limits, the self-notion is ascribable to the aggregate of perception.[5] When a person is said to do such a deed, say such words, think on such a matter, the self-notion is ascribable to the *sankhārā*-aggregate called volition; or, when he is said to attend to this, apply himself to that, be occupied with it, put forward effort, be content, desire, it is ascribable to the *sankhārā*-aggregate called attention, and so on;[6] or when he is said to be greedy, malevolent, confused, conceited, vain, of perverted opinions, envious, selfish, etc., it is ascribable to each of such features; or when he is said to believe, to be satisfied, to be mindful, etc., the self-notion is ascribable to the *sankhārā*-aggregate called faith, etc.[7] When a person is said to see this sight, hear that sound, etc., the self-notion is ascribable to the aggregate of sense-consciousness.[8]

[1] *Vaṇṇarūpe attagāho.* [2] *Pathavīrūpe.* [3] *Āporūpe.*
[4] *Vāyorūpe.* [5] *Saññākkhandhe attagāho veditabbo.*
[6] *Cf.* list of the *sankhārakkhandha* in *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi*, § 62.
[7] *Yam.*, II., p. 237. [8] *Viññāṇakkhandhe.*

Consider here this parable: At a certain spot where once was open space, a great tree has since grown up, equipped with branches, foliage, blossoms, fruit. And a certain man liable to hallucinations happens to be in that district, and happens to say: "This place was once quite open space; that space has now become a great tree." Whereas the space is one thing, the tree another, this man under an hallucination regards the tree which does exist as the "self," or essence, of the space which does not exist, and speaks of the empty space as having become a tree. On this wise should we judge in this matter.[1] So much for names under the aspect of conventional usage.

But in name under its ultimate aspect we are considering ultimate phenomena which are entirely without external appearance, and which are only modes and changes and phases of process. Even in the smallest visible particle many ultimates are present, it being their "locus." Extended element is present as the mode: hardness, distinct from the mode: cohesiveness. The cohesive element is also present, distinct from extended element. Again, the names "consciousness," "mind," "intelligence," "cognition," apply to what is present as a cognizing mode, as distinguishable from the mode of stimulus or contact, or from that of feeling, etc. Contact is a name for the mode of being stimulated, as distinguishable from the modes of cognizing, of feeling, etc. Hence these names severally, each by its own verbal import, apply to certain appropriate existing phenomena only, and not to other, equally existent phenomena. But this cannot be affirmed concerning non-existents such as entity, person, self, soul, and so forth.

How is it, then, that none of those ultimates is entity, person, self, soul? It is in the sense of something "essential"[2] that they are selfless, soulless. Those phenomena are not essences of being or person. They come

[1] The empty *paññatti*—self and the name for it—imputed as base to something relatively real: the ultimates of the living compound.—Tr.

[2] Lit. pithy: *sāraka*.

to be and cease from moment to moment. Now there is no "entity" or "person" who in one life comes to be and passes away from moment to moment. There is that which, we say, comes once into being at birth, subsists for a lifetime, and passes away once at death. But the aggregates which are ultimate phenomena come to be and pass away from moment to moment even in a single day. They do not persist *pari passu* with the individual spell of life.[1] Hence they are not essence of the individual. Because of their non-substantiality they are not the self of him: they are just selfless; they are not souls or vital principles:[2] they are soulless.

How can we say that ultimate phenomena, even in a single day, momentarily come to be and pass away?

The ultimate of extended element is the mode [or phase] of hardness. This mode cannot persist unchanging, unmodified for a single day. It inheres in the varying situations in which our occupations place the body—*e.g.*, in going, etc. And it is *otherwise* according as it is involved in our going, standing, sitting, lying. Involved in going, it lapses at the end of the going; it does not enter the standing phase. If it could, we should just be going, not standing. Again, when it is involved in our standing, it lapses when we cease to stand, and so on. And even in walking, the aforesaid mode of hardness is different at each step, else there would be no second step as distinct from the first.

We conclude, then, as follows: Many phases of activity are seen in life, such as going, standing, contracting, stretching, moving forward and backward, looking forward and backward, raising and lowering, etc.; and all these are mutually divided by the coming to be and passing away of elements. This is true even of such phases of activity as blinking the eyes and of the movements of respiration. And thus it is that the aggregates in an ultimate sense arise and cease from one moment to another, even in a

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 238. [2] *Jīvo. Cf.* our "living soul" (*Genesis*, ii. 7).

single day. Therefore are these ultimate phenomena not the essence of the individual, nor the soul of him. Because of their non-essentiality they are not the self of the individual, they are selfless; they are not the living soul, they are soulless.

There is no "life" (or "living soul," *jīvo*) apart from what we call the two powers or faculties of material and psychical life.[1] Now a "living soul" is generally perceived and ordinarily reckoned as "someone living a week, a month, a year," etc.[2]; the essence of the living appearance is commonly considered to be the self; the essence of its continuity is considered to be the "living soul." But the two powers or faculties of life referred to above are but the vital [co-efficients] of momentary phenomena only, not of a personal entity.

Such is our inquiry into the ultimate aspect of "name."

There are two kinds of truth: conventional, customary truth[3] and ultimate truth. According to the former, "a being [or entity] exists," "a person exists," "self exists," "a living soul exists." According to ultimate truth, neither does a being [or entity] exist, nor a person, nor a self, nor a living soul; there are only phenomena.

Now conventional truth is the work of popular custom; it is opposed to inconsistency, untruthfulness, in speech Ultimate truth is established by the nature of things;[4] it is opposed to mere opinion. Thus, according to conventional truth, it is not untruthful to say there is a personal entity. Why? Because that is the conventional opinion of the great majority; because of the absence of any number of people maintaining the contrary. Nevertheless, it is just an erroneous view. How so? Because a being who in reality[5] does not exist is spoken of as if he existed. According to ultimate truth, to say "there is no personal entity" is neither untruthful nor mere opinion.

Whatever erroneous views are met with in the world, or

[1] *Dve nāma rūpajīvitindriyāni.* [2] *Yam.*, II., p. 239.
[3] *Sammutisaccay.* [4] *Sabhāvasiddhay.* [5] *Sabhāvato.*

whatever evil courses, or whatever woeful doom, all are rooted in the theory of soul or self, arise from the theory of soul or self. None of these things befalls one who has rejected the theory of soul or self.

This rejection, in the religion of the Buddha, is called the first great Nibbāna, unconditioned, occurring while yet there is residual stuff of life.[1]

4.

Of the Five Khandhas[2]

Why, it may be asked, did the exalted Buddha, in his doctrine classifying our conditioned experience under the concept "aggregates" (*khandhā*), divide these under just five heads? We reply that, in these five groups of experience, that which we do for gratification and enjoyment, [in other words] our acts regarded as beneficial [to ourselves and others],[3] in every field of natural desire, are completely accomplished. We may illustrate this by a parable:

A rich man seeking yet more wealth made a great ship. He manned it with fifty-two sailors, and by conveying the travelling public across the ocean to the desired haven, he amassed that wealth. Among the crew one was expert in all the business of the ship, and saw that it was carried out. Another was versed in sea-routes and havens to be reached. He, from a commanding position, would survey both the course of the ship and whither she was bound. The rest of the crew carried out the orders of the [former] officer in all things concerning the ship's business and voyage. Meanwhile the shipowner, working both vessel and crew, continued to receive and enjoy the wealth earned by his maritime enterprise.

Here the way of life renewed[4] is as the sea. The being

[1] *Sa-upādisesay*. This subject is resumed, in another connection, on p. 138.

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 240.

[3] In our idiom, "self-preserving activities."

[4] *Saysāramaggo*.

liable to natural desire is as the shipowner. The material aggregate [or body, *rūpakkhandha*] is as the ship; the feeling-aggregate is as the mass of wealth gained by the working of the ship. The perception-aggregate is as the chief officer. The mental properties called *sankhāra*'s are as the crew who carry out his directions. The aggregate of cognitions, or consciousness, is as he who sets the course and, standing above, steers to the haven.

