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EXPLORING THE *SADDANĪTI*

1. Introduction

Grammars may be considered the absolute fringe of literature. Nevertheless, they go straight to the core of language — the medium in which literature is presented — and reveal a great deal about what those who wrote them thought about their own language, about language in general, and about their literature. Moreover, if a grammar becomes influential it will inevitably affect not only the composition of subsequent literature but also the way in which earlier literature is perceived, in much the same manner that David Lodge must have had in mind when he had one of the characters in his novel *Small World* write a thesis on the influence of T.S. Eliot on Shakespeare.

Devoted to the study of their canon, Theravāda Buddhists produced a number of grammars of the Pāli language. The *Kaccāyanavyākaraṇa* or *Kaccāyanappakarāṇa*, named after its author Kaccāyana about whom we know nothing, was composed in Ceylon some time after Buddhaghosa, who clearly does not know of it, and before its earliest known commentary, the *Mukhamattadīpanī*, written in probably the eleventh century.¹ It is obviously influenced by the Pāṇinian

* First and foremost I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. K.R. Norman who asked me to lecture on the *Saddanīti* during the academic year 1989–90. My sincere thanks are also due to the other two faithful auditors of those lectures, Drs M. Cone and J.D. Smith. The three of them provided extremely valuable criticism, thoughtful suggestions, and indispensable encouragement. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Norman for patiently and generously answering the many queries I have had in the course of writing this essay. Last but not least I gratefully thank Dr J.W. Benson who read through a previous draft and offered valuable comments. The no doubt numerous errors and inaccuracies which still remain are of course my own responsibility, as are the interpretations and views put forward.

¹ K.R. Norman 1983:164.

tradition and by the *Kātantra*.¹ The *Kaccāyana* grammar triggered off a long tradition of commentaries, as well as a series of expanded, revised versions of it such as the *Rūpasiddhi* and the *Bālāvātāra*.

Later another school emerged in Ceylon, a school separate from that of Kaccāyana, through the work of Moggallāna or Moggalāyana who composed his *Moggallānavyākaraṇa* or *Saddalakkhaṇa* during the reign of Parakkamabāhu in Anurādhapura, that is, some time between 1153 and 1186. K.R. Norman (1983:165), referring to G.P. Malalasekara (1928:186), informs us that the colophon of the work says that it was composed after Parakkamabāhu had purged the Saṅgha of all heretical monks, an event which can be dated to 1165. Drawing upon earlier Pāli grammars and the sources built upon by them, the *Moggallānavyākaraṇa* is also heavily influenced by Candragomin.

As a third major work on Pāli grammar we find the *Saddanīti* of Aggavaṃsa. According to M.H. Bode (1909:16), this Burmese monk completed his monumental work in the kingdom of Pagan in the year 1154.² Bode also claims that the work was taken to Ceylon: “A few years after its completion the thera (‘elder’) Uttarājīva left Pagan and crossed the sea to visit the celebrated Mahāvihāra, taking with him a copy of the *Saddanīti*, which was received with enthusiastic admiration, and declared superior to any work of the kind written by Siṅhalese scholars” (*ibid.*:17).³ It may seem surprising that such a celebrated work did not

¹ See R.O. Franke 1902:14–20; Norman 1983:163. L. Renou (1957:129), on the other hand, points out that Kaccāyana’s adherence to the *Kātantra* “n’est pas constante”.

² M.C. Duroiselle (1905:147, note 1) informs us that Forchhammer gives the year as 1156 but claims that Aggavaṃsa himself gives the date as 1154. Recently, Tin Lwin (1991 ?) has questioned this, claiming that “nowhere in the *Saddanīti* is given its dates” and that the introductory *gāthās* are missing in all manuscripts available to us (p. 124). He concludes, somewhat confusingly, that the *Saddanīti* “should be placed towards the end of the reign of Cañsū II (1173–1210) or during the first half of the thirteenth century” (p. 126). Intriguing though it is, this claim would require a more detailed argumentation to be conclusive.

³ Malalasekara (1928:185) gives the *Sāsanavaṃsa* as the source for this, and states (*ibid.*:196): “It was about this time, somewhere about the beginning of

form a separate school and that no Pāli commentary on it is known to us.¹ The only thing that resembles a commentary on it is its Burmese *nissaya*, a translation type of commentary paraphrasing the Pāli text while adding additional information in Burmese.

While no Pāli commentary on the *Saddanīti* exists, at least the text itself was made beautifully accessible to modern scholars through the critical edition of Helmer Smith (1928–30) which he supplemented with two volumes of *tables* (1949–66), comprising lists of texts quoted (*index locorum*), *suttas* (*index aphorismorum*), verbal roots (*index radicum*), various elements of word formation (*index formantum*), the very useful *conspectus terminorum* and *metricorum*, and an index to the whole work (*index verborum*), which, however, he did not complete.² Once again the *Saddanīti* was well received and highly praised, this time by modern scholars. Thus, for example, W. Geiger (1916:37 [§50]): “Eine besondere Stellung in der Wertschätzung der Heimischen Überlieferung nimmt die *Saddanīti* des Aggavaṃsa ein”; B.C. Law (1933:636, note 1): “It is no doubt a standard work on Pāli grammar and philology”; A.K. Warder (1963:383): “The finest and most comprehensive grammar, and standard authority on all questions of grammatical analysis”; K.R. Norman (1983:164): “The greatest of extant Pāli grammars is the *Saddanīti*”. The only dissident voice in this chorus of unanimous praise was that of Franke (1902). It is therefore surprising that the *Saddanīti* has attracted so little attention among modern scholars, in much the same way

Parākrama’s regime in A.D. 1165, that the Elder Uttarājīva left Pagan to visit the celebrated Mahāvihāra, taking with him, as we saw, a copy of Aggavaṃsa’s great work, the Pāli Grammar, *Sadda-nīti*.”

¹ Bode (1909:93) claims that Paññāsāmi, author of the *Sāsanavaṃsa*, “at the request of ‘many of his hearers’ ... wrote a Pali commentary on the first Pali work that had brought honour to Burmese scholarship, the *Saddanīti*”. Nowhere else have I seen any reference to such a commentary and, in fact, I doubt whether such a work ever existed since Paññāsāmi wrote as late as the latter half of the 19th century. It seems rather unlikely that so late a work should have vanished without trace.

² The last part (V:2) was completed by N. Simonsson in 1966 on the basis of notes left behind by Smith.

as it failed to produce any Pāli commentary or to form any separate school of grammar.

To my knowledge the only Western work published on the *Saddanīti* before Smith's edition is that of Franke (1902:45–52) who discussed the author, the character of the work, and its sources. The obvious limitation of Franke's work is that it is based on the *ākhyātakappa* (*pariccheda* 25) alone.¹ Working from notes left behind by the late Helmer Smith, N. Simonsson completed the last index volume of Smith's work in 1966. After that I am aware of only three publications dealing with the *Saddanīti* in more than passing. A.K. Warder (1967:66–68) translated two short passages pertaining to metrical problems, and Y. Ojihara (1971), with a 'note préliminaire' by C. Caillat, compared a chapter of the *Saddanīti* (*kibbidhānakappa*, *pariccheda* 26) with 'données pāninéennes'. Ojihara's work deals mainly in equating *sūtras* or giving text references and contains no discussion of the material. Recently, my attention was drawn to an article by Tin Lwin (1991 ?) which gives a brief, general introduction on the *Saddanīti*, including its date and authorship.² I am aware that extensive work on the *Saddanīti* has been carried out by G. Gren-Eklund in Uppsala. With characteristically profound scholarship she has also taken the trouble of mastering the Burmese *nissaya*, a source I am not able to make use of myself. It is to be hoped that she will publish her work in the near future.

That so little work has been done on the *Saddanīti* is particularly surprising when one considers how important the text is not only for determining the state of Pāli language and scholarship in twelfth century Burma but also for diagnosing the effect it may have had on the transmission of the Pāli canon and the composition of subsequent Pāli literature. At the time of Aggavaṃsa the Aṭṭhakathās were written, but probably not all the Ṭikās, and certainly not the later Ṭikās (the

¹ See Franke 1902:46, note 1. He based his work on a palm leaf Ms. in the India Office Library which contains just this *pariccheda*.

² cf. above, p. 2, note 2.

Navaṭikās) and the Anuṭikās. To my knowledge H. Smith was the first to formulate this point very clearly (1928:VI):

C'est donc dans la conviction que notre pali est une fonction de celui du 12^{me} siècle — et que la connaissance de la philologie birmane et singalaise de ladite époque est indispensable à qui voudra remonter, à travers la recension Buddhaghosa-Dhammapāla, à un pali d'intérêt linguistique —, que j'ai entrepris l'étude de la norme palie enseignée par Aggavaṃsa dans les trois volumes qui forment la *Saddanīti*.¹

This requires the assumption that the text is a reasonably independent work dealing with genuinely existing language from the canon and that the work was influential. This links up with another severe problem pertaining to transmission. Sometimes one traces a quotation to some canonical text only to discover that in our version of the canon it appears in a slightly different form. It is thus often difficult to determine what is a quotation and what is not. By implication this leads on to the problem of determining when Aggavaṃsa adduces examples of genuine Pāli usage and when he constructs examples to fit a particular grammatical phenomenon in Sanskrit. If Pāli grammarians could twist language to suit their rules, a detailed study of their grammars would be important for our studies of Buddhism and its literature.

When I first read Otto Franke's *Geschichte und Kritik der einheimischen Pāli-Grammatik und -Lexicographie* (Franke 1902) my reaction to his treatment of Aggavaṃsa's *Saddanīti* was one of slight irritation. How could he base his evaluation on so small a sample of this monumental work? At the time I had read only bits and pieces of the *Saddanīti*. Now I have read more, and in what follows I am going to do something very similar to what Franke did. I shall examine in detail *pariccheda* 22, the *kāarakappa*, of the third part of the text, the

¹ Quoted also by Caillat 1971:84 and referred to by Norman 1983:6, 165. See also O. v. Hinüber 1978.

Suttamālā. The first part, the *Padamālā*, which presents its material in the form of an elaborate commentary on *bhū sattāyām*, the opening entry of a Pāṇinīya *dhātupāṭha*, deals in considerable detail with the morphology of Pāli. The second, the *Dhātumālā*, is a *dhātupāṭha* in eight *gaṇas* with meaning entries and a commentary with examples of derivatives allegedly attested in the canon. The *Suttamālā* then is a *sūtrapāṭha*, giving its material in the style of Indian grammars, that is, in the form of 1347 short rules, with a commentary, *vṛtti* (*vutti*). This arrangement means that lots of the material is given twice or thrice, a circumstance which does not necessarily imply that the work is three times as good, only that it is extremely bulky. If the sheer volume of the *Saddanīti* is taken into consideration, it goes without saying that I can only deal with a small sample section here. I have chosen a chapter from the *Suttamālā* because this part of the work is more technical and traditional in its presentation and thus lends itself to a more stringent analysis and comparison with other works on Sanskrit and Pāli grammar. I have chosen the section on *kāraṅkas* because of its recognised importance in Pāṇinian grammar.

In pursuing this investigation I want to raise one basic question: What kind of a grammar is the *Saddanīti*? Is it a good grammar? This immediately triggers the question: What is a good grammar anyway? I am inclined, for example, to consider a grammar a good grammar if it takes into consideration as many facts about a language as possible and treats them in a systematic and economic way. Smith, who edited the text and thus no doubt knew it better than any other Western scholar, refers to ‘la système de la *Saddanīti*’ (1928:VI, note 2). Is there such a system? Smith also calls it ‘un cours complet de Palie’ (1928:VI). Is it? Or is it an open-ended treatment of linguistic facts from the canon in the form of a slavish parroting of Sanskrit grammars and Pāli grammars based upon them so that it basically treats Pāli as Sanskrit? O.H. Pind (1990:217–18) suggests, with reference to an example offered in the *Kaccāyanavutti*, that “we are dealing with a tradition which aimed at illustrating the rules of Pāli, *not merely* by means of Pāli translations of examples taken over directly from Sanskrit grammar, but through genuine canonical

quotations. This tendency reached its peak with Aggavaṃsa, who is claimed, by the author of the *Kaccāyanavaṇṇanā*, to have based his grammar on the Pāli” (my emphasis). Once more, the question here is to what extent they found Pāli quotations to suit their rules or whether they really wrote their grammars on the basis of the Pāli canon. And this leads to the most fundamental question of all: What purpose was the *Saddanīti* meant to serve?

All these questions, moreover, link up with the question of influence, so I will in what follows also try to investigate in detail possible sources for the grammatical statements Aggavaṃsa brings forward. Already Franke (1902:50) pointed out the strong influence of *Kaccāyana* and the fact that Aggavaṃsa made use of “der in Senart’s *Kacc.-Ausg.* mitgedruckte Comm. in seiner ganzen Ausdehnung”.¹ Smith (1928:VI), on the other hand, stresses that the *Padamālā* is a ‘critique assez sévère des préceptes de *Kaccāyana*’. But there can be no doubt that Aggavaṃsa was strongly indebted to *Kaccāyana* in as much as he included all of the *Kaccāyana* rules and most of the *vutti* in the *Suttamālā*. Franke (*ibid.*:51) claims influence also from Moggallāna, but this becomes more than doubtful if the *Saddanīti* was composed in 1154 and Moggallāna wrote after 1165.²

Among Sanskrit sources Franke (*ibid.*:51–52) claims that Aggavaṃsa drew on Pāṇini and the *Kāśikāvṛtti* and that he at least knew the *Kātantra*, or, in Franke’s own words, ‘das *Kātantra* hat Aggav. mindestens gekannt’. But that is not certain if Aggavaṃsa relied heavily on *Kaccāyana* and *Kaccāyana* knew the *Kātantra*. This, again, brings up the difficult question of transmission: In what form did Pāli authors have access to previous works? When they quote a text they sometimes quote

¹ I take this commentary to be a *vṛtti* included by the author himself, in the very same manner as Aggavaṃsa has written a *vṛtti* on his own rules in the *Saddanīti*. Aggavaṃsa considers the *vṛtti* to be by *Kaccāyana* and thus part of the text. This is evident from the fact that he quotes from the *vṛtti* and refers the quotation to *Kaccāyana*, e.g. 699,2 (cf. 2.6.1.11 below).

² See, however, Tin Lwin (1991 ?); p. 2, note 2 above.

it in a form slightly different from the one in which we have it. Were they quoting from memory and making mistakes, were they simply sloppy, or did they have a different text? And in the case of the grammarians quoting from Sanskrit works, did they have access to the texts themselves or to someone around them saying: 'I read that text twenty years ago and seem to remember ...'. The attitude towards other grammarians did not change that much from Buddhaghosa to Aggavaṃsa. They both had *some* knowledge of the works of the Sanskrit grammarians, but not necessarily any systematic or full knowledge. Thus, when C. Caillat (1971:83) points to L. Renou's invitation 'à déterminer exactement comment, et dans quelle mesure, les descriptions anciennes du sanskrit ont été imitées par les docteurs des écoles grammaticales palies et prakrites dans les traités qu'ils ont consacrés au moyen-indien', she raises a complex issue indeed. And important as this task is, I can at present see no solution to the problems involved. But a text should certainly be investigated with these questions in mind.

In the case of the *Saddanīti* we also have to consider the fact that the Burmese were probably familiar with Sanskrit before Pāli came their way. Duroiselle (1905:147, note 1) describes the situation as follows:

On a des raisons de penser que le sanskrit fut connu en Birmanie avant le pâli. Le birman du X^e et du XI^e siècles, alors que le pâli venait tout récemment d'être importé de Thaton à Pagan et n'était connu que de l'élite des moines, ne laisse aucun doute à cet égard: car dans les inscriptions de l'époque se rencontrent des mots clairement dérivés du sanskrit, et non pas seulement des termes techniques, mais des mots qui devaient être déjà d'un usage courant, tels que, par exemple, *prassad*, du skt. *prāsāda*, le pâli étant *pāsāda*; *Sakrā* = skt. *Śakra* (p. *Sakka*). Après son introduction, le pâli fut étudié avec ardeur, et le premier fruit de ces études, un siècle environ après la chute de Thaton, fut le *Saddanīti*, une grammaire du *Tipiṭaka* est la plus compréhensive qui existe. ... Il est donc plausible de supposer

que le sanskrit existait à Pagan dès le XI^e siècle au moins et y était scientifiquement étudié avant le pâli, puisque le premier ouvrage en cette langue écrit en Birmanie se fonde sur la grammaire sanskrite pour expliquer quelques formes pâlies.

What bearing did this have on their knowledge of *vyākaraṇa* and what impact did this have on their analysis of Pāli texts and their composition of grammatical works?

When I carry out this investigation of the *kāraṅkappa* I sincerely hope that my interpretations, conclusions, challenges, and — no doubt — errors, will instigate future work on the *Saddanīti*. Quotations from the text are based upon Smith's edition but I do not follow him slavishly with regard to punctuation and the many typographical devices used by him to indicate how, in his opinion, the text should be read. Apart from the fact that his indications are sometimes unintelligible, this is reading too much into the text, and I do not consider that part of an editor's duties. Any major deviations will of course be pointed out. Moreover, Smith quite often marks something as an untraced quotation. Since he does not indicate whether this is due to his own intuition or whether they are marked as quotations in the Burmese *nissaya*, and because Aggavaṃsa often constructs examples *ad hoc*, I have for the most part not indicated these potential quotations but left that to the judgment of the reader. References are either to page and line or to paragraph number in Smith's edition. Since the *Saddanīti* is difficult to make sense of in many places I have stuck to a very literal style in my translations.

1.1 *kāraka*:

In Pāṇinian grammar the term *kāraka* (lit.: ‘doer; accomplisher’) applies to direct participants in actions.¹ Such participants are assigned to a set of six *kāraka* categories which in Pāṇini’s grammar are defined in the following order:² *apādāna* ‘stable point when there is movement away’, *sampradāna* ‘recipient; indirect goal’,³ *karāṇa* ‘instrument’, *adhikarāṇa* ‘locus’, *karman* ‘object; goal’, and *kartr̥* ‘agent’. Moreover, a subcategory of agent is defined, namely *hetu*, the causal agent. The abstract syntactic level at which *kāra*kas are introduced in the grammar serves to mediate between the levels of semantics and morphology. By this device Pāṇini is able to account for the relationship between possible semantic choices on the side of the speaker and some basic features of Sanskrit syntax and morphology. In practice, the advantage is that at the abstract syntactic level of *kāra*kas these structures can be treated as identical and thus share operations. For example, a passive sentence is in no way derived from an active sentence. Both are simply alternative manifestations of what at the underlying abstract *kāraka* level is represented as the same idea. This means that in the process of derivation the starting point is semantics, semantics here including such features as past, present, and future time, active, passive or stative voice, and the participants in actions.

Such participants in actions are, at the level of *kāraka* syntax, assigned to particular *kāraka*-categories. In a similar way the set of *la-kāras*, a set of ten suffixes marked with a diacritic *L*, are introduced after verbal roots at the same abstract level. At this level all verbal endings can

¹ On *kāraka* in Pāṇinian grammar, see, for example, G. Cardona 1967; 1974; 1976:215–24; 1988:160–62; S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen 1975; P. Kiparsky 1982.

² Rules A 1.4.24–55.

³ As G. Cardona has rightly pointed out (1976:340, note 273; 1988:168–69), the terms *apādāna* and *sampradāna* do not easily lend themselves to any one translation. The *apādāna* category, for example, includes a stable point when there is movement away, an object of fear, etc.

be said to signify agents and objects in relation to activities and can thus be treated according to what they at this level have in common. By rule 3.4.69 *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* an L-suffix is added to a verbal root to denote — in addition to the agent (*kartari*, rule 3.4.67) — the object, or, in the case of verbal roots which are objectless (*akarmaka*, that is, intransitive verbs), the mere activity expressed by the verbal root (*bhāva*, lit.: ‘being’). Moreover, these L-suffixes serve to mark tenses. For example, rule 3.2.110 *luṅ* teaches that the aorist L-suffix *IUN* is added after a verbal root (3.1.91 *dhātoḥ*) when the action refers to the general past (3.2.84 *bhūte*). These abstract L-suffixes are subsequently replaced by finite verbal endings or by participial suffixes.

When the relevant semantic choices have been considered on the side of the speaker, the abstract syntactic level of *kāra*kas and *la-kāras* is sorted out. The correct distribution of case endings and finite verbal endings is then accounted for in the surface syntax of a Sanskrit sentence by means of operational rules. By letting sentences be subject to shared operations at the abstract syntactic level, Pāṇini is able to account for the relationship between semantics and case endings, between sentences with finite verbs in the active, passive or impersonal passive (stative) voice, and between sentences containing finite verbs and nominal sentences. Moreover, he succeeds in accounting for syntactic problems pertaining to such areas as control¹ and ellipsis.²

An example may serve to clarify this. Consider the following sentences: *puruṣo vṛkṣam chinatti*, ‘the man is cutting the tree’, and *puruṣeṇa vṛkṣaś chidyate*, ‘the tree is being cut by the man’. To end up at one or the other of these surface levels, derivation proceeds through three

¹ That is, the problem of accounting for the implied agents and objects of non-finite verbal form such as absolutes and infinitives. Consider, for example, the shift of agent in the case of absolutes as illustrated by the two English sentences: ‘Having arrived in the village, John cooked the rice’, and ‘Having arrived in the village, the rice was cooked by John’.

² That is, the problems arising from the fact that words may be elided in sentences, as for example in *sa vṛkṣam chinatti* and *vṛkṣam chinatti*, both meaning ‘he cuts the tree’.

stages. My intention here is simply to give the skeleton of the procedure, so I do not list the rules which map level (1) onto level (2) or level (2) onto level (3), nor do I list the conditions which affect these rules at level (2) and level (3).

(1) Semantic level introducing the participants in the action of cutting:

puruṣa (*svatantra*, the independent participant) + *vr̥kṣa* (*īpsitatama*, that which is most desired by the agent) + √*chid* + *LAṬ* (*vartamāna*, present time)

(2) Abstract syntactic level; participants assigned to *kāraka* categories:

puruṣa (*kartr*) + *vr̥kṣa* (*karman*) + √*chid* + *LAṬ* (*kartari*)

or:

puruṣa (*kartr*) + *vr̥kṣa* (*karman*) + √*chid* + *LAṬ* (*karmani*)

(3) Surface level of morphology:

puruṣa + *sU* + *vr̥kṣa* + *am* + √*chid* + *ŚaP* + *tiP* → *puruṣo vr̥kṣam chinatti*¹

or:

puruṣa + *Tā* + *vr̥kṣa* + *sU* + √*chid* + *yaK* + *te* → *puruṣeṇa vr̥kṣas chidyate*

Thus, looking back at given semantic conditions, *kārakas* and *la-kāras* serve to derive correct Sanskrit sentences by sorting out an abstract syntax on the basis of which operational rules distribute the proper morphology at the surface level.

It should be noted, however, that the above two sentences could equally well appear in the form of corresponding nominal expressions. ²With an agent noun and a genitive construction we get *puruṣo vr̥kṣasya chettā*, ‘the man [is] a cutter of the tree’, and with a past participle in a passive construction and the agent in the instrumental case we get

¹ We may at this stage speak of a fourth level of phonetics at which the correct sandhi rules apply, but that need not concern us here.

puruṣeṇa vr̥kṣas chidyamānaḥ, ‘the tree [is] being cut by the man’.¹ Disregarding details of morphology, the derivation procedures would be the same.

But *kārakas* do not pertain to the derivation of sentences alone. Any verbal noun derived by a *kṛt*-suffix (a primary suffix) is considered to denote either a participant in an action and thus assigned to one or the other of the *kāraka* categories, or the mere activity expressed by the verbal root and thus assigned to the category of *bhāva* ‘being; state of action’. In other words, a certain *kṛt*-suffix is added to a verbal root when a particular *kāraka*, participant in the action denoted by the verbal root, is to be denoted, or when the mere verbal process or state of being (*bhāva*) is to be denoted. By way of example, the suffix *LyuṬ* (*-ana* with *guṇa* and presuffixal accent) is introduced to form neuter action nouns (*bhāve*) (by A 3.3.115 *lyuṬ ca*), but also to derive nouns expressing the instrument or the locus of the action expressed by the root (by A 3.3.117 *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca*). This means that when analysing a particular word alternative interpretations are often possible. For example, the word *sthāna* can be interpreted as *bhāvasādhana*, that is to say, as an action noun (with *LyuṬ* by A 3.3.115 *lyuṬ ca*) denoting the mere activity of standing, as such equivalent to the word *sthiti* ‘a standing’. But it could alternatively be interpreted as *adhikaraṇasādhana*, that is to say, as a noun denoting a locus, ‘place’; or even — theoretically — as *karaṇasādhana*, as a noun denoting a means of standing (the two latter formed with *LyuṬ* by A 3.3.117 *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca* which teaches that this suffix is also added to denote the instrument and the locus). This, roughly, is how *kārakas* work in the Pāṇinian tradition.

It is of course possible to write a grammar without introducing the notion of *kārakas*. Candragomin, the famous Buddhist grammarian, cut out the level of *kārakas* completely.² For Pāṇini the introduction of

¹ For an overview of such core paradigms of Sanskrit syntax, see P. Kiparsky 1982:2–3.

² For a discussion of what this implies and which is the better procedure, Pāṇini’s or Candragomin’s, see S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen 1975:xvi–xix.

kāraḥas is a technical device serving a distinct theoretical purpose. When this purpose disappears, what then ? This raises the question of why Aggavaṃsa retained them when his grammar in this respect is not in any sense derivational or generative.

2. The *kāraḥa*-section of the *Suttamālā*

Aggavaṃsa deals with *kāraḥas* in several places.¹ I have chosen the more formal part which is given in *pariccheda* 22 of the *Suttamālā*. I shall confine myself to the section of this *pariccheda* which deals with *kāraḥas* proper, that is, *suttas* 547–73 (690,30–711,23), but it is noteworthy that the section on *kāraḥas* is immediately followed by his treatment of the functions assigned to the genitive and the vocative, and by his treatment of case endings.