Here the "feeling-aggregate" is the totality of what we partake in and enjoy; the "perception-aggregate" includes our conversance with, our experience of, our intelligence concerning acts considered as good or bad, in the whole range of life, human, divine, and infra-human; the[1] "*sankhāra*-aggregate" covers all activities of thought, word, and deed, wrought according to our experience and conversance; the "consciousness-aggregate" is the totality of our sense-impressions—seeing sights, hearing sounds, etc.—functioning as heralds and guides where we happen to be, pointing out, as it were, to our various movements, "This is here; this is there!"

Thus it is that, in these five groups of experience, that which we do for gratification and enjoyment, [in other words] our acts regarded as beneficial [to ourselves and others], in every field of natural desire, are completely accomplished.

5.

Of Elements (Dhātuyo).[2]

Elements we define as self-containing, or, as we say, "bearing (*dhārenti*) their own nature." They do this without adapting themselves to the will of any being whatever. They are not dependent upon the mind, or purpose, or desire, of any creature. They depend only upon their own respective conditions. If the conditions are present, elements come into being, even for those who are not wishing for them; if the conditions are absent,

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 241. [2] *Ibid.*, II., p. 246.

elements do not come into being, even for those who are wishing for them.

Thus, in the hair of a living creature there are eight elements: the extended, the cohering, the fiery, the mobile elements, colour, odour, taste, and sap. Each of these is self-contained, not one of them "bearing the nature" of any of the others, but each one distinct from the rest. This is true also of other bodily properties. Again, in external nature, whether it be solids, such as earth, mountains, trees;[1] or liquids, such as seas, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, etc., or burning substances, or winds, each one of the same eight elements is self-contained and distinct, none dependent on any of the others.

Moreover, this word "element" is used to mean "non-entity, non-soul," as implied in its connotation. In this connexion our notion of an entity, being, or person (*satta*) implies effort, initiative or sustained, while non-entity negatives this. When, for example, we say, "I shall do that," we evince an initiative, prior to the actual effort of applied power constituting the "doing." These two kinds of effort manifested by beings are not in elements.

Why? In the time occupied by a flash of lightning, elements come into being and pass away hundreds of thousands of times. But it is only in the case of living beings that we distinguish personal efforts conceived as continuously consecutive procedure. The essential meaning of vitality[2] is a peculiar vibration, oscillation, motion, change; without external agency, self-caused. The essential meaning of non-vitality is absence of such vibration. If it be objected that, in unconsciousness and trance, non-vitality is attained (by that which is alive), it may be replied that visible movement is at least the commonly accepted test of vitality, or of its absence. But, in a truer sense, the possession of vitality[3] means the compresence of inhibitory principles (or "controllers," *indriyadhammā*) with the element of animal heat. Where these are not there is no vitality.

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 247. [2] *Jīvaṭṭho.*

[3] In text read *ekantena sajīvaṭṭho.*

All this has been said with reference to the idea of continuous life involved in such conventional phrases as, "This person has lived a week, a month, a year," etc.; and also with reference to the notion of life as an ultimate, wrongly conceived by heterodox theorists who say "life constitutes a person," etc. In the ultimate sense there is no such thing as a [continuous] life-entity. All conscious phenomena [*dhammā*] are without it. How so? Because of their impermanence.

That being so, are the two vital forces [of mind and body] reduced to meaninglessness? Not so. It is just through the existence of these two vital forces that all the variations in the processes of phenomena[1] become realized by us under the common notions of things animate and inanimate. And thus, for every distinguishable phenomenon there is manifested a distinguishable common [or ordinary] notion [or concept] of it.

But ordinary beings are dull of knowledge, and do not discern this or that phenomenon, but with wrong views stumble along amid notions alien [to the true nature of phenomena]. And through manifold *karma* they fall into the stream of doom, and are long borne drifting.

6.

Of Ill (Dukkha) *and the First Ariyan Truth.*[2]

In the fifth chapter of the Yamaka, dealing with the "Four Truths," it is stated that, "with the exception of bodily or mental suffering (*dukkha*), the rest is truth as to *dukkha*, but is not *dukkha*."[3] In other words, except suffering of body or mind, and putting aside the fact of natural desire (*taṇhā*), everything else in the threefold plane of life constitutes the fact about Ill, but is not itself Ill. And it may be asked: If "everything else" is not in itself Ill, how does it constitute the fact about Ill?

[1] Here and below Mr. Aung prefers "ultimates" for "phenomena."
[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 248. [3] *Ibid.*, I., p. 174.

The answer depends upon the specific difference in the meaning of "ill" when we refer to bodily and mental suffering. Here the word "*dukkha*" means pain which is enjoyed[1] [*i.e.*, actually felt], and has the essential mark of "unpleasant." But in [such doctrines as] the "Truth concerning Ill," and [the Three Marks] "impermanence, ill, absence of soul," we are considering Ill in the sense of a state of fear and danger,[2] having the essential mark of no peace, no safety, no good fortune. This is obvious, for pleasant feeling, from the point of view of enjoyment of life, is not "ill"; it is just happy experience, with the essential mark of "agreeable." But as included under *dukkha* when used to mean "no peace," then this pleasurable feeling becomes just [one aspect of] Ill.

For it is as a sick man who maintains life by austere dieting, but who, were he to partake of rich dishes, would die or suffer mortal pain. He is offered very savoury flesh curries by a pious person, seeking to do a meritorious act. But the sick man, though very fain to partake of them, is aware of the pains of disease, and rejects them, saying: "Enough, my friend! I have a fear of such dishes; if I take of them, I shall either die or suffer mortal pain." Now he, if he were to partake of them, would be keenly sensible of their flavour while doing so, but afterwards he would die or suffer mortal pain. So that, whereas on the occasion of partaking of those dishes[3] he has the pleasant sensations of enjoying nice, sweet things, those sensations, under the aspect of fear and peril, are nothing but *dukkha*. So he rejects them, saying: "I fear these dishes." . . . Thus from the standpoint of pleasant experience, pleasurable feeling is really pleasure only in the threefold classification of feeling. But under the aspect of insight into the

[1] *Anubhavana-dukkha*. On this apparently paradoxical usage *cf.* a parallel usage in Professor Alexander's "The Basis of Realism," Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. vi., 1914.

[2] *Bhaya* is of both subjective (fear) and objective (danger) import.

[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 249.

Four Truths, by reason[1] of fear and danger, such pleasure is for all beings[2] nothing but Ill.

For those persons who grasp and cling with the idea: "This is mine! *I* am; this is my Self!" are no more free from all the fear and peril of their vices, of evil-doing, of evil doom, than are fish who have swallowed a bait, with its hook and line and rod and capture and dying, free from the fear and peril of the fisherman's craft and violence. As it was said by the Exalted One in the Khandha-Saṇyutta:[3] "He, bhikkhus, who delights in the aggregates of sentient life, delights in *dukkha*. And I deny that he, delighting in *dukkha*, is altogether free from *dukkha*."

Hence it is that we can say: The truth concerning Ill, save in the [narrower] sense of bodily or mental suffering, is not concerning that which [in itself] is Ill.

7.

Of the Second Ariyan Truth; of Craving and Ignorance.

To all who cling to pleasurable feeling with the idea: "This is mine! *I* am; this is my Self!" grasping arises, for craving is present; without craving, there is no grasping. Hence the Second Ariyan Truth about the source of ill is the truth about craving, for craving is the sole cause for the uprising of all the ills of life.[4]

Now we read in the Yamaka: "Save [that which is included under] the Ariyan (Second Truth) concerning source or cause (*samudayo*), all other causes are not true causes" [that is, of ill].[5] By "all other causes" are meant the facts conditioning ill, which are stated in the Truth-section of the Vibhanga, as "roots" of good, etc.[6] It will be noted that the mental phenomena having causal efficiency, good or bad, not dealt with in that section, are true causes under the aspect of truth in general, but in the Ariyan Truths they are considered, not under the Truth

[1] Read *sappaṭibhayaṭṭhena*.
[2] Read *sabbesaṇ pi sattānaṇ*.
[3] *S.*, iii. 31.
[4] Read *vaṭṭa-dukkhānaṇ* (*saṇsāra*-ills).
[5] *Yam.*, I., p. 174.
[6] *Vibhanga*, p. 106.

about Cause [of Ill], but under that of Ill itself. Even ignorance is there considered, not under Cause, but under the nature of Ill. . . .

But why?[1] it may be objected. Surely ignorance is ranked as a primary source in the formula of causal genesis, and as a condition antecedent to craving. Hence anything causal predicated about craving, must at least apply equally to ignorance.

We reply: in the expository method used for the formula of conditioned genesis, ignorance is the starting-point, but in the second of the Four Truths, craving is taken as the starting-point:—a different line of exposition, which may thus be illustrated: A man, having cleared a tract of land, makes a garden,[2] planting a variety of trees and shrubs. If we here inquire into the starting-point in the series of conditions by which that garden has come to be, we shall say that the land came first. If we are asked, who made the garden? who is its owner? we should say, "the man. He[3] is the maker of the garden, he is the owner." For it was he who did all the requisite work of clearing the surface of the soil, and so on. Hence it is he who enjoys the results.

Now the life of an individual[4] is as the garden, ignorance is as the soil, craving is as the owner. If we are teaching the series of conditions by which individual life comes to be, we should place ignorance as the starting-point, and make that our initial cause. If we are stating what is the phenomenon by which that person goes on living, we should say "craving." The doctrine of causal genesis may be compared to a discourse on the history of the garden. The doctrine of the Four Truths is like a discourse on the maker of the garden.

* * * * *

But why [in the former doctrine] is ignorance stated at

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 250.

[2] Or pleasaunce or park (*uyāna*).

[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 251.

[4] *Sattasantāna. Santāna* (lit., a continuity) comes to signify a person, as in *ajjhattasantānay*, because our idea of "person" is derived from apparent continuity (*santānapaññatti*).—S. Z. Aung.

the beginning? Is there no cause of ignorance itself? There is. Then ought not that cause to have been stated first? Not so; if this were done[1] we should only discover yet a prior condition to that cause, and put that first, and so on. Not in this way should we get to the limits of the infinite past.

Why, then, begin with ignorance [you repeat]? It is named at the beginning because it plays the chief part in, and is the prime root and source of the process of life renewed. No other function is fit to be placed above that of the want of knowledge, which is the radical cause, the fundamental ground of the course of the ills of our infinite lives.[2]

Moreover [it must be remembered that] the formula of causal genesis takes one life only as the range [of its emphasis]. As the Exalted One taught it, one complete span of life [one rebirth] is taken, including the past causal factors of its advent and the future factors [of its resultant]. The causal factors are included under ignorance, and the *sankhāra's*, or voluntary actions.[3] By the future factors are meant birth, old age, and dying in the next life, resulting from the causes at work in this life.[4] And by the teaching about *one* complete span of life, the entire series of lives[4] in the infinite series can be understood.

By these alternative methods, then, either ignorance or craving may serve as a point of departure.

8.

Of the Third Ariyan Truth: Cessation.[5]

Let us suppose a certain poison-tree, growing in a certain place. If that tree continue to bear blossom and fruit, it will propagate its kind in that place for a thou-

[1] *Dele*, in text, full-stop after *vadeyya*.
[2] Read *vaṭṭadukkhapavattiyā*.
[3] *Cf. Compendium*, p. 274
[4] *Bhavābhavā*—rebirths high and low. *Cf. Pss. Brethren*, 305, *n.* 4.
[5] *Yam.*, II., p. 253.

sand, a hundred thousand years, maybe for a whole cycle. Let us suppose that a man, recognizing its noxious properties, cuts it down, so that further propagation by it[1] becomes impossible. Now, the tree may be cut down or it may be rooted up. The latter alone is annihilation, not the former, for if the root be not eradicated, the tree, though repeatedly cut down, will again and again renew its growth and continue to propagate.

Now, this present individuality is as the tree, and craving may be likened to its root. The disciple of the Buddha is like the woodcutter. The production of a series of *dukkha*-facts in the woeful destinies of rebirth, starting from, say, the second rebirth, is as the propagation of the species of poison-tree. The extirpation of craving is as the eradication of the tree. The fact of the cessation of all those facts of sorrow and suffering, in consequence of the extirpation of craving, is as the extinction of the tree-species after the uprooting. And the cultivation of the Fourth or Path Truth, together with the necessary stages of understanding preceding it, is as the man's effort in cutting out the tree by its roots.

When craving, accompanied by a wrong view of the self, is cut off, then all immoral qualities and unhappy rebirths are also cut off. From that moment onward we are free from the perils of misconduct and the miseries of evil destiny. And this, in our religion [as has been said above[2]], is called the first great Nibbāna, unconditioned, wherein is yet residual stuff of life.

When, moreover, craving for things of sense-desire, not conjoined with wrong views, is extirpated in us, then therewith are extirpated all volitions connected with merit relating to planes of sense-experience, as well as all prospect of rebirth in relatively happier worlds of sense-desires. From that moment onward there comes to us emancipation from all corresponding volitions as to all future rebirths, high or low, on any plane of [life carried on by way of] sense-desires, as well as from rebirth itself on relatively

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 254. [2] P. 130.

happy planes of that description, that are so very near to the things making for relapse to destinies of woe, beset as they are by [opportunities of] bad ways, bad habits, bad pursuits, and agitated by the waves and billows of sense-desire and sin.[1] This emancipation, in our religion, is called the second great Nibbāna, unconditioned and with residual stuff of life.

When[2] in anyone that craving for rebirth, known as lust for the heavens of things visible and of things invisible,[3] is extirpated, then therewith are extirpated for us all will to live loftier lives and rebirths more divine in any Brahma heaven. From that moment onward there comes to us emancipation from all volitions to win those heavens and from all such forms of rebirth, since they are but impermanent, unstable, mutable, and beset by many overweening conceits and delusions concerning eternity and annihilation. This emancipation, in our religion, is called the third great Nibbāna, unconditioned and without residual stuff of life.

By "unconditioned" (*asankhata*) is here meant that that Nibbāna is exempt from the ills of karma,[4] through its permanence, stability, and immutability, in that there is no more old age or dying, nor the need of recreating the Paths [in fresh rebirths] in order to attain it.

Of these three stages, it is only the first great Nibbāna which, even in the age of a Buddha, is won by many among gods and men. Few attain the second stage; still fewer, the third. Why is this? Because of the very undeveloped state of their powers.

The phrase, "with residual stuff of life," refers to a residuum of the aggregates of becoming (*bhavakhandhā*) and of lower or vicious qualities (*kilesadhammā*). When anyone has won the first great Nibbāna, with this residuum [to come], he has yet to travel through various rebirths, but he has put an end to false views, to immoral conduct,

[1] *Kilesa.* [2] *Yam.*, II., p. 255.

[3] *Rūparāga-arūparāga-sankhātā*, literally rendered. Mr. Aung has suggested "perceptual and conceptual worlds." [4] *Sankhārā.*

to pains of purgatory. Only excellent modes of rebirth await him. When anyone has won the second great Nibbāna, there is thenceforth for him no further rebirth in any sphere of sense-desire. Winning the loftier way, he will either complete existence as so reborn, or he will by exercising jhāna attain the higher Brahma world. But when anyone has won the third great Nibbāna, there is for him no more coming to be. In that very life he will complete existence.

Here it may be objected as follows: If, as you say, there is for such an one no more coming to be, there is no more fivefold set of aggregates. Therefore there is no more aggregate of feeling. Therefore, in that Nibbāna, there is nothing that can be felt. Therefore, in that Nibbāna, there is no bliss whatsoever, nothing to be enjoyed, nothing desirable, nothing to be glad or to rejoice about, nothing to delight in, nothing wished for, lovely, goodly, nothing to love or be happy over. Like bare, void space, it amounts to something empty, vacuous, inane, and worthless. And men and gods who are established in good fortunes, and yet make great efforts to win this Nibbāna, must be considered as doing all they can each to precipitate himself down into this infinite void.