2.1 Preliminaries

The 22nd *pariccheda* is introduced by the following verse (690,30–31):

*Ito paraṃ sasambandham vibhattippabhavam chadhā
kāraḥam vibhajitvāna pavakkhāmi, suṇātha me.*

This verse is by no means a clear piece of writing and accordingly it does not lend itself to any one clear interpretation. Particularly puzzling are some of its statements when compared with what Aggavaṃsa has previously said about *kāraḥas*. I offer the following tentative translation:

¹ In the *Padamālā* *kāraḥas* and related topics — notably that of *bhāva* which Aggavaṃsa includes in his concept of *kāraḥa* — are dealt with in three sections (5,18–11,24, 20,29–21,11, and 68,30–69,17).

In what follows I shall explain the *kāraḥa*, which has its origin in case suffixes, along with the [general] relation [denoted by a genitive case ending], dividing it [= the *kāraḥa*] into six, [so] listen to me.

Under this interpretation I have taken *vi|bhaj* to mean ‘divide’. One may, however, take it in the slightly more general sense of ‘analyse’. In that case *vibhajitvāna* would be more exclusively linked to *kāraḥam*, and one could translate: ‘... while analysing *kāraḥa*, along with the [general] relation, as something which has its origin in case suffixes [and] is sixfold, I shall [now] explain [it] ...’. But several problems present themselves. The first is whether to interpret the absolute *vibhajitvāna* as referring to the past or to the present, in other words, to decide whether Aggavaṃsa considers himself as having already, in previous parts of his work, analysed *kāraḥas* as stated in the verse, or whether he is now “analysing” them in this way and is about to explain them in detail. This problem could only be settled if it could be established that he has previously analysed the concept of *kāraḥa* in a similar way. If not, I think it would be justified to claim that he means to give a broad definition before explaining it further in what follows.

Three other problems are raised by the three attributes ascribed to the word *kāraḥam* in the verse, *sasambandham*, *vibhattippabhavam*, and *chadhā*. The first is how to interpret *sasambandham*. One possible interpretation would be that a *kāraḥa* is something which has a relation. The relation (*sambandha*) alluded to under this interpretation I would take to be the relation of a *kāraḥa* to an action. That such a relation holds is stated clearly in the subsequent paragraph (691,5–6): *Kiriyābhisambandhalakkhaṇam kāraḥam*, ‘a *kāraḥa* is that which is characterized by a relation¹ to an action’. This view would be supported also by a passage such as the following (20,29–30):

¹ The terms *sambandha* and *abhisambandha* have been discussed by A. Aklujkar who concludes that “no technical or grammatical distinction of any kind exists between *sambandha* and *abhisambandha*” (1989:303). He goes on:

Kāraḥam iti kammakattubhāvā, te hi upacāramukhya-sabhāvavasena karonti karaṇan ti ca kārakā ti [ca] vuccanti; te ca yathākkamaṃ kiriyānimittaṃ sādhaḥkamaṃ sabhāvā ti veditaḥbā.

‘*kāraḥa*’:¹ that is, the object, the agent, and *bhāva* (‘being; state of action; the verbal process’),² for these do³ [something] by force of their being [in relation to the verbal activity] secondary, primary, or [its] very nature [respectively], and⁴ they are called [partly] doing⁵ and [partly] *kāraḥas*.⁶ And these should be

“The appearance of, and to some extent the preference for, *abhisambandha* when its equally non-technical colleague *sambandha* can convey its meaning seems to be due to the sensitivity which early Sanskrit authors had for the shades of meaning expressed by the *upasargas* or prefixes. As the situation was probably perceived as one in which word ‘X’ turned to thing ‘x’ or word ‘Y’ for effecting a connection, it was perhaps felt that an addition of the prefix *abhi*, which indicates ‘facing’ or ‘looking in the direction of,’ was appropriate” (*ibid.*).

¹ This passage deals with *kāraḥa* as the second of three *ākhyātappavatti* ‘functions of a finite verb’, the other two being *kāla* ‘time’ and *purisa* ‘person’.

² Aggavaṃsa gives the following definition of *bhāva* (8,3-4): *Evaṃ sante pi bhāvo nāma kevalo bhavanalavanapacanādiko dhātuattho yeva*, ‘nevertheless *bhāva* is nothing but the meaning of the verbal root itself, such as “being”, “cutting”, “cooking”.’ Thus already Yāska (*Nirukta* 1.1): *bhāvapradhānam ākhyatam*, ‘a verb is that which has *bhāva* as its predominant notion’.

³ *karonti* seems to be a *karṣṣādhana* analysis of *kāraḥa*: cf. 691,4.

⁴ The syntax here is peculiar. Another *iti* after *karonti* would yield the interpretation: ‘Because they do something, and because of doing, they are called *kāraḥas*.’ That is, *karonti* refers to *kamma* and *kattar* while *karaṇa* refers to *bhāva*.

⁵ With reference to *bhāva*.

⁶ Without the *ca* expurgated by Smith one may translate: ‘and considering (*iti*) [also] “doing” they are called *kāraḥas*’. It seems in any case clear that Aggavaṃsa wants to include *bhāva* as one of three *kāraḥas* pertaining to a finite verb and that he is aware of the problem caused by the fact that *bhāva* does not in fact do something, it is mere doing. To get around this he says ‘partly doing, partly *kāraḥas*’. It might even be possible, taking into consideration Aggavaṃsa’s inclination to use words in a technical and non-technical sense side by side, that *kāraḥa* here means ‘doer’; that is, the passage would define the three

known respectively as the target of an action,¹ its accomplisher, and its very nature.

The following statement would likewise point in this direction (712,7-8): *Kiriyābhisambandhābhāvā n’ esā kārakatā sambhavati*, ‘this property of being a *kāraḥa* is not adequate [for the genitive] because there is no relation (*abhisambandha*) to an action’.

In accord with this last statement, however, the expression *sasambandha* could also be taken to refer to the genitive case; that is to say, one would have to translate: ‘*kāraḥa* along with the [general] relation [denoted by a genitive]’. Basically, the Sanskrit grammarians consider the genitive to denote a mere relation, *sambandhamātra*, but Bhartṛhari includes the relations designated by the word *śeṣa* ‘the rest’² in the *sādhanasamuddesa* of his *Vākyapadīya*.³ This interpretation is also

kāraḥas as partly doing, partly doers. Smith refers in a note to the following passage (10,23): *Evaṃ sante pi so karaṇamattattā kāraḥam; tathā hi ‘karaṇam kāro kiriyā, tad eva kāraḥan’ ti bhāvassa kārakatā daṭṭhabbā*, ‘nevertheless, it is a *kāraḥa* in as much as it is nothing but doing, for with regard to *bhāva* the property of being a *kāraḥa* has to be considered in accordance with [the maxim ?] “doing, doer, deed — only that is *kāraḥa*”’; cf. 691,1-6.

¹ The expression *kiriyānimitta* must refer to *kamma* in the present context, and so lends itself to a translation ‘that on which the action is directed; target; goal’, but it seems worthwhile to point out that the *sutta* defining *kāraḥa* in the *Suttamālā* runs (547): *kiriyānimittaṃ kāraḥam*, where the sense seems to be ‘cause of action’.

² Pāṇini’s rule 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhi śeṣe* teaches that a genitive case ending is introduced to denote the rest, *śeṣa*. From the previous rules it is clear that this rest is any relation, *sambandha*, which is not a *kāraḥa*-relation. In other words, a genitive case suffix is introduced to denote any relation sustained between entities, that is to say, any non-verbal relation in general, such as father-son, master-servant, part-whole, etc. The fact that two entities are mutually related by their appearance in a given context is expressed by the genitive case. But the particular type of relation is not specified.

³ VP 3.7.44: *sāmānyam kāraḥam tasya saptādyā bhedayonayaḥ / ṣaṭ karmākhyaḍibhedena śeṣabhedas tu saptamī ||*

supported by the fact that the section on *kāraḥas* proper in the *Suttamāla* is immediately followed by a section on the functions of the genitive case (§§ 574–75). The same order is followed in *Kaccāyana*. Under this interpretation, the *kāraḥas* plus the *sambandha* would cover everything denoted by case endings. In fact, this would entail that *kāraḥas* are only a subset of *vibhattis*: not all *vibhattis* are *kāraḥas*, but all *kāraḥas* are *vibhattis*, the remaining element being the *sambandha*. On the above evidence I consider this second interpretation of the word *sasambandhaṃ* the more likely one.

The problem raised by the interpretation of *sasambandha* as including the genitive case is linked with the following one. The second characteristic of a *kāraḥa* is said in the verse above to be *vibhatti-ppabhava*. This expression too lends itself to various interpretations, depending first and foremost on how we interpret the word *pabhava*. Aggavaṃsa himself gives us the clue in this case in as much as he has previously interpreted the word as either *bhāvasādhana*, an action noun in the sense of ‘an originating, producing, production’, or as *apādānasādhana*, a noun denoting that from which something originates.¹ This would mean that *kāraḥas* are either something ‘of which

kāraḥa is of a general nature; its sources of distinction are seven main [ones]: six through a division beginning with the one called *karman*, the seventh however being the division called the rest (*śeṣa*).

VP 3.7.156: *sambandhaḥ kāraḥebhyo 'nyaḥ kriyākāraḥapūrvakaḥ / śrutāyāṃ aśrutāyāṃ vā kriyāyāṃ so 'bhidhīyate ||*

[By the word *śeṣa* ‘rest’] a relation (*sambandha*) is denoted which is different from *kāraḥa*[-relations] [but] preceded by an action-[and]-*kāraḥa*[-relation] whether the action [in question] has been heard of or not.

In as much as it involves a prior *kriyākāraḥa* relation the *śeṣa* relation is in one sense included among *kāraḥas*.

¹ 68,14–16: *pabhavo ti, pabhavanam pabhavo acchinnatā; pabhavati etasmā ti vā pabhavo, yato hi yaṃ kiñci pabhavati so pabhavo, “pabhava”*: originating is *pabhava*, by fact of [its] not being cut off; or [it is called] *pabhava* since

there is originating in *vibhattis*’, that is ‘which have their origin in *vibhattis*’, or that *kāraḥas* are something ‘which arise from *vibhattis*’. It seems these two interpretations yield more or less the same sense. This agrees well with one of the six interpretations previously given of *vibhatti* (15,4):

kammādayo vā kāraḥe ekavacanabahuvacanavasena vibhajati ti vibhatti.

Or: it distributes/divides the *kāraḥas* [which are] *kamma* etc. with regard to singular and plural; hence *vibhatti*.

This interpretation of *vibhatti* as *karṭṛsādhana* would support the view that *kāraḥas* are only treated as a subset of *vibhattis*, thus distorting the whole purpose of introducing *kāraḥas* as met with in Pāṇinian grammar. There the abstract level of *kāraḥas* is introduced to account for the correct distribution of *vibhattis*, case endings and verbal endings.¹ It is noteworthy in this respect that the expected interpretation of *vibhatti* as *karmasādhana*, as an object of the action denoted by the verb *vibhajati*, is met with as well. In fact, two such interpretations are given, but with completely different senses of *vibhajati* (15,5–9):

vibhajitabbā nāṇenā ti pi vibhatti, ... atha vā sati pi jīnasāsane avibhattikaniddese sabbena sabbam vibhattiṃhi vinā atthassāniddisitabbato visesena vividhena vā ākārena bhajanti sevanti nam paṇḍitā ti vibhatti.

But it can even be distributed/divided (analysed ?), [that is to say,] with the intellect; hence *vibhatti*; ... Alternatively: even if

[something] originates from it, in as much as that which originates from which [= it], that is *pabhava*’.

¹ In Pāṇinian grammar the term *vibhakti* comprises case endings as well as verbal endings (A 1.4.104 *vibhaktiś ca*).

in the words of the Buddha there are expressions without endings, a meaning cannot be expressed altogether without endings. Therefore [the word *vibhatti* can be explained in the following way]: particularly (*vīsesena*) or in many ways (*vīvidhena ākārena*) the learned devote themselves to (*bhajanti*), that is, occupy themselves with (*sevanti*)¹ it; hence *vibhatti*.

This strengthens one's suspicion that Aggavaṃsa does not think of *kāraḥas* as distributors of *vibhattis*. So does the fact that he himself has named the 22nd *pariccheda* of his grammar *kāraḥavibhāga* 'the division/distribution of *kāraḥas*' (740,21).

The third characteristic, that *kāraḥas* are sixfold, he has stated before. Still, he seems unable to make up his mind as to what classification and what number he should settle for. In the passage quoted above (20,29), he says that *kāraḥas* are *kamma*, *kattar* and *bhāva*. This he sums up neatly in the continuation of that passage (20,33): *Kammaṃ kattā ca bhāvo ca icc evaṃ kāraḥā tidhā*, 'kamma, kattar, and bhāva: thus *kāraḥas* are threefold'.

In a later passage of the *Padamālā*, however, he gives a different classification (68,30–69,2):

Evam ettha bhāvakattukammakaraṇāpadānādihikaraṇavasena cha sādhanāni pakāsītāni, tāni sampadānasādhanena sattavidhāni bhavanti; taṃ pana uttarim āvibhavissati 'dhanam assa bhavatū ti Dhanabhūti' ti ādinā. Icc evaṃ kitakavasena sabbathā pi sattavidhāni sādhanāni honti, yāni kāraḥāni ti pi vuccanti; ito aññaṃ sādhanam n' atthi.

Thus, in this context, the six *sādhanas*² have been promulgated as *bhāva*, *kattar*, *kamma*, *karaṇa*, *apādāna*, and *adhikaraṇa*;

¹ cf. *Dhātumālā* (225): *bhaja sevāyam*.

² The term *sādhana*, lit. 'means; accessory' (*sādhyate 'nena* '[something] is realised/accomplished by means of it'), here equals *kāraḥa*. The term occurs in

they are sevenfold with that *sādhana* which is the *sampadāna*, but that will become clear later on by [analytic statements] such as " 'let there be (*bhavatu*) wealth (*dhana*) for him (*assa*)', thus [he is called] Dhanabhūti".¹ This being so, through primary formations there are [these] sevenfold *sādhanas* in fact on every occasion,² these which are [hence³] also called *kāraḥas*. Any *sādhana* other than this does not exist.

Here he claims *kāraḥas* to be sixfold, including *bhāva* but not *sampadāna*, or sevenfold if the latter is included. In the *kāraḥa*-section of the *Suttamālā*, however, he includes *sampadāna* but not *bhāva*. There may be a real question about the *sampadāna* in as much as Aggavaṃsa, as will become clear later on, does not distinguish between *kāraḥa* and *vibhakti*, and further because the confluence of the dative and genitive suffixes may cause some confusion in this respect. Is Pāli case morphology responsible for the separate mention of a *kāraḥa* which in Sanskrit is expressed by the dative? It could also be that the list is given the way it is for some stylistic reason. The passage is not verse, but could it be derived from a verse where such an expression as "with X as seventh" is innocuous? Be this as it may, the above and the following passages are still illuminating in as much as they, at least to some extent, reveal the basis for his diverging classifications (10,19–31):

the *Mahābhāṣya* but is most readily associated with the *Vākyapadīya* where it is the term used for *kāraḥa* and the name of the section on *kāraḥas*, the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*.

¹ This is equal to 'let him be the recipient of wealth'. The analysis is repeated 72,22 in the context of the *i-kāraṇta* (forms ending in the suffix *-i*). The suffix seems to be considered as forming *bahuvrīhi* compounds in the masculine in the sense of *assa bhavatu* 'let there be x for him'. Smith indicates that the statement is a quotation. Whether this is correct or not, it has not been traced as such.

² That is, 'in exactly every way; indeed everywhere', or the idea seems to be that *kṛt*-formations realise all of these *sādhanas*.

³ That is, the *kṛt*-formations are, so to speak, the missing link which explains why *sādhanas* can be called *kāraḥas* and vice versa.

Ākhyātikapade bhāvakāravohāro niruttinayaṃ nissāya gato,¹ atthato pana bhāvassa kārakatā nūpapajjati, so hi na kiñci janeti na ca kiriyāya nimittam, kiriyānimittabhāvo yeva hi kārakalakkhaṇam; iti mukhyato vā hetuto vā bhāvassa kārakatā na labbhati. Evaṃ sante pi so karaṇamattattā kārakam; tathā hi ‘karaṇam kāro kiriyā, tad eva kāraṇam’ ti bhāvassa kārakatā daṭṭhabbā. Yasmā pana kiriyānimittabhāvo yeva kārakalakkhaṇam, tasmā nāmikapade kārakalakkhaṇe bhāvakāraṇam ti vohāraṃ pahāya kattukammakaraṇasampadānāpādānādhikaraṇaṇam channaṃ vatthūnaṃ kattukāraṇam kamma-kāraṇam ti ādivohāro karīyati veyyākaraṇehi. Evaṃ niruttinayaṃ nissāya vuttaṃ bhāvakāraṇaṃ ca dve ca kammakattukāraṇāni ti kārakattayaṃ bhavati taddīpakaṇi cākhyātikapadaṃ tikāraṇam.

The practice of referring to [such a category as] *bhāvakāraṇa* in the case of verbal words proceeds² following the conventions of *nirutti*,³ but in fact the property of being a *kāraṇa* does not

¹ *Ce kato.*

² Or: ‘has come about’. The reading *gato* seems at first sight a little problematic. *Ce* reads *kato* which would be preferable. But it might well be that various forms of Skt. *√śri* lend themselves to periphrastic constructions with various forms of *√gam*; cf. the Buddhist *tisaraṇa*: *buddhaṃ saraṇam gacchāmi*, etc.

³ The term *niruttinaya* is problematic and has to be examined more closely. Smith (1928:VI, note 2) points out the necessity of studying the notion of *naya* which occurs so frequently in the *Saddanīti* and which, in his words, is ‘fondamentale pour le système de la Saddanīti’. Smith refers in this context to Franke (1902:45, note 1). Smith has chosen to print the word *niruttinaya* with an upper case *N*, thus apparently indicating that it refers to a particular corpus of Pāli grammatical texts identified in his *Conspectus terminorum* (= CT) 7.1.2.2 as ‘la doctrine du Niruttapiṭaka, etc. (Index A 5.0.1 ... 5.0.4)’. The texts he mentions in Index A (*Index Locorum*) are the *Niruttipiṭaka*, *Cullanirutti*, (*Mahā*)*nirutti*, and *Niruttimañjūsā*. The same four texts are listed by Smith in the bibliography of his *Epilegomena* to Vol. I of the CPD as items 5.0.1–5.0.4 (5. *Philology*; 5.1–5.3 *Grammar*), but the only references to them are the ones occurring in the *Saddanīti*. This fact makes the reasoning here circular, and the references in the

apply to *bhāva*, for neither does it (= *bhāva*) produce anything, nor is it the cause of [any] action, and the property of being the cause of an action is the one and only defining characteristic of a *kāraṇa*.¹ Therefore the property of being a *kāraṇa* does not apply to *bhāva*, for it is neither the source² nor the cause [of an

Saddanīti to *niruttinaya* have to be identified before one is able to place within the grammatical tradition the texts mentioned. Likewise the concept of *nirutti* has to be carefully examined. Smith (CT 7.1.2.2) does also give *nirukta* in the sense of what I prefer to translate as ‘semantic analysis’ as the meaning of *niruttinaya*. The expression *niruttinayaṃ nissāya* may thus be equivalent to a Sanskrit *niruktyanusareṇa* ‘following the *nirukta* method’. And indeed it seems to me more likely that *niruttinaya* here refers to a particular tradition of grammar or grammatical method in accordance with a Pāli tradition of *nairuktas*; cf. in this respect the *pañcavidhaṃ niruttam*, Smith CT 7.2.1: ‘phonème intercalé, échangé, modifié ou tombé, sens élargi vaṇṇāgama, vaṇṇavipariyāya, vaṇṇavikāra, vaṇṇanāsa, atthātisayayoga’. This “fivefold *nirukta*” is known also from Sanskrit sources through a verse quoted by Durga in his commentary on the *Nirukta* (ed. Bhadkamkar 1918:32) and in the *Kāśikā* on A 6.3.109:

varṇāgamo varṇavipariyayaś ca dvau cāparau varṇavikāranāśau / dhātos tadarthātisayena yogas tad ucyate pañcavidhaṃ niruktam //

[Addition of] an augment-sound, sound-metathesis, and the other two: sound-substitution and sound-elision, [as well as the circumstance that] a verbal root is connected with an extension of its meaning — that is called the fivefold *nirukta*.

Aggavaṃsa builds on the idea of *atthātisaya* for one of his interpretations of the term *dhātu* (2,6): *atthātisayayogato parattham pi dhāreti ti dhātu*, ‘because it is connected with extension of meaning, [according to the analysis:] “it carries (possesses; constitutes; *dhāreti*) also the meaning of something else”, hence [it is called] *dhātu*’. Pointing out that Buddhaghosa alludes to the above verse in his *Visuddhimagga* (210,30) and thus making it clear that it is well established in exegetical traditions, O.H. Pind (1989:40–42) claims that the first complete Pāli version of it is to be found in Upasena’s commentary on the *Niddesa*.

¹ This reflects the definition of *kāraṇa* offered in § 547: *kiriyānimittam kāraṇam*. See below.

² The underlying form of the word *mukhyato* I consider to correspond to Skt *maukhya*. The expression here refers back to the first alternative of the preceding

action]. Nevertheless, it is a *kāraka* in as much as it is nothing but doing,¹ for with regard to *bhāva* the property of being a *kāraka* has to be considered in accordance with [the maxim ?] ‘doing,² doer, deed — only that is *kāraka*’. But since the condition of being the cause of an action is the one and only defining characteristic of *kāraka*, then, in the case of nominal words the defining characteristic of which is *kāraka*,³ the grammarians, abandoning the practice of referring to a *bhāvakāraka*, adopt the practice of referring to *kattakāraka*, *kammakāraka*, etc. for the six entities *kattar* (agent), *kamma* (object), *kaṇa* (instrument), *sampadāna* (recipient), *apādāna* (stable point when there is movement away), and *adhikarāṇa* (locus). Thus it has been stated, following the conventions of *nirutti*, that the *bhāvakāraka* and the two *kārakas* agent and object constitute a triad of *kārakas*, and the verb with [its] three *kārakas* illustrates this.

This makes it clear that Aggavaṃsa has the two main divisions of *kārakas* in mind, namely *kārakas* as realised by finite verbs and *kārakas* as realised by nouns. A finite verb can only express *kattar*, *kamma* or *bhāva*, while nouns can express all the (normally defined) six *kārakas* plus *bhāva*. But it is not at all clear to me whether Aggavaṃsa in his classification of *kārakas* realised by nouns had in mind all nouns, regardless of their derivation, which participate in the action of a sentence, or verbal nouns (*kr̥t* formations) viewed as separate linguistic entities, or both. His remark that ‘through primary formations (*kr̥t*

sentence, that is, that *bhāva* does not produce anything nor is the cause of an action.

¹ The word *kaṇa* here interpreted as *bhāvasādhana*, as an action noun of √*kr̥*.

² It may be that *kaṇa* here has the sense of ‘instrument’ and that Aggavaṃsa’s interpretation of *kaṇa* as *bhāvasādhana* is not fully justified. It would be useful if the quotation — if it is a quotation — could be traced.

³ I consider an interpretation as a *bahuvr̥hi* the only one possible for the compound *kāralakkhaṇe*.

formations) there are [these] sevenfold *kārakas*’ reveals that in that passage at least he has in mind verbal nouns viewed in isolation.

Aggavaṃsa includes *bhāva* under the class name *kāraka*, with regard to both verbs and nouns, but he holds a rather peculiar view of what constitutes a *bhāva*-construction. For a Sanskrit grammarian, the *bhāvaprayoga* — the impersonal passive or stative usage — would be illustrated by a construction such as *devadattena supyate*, lit. ‘it is being slept by Devadatta’. Aggavaṃsa, on the other hand, says that it is a construction wherein the verb is identical in form with a passive specified without an object, and then claims that not only can the agent be expressed by the instrumental or the nominative case but that, in fact, ‘on the view of the Jina’ the *nominative* alone is to be used (8,4-9):

Akharacintakā pana thīyate bhūyate ti ādisu bhāvavisayesu kaṇavacanam eva payuñjanti “nanu nāma pabbajitena sunivatthena bhavitabbaṃ supārutena ākappasampannā”¹ ti ādisu viya; tasmā tesam mate tena ubbhavīyate ti kaṇavacanena yojetabbaṃ, jinamate pana “so bhūyate”² ti ādinā paccattavacanen’ eva. Saccasamkhepappakarāṇe hi Dhammapālācariyena, Niddesapāliyaṃ pana Dhammasenāpatinā, Dhajaggasutte Bhagavatā ca bhāvapadaṃ paccattavacanāpekkhavasen’ uccāritam.

Now, grammarians³ employ only the instrumental case in the domain of *bhāva*, such as *thīyate*, *bhūyate*, etc., as in: ‘surely a wandering monk should be⁴ well dressed, properly covered,

¹ The quotation — if it is a quotation — has not been traced.

² Sacc 63d.

³ Literally: ‘syllable-ponderers’. It is not clear to me whether this term has any derogatory connotations, or whether he tries to distance himself from such a category.

⁴ Literally: ‘by a wandering monk it should be ...’. It is not surprising that he resorts to the frequently occurring future passive participle to illustrate a *bhāva*-construction, here “properly” constructed with the instrumental case.

suitably attired', etc. Therefore, in their view, in the expression *tena ubbhaviyate* it should only be constructed with the instrumental case. But in the view of the Jina [it should be constructed] only with the nominative as in *so bhūyate*. For in the *Saccasaṃkhepappakaraṇa*¹ by the teacher Dhammapāla, in the text of the *Niddesa* by Dhammasenāpati, and in the *Dhajaggasutta* by The Blessed One, a *bhāva*-word has been stated with [a syntactic] expectancy for the nominative case.

He goes on to list these examples, which all illustrate the use of the nominative case. It goes without saying that this conception of what

¹ Aggavaṃsa himself refers the example 'so bhūyate' to the *Saccasaṃkhepa*, further identified by Smith as occurring in 63d, in fact the only occurrence of the form *bhūyate* in this text. The verse, which I would rather abstain from translating, runs as follows:

*opapātikabhāviṣṣa dasakā satta kammajā;
kāme ādo bhavant' aggijādi pubbe va bhūyate.*

(Tentative translation: 'For those who have an existence as *opapātikas* (spontaneously born) there are ten kinds of existence (*satta*, case ?); those who are produced by *kamma* (= born in accordance with their *kamma*) exist first (*ādo* = Skt. *ādau*, loc. of *ādi* ?) in the desire[-realm]; those who are born from fire come into existence previously.')

The *Saccasaṃkhepa* belongs to a group of Abhidhamma manuals known in Burma as *Let-than*, the Little-finger Manuals (cf. Norman 1983:153). Its author, Dhammapāla, is hard to identify and date (*ibid.*:152), but it seems clear that he must be reasonably close to Aggavaṃsa in time. This makes it likely that the type of Pāli employed by Dhammapāla must be reasonably close to that used by Aggavaṃsa, and it is therefore surprising that he quotes this bizarre form without reservations. Normally he sticks to canonical literature for his examples. The words *aggijādi pubbe va bhūyate* one could translate: 'Those which are born from fire etc. do indeed (*eva*) / as it were (*iva*) come into existence previously'. A passive form of $\sqrt{bhū}$ is in any case hard to distinguish from an active one in meaning, that is, 'it is being come into existence' is very close to 'it comes into existence'. Another possibility is that $\sqrt{bhū}$ here is simply treated as a 4th class verb, *bhūyate* again meaning 'it comes into existence'.

constitutes a *bhāva*-construction is very different from the one of the Sanskrit grammarians.¹

To sum up, then, there are in the case of finite verbs three *kāraṅkas*: *kattar*, *kamma* and *bhāva*. This is as much as a finite verb is able to express on its own. In the case of nouns — be they nominal words analysed separately, nouns as parts of sentences, or both — there are six *kāraṅkas*, including *bhāva* but excluding *sampadāna*, or, if the *sampadāna* is included, there are seven. In the *Suttamālā*, however, Aggavaṃsa deals with six *kāraṅkas*, plus the *hetu* or causal agent as a subdivision of *kattar*. Here he includes the *sampadāna* whereas *bhāva* is completely excluded from the enumeration. In light of this it is somewhat surprising that he opens his *kāraṅka* section with a verse claiming that *kāraṅkas* are sixfold, having seemingly forgotten what he stated previously. This could be simply because Aggavaṃsa here slips into the common way of dealing with *kāraṅkas* in Indian grammar. But such a lack of consistency is not what one wants from a grammarian. One may also ask whether or not he has inherited the order in which he deals with them here from some predecessor. They are discussed in the order of *kattar*, *hetu*, *kamma*, *karaṇa*, *sampadāna*, *apādāna*, and *okāsa* (= *adhikaraṇa*). The order in *Kaccāyana* is *apādāna*, *sampadāna*, *okāsa*, *karaṇa*, *kamma*, *kattar*, and *hetu*, that is, the same order as in Pāṇini's grammar. This is also the order of the *Kātantra*. The order in the *Sādhana-samuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, however, comes quite close: *karman*, *karaṇa*, *karṭṛ*, *hetu*, *sampradāna*, *apādāna*, *adhikaraṇa*, and *śeṣa*. If one simply moves the agent — and thus also the causal agent — to the front, one gets Aggavaṃsa's order.

2.2 Definition of *kāraṅka*

547 Kiriyānimittam kāraṅkam. *Yaṃ sādhanasabhāvattā mukhyavasena vā upacārasena vā kiriyābhiniṣṭhāyā*

¹ I cannot enter into this intriguing problem here, but intend to do so in a future publication.

nimittam, tam vatthu kārakam nāma bhavati; mukhyopacāravasena hi kiriyam karotī ti kārakam. Tam chabbidham kattukammakaraṇasampadānāpadān'okāsa-vasena. Kiriyābhisambandhalakkhaṇam kārakam.

'A *kāraka* is the cause of an action.' That which, in as much as it is something which has *sādhana* 'realising' as its real nature, [and] is, primarily or secondarily, the cause of the occurrence of an action, that thing is known as a *kāraka*; for primarily or secondarily it brings about an action, hence [it is called] *kāraka*. [And] it is sixfold by way of *kattar*, *kamma*, *karaṇa*, *sampadāna*, *apādāna*, and *okāsa*. A *kāraka* is that which is characterized by a relation to an action.

Aggavaṃsa first defines a *kāraka* as *kiriyānimitta* 'the cause of an action'. It seems reasonable to compare this with some common definitions of *kāraka* met with in Indian *vyākaraṇa*. From a Pāṇiniya point of view the word *kāraka* is formed by the addition of the suffix *ṆvuL* (-*aka* with *vṛddhi* and presuffixal accent) after $\sqrt{kṛ}$ according to rule A 3.1.133 *ṇvultṛcau* which teaches that the primary (*kṛt*) suffixes *ṆvuL* and *tṛC* are introduced after a verbal root. This operation is further specified by rule 3.4.67 *kartari kṛt* which teaches that *kṛt* suffixes are introduced after a verbal root to denote the agent. The word *kāraka* thus means 'doer; accomplisher'.

During his discussion of rule 1.4.23 *kārake*, Patañjali suggests that *kāraka* is *sādhaka* 'that which accomplishes, realises' and *nirvartaka* 'that which brings about' (Mbh I:323,8–9): *sādhakam nirvartakam kārakasamjñam bhavati vaktavyam*, 'it should be stated that that which accomplishes, that which brings about, is something to which the technical name *kāraka* applies'. He goes on (324,7) to say that the term is an *anvarthasamjñā*, a term which corresponds to its analytical meaning, which implies that it corresponds to the nature of that which it denotes,

and he accordingly comes up with the analysis: *karotīti kārakam*, 'it does (= brings about; accomplishes) [something], hence [it is called] *kāraka*'.

The problem then is that only the agent would be a *kāraka* proper. This is solved by claiming that actions differ according to different *kārakas*, that is, each *kāraka* participates in different ways in bringing about the action. Kaiyaṭa remarks in this context (MbhP II:379): *sādhyatvena kriyaiva śabdāt pratiyate iti kriyāyā nirvartakasya kārakasamjñāpādānādīsamjñā ca pravartate*, 'since it can be accomplished it is action which can be understood from words, and so the name *kāraka* and such a name as *apādāna* apply to something which accomplishes action'.

Various definitions along these lines prevail throughout the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, and I shall adduce a few examples. The *Kāśikāvṛtti* on rule 1.4.23 states: *kārakaśabdaś ca nimittaparyāyah / kārakam, hetur ity anarthāntaram / kasya hetuḥ ? kriyāyāḥ*, 'and the word *kāraka* is a synonym of *nimitta* (cause); *kāraka*, *hetu* (cause) — [these terms] do not convey any different sense. The cause of what? Of an action (*kriyā*)'. The Jain grammarian Abhayanandin states (JV 1.2.109): *kārakam nirvartakam hetur vā / kasya ? kriyāyāḥ*, '*kāraka* is something which brings about or [is a] cause. Of what? Of an action'. Vāsudevadikṣita states in his *Bālamanoramā* (SK I:597): *kriyājanakam kārakam*, 'a *kāraka* is something which produces an action'. This last remark employs a form of \sqrt{jan} in its explanation.

Aggavaṃsa amplifies his definition of *kāraka* with the words *mukhyavasena vā upacāravasena vā*, 'primarily or secondarily'. This statement is based on the problem alluded to above, namely, that if the term *kāraka* is to be understood according to the analysis *karotīti kārakam*, 'it brings about, accomplishes, hence [it is called] *kāraka*', only the agent would be a *kāraka* proper. This question was raised and answered already by Kātyāyana in *vārttikas* 6 and 7 on A 1.4.23 and by Patañjali in his commentary. In *vārttikas* 8 and 9 and in the *Bhāṣya*

discussion of them a distinction is made between the main agent (*pradhānakartr*) and the agency ascribed to the other *kāra*kas.¹

The definition of *kāra*ka as the cause (*nimitta*) of an action comes up also in the commentary of Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.24 (Hel 251,2–3): *yat tu kriyāpadopāttāyāḥ kriyāyā nimittam tat kārakam eva*, ‘that which is the cause of an action which is mentioned through an action word is a *kāra*ka’. In the *Vākyapadīya* context a distinction is made between *nimitta* ‘cause’ and *lakṣaṇa* ‘sign’, the latter also interpreted as a cause in the context of Pāṇini’s rule 1.4.84 *anur lakṣaṇe*.² This discussion need not concern us here, but I mention the occurrence of the *kriyānimitta* definition since it will later become apparent that there is some connection between Helārāja’s commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* and the *Saddanīti*.

Aggavaṃsa’s final remark, that a *kāra*ka is that which is characterized by a relation to an action, I am not familiar with as a standard phrase. It goes without saying, however, that it is acceptable as a general statement about *kāra*kas. It is obviously his own creation, since he gives similar definitions by way of compounds ending in °*lakṣhaṇa* for all the *kāra*kas. Whether he intends these as alternative definitions or as more precise formulations of the ones he gives in the *suttas*, I am not in a position to tell.

2.3 The agent: *kattar*

548 *Yo kurute yo vā jāyati, so kattā. Yo attappadhāno hutvā gamanapacānādīkaṃ kiriyam kurute yo vā jāyati, so kāra*ko kattā nāma bhavati. *Vāsaddo vikappanatto, tena añño*

¹ In the context of the attitude of Indian thinkers to the ‘metaphorical’ use of language and more specifically with regard to the concept of *mukhya* and *upacāra* this has been pointed out by G. Gren-Eklund (1986:91) with reference to the present passage of the *Saddanīti*.

² This rule teaches that the technical term *karmapravacanīya* applies to the particle *anu* when a sign or characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) is to be denoted. In this context *lakṣaṇa* is interpreted so as to signify *hetu* ‘cause’.

*pi attho yojetabbo. Kiriyam karoti ti kattā, so tividho: suddhakattā hetukattā kammakattā ti. Tattha yo sayam eva kiriyam karoti, so suddhakattā nāma, tam yathā: puriso maggam gacchati, sūdo bhattam pacati, putto jāyati, buddhena jito Māro, Upaguttana baddho Māro; yo aññaṃ kammani yojeti, so hetukattā nāma, so hi parassa kiriyāya kāraṇabhāvena hinoti gacchati pavattati ti hetu, hetu ca so kattā cā ti atthena hetukattā: Yaññadatto Devadattam gamayati; yo pana parassa kiriyam paṭicca kammabhūto pi sukarattā sayam eva sijjhanto viya hoti, so kammakattā nāma kammañ ca tam kattā cā ti atthena: sayam eva kaṭo karīyati sayam eva pacīyati odano ti — evam tividhā bhavanti kattāro. Api ca abhihitakattā anabhihitakattā cā ti ime dve te ca tayo ti kattūnam pañcavidhattam api icchanti garū. Tattha puriso maggam gacchati ayam abhihitakattā ākhyātena kathitattā; sūdena pacīyati odano ahinā dattho naro ayam anabhihitakattā ākhyātena kitena vā akathitattā. Abhinipphādanalakkhaṇam kattukāraṇam. Kattā icc anena kv attho: “kattari paṭhamā tatiyā ca”.*¹

‘The one that acts or [for example²] the one that is being born, that [*kāra*ka] is the *kattar* “agent”.’ The one that has presumed predominance and performs an action such as a going or a cooking, or [for example] the one that is being born, that participant of an action is called the agent. The word *vā* has the sense of option, and through it even another sense is to be included. [It is called] agent (*kattar*) according to [the analysis:] ‘it performs (*karoti*) [something, namely] an action’; [and] this [agent] is of three kinds: the pure agent, the causal agent, and the

¹ § 594.

² This, I think, is how Aggavaṃsa’s usage of *vā* is to be understood. See below and 2.3.2.

object-agent.¹ With regard to this, the one that performs an action all by himself is called the pure agent, as for example: ‘the man walks the road’; ‘the cook cooks food’; ‘a boy is born’; ‘Māra was conquered by the Buddha’; ‘Māra was bound by Upagutta’. The one that instigates another to action is called the causal agent, for he is one that impels (*hinoti*), moves, conduces as the reason for another’s action and is therefore called *hetu*. From the meaning ‘it is cause (*hetu*) and it is agent (*kattar*)’, [it is called] causal agent (*hetukattar*): ‘Yajñadatta makes Devadatta move’. But even the one occurring as the object, with reference to the action of another, is accomplished easily by itself, as it were; it is called *kammakattar* according to the sense that it is both object and agent: ‘the mat is made by itself’, ‘the rice is boiling by itself’; thus agents appear as of three kinds. Moreover, the agent specified [by a finite verb] and the agent not specified [by a finite verb], [there are] these two and the [other] three, [so] the teachers teach also the fivefoldness of agents. As far as this is concerned, [in the sentence] ‘the man walks the road’ there is an agent that has been specified [already] in as much as it has been stated by a finite verb; [in the sentences] ‘rice is cooked by the cook’ [and] ‘the man is bitten by a snake’ the agent has not been specified [already] in as much as it has not been stated by a finite verb or by a primary suffix. The *kāraka* which is the agent has as its defining characteristic the bringing about [of something]. What is the purpose in calling it the agent? ‘The first and the third² [case endings occur] when the agent is to be denoted.’

¹ That is, an agent which is treated as an object. See below.

² The Sanskrit grammarians (and so also the Pāli grammarians) refer to case endings by numbers, not by names. Thus, the nominative is referred to as the first, the accusative as the second, the instrumental as the third, the dative as the fourth, the ablative as the fifth, the genitive as the sixth, and the locative as the seventh. The vocative is treated as a variety of the nominative.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs (143): *yo karoti sa kattā*. This is the definition met with also in the *Kātantra* (2.4.14). Aggavaṃsa has taken over this definition, but obviously feels the need to somehow include Pāṇini’s definition in rule 1.4.54 *svatantraḥ kartā*, adding *attappadhāno hutvā* in the *vutti*. The word *pradhāna* as a gloss of *tantra* in *svatantra* ‘the independent one’ occurs already in the *Mahābhāṣya*.¹ The *Kāśikā* (on A 1.4.54) explains *svatantra* by *pradhānabhūta ucyate* ‘who [by the speaker] is spoken of as predominant’ and the word *pradhāna* occurs also in the *Nyāsa*.² Haradatta’s explanation of *svatantraḥ*, on the other hand, comes even closer to the wording of the *Saddanīti* (KāśP 583): *sva ātmā tantram pradhānam asya*; so does Helārāja’s (Hel 312,2): *sva ātmā tantram pradhānam asya*; and likewise Kaiyaṭa’s (Mbhp II:436): *svaśabda ātmavācī | sva ātmā tantram pradhānam yasya sa ‘svatantra’ ucyate*, ‘the word *sva* means *ātman* “self”; he whose *sva*, that is, *ātman* “self” is *tantram*, that is, *pradhānam* “predominant”, he is called *svatantra*’.

The *karṭṛvyutpatti* of the term *kattar*, that is, its analysis as agentival, offered in the *sutta* definition is repeated in the *vutti* (*kiriyaṃ karoti*). Such an interpretation is of course reasonable, though Aggavaṃsa does not return to the problem brought up already by Kātyāyana (vt. 6 on A 1.4.23), namely, whether the interpretation *karotīti kārakam*, ‘it acts, hence [it is called] *kāraka*’, would make all *kārakas* agents. The issue was however touched upon under *sutta* 547 in the context of *mukhya* and *upacāra*.

One characteristic detail is worthy of notice. Here and in the subsequent *suttas* which define *kārakas* Aggavaṃsa lists alternative definitions, introducing them with the word *vā*. In the *vutti* he explains that this term in fact allows other meanings to be recognised. In the present case his choice of an additional definition, *yo vā jāyati*, is not

¹ Mbh I:338,19–20: *svatantra ‘sau brāhmaṇa ity ucyate svapradhāna ity gamyate*, ‘[for example, when] it is said “that Brahman is independent”, [the meaning] “having himself as the predominant one” is understood’.

² KāśN 583.

made at random. It goes back to an issue raised in the *kartradhikāra* of the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* and developed at length in the commentary of Helārāja. Bhartṛhari's first verse brings it up in the following manner (VP 3.7.105):

*utpatteḥ prāg asadbhāvo buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ /
aviśiṣṭaḥ satānyena kartā bhavati janmanaḥ //*

Prior to [its] production the existence of something non-existent depends upon a state of mind. Not different from anything else that exists, it is [conceived as] the agent of [the act of] being born.

The problem is that the agent of the act of being born is a contradiction in terms if what is born is considered not to exist prior to its coming into existence. Helārāja remarks (Hel 314,17–22):

*'aṅkuro jāyate' iti janikartṛtvam sato 'sato vā | tatra
yadi saj jāyate kasmād athāsaj jāyate katham |
ityādinā pūrvam vāstavārūpāśrayeṇa sadasatpakṣabhedenāpi
janikartṛtvam ayuktam ity uktam | upacārasattāśrayeṇa
tūtpattiḥ siddhāntitā
upacarya tu kartāram ...
ityādinā |*

[With regard to the expression] 'the sprout is being born', the property of being the agent of being born pertains either to something which exists or to something which does not exist. In this respect, it has first been stated, through [the words of VP 3.3.43c–d:] 'if it exists, why is it born, and if it does not exist, how is it born?' etc., that the property of being the agent of being born does not apply because [the expression is thought of as] resting on [an idea of] external form and also because of the

dichotomy in viewing [the sprout] as existent and non-existent. But [its] production is established as true since [the expression] rests on secondary being, according to [VP 3.3.45a:] 'but transferring [the application to include] the agent ...' etc.

The difficulty raised by verbs such as *jāyate* is thus not the problem of intransitivity but the problem of ascribing agency to the agent of the action denoted by them. It is brought up also by Kaiyaṭa in the context of A 1.4.30 *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, '[the name *apādāna* is assigned to] the origin of the agent of being born'. The problem here is really how the name *apādāna* applies to the *prakṛti*, the origin or cause of the act of being born, since no separation takes place once and for all. The examples commonly offered by the commentators are: *śṛṅgāc charo jāyate*, 'the arrow is produced from horn'; *gomayād vṛściko jāyate*, 'the scorpion originates from cowdung'. Patañjali concludes that one can do away with this rule since some sort of separation is taking place, either because a continuous process is involved (*saṃtataṭvāt*) or because a succession is implied. In this context Kaiyaṭa brings in also the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* 'the sprout comes into being', and states that there is no fault in ascribing agency to the sprout (Mbhp II:399): *buddhi-vyavasthāpitasyārthasya kriyāyām kārakarūpopagamāt*, 'because the thing [which is to be produced] conceived of in [our] mind acquires the form of a participant in the action'. This reflects the view that grammar deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about. The thing which is to be born is thought of as born.

Aggavaṃsa's classification into *suddha-*, *hetu-*, and *kamma-kattar* is, as far as I know, not common. However it is an obvious one if one is fond of such classifications, and Aggavaṃsa truly is. The examples offered for the *suddhakattar* are either extremely simple, as *putto jāyati* 'a boy is born', or, they are flavoured by Buddhism, in which case they are taken from *Kaccāyana*. The way Aggavaṃsa brings in the causal agent here is somewhat surprising. The verbs employed to define it, *hinoti*, *gacchati*, and *pavattati*, are not taken up again in *sutta* 550

which deals with the causal agent. It is also surprising that these verbs are not causatives, but Aggavaṃsa is probably proceeding in a very mechanical manner since *gati* is one of the senses attributed to \sqrt{hi} in the *Dhātumālā* (1225). The last three verses of the *kartradhikāra* of the *Vākya-padīya* deals with the causal agent. The final verse begins (VP 3.7.124): *nimittebhyah pravartante sarva eva svabhūtaye*, ‘for [various] reasons, everyone engages in activity for his own benefit’. Here we meet with the verb *prāvṛt* and in the commentary of Helārāja on this verse the forms *pravartamāna* and *pravṛtti* occur numerous times. Also in Kaiyaṭa’s commentary on A 1.4.55 *tatprayojako hetuś ca*, ‘the prompter of that [agent A 1.4.54] is [called] cause and also [agent A 1.4.54]’, the word *pravartana* occurs (MbhP II:438): *evam manyate — praiśād ūrdhvaṃ prayojyasya svavyāpāre pravartanāt svātantryam*, ‘the thought is as follows: after being called upon [to act] the one who has been prompted [keeps] his independence since he engages in his own activity’. Both *pravartana* and *pravṛtti* occur also later in the passage. The forms *pravṛtta*, *pravṛtti*, and *pravartana* occur also in the *Padamañjari* in the context of A 1.4.54. Haradatta here quotes the two opening verses of the *kartradhikāra* of the *Vākya-padīya*. The first of these runs (VP 3.7.101):

*prāg anyataḥ śaktilābhān nyagbhāvāpādanād api /
tadadhīnapravṛttivāt pravṛttānām nivartanāt //*

[The independence of the agent is claimed] because he gets his ability [to participate in the action] before any other [participant], moreover, because of [his] bringing about the subordination [of others], because of the activity of those subject to him, because he stops those engaged in activity.

Could it be that one or more of these occurrences inspired Aggavaṃsa to include the verb *pavattati*?

The *kammakattar*, the object-agent, concerns the agent of actions denoted by what is often referred to as reflexive verbs.¹ Already Pāṇini uses the term (A 3.1.62 *acaḥ karmakartari*), and the *karmakarṭṛ* construction is taught by rule 3.1.87 *karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyah* which states that an agent (A 3.1.68) that acts like an object is treated like an object.² The purpose of the rule is above all to trigger passive morphology, and the agent may be viewed as parallel to the object of a transitive sentence. Accordingly, *sayam eva kaṭo karīyati* and *sayam eva pacīyati odano* should not be viewed as passive sentences in as much as one could not specify some agent of these actions without changing the meaning of the sentences: *devadattena pacīyati odano* would mean that Devadatta cooks the rice, in contrast to ‘the rice is boiling’. In order to underline this difference the commentators add *svayam eva* ‘by itself; on its own’, though Kātyāyana (A 3.1.87, vtt. 9–10) derives the *karmakarṭṛ* construction *odanaḥ pacīyate* from *odanaḥ pacīyata ātmanā* by elision of *ātmanā* ‘by itself’. Does this no longer make it a *karmakarṭṛ*-construction? The direct use of an item such as *ātman* to express a reflexive construction reminds one of Middle Indo-Aryan where this might be the only available device. The examples offered by Aggavaṃsa for the *kammakattar* construction occur already in the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 3.1.87. One wonders whether such constructions occur in Pāli at all.

Aggavaṃsa goes on to expand the threefold classification into a fivefold one. This enterprise is simply a category error. His including the *abhihitakattar* and the *anabhihitakattar* reflects a device in Pāṇini’s grammar. The restriction rule A 2.3.1 *anabhihite*, ‘if not expressed [already]’, secures a principle underlying *kāraka* theory: a *kāraka* can only be expressed once. A verbal ending can express *karṭṛ*, *karman*, or

¹ That this is misleading and that we are not merely dealing with a reflexive agent in the ordinary sense has been pointed out by P. Filliozat (1983:12). Clearly, a verb such as *pacati* ‘is cooking’ is not reflexive but ‘the rice’ when we say ‘the rice is cooking’ is both agent and object.

² The interpretation of A 3.1.87 has been discussed recently by S.D. Joshi (1982), P. Filliozat (1983), and M. Deshpande (1985), but I refrain from going into details here.

bhāva. A choice in this respect determines the further choice of morphology in the derivational process. For example, in a sentence such as *devadattaḥ pacaty odanam*, ‘Devadatta boils rice’, agency is expressed by the active, finite verb ending. In Pāṇinian derivation this goes back to the choice that the *la-kāra LAṬ* signify the agent. The agent here would thus be an *abhihitakāraka* and the rules for *kāraḥ* and case suffixes then secure that the nominative case ending is assigned to the nominal stem *devadatta-*. Rule A 2.3.46 *prātipadikārthalinga-parimāṇavacanamātre prathamā* teaches that the first case ending, the nominative ending, is added merely to denote the gender and number of the nominal stem¹ meaning.² The nominative ending, then, does not express any *kāraka*. If the *la-kāra LAṬ* had been chosen to express the object (*karman*), then the agent would not have been expressed already and so the instrumental case which expresses the agent would be assigned to the stem *devadatta-*: *devadattena pacyata odanaḥ*, ‘rice is boiled by Devadatta’. Surely, the terms *abhihitakarṭṛ* and *anabhihitakarṭṛ* do occur in Sanskrit works on grammar, but this division has to do with the way the *kāraka* agent is expressed, that is, it only triggers morphological rules which depend on whether one has chosen an active or passive construction, and it can in no way be said to represent two further types of agent in the way the three previous categories do.

The example *ahinā datṭho naro* is offered by Kaccāyana under the *kattar* rule (143). The definition of the *kattukāraka* as *abhinipphādana* is not familiar to me from any source.

¹ A 1.2.45 *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam* states that a nominal stem, *prātipadika*, is a meaningful linguistic unit which is neither a verbal root, nor a suffix, nor a form which ends in a suffix. A 1.2.46 *ḥṛitaddhitasamāsās ca* teaches that a derived linguistic unit that ends in a *ḥṛi* suffix, a *taddhita* suffix or is a compound is also a nominal stem, *prātipadika*.

² This is one possible interpretation of A 2.3.46. The most common traditional interpretation takes the rule to teach that the nominative case ending is added merely to denote the meaning of the nominal stem, its gender, measure, and number.