We reply: All those fortunes achieved by gods and men are so much food for craving. They have obtained the name of good fortune just because they are so desired. Those in whom is this sensuous craving reckon, that to be a god or a human being is something lovely and pleasant, and that the fortunes characteristic of the one or the other are delightful. They in whom is craving for heavenly things visible and invisible, reckon the same as holding good of the individuality of a Brahma-angel. They in whom is no sensuous craving reckon, that good fortune as god or man is to be shunned as one would shun a mighty jungle possessed by wild beasts and demons. They reckon that life as god or man is repulsive as a mass of divers corruptions (*kilesa*) or carrion. In those forms of life they desire no rebirth; they only desire the absence of rebirth.

And they, so desiring, reckon those fortunes as void, inane, worthless, and full of dread and danger. Now it is just this absence of rebirth among devas or among men that is the second great Nibbāna.

This point of view applies also in the third great Nibbāna. They who crave[1] for the heavens of things visible and invisible reckon that the extreme longevity of a Brahma-angel *is* an eternal great Nibbāna—deathless, griefless, free from all sorrow. In their eyes the divine fortunes of long life, beauty, bliss, prosperity, attendant hosts are so much food for their craving. They in whom is no craving for the heavens of things visible and invisible, reckon those good fortunes as comparable to the properties for dramatic festivals, performances of dancing, singing, and reciting, to the materials for the sports of the young and foolish, to the stock-in-trade of the confirmed toper.[2] They reckon that such individuality is really no better than that of those performers, those young fools, those confirmed topers. But why? Because all is the outcome of the lower nature (*kilesa*). For all those things that thrill and excite, disturb and shake body and mind, in god or man, flow from the lower nature. Hence it comes that they wish not for any rebirth, but only for the absence of rebirth. And just this absence of rebirth in their case is the third great Nibbāna.

10.

Of Consciousness and Cognition.[3]

The terms consciousness (*citta*), mind (*mano*), intelligence (*viññāṇa*), cognition (*mānasa*),[4] denote divers modes of knowing, but they are one in meaning. We know colour (or the visible) by seeing, sound by hearing, odour by smelling, taste by tasting, the tangible by touching, this or that

[1] Read for *natthi*, *atthi*. [2] *Yam.*, II., p. 257. [3] *Ibid.*, II., p. 264.

[4] These are not to be considered as mutually coincident, but simply to represent in both languages the most *general* terms for mental activity.—Tr.

object of thought (*dhamma*) by the mode of "minding" (*man-ana*). As the books say [further]: we know by the modes of "adverting" to impressions, receiving, inquiring, determining, apperceiving, retention, obscure ideation. Again, we know blue-green (*nīla*) as blue-green, and so on; we know the real as real, or as otherwise, and the unreal as such, or as otherwise; we know the desirable or the undesirable as such, or as otherwise.

Now knowing is of three kinds: we know as being conscious (*vi-jānana*), we know as perceiving (*sañ-jānana*), we know as understanding (*pa-jānana*). Of these the first has just been set out in detail. Perceiving is more distinctive or clearer knowing. It includes the knowing which does not forget, even after a lapse of time [and whether the object is clear or obscure].[1] Understanding is knowing adequately —*i.e.*, by way of class and species [and knowing these distinctly in every detail.—S. Z. A.]. It is knowing everything knowable about anything. Even as to any knowable thing there is much to be known—*e.g.*, about its nature, its conditions, its correlations, its effects, its defects, its merits, its impermanence, the ills connected with it. By "understanding" is meant an exhaustive[2] knowledge of all this, for it is said: "The limit of knowledge is the knowable; the limit of the knowable is knowledge."[3] This is said touching omniscience, and it is to be understood as referring to the seven books of the Abhidhamma, more especially the seventh, the great book of the Paṭṭhāna.

But in the [relative degree of] knowledge in a learner, wherever, by knowing, victory is attained over natural vice or infirmity (*kilesa*), there the knowing is understanding. Now this is treated of in the Abhidhamma, namely, in the "Suttanta Selections" of the Vibhanga, and [in general] in the five Suttanta-Nikāyas.

[1] Mr. Aung, who has been in collaboration with the author, writes: "Insert before *kālantare pi*, '*yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ bhūtaṃ vā hotu, abhūtaṃ vā, taṃ . . .*'" and adds: "With Leibniz a notion was obscure when it did not enable us to recognize a thing, but with Ledi Sadaw a notion may be clear, even though the object may be obscure."

[2] *Yam.*, II., p. 265.

[3] No reference is given.

In the case of the great majority wherever, by knowing, the harmful is got rid of and the good is induced, there also the knowing is understanding.

Omniscient knowledge may be illustrated by the chapter in the Paṭisambhidā-magga, containing an exposition of unobstructed knowledge.[1] The knowledge of the learner may be illustrated by the chapter on the exposition of terms.[2] The knowledge of the great majority may be illustrated by various knowledges in work, arts, and science, in gain, and loss, and method, in right views as to the effect of individual acts, and in the ten bases given in the section on knowledge in the Vibhanga.[3]

In the phrase above:—"right views as to the effect of individual acts," action (*karma*) is twofold — namely, past action and present action. Past action is concerned with good and bad acts done by individuals in past lives, whereby they have acquired happy or unhappy rebirth in this or that sphere of individuals. This is illustrated in the Subha-Sutta of the Dīgha-Nikāya,[4] and in the Lesser and the Great Kamma-vibhanga-Suttas of the Majjhima-Nikāya.[5] Present action refers to what is done in the life now being lived by any given individual in this or that sphere: acts of kings, merchants, labourers, recluses and Brahmins, robbers, hunters, fishermen, animals. And this is illustrated in the Vāseṭṭha-Sutta of the Sutta-Nipāta.[6]

Here we see those individuals, who have obtained rebirth in one sphere of life or another, effecting through that rebirth the individual form and features,[7] as well as the common[8] pleasures and pains yielded by their past actions, even as we say that the offspring of mother[9] and father become from their birth heirs of such property in land, sites,[9] money,

[1] *Anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa. Op. cit.*, i., p. 131 (I., 55, § 1).

[2] *Ibid.*, i., 1 ff. Presumably a certain part or all of the preceding catechism in the same Ñāṇakathā.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 306 ff. [4] *D.*, i., X. [5] *M.*, III., Nos. 135, 136.

[6] III., No. 9. [7] Read *vaṇṇasaṇṭhānāni.*

[8] Read *sādhāraṇa-*. [9] *Yam.*, II., p. 266.

and corn as belongs to those parents. Such attainments are said to be given through past actions. But pleasures and pains, due to actions of whatsoever class done in the present lifetime, are said to be yielded by present actions.

Now let us suppose that a man builds a house for a citizen. On the completion of the work the citizen, as owner of the house, pays the builder a hundred kahāpaṇas. If the builder were asked from what source he got the money, he could answer either "from the owner" or "from my handiwork." Most people would give the first answer. The second would be the more intelligent reply. For the citizen pays only for the making of his house; had it not been made, he would not have paid. But the work of the builder's hands will entitle him to that money as long as he lives. Hence we may say both that the money is the builder's property, and the handicraft is the builder's property. The former is the more general statement; the latter is that of the more thoughtful. For money is external wealth and, like all temporal property, is exposed to risk of fire, and so on. But work is personal wealth, stable, and not exposed to risk by fire, etc. The thoughtful hold external wealth in low esteem, but personal wealth, the wealth of energy and understanding, they esteem highly.

In this way are our past actions to be considered. This is the import of what is summed up in the text: "All beings own their deeds."[1]

The foregoing shows the distinction between the three modes of knowing: being aware, perceiving, understanding. But what is the object in treating of consciousness (*citta*) as awareness, by the Yamaka method? That object is more especially the elimination of the Eternalist or Perdurance theory, which is based on mind (*citta*).