2.3.1 Agency, non-existence, and empty terms

549 *Asantaṃ santaṃ va kappīyati, tañ ca. Yam asantaṃ santaṃ viya buddhiyā parikkappīyati, tañ ca kattusaññaṃ bhavati: saññoḅo jāyati, abhāvo hoti, sasavisāṇaṃ tiṭṭhati, udumbarapupphaṃ vikaṣati, vañjhāputto dhāvati.*

‘That which is non-existent is considered as if it were existent; that too [is assigned to the category of the agent].’ That which, though non-existent, is considered by the mind as if it were existent is also something to which the name *kattar* ‘agent’ applies: ‘a connection is coming about’; ‘non-existence¹ exists’; ‘the hare’s horn exists’; ‘the fig-tree flower is blooming’; ‘the son of the barren woman is running’.

There is no trace of this rule in *Kaccāyana*, and it seems to me completely superfluous. First of all, the rule seems to reflect — mindlessly — the wording of an important verse in the *Vākyapadīya* where Bhartṛhari expresses a fundamental view on *kāraḥ* in general (VP 3.7.3):

*sādhavyavahāras ca buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ /
sann asan vārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate //*

Also the practice of [referring to] the means [of an action] is dependent on [the speaker’s] frame of mind. Difference in the form of things, whether it is existent or non-existent, is conceived by the mind.²

¹ Or, possibly, ‘something non-existent’.

² This concerns the notion of *vivakṣā* ‘the wish to express’, in this context the freedom of the speaker to choose how to talk about the participants of an action.

Secondly, the rule reflects the same view that was expressed in the *vutti* on the previous rule, namely that grammar deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about. This view is formulated explicitly by Helārāja in his commentary on the *kartradhikāra* of the *Vākyapadiya* (Hel 313,16): *vyākaraṇe hi śabdārtho 'rthaḥ na vastvarthaḥ*, 'in grammar, meaning/object is the meaning/object conveyed by words, not real objects'. Later in the same *adhikāra* he states (Hel 316,12): *idānīm śabdārtho 'rtha iti svasiddhāntaṃ nigamayitum āha*, 'in order to conclude his own view that the object/meaning is the object/meaning conveyed by words, he [=Bhartṛhari] now states: ...'. This introduces the following two verses (VP 3.7.109–10):

*bhāveṣv eva padanyāsaḥ prajñāyā vāca eva vā |
nāstīty apy apade nāsti na ca sad bhidyate tataḥ ||
buddhiśabdau pravartete yathābhūteṣu vastuṣu |
teṣāṃ anyena tattvena vyavahāro na vidyate ||*

Both for knowledge and for speech forms any display of scope is based on existing things. The [utterance] 'it does not exist' does not exist when there is no scope, nor is that which exists any different from that [which does not exist in this respect]. [Both] cognition and speech function with regard to things as experienced; through no other principle can there be [scope for linguistic] usage of them.

It is noteworthy that these verses occur in the very section where the problem caused by expressions such as *ankuro jāyate* is discussed. This may account for Aggavaṃsa's example *saññogo jāyati* which, to me at least, seems peculiar. Consider also the wording of the *sutta* and its expansion in the *vutti* (*Asantaṃ santaṃ va kappīyati, tañ ca. Yaṃ asantaṃ santaṃ viya buddhiyā parikappīyati*) in the light of the following passage from Helārājā's commentary on the first of the verses cited (Hel 316,16–19):

tathā hi nāstīty abhāvālaṃbanau kañ cana paraparikalpitaṃ svayam utprekṣitaṃ vākāram avalaṃbya jāyete yena sadākārāvalaṃbanābhyāṃ jñānaśabdābhyāṃ anayor viśeṣābhāvah, svākārāvagrahasāmyād iti vyavahāre sarvam eva bhāvābhāvajātaṃ samānam |

For instance, [when one says] 'it does not exist' both non-existence and cognition arise in dependence upon some form — be that imagined through something else or itself observed — since in the case of both [word and cognition] there is non-existence of something specific, because both word and cognition are dependent upon some existing form in as much as it does not matter whether it takes on its own form, [and] thus it is all equally arising — be that something existing or something non-existing — when there is linguistic usage [of it].

As for the rest of the examples offered by Aggavaṃsa, they illustrate the points made here. The terms chosen for this purpose are the standard examples in Sanskrit literature for so-called empty terms, terms which possess meaning but no reference, or Sinn but not Bedeutung, to use Frege's terminology.

2.3.2 The causal agent: *hetu*

550 Yo kāreti yo vā u[pa]tṭhāpayati,¹ so hetu. Idhā pi vāsaddo vikappanatto, tena aññe pi atthā yojetabbā, evam uttaratrā pi: puriso purisaṃ kammaṃ kāreti, āsanā u[pa]tṭhāpeti, pāsānaṃ u[pa]tṭhāpayati.

'The one that causes [someone else] to act or [for example] the one that generates, that [*kāraka*] is the *hetu* "causal agent".'

¹ Ce Be ns *uṭṭhāp°*; Bm *upaṭṭhāp°*.

Here as well the word *vā* has the sense of option and through it even other senses are to be included, as [seen] also subsequently: ‘a man makes a man perform an action’; ‘[a man] makes [a man] lift up a stone’; ‘[a man] makes [a man] arise from [his] seat’.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs *yo kāreti sa hetu* (143). Why Aggavaṃsa has chosen just *u[pa]tthāpayati* as the second half of the definition I am not able to tell, but again he makes it clear how his use of *vā* is intended. The fact that he repeats here the explanation he gave under the previous rule makes one wonder whether this is to stress that it is always the case that *vā* should be understood in this way, or whether it is uniquely to be understood in this way also here but not when it occurs in subsequent definitions. I am inclined to believe in the first of these alternatives.

Kaccāyana gives the example *so puriso taṃ purisaṃ kāreti*, moving on to treat *taṃ purisaṃ* as a variable by giving it also in the instrumental and genitive case. He then adds *evaṃ vihāreti, pāleti, pāṭheti, dhāreti, pāceti, nāyeti*. This makes it likely that in Aggavaṃsa’s examples *puriso purisaṃ* is to be supplied in the last two cases.

2.4 The object: *kamma*

551 Yam kurute yaṃ vā passati, taṃ kammaṃ.
Karīyate taṃ kiriyāya pāpunīyate ti kammaṃ.
Kiriyāpattilakkaṇaṃ kammakāraṃ. Taṃ tividhaṃ
nibbattanīyādivasena, sattavidham api keci icchanti
icchitādivasena. Tattha rathaṃ karoti, sukhaṃ janayati, puttam
vijāyati, aladdham pattheti ti idaṃ nibbattanīyaṃ nāma;
kaṭṭham āngāraṃ karoti, suvaṇṇaṃ keyūraṃ kaṭakaṃ vā
karoti, vihayo lunāti idaṃ vikaraṇīyaṃ nāma; taṃ duvidham:
pariccattakāraṇaṃ apariccattakāraṇaṃ ti, tattha
pariccattakāraṇaṃ nāma, yaṃ kāraṇassa vināseṇa

sambhūtaṃ, apariccattakāraṇaṃ nāma, yattha kāraṇabhūte
vatthumhi vijjamaṇe yeva guṇantaruppattiyā vohārabhedo
dissati; ubhayaṃ pan’ etaṃ yathādassitapayogavasena
daṭṭhabbam; nivesanaṃ pavisati, Ādiccaṃ namassati, rūpaṃ
passati, dhammaṃ suṇāti, paṇḍite payirupāsati, manasā
Pāṭaliputtam gacchati idaṃ pāpanīyaṃ nāma, tathā hi
nivesanaṃ pavisati ti ādisu nivesanādīnaṃ kiriyāya na koci
viseso karīyati aññatra sampattimattā; bhattaṃ bhuñjati icc
ādisu bhattādi icchitakammaṃ nāma, visaṃ gilati icc ādisu
visaṃ anicchitakammaṃ nāma, gāmaṃ gacchanto
rukkaṃmūlam upasaṃkamati icc ādisu rukkaṃmūlādi
nevicchitanānicchitakammaṃ nāma; ajaṃ gāmaṃ nayati,
Yaññadattaṃ kambalaṃ yāceti brāhmaṇo, samiddham
dhanaṃ bhikkhati, “rājānaṃ etad abravi”¹ icc ādisu ajādayo
kathitakammaṃ nāma, gāmādayo akathitakammaṃ nāma,
tathā hi ajaṃ gāmaṃ nayati ti ettha ajo kathitakammaṃ
dvikammikāya nayanakiriyāya pattum icchitatarattā, gāmo
pana appadhānattā akathitakammaṃ, esa nayo itaresu pi —
puriso purisaṃ kammaṃ kāreti icc ādisu pana
āñattapurisādayo kattukammaṃ nāma kattā ca so kammaṃ cā
ti atthena; mayā ijate buddho, Yaññadatto kambalaṃ yācīyate
brāhmaṇeṇa, “nāgo maṇiṃ yācito brāhmaṇeṇa”² icc
evamādisu buddhādayo abhihitakammaṃ nāma ākhyāteṇa
paccayena vā kathitattā; chattaṃ karoti, ghaṭaṃ karoti icc ādisu
chattādayo anabhihitakammaṃ nāma ākhyāteṇa akathitattā.

‘What one does or [for example] what one sees, that [*kāraka*] is the *kamma* “object”.’ It is done (*karīyate*), it is attained through the action, thus [it is called] object (*kamma*). The *kāraka* which is the object has as its defining characteristic the reaching [something] through an action. It is of three kinds: in as much as

¹ Sadd 600,28; Ja IV 462,2.

² Sadd 338,22; 600,25; Vin III 147,22 = Ja II 285,22.

it is to be produced etc.; others teach that it is also sevenfold in as much as it is wanted etc. For example: ‘he makes a chariot’; ‘he makes pleasure arise’; ‘she gives birth to a son’; ‘he longs for something he has not got’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be produced (*nibbattaniya*); ‘he makes wood [into] charcoal’; ‘he makes gold [into] a bracelet or a ring’; ‘he cuts paddy’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be modified (*vikaraṇiya*). The latter is twofold: the one that has left [its] (material) cause behind (*pariccattakāraṇa*) and the one that has not left [its] cause behind (*apariccattakāraṇa*). Among these we call that the one that has left [its] cause behind which has come about as a result of destruction of the cause, [and] we call that the one that has not left [its] cause behind where a different designation is noticed as a result of the birth of a different property [pertaining to the object] only when that which existed as cause is met with in the objects. But this pair is to be considered according to demonstrated usage. ‘He enters the abode’; ‘he venerates the Āditya’; ‘he perceives form’; ‘he hears the doctrine’; ‘he reveres the learned’; ‘he goes to Pāṭaliputra in his mind’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be attained (*pāpaniya*); for in such a way no difference is made to the abode etc. by the action in [sentences] such as ‘he enters the abode’ other than the mere attainment. In [sentences] such as ‘he eats rice’, rice etc. is what we call the object which is wanted (*icchitakamma*); in [sentences] such as ‘he swallows poison’, the poison is what we call the object which is unwanted (*anicchitakamma*); in [sentences] such as ‘going to the village he comes to the foot of the tree’, the foot of the tree etc. is what we call the object which is neither wanted nor unwanted (*nevicchitanānicchitakamma*). In [sentences] such as ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’, ‘the Brahman begs Yajñadatta [for] a blanket’, ‘he begs the rich [for] wealth’, ‘he spoke this [to] the king’, the goat etc. is what we call the object

which is specified (*kathitakamma*) [and] the village etc. is what we call the object which is unspecified (*akathitakamma*); for thus, with regard to [the sentence] ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’, the goat is the object which is specified in as much as it is the object that is most wished to be attained through the action of leading which has two objects, but the village is the object which is unspecified since it is subordinate; this principle [applies] also in the rest [of the examples]. But in such [sentences] as ‘a man makes a man perform an action’, the man who is ordered etc. is what we call the agent-object (*kattukamma*) according to an analysis [as a *karmadhāraya* compound]: ‘it is agent and it is object’. In [sentences] such as ‘the Buddha is honoured by me’, ‘Yajñadatta is asked [for] a blanket by the Brahman’, ‘the Nāga is asked [for] the jewel by the Brahman’, the Buddha etc. is what we call the object which has been expressed already (*abhihitakamma*) in as much as it is specified (*kathita*) by a finite verb or by a suffix. In [sentences] such as ‘he makes a sunshade’, ‘he makes a pot’, the sunshade etc. is what we call the object which has not already been expressed (*anabhihitakamma*) in as much as it has not been specified (*akathita*) by a finite verb.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs *yaṃ karoti taṃ kammaṃ* but the *vutti* is more elaborate (142–43): *Yaṃ vā karoti yaṃ vā passati yaṃ vā suṇāti taṃ kāraṃ kammaṃ kammaṇṇaṃ hoti*. Not only does this account for one possible source of the alternative definition given in the *Saddanīti*, but it seems to me also to reveal why Aggavaṃsa (twice) explained how he intended the particle *vā* to function when he offers two alternatives in his definitions: *passati*, like *jāyati* and *u[pa]tthāpayati* in the preceding rules, stands for other things too. It should be noted, however, that the particular choice of the verb *passati* could also be motivated by the fact that it is dealt with as a special case in the *karmādhikāra* of the *Sādhana-samuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. I shall return to this later on.

Aggavaṃsa claims that *kamma* is of three kinds, starting with the *nibbattaniya*, or, according to others, of seven kinds, starting with the *icchita*. It is therefore somewhat surprising to note that one seems to end up with three plus eight, at least if one counts them as listed. One way to account for this discrepancy, however, would be to take the first three as also constituting the first three of the group of seven, then take the *icchita*-, *anicchita*- and *necchitanānicchita-kamma* as the fourth group, the *kathita*- and *akathitakamma* as the fifth, the *kattukamma* as the sixth, and the *abhihita*- and *anabhihita-kamma* as the seventh. This makes sense although it is not exactly what Aggavaṃsa has stated. Otherwise one would have to conclude that his counting abilities were not too good. But if one turns to the *Vākyapadīya*, one will find that there *karman* is said primarily to be of three major kinds to which four minor ones are added. This would give us a classification as three or as seven. Although Aggavaṃsa presents us with a distorted version, it is clear that the *Saddanīti* classification in some way or other goes back to the one met with in the *Vākyapadīya* (VP 3.7.45–46):

*nirvartyaṃ ca vikāryaṃ ca prāpyaṃ ceti tridhā matam /
tatrepsitatamaṃ karma caturdhānyat tu kalpitam //
audāsīnyena yat prāpyaṃ yac ca kartur anīpsitam /
saṃjñāntarair anākhyātaṃ yad yac cāpy anyapūrvakam //*

Among them [= the *kāraṅkas*] the object, being what is most desired, is considered to be of three kinds, as it is to be produced, modified or attained. Furthermore, it has been imagined as fourfold: that which is to be attained through indifference and that which is not desired by the agent, that which has not been designated by another technical term [= another *kāraṅka* category] and that which previously had another [*kāraṅka* designation].

To me it seems reasonable to think Aggavaṃsa was familiar with the existence of a classification into three and four, adding up to form seven. It seems, however, that he just pushes all the information he possesses into this straightjacket without really having a grip on details or on what exactly constitutes a group. That the *Saddanīti* classification doubtlessly goes back to the one met with in the *Vākyapadīya* will be clear from the following chart of parallels:

<i>Saddanīti:</i>	<i>Vākyapadīya:</i>
<i>nibbattaniya</i>	<i>nirvartya</i>
<i>vikaraṇiya</i>	<i>vikārya</i>
<i>pāpaniya</i>	<i>prāpya</i>
<i>icchita</i>	[<i>īpsitama</i>]
<i>anicchita</i>	<i>anīpsita</i>
<i>nevicchitanānicchita</i>	<i>audāsīnyaprāpya</i>
<i>kathita / akathita</i>	<i>saṃjñāntarānākhyāta</i>
∅	<i>anyapūrvaka</i>
<i>kattukamma</i>	∅
<i>abhihita / unabhihita</i>	∅

I consider it worthwhile to enter into a more detailed discussion here:

1. *nibbattaniya*: This category clearly corresponds to Bharṭhari's *nirvartya*. I shall discuss some issues pertaining to this pair in the context of the *vikaraṇiya / vikārya* type.

2. *vikaraṇiya*: This obviously corresponds to *vikārya*. Aggavaṃsa says this is of two kinds, as the one that has left its material cause behind (*pariccattakāraṇa*) and the one that has not left its material cause behind (*apariccattakāraṇa*). There can be no doubt that Aggavaṃsa intends this twofold classification to pertain to the *vikaraṇiya*

alone.¹ Now, in the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari expands on the *nirvartya*, and not the *vikārya*, as follows (VP 3.7.47):

*satī vāvidyamānā vā prakṛtiḥ pariṇāminī |
yasya nāśrīyate tasya nirvartyatvaṃ pracakṣate //*

The property of being produced is said to belong to that whose material cause which undergoes transformation — whether it is existent or not — is not taken into consideration [for the statement].

That is to say, the property of being *nirvartya* pertains to that *karman* which is not viewed as a transformation of its material cause. The text continues (VP 3.7.48):

*prakṛtes tu vivakṣāyāṃ vikāryaṃ kaiś cid anyathā |
nirvartyaṃ ca vikāryaṃ ca karma śāstre pradarsitam //*

But when the speaker intends [to express] the material cause, then it [is called] *vikārya*; *karman* as *nirvartya* and *vikārya* has been defined differently by others in the Śāstra.

In other words, where Aggavaṃsa comes up with a division of the *vikaraṇīya* according to whether it has left its material cause behind or not, Bhartṛhari primarily applies this division as a difference between the *nirvartya* and the *vikārya*. Note in passing that Helārāja (Hel 268,1) glosses *prakṛteḥ* here by *kāraṇasya*, the word preferred by Aggavaṃsa to denote the material cause. Bhartṛhari goes on to say that in the Śāstra others have defined the difference between *nirvartya* and *vikārya* differently (VP 3.7.49–50):

¹ cf. his wording: °*idaṃ vikaraṇīyaṃ nāma — taṃ duvidhaṃ: pariccattakāraṇaṃ apariccattakāraṇaṃ ti.*

*yad asaj jāyate sad vā janmanā yat prakāśyate |
tan nirvartyaṃ vikāryaṃ ca karma dvedhā vyavasthitam //
prakṛtyucchedasambhūtaṃ kiṃ cid kāśṭhādibhasmavat |
kiṃ cid guṇāntarotpattiyā suvarṇādivikāravat //*

That [previously] non-existing [object] which is being born or that existing [object] which becomes manifest through its birth, that is the *nirvartya*, and the *vikārya* is established as of two kinds: One [kind of *vikāryakarman*] is that which results from destruction of the material cause, as ashes from wood etc., [and another is] the one [that results] from the arising of other properties, as the modification of gold etc. [into such things as jewellery].

The first distinction is between the *satkārya* and *asatkārya* views of causality, views which hold that the product exists in its cause or not, respectively. The latter distinction of two kinds of *vikārya*, however, is clearly what Aggavaṃsa has in mind when he states that the *vikaraṇīya kamma* is of two kinds. The first (*pariccattakāraṇa*) has left its cause behind since it came about as a result of destruction of the cause. The second (*apariccattakāraṇa*) has not left its cause behind in as much as a different name is applied due to the birth of a different property. This second type of *vikaraṇīyakamma* appears only when that which existed as cause is met with in the objects. Aggavaṃsa adds cryptically that this pair is to be considered according to demonstrated usage.

The distinction between *nirvartyakarman* and *vikāryakarman* is met with in the *Mahābhāṣya* under rule A 1.4.49 (Mbh I:332,15–19). In fact it is met with already in vt. 1 on A 3.2.1 *karmaṇy an*. The *vārttika* runs: *karmaṇi nirvartyamānavikriyamāṇe ced vedādhyāyādīnām upasaṃkhyānam*, ‘when an object is being produced or is being transformed, inclusion [should be made] of “study of Veda” etc.’. In the context of this *vārttika* Kaiyaṭa brings up Bhartṛhari’s division of *karman* into *nirvartya*, *vikārya*, and *prāpya* quoting *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.47, 50–51.

3. *pāpanīya*: This, of course, corresponds to Bhartṛhari's *prāpya* 'to be attained'. The relevant verse runs (VP 3.7.51):

*kriyākṛtā viśeṣānām siddhir yatra na gamyate /
darśanād anumānād vā tat prāpyam iti kathyate //*

That [object] upon which the establishment of differences that has come about through the action is understood neither by observation nor by inference, that [object] is called *prāpya* 'to be attained'.

In Helārāja's commentary on this verse we meet with the example *ādityam paśyati* 'he looks at the sun' (Hel 270,9). Whether or not it is a coincidence that Aggavaṃsa gives the example *Ādiccam namassati* in this context is hard to say. I am inclined to believe that this refers to the *gotra* or clan name of Śākyamuni's family, but of course this is not the only possible meaning of *ādicca* here.

The idea of adducing *prāpya* as a separate category is to distinguish objects which are merely attained without any effect being imposed on them by the action. But Bhartṛhari here adds that, according to some, actions such as seeing do have effects on the object of seeing (VP 3.7.52):

*viśeṣalābhaḥ sarvatra vidyate darśanādibhiḥ /
keṣāṃ cit tadabhivyaktisiddhir drṣṭiviśādiṣu //*

The attainment of difference [in the object] by such actions as seeing is observed everywhere, according to some. In the cases of such that have poison in their gaze a distinction is established in that [object of such actions].

It may be a common view that snakes should have poison in their gaze although I am not familiar with it, but the point he wants to

make is obvious: According to some, *all* actions, even the act of seeing, have an effect on their objects, and so the *prāpya* category would be superfluous. Whether this is the source for Aggavaṃsa's choice of 'what one sees' as the second alternative of his *kamma* definition or whether he took it straight from *Kaccāyana* is not possible to tell. I do not, however, think the *Vākyapadīya* link is without significance, since Aggavaṃsa clearly — through some source or other — is familiar with the divisions set forth in that work. The act of seeing is brought up again later in the *karmādhikāra* (VP 3.7.64–65).

So far so good, but with the *pāpanīya* any simple one to one correspondence between Aggavaṃsa and Bhartṛhari comes to an end. The subsequent categories common to both the *Saddanīti* and the *Vākyapadīya* reflect three rules from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, namely A 1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*, 50 *tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam*, and 51 *akathitaṃ ca*. These rules have recently provoked some discussion. The first of them assigns the name *karman* to that *kāraka* which is most desired to be attained by the agent. Rule A 1.1.50 then adds that also that which is not desired but is related to the action in a similar manner has the name *karman* assigned to it. Finally, to account for ditransitive constructions, rule A 1.4.51 teaches that the name *karman* is assigned also to that *kāraka* which is unspecified, that is, which has not otherwise been assigned to any specific *kāraka* category. My rendering of *īpsitatama* and of rules 50 and 51 rests on the traditional interpretation. S.D. Joshi (1976), on the other hand, suggests that *īpsitatama* should be understood in the more general sense of '(immediate) goal' and that it is the subsequent rule A 1.4.50 *tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam* which accounts for double accusative constructions of the type *mānavakaṃ panthānaṃ prcchati* 'he asks the boy the way'. This is echoed and developed further by P. Kiparsky (1982:39 foll.), who suggests that A 1.4.51 *akathitaṃ ca*, the rule held by the tradition to account for double accusatives, in fact accounts for elliptical constructions where the object is omitted from the sentence and therefore identified as *akathita* 'not expressed'. Recently M.M. Deshpande (1991) has discussed issues pertaining to the problem

of double accusative constructions, particularly when they are turned into passives. I refrain from entering into a discussion of these matters here, limiting myself to Aggavaṃsa's way of dealing with the issues.

4. *icchita*, *anicchita* and *nevicchitanānicchita*:

Bhartṛhari, as we saw, does not include Pāṇini's *īpsitatama* in his enumeration, but adds it as a general characterization of *karman* which is then divided further, first into three types and then into four more (VP 3.7.45–46). Aggavaṃsa, on the other hand, gives *icchita* as a separate type of *kamma*, seemingly on a par with *anicchitakamma* and *nevicchitanānicchitakamma*. As noted earlier, it is tempting to see these three as constituting one group in the *Saddanīti* enumeration, although Bhartṛhari classifies *anīpsita* and *audāsīnyena prāpya* as two distinct types of *karman*.

The word *anīpsita* reflects rule A 1.4.50 *tathāyuktam cānīpsitam* mentioned above. So does the *nevicchitanānicchitakamma* / *audāsīnyena prāpya* if *anīpsita* is taken as a negation of *īpsita* which encompasses the two other possibilities of being undesired or being the object of indifference. The example adduced by Aggavaṃsa for *anicchita*, namely *viṣam gilati* 'he swallows poison', is so frequently met with in Pāṇiniya literature that it seems fruitless to mention any text in particular. The word *udāsīna* occurs in Pāli but not any derivation corresponding to *audāsīnya*. This could account for Aggavaṃsa's choice of terminology. The *audāsīnya* category is, as far as I know, first met with in the *Vākyapadīya* classification. In Sanskrit works the standard example is *grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlāni upasarpati* 'going to the village he comes near the roots of a tree', met with for example in the *Kāśikā*. In Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.7.46 it is given in the form *grāmaṃ gantur vṛkṣamūlādi* where the *ādi* indicates the variety in its occurrence.

5. *kathita* and *akathita*: This draws directly on A 1.4.51 *akathitam ca*, 'also that which is unspecified'. Bhartṛhari is less ambiguous in his formulation (VP 3.7.46): *saṃjñāntarair anākhyātam*, 'that which has not been designated by another technical term', that is,

which has not already been assigned to any other *kāraka* category. As is clear from the examples, Aggavaṃsa uses this Pāṇiniya rule to account for the assignment to the category *kamma* of the second object of a double accusative construction such as *gāmaṃ* 'village' in *ajam gāmaṃ nayati*, 'he leads the goat [to] the village'.