Mind, I repeat, is the peculiar basis of the error of permanence, and its special soil. For it is said in the Brahmajāla-Sutta of the Dīgha-Nikāya[2]: "In this case some recluse or Brahmin is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusions of his own,

[1] *M.*, III. 203; *A.*, v. 288. [2] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 34.

beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry. This self, which is [connected with] eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin, is impermanent, not perduring, liable to change. But that self [or soul], which is called consciousness, or mind, or intelligence, is permanent, stable, perduring, not liable to change, and it will remain for ever and ever." Those who hold this opinion discern the dissolution of the material body at death under present conditions, but they do not discern the dissolution of mind. And very many are of opinion that, at the dissolution of the body, the mind regarded as self enters upon another birth, and so entering, in that state of being a new body comes to be, allied to which that self endures for a lifetime in that state. Now it is just to reject that perdurance view concerning mind [or consciousness], that such a chapter as that on Citta in the Yamaka is taught, showing the uprising and ceasing of mind [or consciousness] from moment to moment.

As it is, the material organism, visibly dissolved here on earth, goes to no subsequent sphere of [animate] becoming. And it has been said that the mental constituents are dissolved here on earth as well. That being so, does it not amount to saying that a given person, by this dissolution, this annihilation here on earth, does not transmigrate to a subsequent rebirth? It does not.

[Let us distinguish.] The terms "material group," "mental group,"[1] belong to the vocabulary of ultimate truth. "This person," "that person," belong to the terms of conventional truth. From the standpoint of conventional truth, it is the custom, the customary truth to say that, under present conditions, "this or that person goes hence to another place," and "comes hither from another place." From the standpoint of ultimate truth it is accepted as true to say that, of the material group in this or that person, nothing material, and of the mental group, nothing mental passes on from one place to another. Wherever they are, there they just dissolve.

In like manner, from the standpoint of conventional

[1] Read *nāmakāyo*.

truth, it is the custom, the customary truth to say that "this or that person transmigrates, runs on, travels on from one state of becoming to another." But from the standpoint of ultimate truth it is accepted as true to say that of the material group, in this or that person, nothing material, and of the mental group, nothing mental transmigrates from one place to a succeeding place. Wherever it is, there it just dissolves.[1] . . .

Again, just as, when loads of sand are brought and a long road is made, it is conventionally true to say, "This road 'goes' as far as such and such villages," it is no less true, considering the sand itself, to say, "Not a single grain of it 'goes' the length of a finger in any direction; each remains where it is placed." So, too, in our present argument, difference in usage is to be understood[2] by difference in the standard of truth.

Because we have stated that mind and body do not transmigrate from one life to the next, we must not therefore be supposed to say that "this person" or "that person" is annihilated. [Again] if we state that "this or that person" transmigrates from one life to the next, we must not be supposed to say that a "perduring mind and body" transmigrates from one life to the next. To hold the belief that mind-and-body is an ego, a living principle, an entity, a soul, and say that entity is annihilated, is the theory of nihilism (annihilationism). To hold that belief and say that the entity is eternal, is the theory of eternalism (perdurance).

We may illustrate this by a river. If we stand on the river's bank and say, "This river has been here for a hundred or a thousand years," we should be speaking correctly of it as a river. If we should say, "This volume of water does not stay here for a single day, but flows to ever lower levels, we should be speaking of it as water. Even so, in our present argument, difference in usage must be understood by difference in the standard of truth.

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 268. For *sijjhatīti* read *bhijjatīti*.

[2] *Paccetabbaṃ* really means "is to be believed." It is a matter of trust; *veditabbaṃ* is a matter of *ñāṇa* (S. Z. Aung).

But how are we to understand the momentary arising and ceasing of mind?

Let this be thus answered: There are six kinds of consciousness—to wit, the five special senses and the co-ordinating sense [,sensus communis, which we call] *mano*. Now consciousness arising in or through the eye is visual consciousness, since it arises[1] solely in the eye and not elsewhere, and there ceases. And of this seeing, beholding, regarding, observing, looking over, looking about, if anyone say, "It is *I* who see a visible object," he calls visual cognition his "self." On the other hand, if anyone say of visual consciousness, "It is a mental phenomenon, an element, a sphere of sense, it is not 'mine,' it is not 'I,' it is not my 'self,'" he calls visual consciousness not-self.

So for the other senses. The sense of touch is consciousness arising through the body. By "body" we mean the whole sensitive surface. The body is divided [in our scriptures] under thirty-two heads. Wherever in those thirty-two parts there is sentient capacity, the whole of that sentient surface is meant. How is this capacity to be known? Where it exists we know it if, for example, the part is pricked by the point of a needle or a thorn. If the sentient capacity is there, a feeling of pain manifests itself. From sole of foot to crown of head, from skin without even to the marrow within, wherever there is a surface having sentient capacity, there cognition of touch arises. When, for instance, the foot is placed on a very hot surface of soil, rock, or sand, a feeling of pain in the entire sole of the foot is manifested. "My foot is scorched!" is the cry. At the same time throughout the sole of the foot the four mental aggregates are manifested. Several hundred thousand painful touch-consciousnesses are manifested at one stroke: all this makes up the aggregate of cognition called *viññāṇa*. Together with this many hundred thousand sensations of pain are manifested: this is the aggregate of feeling. Accompanied by these many hundred thousand perceptions arise: this is the aggregate

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 269.

of perception. Accompanied by these, numberless [mental] contacts arise, volitions, individualizings, psychic vitalities, attendings: all this is the aggregate of miscellaneous reactions called *sankhāra's.* [So that] at this minute the four mental aggregates are manifested with respect to the whole sole of the foot.

Herein *consciousness* (*viññāṇa*) is just the specific awareness of the material quality (*rūpa*) called heat. Nor is there only just this awareness; there is also, through that material quality, a touching, an impressing, a colliding with the sensitive skin (*kāyo*): this is *contact.*[1] Given the contact, an act of disagreeable feeling is manifested: this is *feeling* (*vedanā*).[2] Given the contact and feeling, an act of perceiving[3] is manifested, by which it is recognized afterwards that "then such an experience befel me": this is the aggregate of *perception.* Given contact, feeling, and perception, there is the co-operation of [other] mental factors in the perception of the object, urging, as it were, again and again to unity with respect to the object, viz.: *volition* (*cetanā*); concentrating and steadying mind on the subject, viz.: *individualizing.*[4] Besides these, whereas the consciousness of objects ceases again and again, yet through the continuous preservation by "life," the mental continuity is not interrupted, but is continued till death—nay, till the final Nibbāna, or Parinibbāna with no residual stuff of life, is reached. This is called *psychic life.*[5] The repeated application [of mind] to the

[1] *I.e.*, mental contact (S. Z. Aung).

[2] Sensation: awareness of the animal organism as disagreeably affected by heat (S. Z. Aung).

[3] Or "remarking" (S. Z. Aung).

[4] *Ekaggatā.*

[5] The following sentence, giving the seventh in the "eight modes of consciousness," was inadverently omitted from the author's MS. by his Burmese copyist, and was therefore not included in the P.T.S. text: "Ārammaṇe punappunaṃ niruddhe pi citte, yena jīvitena anupāliyamānattā taṃ cittasantānaṃ na chijjati; yāva maraṇakālā yāva anupādisesaparinibbānā eva vā pavatti yeva: idaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ nāma S. Z. Aung; *cf. Compendium*, p. 12).

object, without letting it go, notwithstanding the repeated cessations in the mental continuum is called *attention*.

These eight phenomena: consciousness and conscious factors, are manifested in the sentient parts of the sole of the foot. As long as the heat is not abated, so long do the mental aggregates [named above] continue to manifest themselves in the dermis, epidermis, and flesh of the foot. But when the heat is abated, and the foot is grown cool, then they are felt to cease, to expire, to pass away, to break off. Then only does the impermanence of the aggregate of consciousness (*viññāṇa*), then only does the impermanence of the aggregates of feeling, perception, and miscellaneous activities become apparent.

The mental aggregates do not concern themselves with the sole of the foot only. In the interval between any two such acts of localization of consciousness there arises a series of representative cognition within the heart, as i there were no break at all. Besides, on account of the feeling of pain, manifold bodily movements, often accompanied by speech, take place, among which processes of visual and auditory consciousness intervene. All these processes, bounded by subconscious states,[1] proceed without interfusion. For in any one person no two conscious states proceed quite simultaneously. We cannot think of two things at one and the same instant. It is only through the exceeding rapidity of mental procedure that the processes of thought involved in seeing, hearing, etc., seem to be going on simultaneously.

Such is the procedure, by way of arising and ceasing, of the four mental aggregates with respect to a sensitive surface like the sole of the foot, or in any other part of the body. There are various ways[2] in which the head may suffer. Such sufferings are also just those four aggregates, together with pain; the arising and ceasing of the head complaints is just the arising and ceasing of those four aggregates. And this is true for illnesses in the particular organs in the head. Throughout the body [or sensitive

[1] *Bhavangāni.* [2] *Yam.* II., p. 271.

surface] procedure is by way of arising and ceasing of four aggregates with accompanying disease.

Similarly, when the feeling is pleasant—as when a man journeying along a road in summer at noontide beneath the sun's rays, reaches a pool of cold water in the midst of a wood, and plunges his heated body in it—then there is a cessation throughout his sensitive surface of the four aggregates, with the accompanying pain created by the heat, and there is an arising of four aggregates accompanied by pleasure. The reverse happens when he once more sets out.

Throughout the world sentient procedure should be considered in this way, namely, with reference to the arising and ceasing of four mental aggregates, accompanied by pain or by pleasure.[1]

Again, where kings, or gods, or others pursue the pleasures of sense-desires, and the four aggregates arise as the result of contact with the body's sentient surfaces, they, accumulating for such ends possessions in wives, houses, wealth, and grain, undergo manifold ills. For the aggregates, born of physical contact and accompanied by the charms of sense, cease even while those pleasures are being enjoyed. And from that moment[2] those persons become distressed in body. The four aggregates are manifested with the accompaniment of suffering. And the arising and ceasing of the four aggregates, as accompanied by pleasure, becomes apparent. Thus may be explained the cessation of the sense of touch.

By "representative cognition" (above, p. 149), is meant all consciousness arising in mind—literally at the mind-door—considered apart from the organs of the special senses. Now such consciousness is bad, is good, is indeterminate. When bad, it is accompanied by one of the three radical conditions: appetite, hate, dulness. Where there is appetite, there may be also joy or indifference accom-

[1] Or by an alternation of both, as in the act of fanning oneself (S. Z. Aung).

[2] Read *tay-khaṇe*.

panying it; there is some object of sense, visible or audible, etc. Such an object, if visible, is of some colour: blue-green, such as a cloud, a hill,[1] a forest, a tree, and so on in detail. Similarly, the business of stealing[2] and of inchastity is accompanied by appetite.

Now bad, good, indeterminate, are mutually exclusive. If in anyone person bad consciousness is working, its opposite cannot arise unless, and until, the former consciousness ceases. The reverse case is equally true. Two moments of consciousness, one good, one bad, do not arise simultaneously.

Here it may be objected: "Mind (*citta*) is one and the same in each individual, permanent, persisting, stable. Now, when it is accompanied by appetite, hate, or dulness, it is bad; when it is accompanied by disinterestedness, love, or knowledge, it is good. Similarly, when this mind thinks evil, it is then bad; when it thinks righteously, then it is good.

Let us ask the objector: "That thinking which is accompanied by appetite, and that thinking which is accompanied by hate, is it one and the same thinking, or different?" If he is intelligent, he will answer: "Not one and the same, but different. One who is indulging in appetite shows adaptability, one who is giving way to hate shows aversion, and these two dispositions can never fuse." Hence it is settled by his reply, that thinking accompanied by appetite is a different mode [of thought] from thinking accompanied by hate. And this may be verified by every-day experience. When we see a person enamoured of anything, we know he is not hostile to it, and *vice versa*. Even certain animals can form similar judgments.

Hence, in the first place, if one kind of bad thinking does not fuse with another kind of bad thinking, whence, indeed, should good merge into bad, or bad into good thinking? And therefore it cannot be maintained that "the mind of any one person is one and the same, imper-

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 272.

[2] Read *adinnādānakiccaṃ*. The initial letter is not in the original MS., but the context requires it.

manent, etc. . . . and that when it thinks righteously, it is then a good mind."

He might rejoin: "It is true that dislike can nowise fuse with liking, for liking [involves] appetite, and dislike, enmity. These affections (*dhammā*) cannot go on simultaneously; how then should they attain unity? And the modes of thinking associated with each are mutually hostile; how then should there be fusion? But [it remains that] both these affections are modes of the selfsame mind, which expresses now liking, now dislike."

We in reply would ask: "Are mind and thinking (*a*) both one and the same,[1] or (*b*) diverse?"

If he answer: "One and the same," then two modes of thinking amount to two minds.

If he reply: "Diverse," then mind is just mind, and is not a mode of thinking. Mind is then one thing, a mode of thinking is another, and so the three modes of mind in operation—genesis, decline, death—are different from mind itself. And if genesis—that is, birth—be one distinct thing, decline another, death another, then thinking, as a mental factor, is a different thing from mind. That being so, what are we to call this "mental factor"?[2]

Then he will say: "Just as birth [of consciousness] is one thing, and decay and dying each another, so, too, is thinking a thing considered as a mental factor, called by that name."

If that is so, the mental factor "contact" would possess the act of touching; "feeling" (*vedanā*) would possess feeling (*vedayitākāro*)[3]; perception would possess perceiving,

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 273.

[2] Mr. Aung writes: "On this Ledi Sadaw wrote to me as follows: 'If mind (*citta*) and thinking (*cintanakriyā*) be essentially different, there remains the question whether the latter is a mere name (*paññatti*) or an ultimate (*paramattha-dhamma*). If a name, there is no necessity to differentiate it from mind, for a name is not a [real] thing. But the comparison here drawn between thinking and birth-decay-death is just to show that thinking is no less a *paramattha-dhamma* than the other, and not a mere *paññatti*.'"

[3] Analogous to mind and thinking, feeling would be "a faculty," having the property of feeling.

etc. Again, the extended and other elements would possess hardness, and so on; Nibbāna would appear to possess peace. All these actions, or conditions, would have to be regarded as things apart or distinct from those mentioned. And mind would possess several modes of thinking. Of these modes that of seeing, for example, would be a thing apart or distinct from the visually conscious mind, hearing would be a thing apart or distinct from the auditorily conscious mind. And so, too, we might speak of many modes of a mode.[1]

Now (*a*) in the view of "one and the same"—namely, that the mind of an individual is one, permanent, persisting, stable; and that it may be said of mind and the mode "thinking" they are both one—the perduring mind is called the self, the essence (or substrate, *sāro*) of the mode "thinking." And for one who holds this view, all modes of mind—seeing, hearing, etc.—should be just as permanent, perduring, stable, as mind itself. That being so, we should be permanently seeing a given sight, hearing a given sound, smelling some odour, tasting some sapid, touching something tangible.

The objector might rejoin: "When an object of consciousness comes into the avenue[2] of sight then it is seen; when it does not so come it is not seen." That being so, seeing is obviously an impermanent mode. And the mode "seeing" being impermanent, mind itself is obviously impermanent. "We see," "We don't see," are affirmations of common experience. Hence, if we say "Mind is permanent," our statement conflicts with the varying statements of experience as to seeing and not seeing made by ordinary people.

Or (*b*),[3] in the view "diverse" (*i.e.*, that mind and thinking are diverse), we reply thus: The objector says

[1] *Cf.* the phrase: "I know I feel; I know that I know that I feel" (S. Z. Aung).

[2] Read for *ābādhaŋ*, *āpāthaŋ* or *āpādhaŋ*. The author's MS. has *āphādhaŋ*.

[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 274.

that mind is permanent, perduring, stable. We ask: "Is that consciousness of touch,[1] accompanied by pain, in the sole of the foot [as described above], permanent?" "Yes," does he say? "In what place does that consciousness[2] permanently abide?" He says: "That consciousness[2] abides permanently in the heart. For it—*i.e.* mind[2]—abides there permanently from the time of birth. When in the special organs and limbs an object of sense comes into the avenue of consciousness, then mind, issuing from the cavity of the heart, becomes localized at the given organ, and cognizes the object presented thereat. Contact and other mental factors arise just there. And when the object [of consciousness] ceases, mind itself, not ceasing, returns to its abode in the cavity of the heart."