In a *śloka-vārttika* quoted by Patañjali in the *Bhāṣya* on A 1.4.51 (Mbh I:334,1–2) we find that a specific list of verbal roots is given in order to teach the verbs which are involved in ditransitive constructions and the objects which are considered *akathita*. This is a feature very rarely resorted to by Sanskrit grammarians.¹ With the roots *duh* 'milk', *yāc* 'beg', *rudh* 'obstruct; lock up', *pracch* 'ask', *bhikṣ* 'beg', and *ci* 'pick', the cause of the object which is used, for example 'milk' with *duh*, is called *akathita* provided that no other designation has been taught previously; so too are the subordinate objects of *brū* 'speak' and *śās* 'instruct'. Patañjali subsequently states that only three of these are valid examples of ditransitive roots, namely, *yāc*, *pracch*, and *bhikṣ*, and gives the following examples (Mbh I:334,15): *pauravaṃ gāṃ yācate*, *māṇavakaṃ panthānaṃ prcchati*, and *pauravaṃ gāṃ bhikṣate*. The reason for this is probably his interpretation of *akathitam* 'unspecified'. He opens his discussion of the rule as follows (Mbh I:333,25): *kenākathitam / apādānādibhir viśeṣakathābhīḥ*, 'unspecified by what? By special designations such as *apādāna* etc.'. This is quoted also in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, but there we also meet with the verse quoting the whole list of roots. In as much as double accusative constructions involving other

¹ As pointed out by M.M. Deshpande (1991), this might have its background in the fact that difficulties arise when we try to turn a construction such as *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ*, 'he milks milk from the cow' (lit.: 'he milks the cow milk') into a passive construction. We are faced with two possibilities according to whether the cow or the milk is considered the primary object: *gaur duhyate payaḥ*, lit.: 'the cow is milked milk', or **gāṃ duhyate payaḥ*, lit.: 'milk is milked [from] the cow'. Deshpande has tried to provide a solution to this anomalous situation by investigating ideas scattered in commentaries. Aggavaṃsa does not touch upon this problem at all, although he does give the passive version of *Yaññadattam kambalaṃ yācati brāhmaṇo* as *Yaññadatto kambalaṃ yāciyate brāhmaṇena*, 'Y. is asked a blanket by the Brahman'.

than these three roots do occur in the Sanskrit language, the later tradition does not accept the limitation. Important in this respect is the view of Bhartṛhari¹ that assigning something to a *kāra* category is a function of the speaker's wish or intention (*vivakṣā*). Patañjali too recognises that ditransitive constructions with verbs other than the three listed do occur. He introduces another *Ślokavārttika*, quoted also by Helārāja,² with the words (Mbh I:335,18) *ke punar dhātūnām dvikarmakāḥ*, 'but which of the roots are ditransitive?'. Kaiyaṭa comments on this as follows (MbhP II:423): *duhyādipariḡaṇanād anyatra dvikarmakatvaṃ na prāpnoti, dṛśyate ceti matvā pṛcchati — ke punar iti*, 'the feature of taking two objects does not obtain elsewhere than [with regard to the roots] in the list beginning with [the root] *duh* "milk", but it is [nevertheless] observed. With this [fact] in mind, he asks: "but which" [are these roots]?' Patañjali then quotes the *ślokavārttika* and gives the following examples (Mbh I:335,19–22):

*nīvahyor harateś cāpi gatyarthānām tathaiva ca /
dvikarmakeṣu grahaṇam draṣṭavyam iti niścayaḥ //
ajām nayati grāmam / bhāram vahati grāmam / bhāram harati
grāmam / gatyarthānām / gamayati devadattam grāmam /
yāpayati devadattam grāmam /*

It has been settled that among ditransitive verbs one should observe mention of [the roots] *nī* 'lead', *vah* 'carry', and also of *hr* 'take', and likewise of [verbs] with the meaning of motion. [For example:] 'he leads the goat [to] the village', 'he carries the burden [to] the village', 'he takes the burden [to] the village'. Of verbs of motion: 'he makes Devadatta go [to] the village', 'he makes Devadatta move [to] the village'.

¹ VP 3.7.3, referred to in section 2.3.1 above.

² On VP 3.7.71.

Aggavaṃsa's examples cover only four of the verbs prescribed by the Pāṇiniya tradition: *nayati*, *yācati*, *bhikkhati*, and *brūti*. The examples given are standard, except for *rājānaṃ etad abravi* which Aggavaṃsa seems to have remembered from the canon (Ja IV 462,2). It is not in *Kaccāyana* where *kamma* is dealt with very briefly. Why Aggavaṃsa has chosen just these four examples is hard to ascertain. Is he indicating that these verbs were the only ditransitive ones occurring in Pāli, or is his choice completely arbitrary? It is noteworthy that Patañjali brings in causatives when he gives examples for verbs of motion, an issue I shall return to below.

With regard to Aggavaṃsa's identification of principal and subordinate objects the following verses in the *Vākyapadīya* are of interest (VP 3.7.70–71):

*sarvaṃ cākathitaṃ karma bhinnakakṣyaṃ pratīyate /
dhātvarthoddeśabhedena tan nepsitatamaṃ kila //
pradhānakarma kathitaṃ yat kriyāyāḥ prayojakam /
tatsiddhaye kriyāyuktam anyat tv akathitaṃ smṛtam //*

But every unspecified object is understood to fall under a different zone; because there is difference in the scope of the meaning of the root, it is indeed not what is most desired [to be obtained by the agent]. The principal object has been specified as that which prompts the action [to take place], but that which is connected with the action for attaining it [= the principal object] is something else, declared to be the unspecified.

6. *kattukamma*: Aggavaṃsa's introduction of the *kattukamma*, the object which is also the agent, that is, the agent which is prompted to do an action and so is the object of the agent of a causative verb, is peculiar. It does not correspond to Bhartṛhari's category of *anyapūrvaka* 'that which previously had another [*kāra* designation]'. The latter is interpreted by Helārāja (on VP 3.7.46) as referring to the

assignment of Devadatta to the category *karman* in sentences such as *devadattam abhikrudhyati* ‘[someone] is angry with D.’, whereas he is assigned to the category *sampradāna* when there is no preverb, as in *devadattāya krudhyati* ‘[someone] is angry with D.’. The *Saddanīti* text here becomes rather tricky too. Smith phrases it as follows (Sadd 692,30–31): “... akathitakammaṃ, esa nayo itaresu pi — *puriso purisaṃ kammaṃ kāreti* icc ādisu pana ...”. What did Smith intend by indicating a phrasing like this? What is the link between the preceding and the following passages? The word *pana* seems to indicate a contrast to the preceding, but in what way? It is hard to translate *esa nayo itaresu pi* in any other way than ‘this principle [applies] also in the rest [of the examples]’. But which are the rest of the examples? One would immediately think of the three adduced subsequently as similar to the one of the goat and the village. When it comes to the contrast indicated by the word *pana* it could be that Aggavaṃsa has in mind the causatives listed in the *śloka-vārttika* quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya*. But let us once again turn to the *Vākyapadīya*. Bhartṛhari deals with double accusative constructions at some length (VP 3.7.70–77). Of immediate interest are the following verses (VP 3.7.72–73):

duhyādīvan nayatyādau karmatvam akathāśrayam /
ākhyātānupayoge tu niyamāc cheṣa iṣyate //
antarbhūtaṇijarthānāṃ duhyādīnāṃ ṇijantavat /
siddham pūrveṇa karmatvaṃ ṇijantaniyamas tathā //

As in the case of [the roots] *duh* etc., the property of being object [applies also] in the case of [the roots] *nī* etc. based on the fact that they lack specification; but when there is no fitness for the action because of the restrictions [specified in the body of rules], the rest [= the genitive] is taught. For [roots] such as *duh* with the meaning of the causative suffix inherent, as if they ended in the causative suffix, the property of being object is previously established [by A 1.4.49]; thus a restriction [has

been made by A 1.4.52] with regard to [roots] ending in the causative suffix.

Bhartṛhari here suggests a causative solution to the problem of double accusatives. Instead of saying *ajāṃ grāmaṃ nayati* one could say *ajāṃ grāmaṃ gamayati* ‘he makes the goat go to the village’. If so, the goat would be the *prayoḥyakartr*, the agent which is prompted, and accordingly assigned to the category *karman* by A 1.4.52 *gatibuddhi-pratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakāṇām anikartā sa ṇau* which teaches that the agent of actions denoted by verbal roots meaning ‘move’, ‘know’, and ‘eat’, or roots the object of which is a word meaning ‘sound’, or intransitive verbs which are not in the causative, is assigned to the category *karman* in the causative.

On this view the two objects in a double accusative construction can no longer be graded as primary or secondary; they are both primary. Bhartṛhari eventually gives up this view (VP 3.7.76–77), but this could nevertheless — via some channel or other — be the reason why Aggavaṃsa (apparently) makes a contrast to the previous division into primary and secondary objects for constructions like ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’.

In as much as the text is rather unclear at this point, it is tempting to speculate a little further. Could it be that when Aggavaṃsa talks about *itara* he has in fact misunderstood the meaning of the word *śeṣa* ‘rest’ in the *Vākyapadīya* verse? I am not saying that he is not aware that the word *śeṣa* denotes the genitive, only that he could have misinterpreted or had a badly transmitted version in this particular context. Moreover, Aggavaṃsa has clearly moved into the causative domain, but does he think that is what Bhartṛhari indicates by *anyapūrvaka* ‘that which previously had another [*kāraka* designation]’, namely the change from agent to object in the causative?

7. *abhihita* and *anabhihita*: Aggavaṃsa finally introduces the *abhihitakamma* and the *anabhihitakamma* in the same manner as he introduced the *abhihitakattar* and the *anabhihitakattar* above (2.3), and

my remarks in that context would be valid also here. He simply talks about objects in passive constructions as *abhihita* ‘already expressed’ and thus taking a nominative case ending, and about objects in active constructions as being *anabhihita* ‘not expressed already’ and thus taking an accusative case ending. In other words, we are not really dealing with different *types* of objects, only with differences in the morphology that expresses them. In an attempt at making Aggavaṃsa’s enumeration add up I have in the case of *kamma* treated the *abhihita* and *anabhihita* as one category. True, this does not correspond with what he did for the agent, where he expanded a threefold classification into a fivefold one by inclusion of the *abhihitakattar* and the *anabhihitakattar*. Some internal inconsistencies will thus stubbornly remain.

2.5 The instrument: *karaṇa*

552 Yena kurute yena vā passati, tam pi karaṇam.
Kariyati kiriyam janeti anena kattuno upakaraṇabhūtena vatthunā ti karaṇam. Ettha ca, sati pi sabbakāraṇānaṃ kiriyā-sādhakatte, ‘yena kurute’ ti ādi visesetvā vacanam¹ kattūpa-karaṇabhūtesu sādhanesu sādhatamass’ eva gahanattham. Kiriyāsambhāralakkhaṇam karaṇakāraṇam. Tam duvidham ajjhattikabāhiravasena: “cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati sotena saddaṃ suṇāti ... manasā dhammaṃ vijānāti”,² hatthena kammaṃ karoti, pharasunā rukkham chindati.

‘That by means of which one acts or [for example] that by means of which one sees, that too is [the *kāraka*] *karaṇa* “instrument”.’ Something is done with it, [or] one accomplishes an action with it, [that is,] with a thing being an implement for

¹ Smith reads *visesetvā-vacanam* with a hyphen. His reason for doing so escapes me. I take *visesetvā* to be the absolutive of a causative and *vacanam*, the subject, to go with *gahanattham*.

² D II 338,19–22.

the agent, thus [it is called] instrument (*karaṇa*). And with regard to this, although the property of being a means of [accomplishing] an action pertains to all *kāraṇas*, [this] statement, having specified ‘that by means of which’ etc., is intended for the understanding of only the most effective means among the means which work as implements for the agent. The *kāraka* which is the instrument is characterized as the implement of the action.¹ It is of two kinds, as internal and external: ‘He sees shape/colour by means of the faculty of seeing, he hears sound by means of the faculty of hearing, ... he understands the doctrine by means of the faculty of thinking’; ‘he performs an action by means of the hand’; ‘he cuts the tree by means of an axe’.

The *Kaccāyana* definition runs (141): *yena vā kayirate tam karaṇam*. The *vutti* explains: *yena vā kayirate yena vā passati yena vā suṇāti tam karaṇam ...*. As Senart points out (142), this is not necessarily the obvious interpretation of *vā* in *Kaccāyana*’s definition, but it is in complete agreement with Aggavaṃsa’s and with the examples the latter offers. Apart from the final example in the *Dīghanikāya* quotation, all examples occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti*.

Aggavaṃsa obviously felt the need to include the core of Pāṇini’s definition (A 1.4.42): *sādhakatamaṃ kāraṇam* ‘the most effective means [is called] the instrument’. All *kāraṇas* are instrumental in bringing about an action. The superlative suffix *-tama* therefore serves to point out the means *par excellence*. The discussion brought up by Aggavaṃsa is met with already in the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 1.4.42. Aggavaṃsa’s treatment of the *karaṇa*, then, does not bring in any new material. All he does is to elaborate on the *Kaccāyana* definition in the by now familiar way of including options, and then link this definition to the one given by Pāṇini and to a basic issue in the discussion of the

¹ Smith (CT 5.1.1.3): ‘l’outillage de l’action’.

Pāṇiniyas. Aggavaṃsa's division into *ajjhattika* 'personal; internal' and *bāhira* 'external', on the other hand, I am not familiar with at all. It is certainly not met with in the *Vākyapadīya* from where several of his divisions stem. The focus of the discussion in that text is on degrees of instrumentality and on whether one talks about properties or things as instruments. But the opposition *ajjhattika-bāhira* is familiar from Buddhist literature, particularly in the context of *skandha*-, *āyatana*-, and *dhātu*-analysis.¹ In the present context of grammar, however, I find it hard to understand how the division serves any purpose at all.

2.6 The recipient etc.: *sampadāna*

The *sampadāna* is dealt with at length in the *Saddanīti*. This is the case also in the *Kaccāyanavutti*. Moreover, the two texts follow an identical procedure; one rule deals with the more general exposition and is followed by another rule which points out special cases and which is elaborated upon at great length with a multitude of examples in the *vutti*. Among all the *kārakas* only the *apādāna* is dealt with in the same extensive manner.

553 Yassa dātukāmo yassa vā ruccati, taṃ sampadānaṃ. *Yassa vā dātukāmo yassa vā ruccati yassa vā khamati yassa vā dhārayate, taṃ kārakaṃ sampadānasaññaṃ hoti: samaṇassa dānaṃ dātukāmo samaṇassa cīvaram dadāti, tassa purisassa bhattaṃ ruccati "gamaṇaṃ mayhaṃ ruccati",² "mā āyasmantānaṃ saṃghabhedo ruccittha",³ Devadattassa suvaṇnacchattaṃ dhārayate Yaññadatto. Sammā pakārena assa dadāti ti sampadānaṃ paṭiggāhako. Paṭiggahana-lakkhaṇaṃ sampadānakārakaṃ. Taṃ pan' etaṃ sampadānaṃ tividhaṃ hoti anirākaraṇ'-ajjhesanānumativasena; tathā hi*

¹ e.g. MI 61,12; cf. CPD.

² Ja VI 544,1.

³ Vin III 175,21.

kiñci dīyamānassa anirākaraṇena sampadānasaññaṃ labhati yathā: buddhassa puppham dadāti, rukkhassa jalam dadāti ti, kiñci ajjhesanena: yācakānaṃ bhojanaṃ dadāti ti, kiñci anumatiyā: Nārāyanassa baliṃ dadāti, bhikkhussa bhattaṃ dadāti ti. Ettha ca sāsane yuttito rocanatthe sampadānavacanaṃ ca upayogavacanaṃ ca dissati: samaṇassa rocate saccam, "tassa te saggakāmassa ekattam uparocitam",¹ "kiss' assa ekadhammassa vadhaṃ rocesi Gotama",² "purisassa vadhaṃ na roceyyam",³ "kim nu jātiṃ na rocesi"⁴ ādisu, ruccanatthe pana sampadānavacanam eva dissati: "na me ruccati bhaddante ulūkassābhiseccanaṃ"⁵ ti ādisu; tasmā ayaṃ nīti sādhuṃkaṃ manasikātabbā.

[That *kāraka*⁶ to whom [the agent] has a desire to give, or [for example] [that *kāraka*] to whom [something] is pleasing, [is called] *sampadāna* "recipient".⁷ One to whom [the agent has] a desire to give, or one to whom [something] is pleasing, or one to whom [something] is fitting, or [for example] one to whom [something] is owed, that *kāraka* is something to which the technical name *sampadāna* applies. [For example:] 'There is a wish to give a gift to the Śramaṇa'; 'he gives a robe to the Śramaṇa'; 'food pleases this man'; 'going pleases me'; 'division in the Saṃgha should not please the venerable ones'; 'Yajñadatta owes Devadatta a golden sunshade'. In the proper (*sammā* = *sa*) way (*prakāreṇa* = *pra*) one gives to that one, thus [it is called] *sampadāna*, [that is,] the one who receives.

¹ Ja VI 64,28.

² S 147,9 = 161,4.

³ Ja VI 572,23.

⁴ S I 132,25 = Thī 190a.

⁵ Ja II 353,15.

⁶ Normally animate and most frequently a person.

⁷ As noted already, 'recipient' is not a fully adequate rendering of *sampadāna*. See p. 10, note 3 above.

The *kāraka* which is the *sampadāna* is characterized by receiving. Now, this *sampradāna* is threefold in as much as [the giving is characterized by] non-rejecting (*anirākaraṇa*), requesting (*ajjhesana*), or approval (*anumati*). For thus [a *kāraka*] to whom something is being given through non-rejection gets the technical name *sampadāna*, as for example: ‘He gives a flower to the Buddha’; ‘he gives water to the tree’; [likewise] one [to whom] something [is given] by request [as in]: ‘He gives food to the beggars’; [and likewise] one [to whom] something [is given] by approval [as in]: ‘He gives an offering to Nārāyana’; ‘he gives food to the monk’. And here in the teaching both the statement of *saṃ* and the statement of *upa* are appropriately taught when the sense is that of approval as in such [sentences] as: ‘Truth pleases the Śramaṇa’; ‘solitude has appealed to you who desire heaven’; ‘you find pleasure in the slaughter of what single thing, Gotama?’; ‘may I not find pleasure in the slaughter of a man’; ‘why do you not approve of birth?’ But in such [sentences] as: ‘I dislike, venerable ones, the Anointment of the Owl’, only the statement of the *sampadāna* appears when there is the sense of *ruccana* ‘to seem good to’. Accordingly this principle demands keen attention.

The *Kaccāyana* definition runs (134): *yassa dātukāmo rocate vā dhārayate vā taṃ sampadānaṃ*. It is noteworthy that Aggavaṃsa has replaced *rocate* with *ruccati*, a form based on a weaker grade of the root. This, it seems, is in agreement with his peculiar subsequent distinction between *rocanatthe* and *ruccanatthe*. As usual Aggavaṃsa gives only two alternatives in his definition, but the exclusion of *dhārayate* could be motivated by the fact that this verb is listed separately in the subsequent rule as it also is in *Kaccāyana*.

A *nirvacana*, semantic analysis, of the term *sampadāna* very similar to the one offered by Aggavaṃsa is met with in the *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (KāśN I:546): *samyak prakarṣeṇa dīyate* ‘properly,

excellently it is given’. The *Nyāsa* is definitely earlier than the 11th century, maybe as early as the 7th.

The threefold division of the *sampadāna*, on the other hand, goes back to the *Vākyapadīya* (3.7.129):

*anirākaraṇāt kartus tyāgāṅgam karmaṇepsitam /
preraṇānumatibhyāṃ ca labhate sampradānatām //*

That element in [the act of] forsaking which is the goal to be attained by the object [of the action of giving, i.e. the gift,] attains the property of being the *sampradāna* [either] from not refusing (*anirākaraṇāt*) the agent [of giving], or from urging (*preraṇāt*) [the giver] or from giving consent (*anumateḥ*).

Apart from the replacement of the term *preraṇa* with the synonymous term *ajjhesana* the classification is the same.

As for the examples, one may be puzzled by the fact that a Burmese Buddhist comes up with *nārāyanassa balim dadāti*, ‘he gives an offering to Nārāyana’. It is noteworthy then that Helārāja makes the following statement in his commentary on VP 3.7.129 (Hel 332,8–9): *tathā dīyamānaṃ na nirākaroti balyādi devatādīti tad api kriyāṅgam*, ‘thus, such [an entity] as a deity [who] does not decline such [an entity] as an offering which is being given [to it], that too is an element in the action [and gets the name *sampradāna*]’. Here we meet with the word *bali* ‘offering’ and an unspecified deity as the *sampradāna*.

The final issue to be brought up by Aggavaṃsa under this rule I find somewhat peculiar. He claims that both the statement of the *sampadāna* and the statement of the *upayoga* appears in such sentences as *samaṇassa rocate saccam*, ‘truth pleases the Śramaṇa’. Smith (CT 3.3.3) claims that *upayoga* is a term for the accusative case; so also CPD (s.v.) where reference is made to the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on A 1.4.51 *akathitam ca*. I doubt whether one could claim that this is the whole story. As noted already, it is rule 1.4.51 which — if we stick to the traditional

interpretation — accounts for double accusative constructions. The term *upayoga* occurs in the *śloka-vārttika* on this rule which specifies a list of ditransitive verbal roots. More precisely it occurs in the compound *upayoganimitta* ‘the cause of the use [of something]’ with reference to the cow in a sentence such as *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ*, ‘he milks the cow milk’. It is thus not a question of the accusative case but of assigning the *upayoganimitta*, i.e. such entities as the cow in constructions of this kind, to the category *karman*. This is clear also from the *Kāśikā* on 1.4.51 which quotes the *śloka-vārttika* from the *Bhāṣya* and remarks on the term *upayoga* as follows: *upayujyata ity upayogaḥ payaḥprabhṛti, tasya nimittam gavādi, tasyopayujyamānapayaḥprabhṛtinimittasya gavādeḥ karmasamjñā vidhīyate*, ‘[according to an analysis as *karmasādhana*, i.e., as the object of the act of using, namely:] “it is used”, [it is called] *upayoga*, that is, the milk etc.; its cause (*nimitta*) is the cow etc.; [and] the technical name *karman* is allotted [also] to this cause of the milk etc. which is being used, namely to the cow etc.’. So it is only in the special case of the principal and subordinate objects in ditransitive constructions that the terms *upayoga* and *upayoganimitta* apply. A similar analysis and use of vocabulary is met with in Kaiyaṭa’s remarks on the *śloka-vārttika* from the *Bhāṣya*.

It seems worthwhile to mention the paragraph in Kaiyaṭa’s commentary which introduces this *śloka-vārttika* (Mbhp II:413–14):

kim udāharanam iti | naṭasya śṛnotītyādāv api karmasamjñāprasāṅga iti praśnaḥ | atha vāpādānādibhiḥ sarvasya viśayasya vyāpanād udāharanāsambhavam¹ matvā pṛcchati |

‘What is the example²?’ The question concerns the possible application of the term *karman* even [to the actor etc.] in such cases as *naṭasya śṛnoti*, ‘he listens to the actor’. Or else he asks

¹ So read for *vyāpanādūhara*°.

² That is, of something unspecified (*akathita*) which has not been covered already by the *apādāna* etc.

[the question] thinking that an example is impossible since the whole field has been covered by the *apādāna* etc.

Could it be that Aggavaṃsa had this discussion in mind? Could it also be that he has mixed up a genitive such as *naṭasya* with an imaginary dative in the Pāli, thus linking it to the *sampadāna* category and thinking it equivalent in usage to a *kamma*? It may also be the case that he has taken his inspiration from another part of the discussion of A 1.4.51 where the *sampradāna* category is directly in the picture. The discussion at this point concerns sentences such as *putram anuśāste dharmam*, ‘he instructs his son in *dharma*’ which would exemplify the rule stated in the *śloka-vārttika*. Patañjali rejects them saying (Mbh I:334,14): *naitad asti | kathitātra pūrvā sampradānasamjñā*, ‘this is no good; with regard to this the previous name *sampradāna* has been specified [by rule 1.4.32]’. Kaiyaṭa remarks on this (Mbhp II:417): *kathiteti | dharmeṇa vacanānuśāsanakarmanā putrasyābhipreya-mānatvāt*, ‘[concerning] “has been specified”: because the son is what is in view¹ via the *dharma* which is the *karman* of the instruction through words’. Patañjali here discards all but three verbal roots as ditransitive and thus leaves matters somewhat vague in as much as constructions such as *gaṃ dogdhi payaḥ* do occur. Later grammarians rely here on Bhartrhari who resorted to the principle of *vivaḥṣā*, the wish or intention of the speaker.²

It could well be that Aggavaṃsa took advantage of this slightly vague situation to “place” the examples he offers, although they are very different in as much as they are not double accusative constructions. It is in any case clear that Aggavaṃsa is on slippery ground. His example *kim nu jātim na rocesi*, ‘why do you not approve of birth?’, is an absurdity in as much as it is a construction entirely different from the preceding

¹ The wording here goes back to Pāṇini’s definition of the *sampradāna* in rule 1.4.32 *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam*, ‘that which one aims at through the *karman*, that is the *sampradāna*’.

² VP 3.7.3; cf. the discussion of *kathita* and *akathita* in section 2.4 above.

ones. This links up with his peculiar insistence on a distinction between *rocana* ‘approving of’, the “object” of which he claims can be assigned to both the *sampadāna* and the *upayoga* categories, and *ruccana* ‘seeming good to’ which is linked exclusively to the *sampadāna*. The reason for this is probably due to the possibility of viewing ditransitive constructions as pseudo-causative constructions. Among the forms adduced by Aggavaṃsa *rocesi* is a causative whereas the others are middle forms from a different grade of the root.