To this we may reply as follows: "Throughout the world diseases arise in eye, in ear, and are evident. Several diseases pertain to the head; they arise there, and there they are healed—so we think and say. So for diseases in the limbs. It is thus that we localize them.

"Now, what we call 'disease' is a certain pathological state of corporeal qualities *plus* certain geneses of the four mental aggregates accompanied by pain. Your view [that mind is permanent] is in conflict with these, our common experiences and customary judgments."

The objector may rejoin: "Notions and conventional phrases are current in the world,[3] but knowledge is the only standard and criterion here."

We reply: You say "knowledge." But knowledge is twofold—inferential and intuitive.[4] When ordinary persons are investigating abstruse, subtle, recondite matters, their knowledge is inferential. When they attain to intuition in such matters they have trained the mind, trained their understanding, and so have reached to intuition. Their knowledge being intuitive—that is to say, they having discarded the notion "person," "being," "self,"

[1] *Kāyaviññāṇa-cittaṃ.*
[2] *Cittaṃ.*
[3] Read *pavattanti.*
[4] *Anumāna-, paṭivedha-ñāṇaṃ.*

"living thing"—they cognize under the aspect of the purely phenomenal, of the purely elemental.

"Now[1] mind, mental factors, material quality, Nibbāna,[2] are just such abstruse, subtle, recondite matters. For the untrained, who are without training of mind and understanding, and who are unable to suspend even for a moment the notion of 'person,' 'being,' 'self' [soul], 'living thing,' the real nature of these phenomena are beyond the average range of their ken. But these matters are within the range of the intelligence which knows by way of intuition. For those whose knowledge has been abundantly trained in the doctrines of the intuitively wise Ariyan philosophers, even their inferential knowledge may be said to partake of the nature of intuitive knowledge, since it invariably leads to the latter kind. By persistent cultivation that inferential knowledge is changed into intuitive knowledge. With others, inferential knowledge ever follows after the 'person,' the 'entity.' Such people may freely talk about philosophical subjects, but their knowledge is running along person-cum-entity lines. It is [to shift the metaphor] like dry grass and leaves flung into deep water.

"But when by you, O objector, it is said, 'Knowledge is the sole standard and criterion here,' do you know your own knowledge as thus described?"

For they whose knowledge has not penetrated the fact of the arising and ceasing of material qualities, are blind to that arising and ceasing; they only see a continuous and a static condition in those phenomena. They consider their own mind as a permanent something. They conceive the selfsame mind moving about here and there within the body. The selfsame mind in the morning, the selfsame mind at noon, and at eventide the selfsame mind. "I with this selfsame mind go, stand, sit, lie, contract, expand," is what they grasp. What they neither know nor see is conditioned genesis of mind [*citta*].

What is conditioned genesis of mind [or consciousness]? It is written: "Because of eye and visual objects conscious-

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 275. [2] *Cf. Compendium*, § 1, p. 81

ness—that is, visual consciousness—arises. Because of ear and sounds consciousness, auditory consciousness arises." Analogously, olfactory, and sapid consciousness arises. And because of "body" and tangibles, consciousness[1]—that is, touch-consciousness—arises. [Finally], because of "mind" [*mano*] and cognoscibles, consciousness—that is, representative consciousness—arises. This is conditioned genesis of mind. . . .

Here we have (*a*) a *specific* consciousness, visual, etc. (*b*) The fact of its now arising without having previously arisen. This (*a*) *e.g.*, sight (*b*) arises. Because of what? Because of eye and visible object. In other words, the sense of sight arises from the [conjunction of] sensitive surface [retina] in the two eye-organs, and from colours existing in objects without, such as woman, man, house, carriage, cart, earth, mountain, tree, etc.

By "because of"[2] is meant that neither man nor god, neither Brahmā nor lord of the world, is able by any method or magic whatever, to cause *that* consciousness without the eye and the visible object, or colour. But when the colour-images are conjoined with the eye, none of them, again, is able to prevent that consciousness from arising. And this is because it naturally and truly exists in relation to the eye and the visible object, depending upon both of them.

(1) *Eye Consciousness.*—This is so called because it arises in dependence on the base [the visual organ] of sight, and is therefore called visual [or eye] consciousness. It means the knowing by the eye, this being called "the governor,"[3] because of the relation of control.[4] And this knowing is nothing more than the act of seeing.

When objects are reflected in a clear mirror or water, there is no act of seeing objects by mirror or water. Hence we know that they are not alive, are not persons. Not thus is it with the eye. When objects are reflected in the eye itself, there is an act of seeing them by the eye. So that we say: "My eye sees a sight, sees moon, sun, etc."

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 276.
[2] Read *Paticcāti taŋ . . .*
[3] Read *sāmībhūtassa.*
[4] *Indriyapaccayattā.*

Hence we know that, in this world, the eye is associated with life and belongs to the domain of animated beings.

But though there is a general agreement that visual cognition is due to the eye's distinguishing, there is no general discernment of this, that a given act of such cognition is a single phenomenon. In philosophy, however, it is precisely this that constitutes the distinction: a particular [or single] phenomenon has arisen in dependence on the ocular basis. So also for the next three special senses (2-4).

(5) *Body Consciousness* is consciousness of touch. Here, again, if a log of wood or lump of clay be exposed to fire, there is[1] no act of consciousness; hence we know they are not alive, are not "persons." Not thus is it with the sensitive surfaces of living beings. If any part of those surfaces be touched by fire, there is an act of consciousness, which amounts to saying: "My hands, my feet, my back, etc., *know* contact." Hence we know that the whole body is associated with life, that is, belongs to the domain of animated things.

But we fail to grasp that which is the distinctive attitude of philosophy, namely, that the bodily sensations we feel are, as in the case of sight, each a particular [a single] phenomenon.

In (6) *representative consciousness*[2] mind (*mano*) is mere mentation, just knowing considered apart from seeing and other occasions of sense. It consists of various cognitive acts of the normal mind, or what is called, "mind-door." This is less patent [than sense] to observation, and constitutes part of the organic, subconscious life-continuum (*bhavanga*). These cognitive acts are divided into classes, such as good, bad, undetermined representative cognitions. And we are commonly aware that this inner (*mano-*) consciousness is the fundamental vital factor of a person as such. We deem that "my mind" can think everything thinkable, know everything knowable. We judge that it sets going all bodily and vocal action.

Now herein it is not a customary figure of speech to say:

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 277. [2] *Manoviññāṇay.*

"My mind thinks, knows, sets going." By the majority the doer and the deed are held distinct. The doer of this or that deed is called an "agent." An act is "something done by an agent." A man walking is called an "agent." His walking is called an "action." It is judged that doer and deed, agent and act, are two different things. And by the doer of the deed we mean a self, a living thing, a person, an agent, a sentient being, a master, a possessor, a ruler, a subject,[1] a free agent. Under these names the doer does this or that action—nay, any number of actions: walking, standing, sitting, cooking, partaking, business, experiencing consequences, being born, growing old, dying, moving on at death,[2] being reborn, entering on one life after another. All these phrases belong to the standpoint of conventional truth.[3]

But in philosophy (Abhidhamma), from the standpoint of ultimate truth, there is no difference between act and agent. The mode "thinking" is the act "thinking." The mind (*citta*), or thinking agent, is not different from the act "thinking."[4] The objector's distinction—"mind and the mental mode of thinking are diverse"—is out of place in the sphere of philosophy. So, too, there is no agent of contact apart from the act "contact," and so on for the other mental factors.[5]

Even the four categories of ultimates—consciousness (or mind, *citta*), mental factors, material qualities, Nibbāna—are only acts.[6] Consciousness—namely, which is the act of thinking [*i.e.*, mentation]—is one ultimate phenomenon. And to this category belong all functions of mentation or knowing, as well as all sense-functioning. [Again] contact, or the act of impingeing upon, is one ultimate phenomenon. To this category belong the facts of collision, coinciding in impact, etc. The genesis of

[1] Literally, resident, but so S. Z. Aung prefers.

[2] *Cavati*, which I usually render literally by *deceasing*, is, Mr. Aung writes, translated into Burmese by "to move," "to change."

[3] *Cf.* above, p. 129.