Although I shall have to leave this mystery partly unsolved, it is clear that the source for the introduction of √*ruc* in the first place is A 1.4.33 *rucyarthānām priyamāṇaḥ* which assigns the one who is pleased to the category *sampadāna* in the context of verbal roots with the sense ‘to please’. The standard example is *devadattāya modako rocate*, ‘sweets are pleasing to D.’. Moreover, it seems worthwhile to quote VP 3.7.130:

*hetutve karmasamjñāyām śeṣatve vāpi kārakam /
rucyarthādiṣu sāstreṇa sampradānākhyam ucyate //*

In [the rules] beginning with *rucyarthānām* etc. the *kāraka* called *sampradāna* is taught by the Śāstra even when the properties of being *hetu*, *karman*, or *śeṣa* are there.

2.6.1 More on the *sampadāna*

The basic *sutta* dealing with the *sampadāna* is followed by one which specifies several specific cases and is expanded on at length in the *vutti*. I shall therefore split up the text into convenient portions.

554 *Silāghahanuṭhāsapadhārapihakudhaduh’-
issosuyyarādh’ikkhapaccāsunaanupatigiṇapubba-
katt’ārocanatthatadatthatumatthālamatthamaññānā-
dar’appānini nayanagatyatthakammani āsimsattha-
sammutitativatthādisu ca. Silāgha hanu ṭhā sapa dhāra*

*piha kudha duha issa icc etesaṃ dhātūnam payoge ca,
usuyyatthānam payoge, radh’ikkhapayoge ca, paccāsuna-
anupatigiṇānam pubbakattari ca, ārocanatthayoge tadatthe
tumatthe amatthapayoge ca, maññatipayoge anādare
appānini ca, nayanagatyatthānam kammani ca, āsimsattha-
payoge ca, sammutipayoge ca, tativatthādisu ca — taṃ
kārakam sampadānasaññam hoti. Ethh’ ādisaddena pañcamī-
chatthīsattamīnam attho ca, sāratto ca, bahuviddho
akkharappayogo ca gahito; etesu pi catutthī vibhatti bhavati.*

‘[The technical name *sampadāna* applies] also in the cases of [the verbal roots] *silāgha*, *hanu*, *ṭhā*, *sapa*, *dhāra*, *piha*, *kudha*, *duha*, *issa*, *usuyya*, *rādha*, and *ikkha*, of the agent of the previous action [of requesting] with regard to [the verbal root] *suṇa* with preverbs *pacca* or *ā* and [the verbal root] *giṇa* with preverbs *anu* or *pati* in the sense of declaring (*ārocana*¹), of that which is for the sake of something, of the sense of the infinitive, of the sense of sufficiency, [in the case of the object] of *mañña* “think; consider” when it has the sense of contempt provided [the object] is inanimate, in the case of the object of [an action denoted by verbal roots] having the senses of “moving” or “leading”, in cases where there is the sense of benediction, [usage of the word] *sammuti* “permission; consent”, and the sense of the third [case ending] etc.’ Also when there is usage of the roots *silāgha*, *hanu*, *ṭhā*, *sapa*, *dhāra*, *piha*, *kudha*, *duha*, and *issa*; also when there is usage [of a verbal root] in the sense of ‘finding fault with’ (*usuyya*); also when there is usage of [the roots] *rādha* and *ikkha*; also when there is a previous agent of [an action denoted by the verbal root] *suṇa* preceded by [the preverbs] *pacca* and *ā* and [the verbal root] *giṇa* preceded by *anu* or *pati*; also when there is usage in the sense of ‘declaring’,

¹ Smith, *Index verborum*, gives *ārocanā* (f.) for reasons which escape me; CPD gives *ārocana* (nt.).

for the sake of something, when there is the sense of the infinitive, [and] when there is usage in the sense of sufficiency; also when there is usage of *maññati* when there is contempt and [it applies] to something inanimate; also in the case of the object of [an action denoted by verbal roots] with the senses of ‘moving’ or ‘leading’; also when there is usage in the sense of benediction; also when there is usage of [the word] *sammuti* ‘permission; consent’; [and] also when there is the sense of the third [case ending] etc. — that *kāraka* [too] is something to which the technical name *sampadāna* applies. As far as this is concerned, by the word *ādi* ‘etc.’ [is indicated] the meaning of the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh [case endings], moreover the meaning *sāra* ‘advantage; reminder (?)’, and it is accepted that linguistic usage is of many kinds; in these cases too the fourth case suffix applies.

Kaccāyana offers an identical rule (135), except that Aggavaṃsa has added *nayana*^o to *gatyartha*^o and the *Kaccāyana* rule has a different ending, equally obscure, reading *°bhiyyasattamyatthesu ca* after *sammuti*. The rule covers rules from the *kāraka* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but also from A 2.3, the section where *vibhaktis* are assigned. The above translations of several of the phrases taken over by Aggavaṃsa are out of place, and I think syntactically coherent translations of them are virtually impossible, particularly because many of the elements are quoted verbatim but deprived of their original syntactic context. In as much as Aggavaṃsa comments at length on each and every one of the elements listed, it seems better for me to reserve further discussion until an element is brought up anew. Note that in general most of the examples offered in the commentary on *Kaccāyana* are met with also in the *Saddanīti* where a few more are normally listed.

2.6.1.1 *silāgha, hanu, ṭhā, and sapa*

(694,20–695,5) *Silāghapayoge tāva buddhassa silāghate, sakamupajjhāyassa silāghate icc evamādi; ettha ca silāghate ti katthati, thometi ti attho. Hanupayoge hanute mayham eva, hanute tuyham eva icc evamādi; ettha ca hanute ti apanayati, apalapati allāpasallāpaṃ na karoti ti attho. Ṭhāpayoge upatiṭṭheyya Sakyaputtānaṃ vaḍḍhakī icc evamādi; ettha ca upaṭṭhānaṃ nāma upagamanāṃ saddatthavasena, samketatthavasena pana upaṭṭhahanaṃ ti attho, tathā hi garuṃ “annena pānena upaṭṭhito ’smī”¹ ti “upagantvā ṭhito asmī”¹ ti attham vadanti saddatthavasena, samketatthavasena pana “mātāpituupaṭṭhānaṃ”² ti ādisu viya upaṭṭhahanaṃ adhippetam. Sapapayoge “sapatham pi te samma aham karomi”³ mayham sapate, tuyham sapate ti; ettha ca sapate ti sapatham karoti ti attho, sapathañ ca nāma paresam tosāpanattham saccakaraṇam “alamkatā suvasanā mālinī candanussadā ekikā sayane setu yā te ambe avāhari”⁴ ti ādisu viya, puriso attano veriṃ sapatī ti ādisu pana paresam tosāpanattham saccakaraṇam na hoti, tasmā tādisesu ṭhānesu sampadānasaññā na hoti ti daṭṭhabbam.*

As for the usage of *silāgha* ‘praise’: ‘He praises the Buddha’, ‘he praises his own preceptor’,⁵ and so on in the same manner. And in this context *silāghate* [means] *katthati* ‘boasts’, that is to say, *thometi* ‘praises’. As for the usage of *hanu* ‘hide’: ‘He hides from me alone’, ‘he hides from you alone’, and so on in the same manner. And in this context *hanute* [means] *apanayati*

1 Smith, note: cf. Pv-a 135,9 (:Ja V 173,26 et Ja V 175,21, Pv 256b).

2 Khp V 5a.

3 Ja V 481,2.

4 Ja III 139,9–10.

5 The wording *sakamupajjhāyassa* (so Smith) is tricky. It is difficult to take *sakam* on its own and difficult to explain it as part of a compound.

‘leads away’, *apalapati* ‘conceals [in speech]’, that is to say, he does not make conversation. As for the usage of *ṭhā* ‘stand’¹: ‘The carpenter should do service (*upaṭṭheyya*) for the sons of Sakya’, and so on in the same manner. And in this context that is called *upaṭṭhāna* which is *upagamana* ‘approaching [someone]’ according to its literal meaning, but in its conventional meaning [it means] *upaṭṭhahana* ‘standing by [someone’s side]; serving (= being a servant)’; that is the meaning. For thus they teach that [when someone says] ‘I approach the teacher² with food and drink’ it means ‘having gone up to [him] I stand [there]’, in accordance with the literal meaning, but according to the conventional meaning [the sense of] *upaṭṭhahana* ‘standing by; serving’ is intended, as in such

¹ Literally, ‘stopping [one’s] movement’. This is the meaning entry given in the *Dhātumālā* (300; 1113): *ṭhā gatinivattiyam*, taken verbatim from the Pāṇiniya *dhātupāṭha* (1.975: *ṣṭhā gatinivṛttau*). This, however, is not the meaning relevant here. See below.

² Smith gives the text here as follows: *tathā hi garuṃ “annena pānena upaṭṭhito ‘smi” ti “upaganvā thito asmi” ti attham vadanti ...*, adding the following note to *garuṃ*: *sic Ce Bem ns (i.e. garū)*. I do not think that Smith intended this *garū* as a nominative plural to be taken with *vadanti*. In that case one would have to translate: ‘For thus the teachers teach [that when someone says] “I approach [someone] with food and drink”, it means “having gone up to [them] I stand [there]” ...’. Rather I think he intended to signal that what we are dealing with here is a genitive singular, the ending *-ū* being historically correct, and then shortened to *garu*. One may refer to the phrase *kissa hetu* ‘for what reason’. The form *garuṃ*, then, is probably a scribal correction by someone who has tried to make sense of a form he did not recognise by adding an *anusvāra* and thus making it an accusative singular. Surely, at any time in the history of the Pāli language a long vowel could be replaced by a short nasalised vowel, but hardly in a genitive case ending. For these reasons I also take *garuṃ* as part of the example. This may seem at odds with Smith’s indication of where the example begins, but if he did not consider it an accusative singular the reason he kept *garuṃ* outside the quotation mark could be that the person waited upon is not stated in the similar constructions he refers to. Finally, a strong reason for taking it as part of the example and as a genitive form is that otherwise we would in fact lack a *sampadāna* in Aggavaṃsa’s example of the same.

[expressions] as ‘looking after one’s mother and father’. As for the usage of *sapa* ‘swear; curse; make an oath’: ‘To you I properly make an oath as well’, ‘he makes an oath to me’, ‘he makes an oath to you’.¹ And in this context *sapate* means ‘makes an oath (*sapatha*)’; and that is called *sapatha* ‘oath’ which is a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others, as in such [sentences] as ‘adorned, well dressed, garlanded, abundant in sandal perfume — she who took away these/your mango fruits, let her solitary lie in bed’. But in such [sentences] as ‘the man curses his enemy’² there is no statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others, and therefore it should be understood that the technical term *sampadāna* does not apply in cases such as these.

The roots dealt with here are given in identical fashion by Kaccāyana. They are taken directly from A 1.4.34 *ślāghahnuṣṭhāsapāṃ jñīpsyamānaḥ* which teaches that the name *sampradāna* is assigned to someone *who is meant to know* in the context of the verbal roots *ślāgh* ‘praise’, *hnu* ‘hide’, *sthā* (in a special meaning to which I shall return), and *śap* ‘swear; curse; make an oath’. As for the *Saddanīti* passage, one may assume that the meanings intended for these roots are the same as the ones assigned to them in the *Dhātumālā* — which, incidentally, are identical with the ones given for these roots in the Pāṇiniya *dhātupāṭha*. But if this is all there is to it Aggavaṃsa would be simplifying the picture to the extent of missing the point of introducing the rule.

In the first place, the Pāṇini rule includes the special requirement that the one who is assigned to the category of the *sampradāna* is to be

¹ My translation ‘make an oath’ here is a consequence of following Smith’s reading *sapatham karoti* in the immediately following clause which explains the meaning of *sapate* and of Aggavaṃsa’s subsequent claim that in the case of these expressions ‘a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others’ is involved.

² The form *verim* creates a slight problem. I take it to be the accusative singular of *verin* ‘bearing hostility’, here used as a substantive meaning ‘enemy’.

informed (*jñīpsyamānaḥ*) of the activities expressed by these roots. This seems to have become lost both in Aggavaṃsa's treatment, and also, as noted already by Senart, in the *Kaccāyanavutti* (140):

Les quatre premiers cas prévus par cette règle semblent empruntés à Pāṇini, I, 4, 34 : “çlāghahnuṃsthâçapâm jñīpsyamānaḥ”. Mais comme, ni dans le texte de notre règle, ni même dans le commentaire, le mot “jñīpsyamānaḥ” ne se trouve reproduit, il est naturel de penser que le sens particulier que son addition force à attribuer aux quatre racines dans le grammairien sanscrit ne doit pas être transporté aux quatre verbes pâlis. C'est ainsi que j'ai traduit “silāghate” non: il se vante à quelqu'un, mais: il loue quelqu'un, et “sapate mayham”, non: il me fait serment de ... mais: il me blâme, conformément à Vārt. 8 in Pāṇ I, 3, 21 (çapate upāmbhane : devadattāya çapate).

Aggavaṃsa's case is slightly more complex. He does somehow try to bring in particular meaning nuances for the roots involved albeit not in any particularly illuminating way and certainly not in a way which captures the intentions of Pāṇini fully. Moreover, he clearly realises that there is something odd going on in the case of the root *thā* and tries, although erroneously, to make the terrain agree with the map in this case and in the case of *sapa*.

According to A 1.4.34 the sentence *buddhassa silāghate* ought to mean ‘he praises the Buddha [and shows it to him]’. There is no evidence that this was Aggavaṃsa's intention. Similarly, *hanute mayham eva* ought to be translated ‘he hides from me alone [wanting me to know it]’ as in the Sanskrit *gopī kṛṣṇāya hnute* ‘the milkmaid hides from Kṛṣṇa [wanting him to know it]’. Aggavaṃsa indicates the meaning of *hanu* by resorting to the meaning entry of the *Dhātumālā* (1284), *apanayane*, taken from the Pāṇinīya *dhātupāṭha*. But he curiously glosses *apanayati* by *apalapati* which he must have taken from Sanskrit since there is no such verb in Pāli. The problem is: from where? It is not found in the

Kāśikā on this rule, nor in the commentaries thereupon. The *Mahābhāṣya* does not comment on this rule. It is of course possible that he just took this verb from his Sanskrit vocabulary, and that the interpretation ‘he does not make conversation’ is his own innovation.

When we come to the root *thā* we are facing more trouble. The meaning alluded to in A 1.4.34 is the one taught by Pāṇini in rule 1.3.23 *prakāśanastheyākhyayoś ca*. The rule preceding this one states that *ātmanepada* suffixes are added to the root *sthā* when it is preceded by any one of the preverbs *sam*, *ava*, *pra*, or *vi*. Rule 1.3.23 then teaches that *ātmanepada* suffixes are added to this root also when it has the senses of *prakāśana* ‘revealing one's intention’ or *stheyākhyā* ‘proclaiming someone an arbitrator’. To give an example, *devadattāya tiṣṭhate* could mean ‘she reveals herself to Devadatta [wanting him to know of her desires]’. This has escaped Aggavaṃsa completely, but he bravely sets out to find some Pāli usage which could possibly be accounted for by this rule. He settles for the usage of *upaṭṭhā*. In order to make his distinction clear here, he then resorts to the circular enterprise of explaining *upaṭṭhāna* by itself, that is, by another action noun, *upaṭṭhahana*. This procedure — much as one can sympathise with Aggavaṃsa in his difficult task — does leave a few holes and discrepancies here and there as is bound to be the case when the territory is forced to agree with the map.

Let me then finally turn to the case of *sapa*. As pointed out by Senart, *vārttika* 8 on A 1.3.21 states that *ātmanepada* substitutes are introduced after the root *śap* when the swearing is perceived as such by the recipient of the swearing. This is specified further in the *Kāśikā* so as to involve touching the body ‘with the statement’ (*vācā*). The situation is clarified further in the commentaries of Haradatta and Jinendrabuddhi who both explain that we are dealing with a special kind of oath — *śapathaviśeṣa*. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi makes a clear distinction in meaning here between the *ātmanepada* and the *parasmaipada* forms of the root *śap*: *śapatīty ākrośatīty arithaḥ*, ‘*śapati*, that is to say, “abuses; curses” [in the *parasmaipada*]’. It is this distinction which is reflected in

Aggavaṃsa's attempt to distinguish between *ātmanepada* usages of this verb where 'a statement of truth for the sake of other people's happiness' is involved and *parasmaipada* usages where this is not the case, as in *puriso attano verim sapati* 'he curses his enemy', clearly stating that in the latter case the term *sampadāna* does not apply. Neither Haradatta nor Jinendrabuddhi are clear on this point, however, and such a claim is certainly not in complete accordance with Sanskrit usage, where — I believe — one could say *devadattāya śapati* 'he swears at Devadatta' with the verb in the *parasmaipada* voice and the recipient of the abuse in the dative case. One may therefore be entitled to question Aggavaṃsa's examples for the *ātmanepada* usage of the verb in the sense of making an oath. These are extremely simplistic and do not necessarily reflect anything more than a knowledge of what the Sanskrit grammarians claim and thus are not genuine Pāli language usage. It is noteworthy that in the *Dhātumālā* (557) Aggavaṃsa lists only the *parasmaipada* form *sapati*. If his example *verim sapati* is genuine and not constructed by him to fit the occasion, *sapati* takes an object in the accusative case.

Four references are given under *sapati* in the PED. Three of these reveal relevant information:

1) Mhv 25.113: *vinā saṃghena āhāraṃ mā bhuñjetha kadāci pi, mātāpitāhāre sapimsu dahare va no*; clearly *parasmaipada* with an unambiguous accusative, so that on the authority of Aggavaṃsa we ought to translate: 'When we were young [our] mother and father cursed us, saying: "without the Saṅgha you shall never enjoy a meal".' But, in that context, one might consider this as making an oath. The PTS translation (Geiger) runs: "Without the brotherhood you shall never take a meal," thus our mother and father have caused to swear us in our boyhood at the meal'. The form *sapimsu* is certainly not causative, but the translation may serve to indicate that the construction was considered problematic.

2) Ja V 104,21: *tvam sapasi rajānaṃ*; again *parasmaipada* with an accusative, and if we follow Aggavaṃsa we ought to translate: 'You curse the king'.

3) S I 225: *Sapassu ca me Vepacitti adubbhāyā ti*; clearly an *ātmanepada* imperative form of the verb, while *me* could be taken as a genitive/dative, although, analogous to *no* above, it is occasionally met with as an accusative, and, as we shall see below, Buddhaghosa takes it as a locative. But the genuine dative *adubbhāya* is crystal clear, and — if we follow Aggavaṃsa I hasten to add — we ought to translate: 'And make an oath to me, Vepacitti, who am free from violence'. The PTS translation (Mrs Rhys Davids), on the other hand, runs: 'Thou mayest swear, Vepacitti, that I will use no treachery'.

This does not provide us with enough material to draw any absolute conclusions, but nothing so far contradicts Aggavaṃsa's claims. We have two cases of *parasmaipada* forms with an accusative, and one case of an *ātmanepada* form with a genitive/dative. One may, however, question whether the *parasmaipada* form *sapimsu* really makes a case since *ātmanepada* forms of aorists are extremely rare, and likewise whether one can attach much significance to the fact that the imperative *sapassu* is an *ātmanepada* form since *ātmanepada* imperatives are quite frequent.

Buddhaghosa's explanation of *sapassu ca me*, on the other hand, is quite informative: *mayi adubbhattāya sapathaṃ karohi*. Here it is no longer possible to apply Aggavaṃsa's distinction. We do have a dative form, but he glosses *me* as *mayi* which undisputably is a locative. I can only take this to mean: 'make an oath on me for the purpose of non-violence', with the genuine dative form understood as a dative of purpose.¹ Although Aggavaṃsa's explanation deviates from Buddhaghosa's and although he may have been inspired by the formulations of Haradatta and Jinendrabuddhi, it is nevertheless possible that

¹ This word can either be taken as an abstract noun formation from *adubha* in the sense of 'non-violence-ness' or as a compound with *atta* (= Skt. *ātman*) as the second member in the sense 'who is of a non-violent nature'. It is noteworthy, though, that the Burmese edition reads *adubbhatthāya* 'for the sake of non-violence' and indicates that the Sinhalese reads *adubbhanatāya* with *v.l. adrubhattāya*. The readings have one thing in common: they are all datives of purpose.

Buddhaghosa was the direct source for Aggavaṃsa's introduction of the phrase *sapatham karoti* as the explanation of *sapate* since Aggavaṃsa was no doubt familiar with Buddhaghosa's works.

It seems to me likely that Aggavaṃsa here has tried to reconcile what the Sanskrit grammarians say with actual occurrences in the Pāli canon. In a passage such as *sapassu me adubbhāya* it is therefore possible that, unlike Buddhaghosa, he actually considered *me* as a dative agreeing with *adubbhāya*, both words taken to denote the person to whom the oath was made. But it is clear that this does not reflect genuine Pāli usage. Consider the following passages:

1) Vin I 347,37: *Brahmadatto ca Kāsirājā Dīghāvu ca kumāro aññamaññassa jīvitam adamsu pāṇiṇi ca aggaheṣuṃ sapathaṃ ca akamsu adrūbhāya*, 'Brahmadatta, king of Kāsi, and the young Dīghāvu granted life to each other, and grasped [each other's] hands, and made an oath for non-violence'. This is a completely different conception of how the dative *adrūbhāya* links up with the verbal phrase.

2) Mhv 7.23: *Adubhatthāya sapatham so tam yakkhim akārayi*, 'he caused the Yakkhi to make an oath for the sake of non-violence'. Here there is no doubt that we are dealing with a dative of purpose since the element *attha* has been added.

3) Ja I 180,22: ... *attano adūbhāya sapatham karetvā*, 'having caused [them] to make an oath for non-violence against him'.

4) Ja VI 460,21: *ubho pi aññamaññaṃ adūbhāya sapatham karimsu*, 'and they both made an oath for non-violence to each other'. Note that the recipients of the oath are indeed expressed in the accusative case.

All of these datives are datives of purpose as is indeed normal for genuine datives in Pāli. It is clear that Aggavaṃsa has tried to thrust a pattern from the Sanskrit language upon the Pāli language which the latter cannot take.

It is equally clear, then, that his clever distinction between *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* usages of the verb *sapa* is untenable, since the person at whom the oath or curse is directed is expressed in the

accusative in all the genuine examples, just as in the *parasmaipada* example he adduces: *puriso attano verim sapati* 'the man curses his enemy'.

One little detail ought to be mentioned before we leave Aggavaṃsa's representation of A 1.4.34. Could it be that the expression *paesaṃ tosāpanattham saccakaraṇam*, 'a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others', is Aggavaṃsa's idea of *jñāpsyamānaḥ*, the requirement expressed in A 1.4.34 that the one who is assigned to the category of the *sampradāna* in connection with the roots mentioned is to be informed of the activities expressed by these roots? Although he is mistaken when it comes to actual facts, Aggavaṃsa could be seen to apply such a distinction here. What speaks against the idea is that he applies this requirement only to the verb *sapa*.

2.6.1.2 dhāra

(695,9–13) *Dhārayatipayoge* "idha gahapati kulaputto na kassaci kiñci dhāreti appam vā bahum vā",¹ *suvanṇam dhārayate*, "tassa rañño mayam nāgam dhārayāma"²; *tattha dhārayate ti iṇavasena gaṇhāti, iṇam katvā gaṇhāti ti attho, ettha dhaniko yeva sampadānam*.

As for the usage of *dhārayati* 'owe': 'In this case, householder, a clansman does not owe anyone anything, little or much', 'he owes gold', 'we owe this king an elephant'. And in this context *dhārayate* means 'incurs a debt', that is, having created debt he keeps it; here the creditor is indeed the *sampadāna*.

This reflects A 1.4.35 *dhārer uttamaṇaḥ* which teaches that the name *sampradāna* is given to the creditor in relation to the verb *dhārayati*. This is standard usage in Sanskrit as well as in Pāli. Note that

¹ A II 69,26.

² Smith: cf. Ja II 370,4.

Aggavaṃsa has left out the *sampadāna* in the example *suvaṇṇaṃ dhārayate* ‘he owes gold’.

2.6.1.3 *piha*

(695,13–17) *Pihapayoge* “*devā pi tesam pihayanti sambuddhānaṃ satīmatam*”,¹ *buddhassa aññatitthiyā pihayanti*, “*devā dassanakāmā te*”² *icc evamādi — ito icchāmi bhaddantassā ti idaṃ pana sar’icchāyoge kammani chaṭṭhiyantam padan ti daṭṭhabbam*.

As for the usage of *piha* ‘yearn for; desire; envy’: ‘Even the gods envy these fully enlightened, mindful ones’, ‘heretics envy the Buddha’, ‘the gods desire to see you’,³ and so on in the same manner. But [in the sentence] ‘henceforth I long for prosperity for you’, it should be understood that the word which ends in a genitive case suffix is [assigned] to [the category of] the object in relation to [the activities of] longing and remembering.

This goes back to A 1.4.36 *sprher ipsitaḥ* which teaches that the object desired to be obtained in relation to the verbal root *sprh* is assigned to the *kāraka* category *sampradāna*. The *Dhātumālā* (1676) gives *piha icchāyam* which no doubt reflects the meaning given in the Pāṇinīya *dhātupāṭha* 10.325 *sprha ipsāyām* so that the meaning intended is that of *ipsā* ‘wish to obtain’ and not simply *icchā* ‘desire’, although the semantic difference here may in practice be slight. The example given in the *Dhātumālā* (1676) is *pihanīyā vibhūtiyo*, ‘[various] attainments are to be

¹ Dhṛ 181cd.

² Ja VI 104,5.

³ The word *te* is ambiguous and three equally strange interpretations are possible: ‘these gods have the desire of seeing you’, ‘the gods are desirers of seeing you’, or ‘the gods have a desire to see in respect of you’.

longed for’. As a possible quotation this has not been traced as such. Now, the most common meaning of *piha* in Pāli seems to me to be ‘envy’, a meaning which clearly applies in two of Aggavaṃsa’s examples, that is, if *buddhassa aññatitthiyā pihayanti* is not merely a gloss of the preceding example, or coined in analogy with it. But one may wonder whether at least the last example here really is based on common usage. The *Mahābhāṣya* does not comment upon A 1.4.36, but the *Kāśikāvṛtti* does. There, in reply to why Pāṇini says *ipsita* “desired to be obtained” in the rule, the sentence *puṣpebhyo vane sprhayati*, ‘he longs for flowers in the forest’ is adduced. Haradatta clarifies this in his commentary (KāśP I:553):

īpsitamātre iyaṃ saṃjñā / prakarṣavivakṣāyāṃ tu paratvāt karmasaṃjñāiva bhavati — puṣpāṇi sprhayatīti / yadā tv īpsitam īpsitatamaṃ vā śeṣatvena vivakṣyate, tadā ṣaṣṭhī bhavati //

This technical term [i.e., *sampradāna*] applies to that which is only desired to be obtained [i.e., not to the forest, for example]. But when there is a wish to express superiority [in desire] then, because it follows, only the technical term *karman* applies [by rule A 1.4.49, and an accusative case ending is added], as in *puṣpāṇi sprhayati* ‘he wants to obtain flowers’. When, however, one wishes to express that which is desired to be obtained or that which is most desired to be obtained by means of the property of being [one of the relations referred to as] the rest, then a genitive case ending is added.

One wonders whether this argumentation really holds water, that is, whether the expression *puṣpāṇi sprhayati* would be approved of by Pāṇini. If by rule 1.4.36 the assignment to the *sampradāna* category would not overrule the assignment to the *karman* category in the domain

of \sqrt{sprh} , then the rule would be *niravakāśa*, without scope elsewhere.¹ Be that as it may. We do, however, have clear examples in Sanskrit of \sqrt{sprh} being used with both accusatives and genitives, and what is of interest here is that it could quite well be that Aggavaṃsa picked up Haradatta's explanation or something similar and transferred it to Pāli when he contrasts the *sampadāna* usage with one where a genitive usage is explained as an accusative, that is, where a genitive ending is made applicable through an assignment to the category *kamma*. Here he takes the opportunity to include also verbs meaning 'remember' to account for constructions such as the Sanskrit *mātuḥ smarati* 'he remembers his mother' in distinction to *mātaraṃ smarati* 'he remembers his mother'. That, however, has nothing to do with the *sampradāna*. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the usage of the genitive case to express the *karman* in relation to verbs meaning 'remember' is accounted for by rule 2.3.52 *adhīgarthadayeśāṃ karmaṇi* which teaches that a genitive ending denotes the *karman* when there is usage of verbs having the sense of 'remember' and of *day* 'distribute' and *īś* 'own'.

2.6.1.4 *kudha, duha, issa, and usuyya*

(695,17–25) *Kudhaduhaissausuyyatthānaṃ payoge kujjhati Devadattassa, "tassa kujjha mahāvira",² "yadi 'han tassa kuppeyyaṃ",³ duhayati disānaṃ megho, "yo mittānaṃ na dubbhati",⁴ keci pana "na dūhati " ti paṭhanti; titthiyā issayanti samaṇānaṃ, "devā na issanti purisaparakkamassa",⁵ aññatitthiyā samaṇānaṃ usuyyanti lābhagedhena,⁶ dujjanā*

¹ Of course, for Haradatta the distinction here rests on the *-tama* suffix.

² Ja III 42,7.

³ Cp II 3: 4c.

⁴ Ja VI 14,7–25.

⁵ Ja III 7,20.

⁶ Senart (Kacc-v 135) phrases this differently here: *titthiyā samaṇānaṃ usuyyanti; lābhagiddhena dujjanā guṇavantānaṃ usuyyanti; guṇavadḍhena kā usuyyā vijānataṃ*.

*guṇavantānaṃ usuyyanti guṇasamiddhiyā, "kā usuyyā vijānataṃ"*¹ — *dutiya ca: "brāhmaṇo Vassakārabrahmaṇaṃ usuyyati"*²

As for the usage of *kudha* 'be angry', *duha* 'injure',³ *issa* 'envy; not tolerate', and *usuyya* 'find fault with; feel resentment': 'He is angry with Devadatta', 'let there be wrath toward him, Great Hero', 'if I had felt angry with him', 'the cloud gives milk (*duhayati*) in the quarters',⁴ 'he who does not injure (*na dubbhati*) [his] friends', but some read '*na dūhati*', 'members of other sects envy (or: do not tolerate?) the Buddhists', 'the gods do not envy what a man can do',⁵ 'non-Buddhists feel resentment against the Buddhists out of greed for the gain [the Buddhists are given]', 'bad people feel resentment against the good because of their wealth of good qualities', 'what resentment is there against the wise?'; also the second [case suffix occurs]: 'the Brahman feels resentment against / finds fault with the Brahman Vassakāra'.

Aggavaṃsa still moves along the tracks of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and has now reached rule 1.4.37 *krudhadruherṣyāsūyārthānāṃ yaṃ prati kopaḥ* which teaches that the one towards whom anger (*kopa*) is felt is assigned to the category *sampradāna* in relation to the meanings of the verbal roots *krudh* 'feel angry', *druh* 'injure; harm', *īrṣy* 'be jealous', and *asūya* 'find fault with'. In the *Mahābhāṣya* discussion of this rule Patañjali raises the question of whether these roots are synonymous since their meanings can be summed up by the word *kopa* 'anger'. The answer

¹ Vin I 43,28; S I 127,8.

² Ps IV 74,1–2 *ad* M III 15,5.

³ Smith (695, note 12) refers to Mmd Ce 224,5 which gives the meaning of *duha* as *jigimsā* 'wish to injure'. It is not listed in the *Dhātumālā*.

⁴ This is what I think this sentence means, but see below.

⁵ i.e., mere mortal efforts; gods can do much more.

is that they do have different meanings, but what they have in common is summed up by the meaning of the word *krodha*. You are not harming something or feeling jealous unless you are angry. What is not discussed, though, is whether the name *sampradāna* would apply when a root synonymous with one of the roots listed is used. This issue has some bearing on the *Saddanīti* passage since Aggavaṃsa in addition to the listed root *kudha* (*krudh*) brings in also the root *kup* (*kuppati*; Skt *kupyate*). It seems that the Sanskrit commentators did not understand the rule to be applicable in such a way, so that most probably Aggavaṃsa is just freely adding a root in accordance with the examples that come to his mind. The Sanskrit commentators do, however, point out that the specification ‘towards whom anger is felt’ is necessary since one may, for example, feel jealously protective of one’s wife while one’s anger is directed against someone else who would then be the *sampradāna* whereas the wife would not, as in *bhāryām irsyati* ‘he is jealous in respect of his wife’. Here the sense is that one jealously keeps an eye on his wife and the word *bhāryā* ‘wife’ accordingly appears in the accusative case. Such usage could be Aggavaṃsa’s reason for stating towards the end of the passage that the second case also occurs, although there is another more probable explanation for this to which I shall return.

The root *duha* in the sense ‘harm’ does not occur in the *Dhātumālā*. It is therefore obvious that Aggavaṃsa has just taken it over from the list of verbs in Pāṇini’s rule. Moreover, he seems to have ended up in a real shambles here in as much as the root *duha* occurs in the *Dhātumālā* (1036) in the sense of *papūraṇa*. This is the meaning entry of the root *duh* ‘milk; extract’ met with in the Sanskrit *dhātupāṭhas*. Aggavaṃsa’s first example here involves the verb *duhayati*. This is not a common verb in Pāli. It would most probably be a 10th class verb since as a causative Pāli would strengthen its first syllable: **dūhayati*. Smith (index) takes it as equivalent to Skt *druhyati* although he points out (with an exclamation mark) that the Burmese *nissaya* (quoted Sadd 695, note 17) relates it to *dohati*, that is, to Skt *dogdhi* ‘milks’. I believe that this in fact is the connection and that Aggavaṃsa and not the *nissaya-kara* is to

blame. The idea would in that case be that the cloud gives moisture as if being milked (cf. *papūraṇa* ‘filling up’). But for *duhayati* we have only this one example, we do not know where it comes from, and, admittedly, its meaning is far from clear. It seems to me that Aggavaṃsa does not have an example for *duha* (*druh*) but has to face the inherited list of verbs. If we take the forms met with in Aggavaṃsa’s examples and add that *dubbhati* also alternates with *dūbhati*,¹ we end up with four different forms: *dubbhati*, *dūbhati*, *dūhati*, and *duhayati*. This provides a striking example of the difficulties facing lexicographers of Pāli.

The examples for *issa* and *usuyya* do not present particular difficulties apart from determining the exact nuances of meaning.² Notably, though, the root *usuyya* is not listed in the *Dhātumālā*. But Aggavaṃsa’s final remark, exemplified with *usuyya*, offers more interesting information. First of all, he mixes up the notions of *kāraka* and *vibhakti*, case suffix. He refers to the alternative usage of the second case ending. Now, as mentioned above, this claim could have been triggered by the fact that in Sanskrit a root like *irsy* is constructed with an accusative when the form to which that ending is added does not denote the *sampradāna*. I do, however, believe that Aggavaṃsa has mechanically followed in Pāṇini’s footsteps. The immediately following rule is A 1.4.38 *krudhadruhor upasrṣṭayoḥ karma* which teaches that when the roots *krudh* and *druh* occur with preverbs, then the one towards whom anger is felt is no longer assigned to the category *sampradāna* but to the category *karman* and thus appears with an accusative case ending, as for example *devadattam abhikrudhyati* ‘is angry at Devadatta’ and *yajñadattam abhidruhyati* ‘harms Yajñadatta’. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that any such distinction between the roots *kudha* and *duha* with or without preverbs seems not to exist or is at least blurred in Pāli. A good example is provided by a

¹ cf. Ja VI 14,7–25 (ed. Fausbøll) which reads *dūbhati*.

² The root *issa* is explained by itself in the *Dhātumālā* (872): *issa issāyam*. In the Pāṇinīya *dhātupāṭha* the entry *irṣyārthāḥ* specifies the meaning of the three roots *irṣ*, *sūrṣ*, and *irṣy*.

quotation offered by Aggavaṃsa himself, namely the *Cariyāpiṭaka* phrase *yadi 'haṃ tassa kuppeyyaṃ* 'if I had felt angry with him'. But the edition of Jayawickrama (PTS, 1973) reads *pakuppeyaṃ* in all occurrences of this phrase.¹ A similar formulation also occurs with the *sampadāna* in the dative/genitive plural (Cp II 1.8, 10): *yadi 'haṃ tesam pakuppeyyaṃ*. Now this provides metrical difficulties, so not surprisingly the variant reading *kuppeyyaṃ* occurs in all instances, but not systematically in any one edition (Morris, Burmese, Thai, Sinhalese, etc.). It is perhaps too simple to say that *pa* has been added and that that is how the metrical problem arose. The *aṭṭhakathā* explains the phrase (Cp-a 157): *tassa mānathaddhassa kūṭajaṭilassa ahaṃ yadi kujjheyyaṃ*, 'if I were to be angry with him, that is, with Mānathaddha Kūṭajaṭila'. Here *pakuppeyyaṃ* is glossed by *kujjheyyaṃ*, without a preverb but in exactly the same construction.

2.6.1.5 *rādha* and *ikkha*

(695,25–696,6) *Rādha ikkha icc etesaṃ dhātūnaṃ payoge, yassa vipucchanaṃ kammavikhyāpanatthaṃ, taṃ kārakaṃ sampadānasaññaṃ hoti; tatha ca dutiyā: ārādho 'haṃ rañño ārādho 'haṃ rājānaṃ, "ky āhaṃ ayyānaṃ aparajjhāmi"² ky āhaṃ ayye aparajjhāmi,³ āyasmato Upālissa upasampadāpekho Upatisso āyasmantaṃ Upāliṃ vā, "cakkhuṃ janassa dassanāya taṃ viya maññe"⁴.*

Rādha 'satisfy'⁵ and *ikkha* 'look': when there is usage of these roots, one about whom there is an inquiry which has the aim of

¹ Cp (ed. Jayawickrama) II 3.4, 5.8, 7.4, 8.6.

² Vin III 162,11.

³ Smith: cf. Vin I 56,11; but he has not marked it as a quotation.

⁴ Smith: cf. M II 121,14 (Ps).

⁵ This root is not listed in the *Dhātumālā*; Mmd Ce 224,7 gives *rādha hiṃsā-saṃrādhesu*. The meaning 'injure' clearly does not apply here and the author

clarifying an action,¹ that *kāraka* is assigned the name *sampadāna*; but likewise the second [case suffix]: 'I am a homager of the king', [or:] 'I am homaging the king', 'do I offend against the masters?', [or:] 'do I offend the masters?', 'Upatissa has an expectation of ordination from the venerable Upāli', or '[Upatissa looks] to the venerable Upāli [for ordination]', 'the eye is for the seeing of people, like that I think'.

The rule is in this case A 1.4.39 *rādhiṃsya yasya viprasnaḥ* which states that the name *sampadāna* is assigned to one about whom there is an inquiry in relation to the roots *rādhi* 'satisfy; propitiate' and *ikṣ* 'look'. Aggavaṃsa is moving on very slippery ground here. First of all, the Sanskrit commentaries reveal that we are dealing with very specific usages here; so for example the *Kāśikā*: *yasya śubhāsubhaṃ prcchate / devadattāya rādhyati / devadattāyeḥsate / naimittikaḥ prṣṭaḥ saṃ devadattasya daivaṃ paryālocayati arthaḥ*. This makes the context clear: 'He about whom good and bad is being asked: "He makes prophecies for Devadatta." "He looks into Devadatta." That is to say, a fortune-teller being asked considers the fate of Devadatta.' The *Nyāsa* adds: *daivaṃ iti śubhāsubhaṃ karma*, 'daiva (fate), that is, good or bad karma'.

On the authority of the Sanskrit grammarians, then, we ought to translate *kammavikhyāpanatthaṃ*: 'which has the aim of clarifying [somebody's] karma'. But it seems doubtful that this is what Aggavaṃsa had in mind when one looks at his examples. The first one, *ārādho 'haṃ rañño*, can hardly mean that he investigates the fortune of the king. Aggavaṃsa's claim that it is equally possible to use the accusative is also obscure. The CPD lists *ārādha* with both dative and accusative but the references are only to the Pāli grammarians. The *Kaccāyanavutti* (136)

seems to have confused $\sqrt{rādhi}$ with \sqrt{radh} , cf. dhp 4.84 *radha hiṃsā-saṃrādhyoḥ* while we are dealing with 5.16–17 *rādha sādha samsiddhau*.

¹ For this translation of *kammavikhyāpanatthaṃ*, see below.

has *ārādho me rañño / rājānaṃ*. The *Padamañjarī* on the *Kāśikā* passage cited above states that the form *yasya* in the rule is an objective genitive, *karmani śaṣṭhī*. It could be that Aggavaṃsa has had some such statement in mind, and since his usages are clearly genitives and not datives he could have considered it possible to use the accusative for the genitive, but I do not find this explanation very convincing. But his examples are not very convincing either. In fact, I doubt whether his accusative examples are genuine. Only the genitive ones are attested. The “accusative version” of the Upāli example seems outrightly strange, whereas in his last example he does not give an accusative equivalent although an action noun in *-ana* such as *dassana* could take an accusative in Pāli. It is also noteworthy that the verbs or verbal nouns adduced as examples of the roots *rādha* and *ikkha* in all instances occur with preverbs. In the last example he uses $\sqrt{dṛś}$ instead of $\sqrt{īkṣ}$. One seems forced to conclude that again Aggavaṃsa slavishly follows the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and parrots lists of verbs he has not even included in his own *Dhātumālā* and for which he can only produce dubious examples, so that again he tries to force upon the Pāli language an unsuitable mould from the Sanskrit.

2.6.1.6 *paccāsuṇa* and *anupatiṅga*

(696,6–22) *Suṇotissa dhātussa paccāyoge, yo etassa kammuno kattā, so sampadānasañño hoti, taṃ yathā: “Bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi: ‘bhikkhavo’ ti, ‘bhadante’ ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosum”*,¹ *ettha ca Bhagavā āmantaṅkiriyaṃ savasena kammabhūtānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ kattā hutvā paccāsavakiriyaṃ savasena sampadānaṃ hoti — evaṃ akkharacintakānaṃ matavasena attho veditabbo, āgamikā pana ‘Bhagavato vacanaṃ paccassosun’*² *ti chaṭṭhipayogaṃ icchanti. Suṇotissa dhātussa payoge dvīsu kammesu yaṃ kammaṃ pubbaṃ*

¹ A I 1,6-8.

² Smith: cf. Mp I 18,25 = Ps I 14,34 (Sv ad D II 263,21).

kathitakammattā, tassa kammuno pubbassa yo kattā, so sampadānasañño hoti, taṃ yathā: bhikkhu janaṃ dhammaṃ sāveti tassa bhikkhuno jano anuṅgaṇāti tassa bhikkhuno jano patigaṇāti, sādhuṅkaradānādinaṃ taṃ usāhayati ti attho; ettha ca janan ti akathitakammaṃ, dhamman ti kathitakammaṃ, bhikkhu pana savanakiriyaṃ savasena kammabhūtassa kattā hutvā anuṅgaṇanapatigaṇanakiyaṃ savasena sampadānaṃ hoti ti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

When [the preverbs] *pacca* or *ā* are attached to the verbal root *suṇoti*, the one who [was] the agent of that [previous] act, [that participant in the subsequent action] is assigned the name *sampadāna*, as for example: ‘The Noble One addresses the monks saying “Monks”, [and] these monks replied (*paccassosum*)¹ “Venerable One” to the Noble One’; and here the Noble One, having been the agent in relation to the monks who were the objects due to the act of addressing, is the *sampadāna* due to the act of replying — thus the meaning is to be understood according to the view of the grammarians; those versed in scripture, on the other hand, teach the usage of the sixth [case suffix], [saying that it really means] *bhagavato vacanaṃ paccassosum*, ‘they reply to the statement of the Noble One’. When there is usage of the verbal root *suṇoti* with two objects, it is the agent of the previous object which was the previous object in as much as it was the object that was specified, that receives the name *sampadāna*; as for example: A monk makes people listen to the Doctrine, [and] people encourage this monk, people respond to this monk. That is to say, they incite him by giving their acclamation. And here ‘people’ is the unspecified object, while ‘the doctrine’ is the specified object; the monk, on the other hand, having been the

¹ Most translators render *paccassosum* ‘assented’, but I prefer to translate it simply as ‘reply’ here.

agent in relation to that which was the object¹ due to the activity of hearing, is the *sampadāna* due to the activities of praising (*anugāyana*) and responding (*patigāyana*); thus it should be understood.

The first rule underlying this is A 1.4.40 *pratyāñbhyām śruvaḥ pūrvasya kartā*. This rule teaches that when the root *śru* ‘listen; hear’ is preceded by the preverbs *prati* or *ā*, thus meaning ‘promise’, then the one who was the agent of the previous act of requesting and is now the one to whom the promise is made is assigned to the category of the *sampradāna*. I doubt whether one would be able to make sense of Aggavaṃsa’s wording without this information.² Moreover, he applies Pāṇini’s rule to a different context and provides an example with a verbal form that, as far as I can see, has a different meaning. The standard example in Sanskrit is *devadattāya gāṃ pratiśṛṇoti / āśṛṇoti*, ‘[on request] he promises a cow to Devadatta’. The situation in the Pāli example is clearly one of address and return of address. Aggavaṃsa seems to have felt a bit uncomfortable here, so he dismisses the grammarians (“syllable-ponderers”) saying that those who know their scripture understand that the word *vacanaṃ* has been left out. Thereby he betrays confusion between what is a historical genitive and datives which have been taken over in the form of genitives. Moreover, we are never certain whether he means the *sampadāna* or the dative case.

The second rule of relevance here is A 1.4.41 *anupratigṛṇas ca*, ‘also in the case of the root *gṛ* preceded by *anu* or *prati* [is the agent of the previous action assigned to the category of the *sampradāna*]’. This refers to the specific context of Vedic ritual. The *Kāśikā* gives the example *hotre ’nugṛṇāti*, ‘he responds to the Hotṛ reciting’. The Hotṛ, the priest who recites from the *Rgveda*, is in many ways the prima donna of Vedic ritual, and is encouraged by the Adhvaryu priest who repeats his

¹ Note that he does not say which one.

² The *Kaccāyanavutti*, by comparison, is quite clear in its formulation (136): *Paccāsūṇānupatigīṇāṃ pubbakattari ca*.

recitation. The verbs *anugṛṇāti* and *pratigṛṇāti* thus mean to answer or respond in recitation, to encourage by repeating. Although he was probably not too familiar with these verbs, Aggavaṃsa still feels he has to account for this rule as well. The result is peculiar. First of all, he introduces *suṇoti* again, not *giṇāti*.¹ Then, oddly, he brings in the causative of this verb, *sāveti*, and the ditransitive construction that goes with it. One may be allowed to question the purpose of introducing the *akathita-* and *kathita-kamma* distinction here. To me it makes no sense whatsoever. One may also question the authenticity of Aggavaṃsa’s example. According to the CPD, *anugiṇāti* is attested only here and in the parallel text of the *Kaccāyanavutti* as well as in the 13th century grammatical work *Payogasiddhi*. The assumption that the example is fabricated is strengthened by the fact that for the verbal noun Aggavaṃsa uses *anugāyana* ‘singing after; praising’ presumably because *anugāyati* is the verb that actually occurs. When the CPD gives the meaning of *anugiṇāti* as ‘to say after, repeat [the word of another]; to approve or assent’, this is probably due to an attempt at mediating between the Sanskrit meaning of the verb and what the context in Aggavaṃsa’s example requires. But who knows, maybe people did repeat in chorus to encourage a monk who was teaching the doctrine by reciting from the canon?

2.6.1.7 *ārocanattha, tadattha, tumattha, alamattappayoga, and maññatipayoga*

(696,22–697,6) *Ārocanatthe*: “*ārocemi kho te mahārāja paṭivedemi kho te mahārāja*”² — *āmantaṇatthe dutiyā yeva na catutthī*: “*handa dāni bhikkhave āmantayāmi vo*”,³ “*āmantayassu vo putte*”⁴ *icc evamādi. Tadatthe*: “*ūnassa*

¹ cf. *Dhātumālā* 1208 *Ge sadde. Giṇoti, giṇāti*.

² S I 101,20.

³ D II 120, 13.

⁴ Ja VI 544,7,9.

pāripūriyā”,¹ *buddhassa atthāya jīvitam pariccajāmi, atthāya vata me Bhaddā sunisā gharam āgatā. Tumatthe: “lokānukampāya”*,² *lokaṃ anukampitun ti attho, bhikkhūnaṃ phāsu-vihārāya, phāsu viharitun ti attho. Alamathappayoge ca sampadānasaññā; ettha ca alaṃsaddassa attho araha-ṭṭikkhepā, tattha arahatthe: alaṃ me buddho, alaṃ me rajjaṃ, alaṃ bhikkhu pattassa, alaṃ mallo mallassa arahati mallo mallassa, ṭṭikkhepe: “alaṃ te idha vāsenā”*,³ *alaṃ me hiraññasuvaṇṇena, “kiṃ te jaṭāhi dummedha”*.⁴ *Maññatipayoge anādare apāṇini: kaṭṭhassa tuvaṃ maññe, kaḷiṅgarassa tuvaṃ maññe; anādare ti kimatthaṃ: suvaṇṇam taṃ maññe, apāṇini ti kimatthaṃ: gadrabhaṃ tuvaṃ maññe.*

When there is the sense of *ārocana*⁵ ‘announcing; declaring’: ‘I announce to you, king, I make known to you, king’. When there is the sense of *āmantaṇa* ‘addressing; inviting’ only the second [case suffix applies], not the fourth: ‘Well now, monks, I address you’; ‘call your children’, and so on in the same manner. When there is [the sense of] ‘for the purpose of it’⁶: ‘For the sake of making up the deficiency’; ‘I abandon my livelihood/living/life for the sake of the Buddha’; ‘certainly for the sake of me, Bhaddā, the daughter-in-law, has come to the house’. When there is the sense of *tum* (the infinitive suffix): ‘For the mercy upon the world’, that is to say, to commiserate the world; ‘for the comfort of the monks’, that is to say, to dwell

¹ Vin III 203,36.

² M I 21,27.

³ Vin III 184,16.

⁴ Dh 394a.

⁵ CPD lists this as a neuter action noun. Smith (*Index verborum*) gives *ārocana*, feminine. His reason for doing so escapes me.

⁶ Aggavaṃsa is obviously sticking to his set phrase °*atthe* out of habit. This makes the expression elliptical and quite difficult to translate accurately.

comfortably.¹ Also when there is usage in the sense of *alaṃ* ‘enough’ the term *sampadāna* [applies]; and here the meaning of the word *alaṃ* is *araha* ‘capable [of]; worthy [of]; fit [for]’ and *ṭṭikkhepa* ‘rejection [of]; enough [of]’. When the sense is *araha*, then: ‘The Buddha is sufficient for me’; ‘kingship is sufficient for me’; ‘a monk is worth his begging-bowl’; ‘one wrestler is enough for the other’, that is to say, ‘one wrestler is worthy of [= equal to] the other’. When the sense is *ṭṭikkhepa*: ‘Enough of living here for you’; ‘enough of gold and glitter² for me’; ‘what with [= what’s the point of] matted locks for you, you fool’. When there is the usage of *maññati* ‘thinks; considers’ in the sense of contempt, except in the case of animates: ‘I consider you a stick of wood’; ‘I consider you a mere piece of wood’. What is the point in stating ‘in the sense of contempt’? [Compare:] ‘I consider this [to be] gold’. What is the point in stating ‘except in the case of animates’? [Compare:] ‘I consider you a donkey’.