[4] I have suppressed the appositional "of," because of the ambiguity in such phrases.

[5] *Cf.* above, p. 148.

[6] *Kiriyā-mattā-eva.*

consciousness belongs to the category of birth, which is also one ultimate phenomenon, as do also all facts of inception, production, origination, propagation, or continued serial genesis. Analogous are mental decay and mental death, belonging respectively to the categories of the ultimate phenomenon of decay and of that of death.

Now the act "thinking"[1] is distinguishable into various acts—seeing, etc. An act of seeing is one mind or consciousness (*citta*), called visual consciousness, and so on. An act of seeing may also be distinguished according to object, direction, position, basis (or seat), duration. Seeing any one colour—blue-green, yellow—is a mind or consciousness. "Blue-green as different" is a thinking-mode; "yellow as different" is a thinking-mode. The two colour-consciousnesses do not arise as one and the same; they are effected severally. Moreover, in the seeing of any one colour there is variation in direction, locality, position, and seat [of the colour]. "Blue-green seen in the east" differs from "blue-green seen in the west." Again [as to time or occasion], we see a given colour only when the eyelids are raised, not when they are lowered. If the seeing act happens, we see; if not, we do not. Thus, even with respect to one bodily posture only, acts of seeing are effected differently.[2] All these are just so many consciousnesses; and so for the other senses.

To[3] sum up: The many thousand manifold modes, or ways of action which appear in our subjective continua and in the external world-continua—all those modes of activity of which we can say, "This is one," "That is one"—are shown to be variously determined. This is true, whether the determinations are new as now manifesting themselves, or whether they are old as being vanished experiences. Just as that flowing river or burning flame appears to those who contemplate[4] it as a mode of motion, not as

[1] *Cintana*, as above, so here, is simply "being conscious of."

[2] Mr. Aung for *paccakkhato* suggests *paccekato*, but the former is according to the author's MS.

[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 279.

[4] Read *nijjhāyantānaṃ*.

static, and the motion itself consists in a continuous process of vanishing[1] past acts and of manifested fresh acts, so all these determinations into various "acts" are only series of distinct phenomena, mental and bodily, made manifest by way of arising and ceasing. And whenever the various modes of cognition and other [forms of consciousness] are produced as freshly emerging acts, through such and such a causal relation, they arise, all of them, as something which had not previously arisen. Not one of them has previously existed in that given person's experience. That they persist in a certain mental *locus* and come hither from thence is not true. Where they arise there they cease. They do not go hence to a certain mental *locus*.[2]

It has now been declared what is both the causal genesis of consciousness or of other organic phenomena, and what is the causally conditioned nature of them. As it is written: "What is causal genesis? Because of eye and visible objects, etc.[3] This is the causal genesis of consciousness."

By "eye" here is meant a certain personal material quality, a part of our personal organism. "Visible objects" are external material qualities of colour. These exist both in the organism and without. Hence, to distinguish external material qualities of colour from those of the organism they are called external. Being external, they may yet be within the range of vision, like the moon's orb, etc. And with respect to these, wherever any of them obtain the condition of being lit up, as by the sun,[4] a lamp, etc., then because of this a new visual consciousness arises. This is the causal arising or conditioned genesis of visual consciousness. So for other modes of consciousness.

[1] Read *-dhānena hotīti*.

[2] *Nāmaṭṭhāna*. *Cf.* the *boîte à souvenirs* in Professor Bergson's address, Proceedings, Society for Psychical Research, July, 1913.

[3] *Cf. Majjhima*, I., p. 259 ; *Sayy*, II., p. 74, etc.

[4] Read *suriyāloka*, inadvertently divided in the author's MS.

This[1] is the reply to the question we set out to answer: "How are we to understand the momentary arising and ceasing of mind?"[2]

10.

Of "Good, Bad, and Undetermined."

When[3] in Abhidhamma [philosophy], good phenomena (things, states, *kusalā dhammā*) are mentioned, all those "phenomena" which the world holds as "good" are meant. Why are they so called? By the wise of the world a given man is called *kusalo* who (1) is ethically good (*kalyāṇo*), does, says, thinks nothing bad or evil; or who (2) is good in judging his own advantage, or that of others, or that of both; or who (3) is good at a certain kind of work, or at a certain art or craft, or in a certain field of knowledge; or who (4) may be called skilful, clever, learned, wise; or who (5) is free from greed, or hate, or dulness; or who (6), if he be a *deva*, is free from greed or hate,[4] if he be a Brahma-deity, is sublime, if he be a recluse, lives by the Norm. Thus, in ordinary speech, "good" may be applied to distinctive qualities *in the individual.* But in Abhidhamma the existence of the individual, male or other, is not admitted; only phenomena are admitted as existing. Hence, the word *kusala* is there applied only to phenomena, not to individuals, nor persons, nor self, nor souls, nor humans, nor devas, nor Brahmas.

The same argument taken negatively applies to "bad phenomena."

"Undetermined" is that which may not be affirmed, may not be called either good or bad. Things which come to pass as desired are "good"; those which come to pass as undesirable are "bad." Things which come to pass as neither, but which at the moment of coming to pass are merely incidental as factors or in utility, are

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 280.
[2] Above, p. 155.
[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 281.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 282.

called "undetermined."[1] The term includes anything that can be termed morally neither good nor bad. Extended element,[2] for instance, is *a-vyākata*, undetermined. So also are the other three elements; and so also are colour and odour and sapids and sap (*ojā*).

11.

Of Dhamma's.

In ordinary usage everything is considered as unified and called "individual"—person, self, living thing, a human, a god, a man, a woman, head, hand, foot, hair, down, nails, teeth, soil, mountain, tree, branch, house, carriage, cart, vehicle, garment, couch, chair.

In philosophy all things are only phenomena—extended elements, etc., and not individual, not person . . . not couch or chair.

Similarly as to feeling: phenomena associated with pleasurable feeling are unified and called a happy person, a sad person, and so on; but in philosophy there is nothing but phenomena, not individual nor person, etc. Thus must we ever draw the distinction between customary conventional truth and philosophic ultimate truth.

12.

Of Powers or Controlling Functions (indriya).[3]

Indriya is the specific state, the prerogative,[4] of *inda*, a ruler. It means [in our psychology] that which controls subjective or personal phenomena in this way or that so as to bring about some state of mental or bodily factors. The "state" or "prerogative" means that which causes its

[1] Neither Mr. Aung, nor myself, nor a local Sadaw consulted by him, was quite certain as to the sense here. The author was engaged in touring duties when Mr. Aung was revising this section, and letters did not reach him.

[2] *Pathavī.*

[3] *Yam.*, II., p. 283.

[4] Mr. Aung's rendering for *bhāvo.*

possessor to believe "I am the ruler, the lord of seeing, hearing, etc. This is mine; this am I; this is my self"—the state which brings about the belief. So in the term "self-state"—that is, individuality (*attabhāvo*)—the state brings about the belief that all the subjective phenomena of that individuality are of the self.

This state of self is divided into twenty-two principal occasions of control-function, as follows:

The occasions of the five special senses and of mentations (*manana-ṭṭhāna*).

The occasions of the formation—literally, bending or turning (every material quality available from the parents towards the formation)—of sex, male or female.

The[1] occasion of living—viz., duration.

The five different occasions of feeling—positive bodily feeling (two), positive mental feeling (two), neutral feeling.

The five different occasions of the action [of karma]. Karma, or action, includes deed, word, and thought.

The three occasions of the purification of intellectual vision. These are—firstly, the Path of the Stream; lastly, the Fruition of Arahatta; and thirdly, the six intermediate stages.

On the occasion of sight, the eye controls. By it the belief, "I see a sight," springs up. This expression involves also this, that "I am the lord of seeing" (that is to say, there is a conjuncture of the conditions—"Whenever and wherever I wish to see, I see," and "As long as I wish to see, I see") "because the eye is my self and obeys my will." The Ariyans also use such expressions when using conventional terms, but they do not mishandle them. When they say, "I see something," they do not believe that "the eye, the act of sight, is my self."

This applies to all the other functions of control.

[1] *Yam.*, II., p. 284.