The introduction of *ārocana* is peculiar. It is, however, met with also in *Kaccāyana*. But so far things have proceeded along an exact parallel to the treatment of the *sampadāna* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. This is the deviation. The reference is clearly to the *meaning* of *ārocana*, not the usage of that particular word. The word *ārocana* itself is not common in Sanskrit, but cf. BHSD. A 1.4.33 introduces the *sampadāna* in connection with *√ruc*, but in the sense ‘to be pleasing’, and Aggavaṃsa included this in his main definition of the *sampadāna*. Moreover, it is not

¹ Unless one assumes that the word *phāsu* has a cognate accusative suppressed, then it is an accusative used adverbially. According to the PED it is an adjective which “never occurs by itself in form *phāsu*”. This is certainly not the case; cf. Th 537–38. Etymologically connected with *√sprś* ‘touch’; Turner (1973) claims it is < **spārśu* as a vṛddhi derivation, not < **sparśu*. Its basic meaning (cf. C. Caillat 1960 and 1961) is ‘touchable’, that is, ‘ritually free to be touched’, hence ‘comfortable; all right’.

² Normally translated ‘gold coined and uncoined’.

very helpful of him to give as his example here an enclitic which can represent five different cases. Admittedly, there is a debate on whether *te* can be accusative. It is then even more puzzling when Aggavaṃsa claims that *vo* must be accusative and cannot be dative.

Once again it becomes clear that Aggavaṃsa does not distinguish between *kāraka* and *vibhakti*. This is evident from the fact that he now leaves the *kāraka* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and moves on to incorporate rules from the *vibhakti* section, the section which teaches the addition of case suffixes to nominal stems. The rules covering the dative case suffix are A 2.3.12–17, and Aggavaṃsa incorporates all of them, directly or indirectly, in the remaining part of the passage cited above.

First in this sequence is the expression *tadatthe* which is clearly intended to cover the dative of purpose. Although it is not clear where Aggavaṃsa has this expression from, it is evident that he quietly moves in the shadows of A 2.3.13–14. In Pāli the dative has lost its donative usage, and so the dative of purpose is by far its most common usage, with some occurrences of datives of place and time. In Sanskrit the situation is different, and the dative of purpose is by no means the exclusively prominent one. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, rule 2.3.13 *caturthī sampradāne* is a general rule which teaches that the dative case suffix is added to a nominal stem when the *sampradāna* is to be denoted and has not already been expressed otherwise. This is followed by rule 2.3.14 *kriyārthopapadasya ca karmani sthāninaḥ* which teaches that a dative case ending is added to denote the object (*karman*) of a substituent, an original that has been replaced, which served as an attendant word in expressing the purpose of the action. For example, in *edhebhyaḥ vrajati* ‘he goes for firewood’ the dative suffix is added to what was the object of the action expressed by the infinitive in the construction *edhān āhartuṃ vrajati* ‘he goes to fetch firewood’. Clearly, the wording of A 2.3.14 is too complex for Aggavaṃsa’s purpose, since it appears in a network of rules involving among other things the unstated substitution of the infinitive suffix *tumUN* which is added by rule 3.3.10 *tumunṇvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām*. This rule need not concern us here

in any detail. It states that the action denoted by the root to which the suffix *tumUN* is added must be the purpose of the action denoted by another verb. This sense of being for the purpose of another future action is referred to as *tādarthya* in the tradition.

In Sanskrit grammatical works the expression *tādarthya* comes up in the first *vārttika* on A 2.3.13, *caturthīvidhāne tādarthya upasaṃkhyānam* which states that when the *caturthī* is being taught one should state additionally that it is also added when there is the sense of ‘for the purpose of that’, *tādarthye*. This is clearly intended to refer to a material used for a particular purpose. Patañjali offers the examples *yūpāya dāru* ‘wood for a sacrificial post’ and *kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam* ‘gold for an ear-ring’.

The same expression and the same examples come up also in the context of A 2.1.36 *caturthī tadarthārthabalihitasukharaḥṣitaiḥ*. The first part of this rule states that a word in the dative case is optionally compounded with a word denoting a thing which is for the purpose of what the first member of the compound signifies. The first *vārttika* on this rule raises the question of whether compounds should be made with any word denoting a thing for the sake of something else. The answer is that only when there is a relation between material and product should a compound be made. Thus, from *yūpāya dāru* ‘wood for a sacrificial post’ and *kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam* ‘gold for an ear-ring’ one can make the compounds *yūpadāru* and *kuṇḍalahiraṇyam*, but one cannot make such a compound from *randhanāya sthālī* ‘a pot for cooking’. The discussion moves on to the second word *artha* in the rule and whether one should form a *nityasamāsa*, an obligatory compound, with this word. An example is *brāhmaṇārthaṃ pāyaḥ* ‘milk for the Brahman’. Details in this need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that Aggavaṃsa does not seem to include such datives of purpose that are covered by the *vārttika* on A 2.3.13, by A 2.3.14, or by A 2.1.36 under his *tadattha* formulation.

Next we have the word *tumatthe*. This is most likely taken over from the subsequent rule in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, namely 2.3.15 *tumarthāc ca bhāvavacanāt* which teaches that a dative case suffix is also added to a

stem expressing *bhāva*, that is, to the stem of an action noun denoting the mere activity of whatever the verbal root signifies, and having the sense of the suffix *tumUN*, the infinitive suffix. Examples are *yāgāya vrajati* ‘he goes to sacrifice’ in the sense of *yaṣṭum vrajati*. This does not fit in too well with the examples adduced by Aggavaṃsa. The presumption that he follows the progression of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* here is strengthened by the next item introduced, the dative used *alamattha*, in the sense of *alam* ‘enough’.

In this case there can be no doubt that Aggavaṃsa has drawn on A 2.3.16 *namaḥsvastisvāhāsavadhālamvaṣadyogāc ca*. This rule teaches that a dative case ending is introduced also after a nominal stem that co-occurs with any of the words listed. Why Aggavaṃsa has picked out only *alam* remains a mystery. That he finds no usage of the Vedic ritual interjection *vaṣaṭ* is hardly surprising, but *namaḥ* is common in all Pāli Suttas. More alarming is the fact that Aggavaṃsa has mixed up two usages of the word *alam* here. The one he wants is ‘enough’ in the sense of ‘equal to; a match for; sufficient for’, which Aggavaṃsa indicates by the meaning *araha* ‘capable [of], etc.’. Even here one might claim that there is a distinction between the examples ‘the Buddha is sufficient for me’ and ‘a monk is worth his begging-bowl’. But clearly he errs when introducing the sense of *paṭikkhepa* ‘rejection; enough of’ which involves neither the *sampadāna* nor the dative case suffix at all.

This raises several issues. One may note that Aggavaṃsa uses here the expression *alamatthappayoge* ‘when there is usage in the sense of *alam*’ and not simply *alamatthe* ‘when there is the sense of *alam*’, as in the previous *ārocanatthe*, *tadatthe*, and *tumatthe*. This, I believe, is quite revealing. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* rule 1.1.68 *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā* sets down the principle that in the grammar a word denotes its own form except in the case of a word which is a technical term of grammar. The inclusion of synonyms, then, have to be provided for by special statements. With regard to *alam* in A 2.3.16, the Sanskrit grammarians have a long discussion which goes back to the *Mahābhāṣya* and the second *vārttika* on this rule: *alam iti paryāptyarthagrahaṇam*

‘[by the word] *alam* there is mention of the meaning “being a match for” (*paryāpti*)’. This, according to Patañjali, is to exclude the usage of the dative in sentences such as *alam kurute kanyām* ‘he adorns his daughter’ which requires the accusative case ending. Patañjali brings in the example *mallo mallāya* ‘one wrestler is a match for the other’ in the sense that they are equals. But he also adduces other examples fitting the *paryāpti* requirement: *prabhur mallo mallāya* ‘one wrestler is a lord for the other’ and *prabhavati mallo mallāya* ‘one wrestler is overpowering for the other’. This is the first sign that Aggavaṃsa may have understood the application to be restricted not only to the occurrence of the word *alam*, but to any usage where there is the sense of *alam*. This, of course, is a gross misunderstanding. The *vārttika* and the necessity of stating it is brought up again in several subsequent Sanskrit works, for example the *Kāśikāvṛtti* and its commentaries. The reason is that the *paribhāṣā*, general rule of interpretation, *upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktir balīyasī*¹ is considered to make the *vārttika* superfluous. Briefly, the *paribhāṣā* states that a *vibhakti* signifying a *kāraka* supersedes a *vibhakti* occasioned by an *upapada* ‘attendant word’, that is, a syntactically co-occurring word such as *alam*. This would account for the usage of the accusative in *alam kurute kanyām* where A 2.3.2 *karmaṇi dviṭīyā* teaches the application of the accusative as a *kārakavibhakti* while the dative ending taught by A 2.3.16 would be an *upapadavibhakti* and thus superseded by the ending taught by A 2.3.2.

Whether Aggavaṃsa had seen this particular passage or not, the remarks of Kaiyaṭa *ad locum* may serve to illustrate my point (MbhP II:788): *tena tatparyāyānām api grahaṇam sidhyati | anyathā svarūpasyaiva grahaṇam syāt | atha vālam ityarthagrahaṇam vyākhyeyam ity arthaḥ*, ‘Thereby [that is, by stating only the wording *paryāptyartha* “with the sense of being a match for”] understanding also of synonyms of *alam* would be established. Otherwise there would be understanding of the own form [of the word *alam*] alone. Or else, the interpretation [of

¹ For a detailed exposition of this *paribhāṣā* and its needlessness, see Cardona 1980.

the *vārttika* is that by the word] *alam* there is understanding of [its] meaning'. Both of these solutions open the way for the inclusion of synonyms of *alam* which then is to be taken to mean 'in the sense of *alam*', *alamatthe*, Aggavaṃsa's wording in his rule.

It is clear that Aggavaṃsa, if he did not understand the situation here fully, could have taken this or a similar passage as a green light to include any usage of *alam* and any synonym of *alam*, including even *kim* occurring with a form in the instrumental in a construction such as *kiṃ te jatahi* 'what is the sense of matted locks for you' where the pronoun *te* occurs as a genitive/dative form but with no relevant relation to the construction in question. One may note that the example with *kiṃ* is not met with in the *Kaccāyanavutti*.

That I have gone into such detail here may seem unnecessary. But to me it is significant that none of the subtleties alluded to above have been grasped or included by Aggavaṃsa while he includes constructions which miss the point completely. To me this serves to illustrate the crudeness and superficiality with which he handles *kāraka* as a grammatical device.

The expression *maññatipayoge* removes any doubt that in the present section Aggavaṃsa is following the sequence of rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In this case he is dealing with A 2.3.17 *manyakarmanī anādare vibhāṣāprāṇiṣu* which teaches that *optionally* a dative ending is introduced after a stem which is the object of the verb *man* 'to consider' when this has the sense of contempt except in the case of animates. Aggavaṃsa accounts well for this rule. The question remains, however, whether we are dealing with genuine Pāli usage here or whether Aggavaṃsa has construed examples to fit Pāṇini's rule. None of the examples have been traced as quotations. This calls for considerable caution. The word *kāṣṭha* 'stick of wood' occurs in a verse cited in the *Kāśikā*: *manye kāṣṭham ulūkhalam* 'I consider a mortar to be a piece of wood'. Here there is no sense of contempt, so the accusative case ending is added. To illustrate the requirement that animates have to be excluded,

the Sanskrit authors give examples including dogs and jackals. Would it not be easy to substitute a donkey for these ?

2.6.1.8 *nayanagatyatthakammani*

(697,6–12) *Nayanagatyatthakammani*: "yo maṃ gahetvāna dakāya neti"¹, *gāmassa pādena gato*, "appo saggāya gacchati"², "saggassa gamanena vā"³, "mūlāya paṭikasseyya"⁴ — *kassa gatiyan ti dhātu, paṭikasseyyā ti ākaḍḍheyya, bhikkhum āpattimūlaṃ āneyyā ti attho; dutiyā ca: dakam neti, gāmaṃ pādena gato, appo saggam gacchati, mūlaṃ paṭikasseyya*.

In the case of the object [of an action denoted by a verb] with the senses of *nayana* 'leading' or *gati* 'movement': 'He who, having taken me, leads me to water'; 'he has gone on foot to the village'; 'few go to heaven'; 'or by going to heaven'; 'he should drag back to the root'. The verbal root here is '*kassa* in the sense of movement'⁵: '*paṭikasseyya*', he should drag back, that is to say, he should lead the monk back to the root of his offence. And also the second [case ending]: 'He leads to water'⁶; 'he has gone on foot to the village'; 'few go to heaven'; 'he should drag back to the root'.

The sequence of rules A 2.3.13–17 which deals with the dative case ending is preceded by the rule 2.3.12 *gatyarthakarmani divitīyācaturthyau ceṣṭāyāṃ anadhvani*. This is the last rule in the

¹ Ja III 296, 20–21.

² Dh 174d.

³ Dh 178b.

⁴ Vin I 320,35.

⁵ Dhātumālā 955.

⁶ This is what it "ought" to mean.

sequence dealing with the assignment of cases when the *kāraka karman* is to be denoted. As I understand it, the rule states that the second or fourth case suffixes are used to signify the object (*karman*) of verbs having the sense of *gati* ‘going’ provided movement actually occurs and the object is not a path. So far so good; Aggavaṃsa has acceptably accounted for the usage of both the dative/genitive and the accusative in the case of objects of verbs of motion. But he has included this rule in his *sampadāna* section, not in the section dealing with *kamma*. Moreover, it is not clear whether these objects of verbs of motion are assigned to the category *kamma* when there is an accusative ending and to the category *sampadāna* when there is a dative/genitive ending. It seems at first easy to say that this confusion is due to the fact that Aggavaṃsa does not distinguish clearly between *kāraka* and *vibhakti*. This, however, is too simple in as much as the problem was not entirely clear to the Sanskrit grammarians either. The discussion of how to interpret A 2.3.12 goes back all the way to the *Mahābhāṣya*. Questioning the purpose of this rule, Patañjali states (Mbh I: 448,18–21):

*kim arthaṃ punar idam ucyate | caturthī yathā syāt | atha
dvitīyā siddhā | siddhā karmaṇīty eva | caturthy api siddhā |
katham | saṃpradāna ity eva | na sidhyati | karmaṇā yam
abhipraiti sa saṃpradānam ity ucyate kriyayā cāsau grāmaṃ
abhipraiti | kayā kriyayā | gamikriyayā | kriyāgrahaṇam api
tatra codyate |*

Now, for what purpose is this [rule] stated? So that the fourth [case suffix] would be applicable. Is the second established, then? It is indeed established by [rule 2.3.2] *karmaṇi dvitīyā* ‘the second [case suffix] when the object is to be denoted’. [But] the fourth [case suffix] has been established too. How? By [rule 2.3.13] *caturthī saṃpradāne* ‘[the fourth case suffix] when the *sampadāna* [is to be denoted]’. [No,] it has not been established. [Rule 1.4.32] states that ‘what [the agent] aims at

through the *karman*, that is [called] the *sampadāna*’, but [here the agent] aims at the village through the action [and not through the *karman*]. Through what action? Through the action of going. There [i.e., in the discussion of rule 1.4.32] mention of [the word] *kriyā* ‘action’¹ is also urged.

If I understand Patañjali correctly here, he is proposing that one can do without rule 2.3.12. In that case, one could simply assign the village to the category *karman*, add the accusative case suffix according to A 2.3.2 *karmaṇi dvitīyā*, and thus get a sentence like *grāmaṃ gacchati* ‘he goes [to] the village’. Likewise one could assign it to the category *sampadāna* by A 1.4.32, including the reading *kriyayā* ‘through the action’, add the dative case suffix according to A 2.3.13 *caturthī saṃpradāne*, and thus get the sentence *grāmāya gacchati* ‘he goes to the village’. Rule 2.3.12 would thus be superfluous. It is worthy of notice, though, that Patañjali rejects the inclusion of the word *kriyā* in rule 1.4.32 in his discussion of that rule.² It seems then reasonable to assume that Patañjali would be forced to retain rule 2.3.12.³ And if rule 2.3.12 is retained, it seems clear that the village would be assigned to the category *karman* and one has a choice with regard to the accusative or the dative case suffix. The *Kāśikāvṛtti* accepts the rule.⁴

Nevertheless, the *Bhāṣya* discussion seems to have created quite a bit of havoc and is obviously at the core of certain issues raised in the *Vākyapadīya* in explaining the varieties of *sampadāna*. The entire

¹ That is, *kriyayā* ‘through the action’ as well and not only ‘through the *karman*’.

² Mbh I: 330,23–331,2.

³ I am not quite certain about this, though, since Patañjali at A 1.4.32 accepts the interpretation of *karmaṇā* = *kriyayā*.

⁴ However, the *Kāśikā* raises the question of why the word *dvitīyā*, seemingly redundant because of A 2.3.2, is included in the wording of the rule. The reason given is that it is to block A 2.3.65 *karṭṭkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* from taking effect, and the subsequent addition, for example, of the genitive case suffix and not the accusative to the stem *grāma-* in an expression like *grāmaṃ gantā* ‘a goer to the village’. Details are of no interest here.

discussion of the *sampradāna* there covers only seven verses (VP 3.7.129–35). The first of these gives the general definition, the second brings in the usage accounted for by A 1.4.33 which Aggavaṃsa incorporates in his main definition of the *sampadāna*, and the remaining five deal with issues pertaining to A 2.3.12. Roughly, Bhartṛhari suggests that the issue depends on whether an action is thought about as a unity or as consisting of parts (VP 3.7.133–34):

*bhedābhedavivakṣā ca svabhāvena vyavasthitā /
tasmād gatyarthakarmatve vyabhicāro na drśyate //
vikalpenaiva sarvatra samjñe syātām ubhe yadi /
ārambheṇa na yogasya pratyākhyānaṃ samaṃ bhavet //*

And the wish of the speaker [of whether to express the action] as having parts or as a whole depends on its own nature. Therefore there is no error in the case of objects of [verbs] having the sense of motion. If the technical terms [*karman* and *sampradāna*] were both to appear everywhere according to option alone, the rejection of the rule would not be the same as its statement [that is, would not have the same effect].

One has to adopt some principle in order to determine when an action is to be considered as a whole or as having parts, but clearly both the *karman* and the *sampradāna* are considered possible with regard to verbs of motion. The *Vākyapadīya* may thus be Aggavaṃsa's source for including A 2.3.12 in the *sampadāna* section and for not making it very clear whether, when there is usage of the accusative case, the object of the act of going is assigned to the category *kamma*.

One final but significant point remains to be considered, namely Aggavaṃsa's inclusion of the word *nayana* 'leading' in his rule. This is obviously done on his own initiative in as much as it is absent in *Kaccāyana* and the *vutti*. His exact source for this is difficult to trace, but there can be no doubt that it is one or more of the Sanskrit grammarians.

The word appears already in the third *vārttika* on rule 2.3.12: *ceṣṭāyām anadhvani striyaṃ gacchaty ajāṃ nayaty atiprasaṅgaḥ*, '[the expression] "provided movement [actually occurs] and [the object is] not a path" would cause overapplication, as in "he approaches the woman" and "he leads the goat".' The point here is that both *gacchati* and *nayati* are verbs of motion and the objects stated are not a road and movement does actually occur. But the expressions *striyai gacchati* and *ajāyai nayati* are not acceptable. The solution is offered by vt. 4: *siddhaṃ tv asaṃprāptavacanāt*, 'it is established, however, if we state "[an object] which has not been reached [yet]"'. Kaiyaṭa explains (Mbhp II:784):

*strī tu saṃprāpteti caturthyabhāvaḥ / ajāṃ nayatīty atrāpy
ajāyāḥ saṃprāpaṇāc caturthyabhāvaḥ / atha vā nayatir
gatyartha eva na bhavati / pratīyate hy atra gatih, na hy asau
nayater arthaḥ, tasya prāpaṇāvācitvād ity āhuḥ /*

But the woman has been reached, therefore a fourth [case ending] is lacking. Also in the case of 'he leads the goat' the fourth is lacking since there is reaching (delivery) of the goat. Or else, the verb *nī* is not only a verb of motion. For here 'going' is understood, but that is not the meaning of *nī*, since it expresses [the sense of] *prāpaṇa* 'conveying; transporting', they say.

In other words, the verb *nī* is not simply to be considered a verb of motion and ought therefore to be mentioned separately. Whether inspired by this Kaiyaṭa passage or some similar passage — Helārāja discusses the *saṃprāpta vārttika* under VP 3.7.134 — it is clear that Aggavaṃsa's inclusion of *nayati* has been triggered by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. He remembers the genuine example *dakāya neti* 'he leads [me] to water' but does not seem to bother about the *saṃprāpta* problem. I wonder whether the accusative version, *dakaṃ neti*, would be

genuine Pāli, though, or whether it would simply mean ‘he leads the water’.¹

2.6.1.9 *āsimsattha* and *sammutipayoga*

(697,12–15) *Āsimsatthe ca: āyasmato dīghāyu hotu, bhaddaṃ bhavato hotu, kusalaṃ bhavato hotu, svāgataṃ bhavato hotu icc evamādi. Sammutipayoge: sādhusammuti² me tassa Bhagavato dassanāya.*

Also when there is the sense of benediction (*āsimsā*): ‘May long life (*dīghāyu*) befall the Venerable One’; ‘may good fortune (*bhadda*) befall you’; ‘may welfare (*kusala*) befall you’; ‘may there be welcome/welfare for you’, and so on in the same manner. When there is usage of *sammuti* ‘approval; consent’: ‘There is approval of the Saṅgha for me to see the Noble One’.

Āsimsattha incorporates A 2.3.73 *caturthī cāsiṣyāyuṣya-madrabhadrakuśalasukhārthahitaiḥ*. This rule teaches that instead of a genitive (A 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*) a dative case suffix is optionally (*anyatarasyām*, A 2.3.70) added after a nominal stem when it co-occurs with the words *āyusya* ‘long life’, *madra* ‘joy’, *bhadra* ‘good fortune’, *kuśala* ‘welfare’, *sukha* ‘happiness’, *artha* ‘prosperity’ and *hita* ‘good’ when *āsiṣi* ‘benediction; blessing’ is intended. Apart from A 2.3.62 which teaches a certain usage of the dative in Vedic, this is the only rule after A 2.3.17 concerning the usage of the dative case suffix. But it has nothing to do with the *sampradāna*. Note that Aggavaṃsa’s examples, presumably to the extent he has been able to find some, follow the progression of the words mentioned in A 2.3.73. This rule is the final rule in the section assigning case suffixes in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* so

¹ cf. Dh 80a: *udakaṃ hi nayanti nettikā*, ‘for irrigators lead water’.

² Cf. *sammata*^o; cf. also *sādhusammata* D I 48; S IV 398; Sn 92,1 *et passim*; Mil 4,21.

Aggavaṃsa has by now taken what he thinks he can use from that text on the *sampradāna* and the fourth case suffix. The rest of his *sampadāna* passage deals more directly with issues brought up by the Pāli itself.

Quite problematic is the first issue of this kind: *sammutipayoga* ‘when there is usage of *sammuti*’. I presume one has to add ‘the term *sampadāna* applies’. As far as I know, this has no parallel in Sanskrit grammar. Aggavaṃsa offers one single example which is not without ambiguity as to its translation. First of all, I take *sādhusammuti* to be a *tatpuruṣa* or a *karmadhāraya* compound, to be interpreted as ‘approval by good ones’ or ‘approval as good’. Moreover, there are variant readings here. For example, *sādhusammata* is translated by K.R. Norman as ‘well-thought of by the general public’¹ which would imply ‘approved of as *sādhu* by those who are *sādhu*’. This implication might well have been intended. Then there are two possible dative forms, *me* ‘for me; of me’ and *dassanāya* ‘to see’; ‘approval/agreement for me of the seeing’ would be a dative of purpose. *Kaccāyana* has *sammuti*^o with the variant *sammata*^o. The *vutti*, incidentally, offers one more example, *aññatra sanghasammutiya bhikkhussa vippavattum na vaṭṭati*, which Senart translates “il n’est pas permis au religieux de s’absenter autrement que du consentement de la communauté”.

2.6.1.10 *tatīyatthādi*

(697,15–698,17) *Tatīyatthe: “asakkatā c’ asma Dhanañ-jayāya”² mayam Dhanañjayena raññā asakkatā bhavāmā ti attho. Ādisaddena pañcamiyatthe ca: “bhiyyoso mattāya”³ ayam hi bhiyyoso mattāyā ti payogo pañcamīpayogo “yo ca sītañ ca uñhañ ca tiñā bhiyyo na maññati”⁴ ti payogo viya;*

¹ *The group of discourses* II, Sn 92,1 etc.

² Ja III 98,16.

³ Smith: ns *cit.* S II 242,21.

⁴ D III 185,15–16 = Th 232.

tattha bhiiyoso ti idaṃ bhiiyosaddena atirekatthavācakena¹ nipātena samānattham nipātapadam “*ahaṃ bhikkhave yāvade ākaṃkhāmi vivicca’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi*”² *ti ettha yāvadevasaddena samānattham yāvade ti nipātapadam viya; na c’ ettha vattabbaṃ: ‘bhiiyoso ti nipātapadam nāma atthi ti ācariyehi niddiṭṭham na diṭṭhapubban’ ti ācariyehi ‘nipātā nāmā’ ti aniddiṭṭhānam pi bahūnaṃ nipātānaṃ sāsane dissanato, “maṃkate Sakka kassaci”*³ *ti ettha hi man ti amhatthe upayogavacanam sabbanāmikapadam, kate ti nipātapadam; tasmā samsayaṃ akatvā bhiiyoso mattāyā ti ettha ‘mattato bhiiyo’ ti attho gahetabbo ‘tinā bhiiyo’ ti ettha tiṇato⁴ bhiiyo ti attho viya, imam attham yeva sandhāya porāṇā ‘bhiiyoso mattāyā ti atirekappamāṇenā’ ti tatiyāvibhattivasena attham kathayimsu, pañcamivibhatti hi katthaci tatiyāya samānatthā “mattāsukhapariccāgā”*⁵ *ti ettha viya, appamattikassa sukhasa pariccāgenā⁶ ti hi attho. Keci pan’ ettha vadeyyum: ‘mattāsukhapariccāgā’ ti ādisu yasmā mattāsaddo itthiliṅgo, tasmā ‘bhiiyoso mattāyā’ ti etthā pi mattāyā ti idaṃ itthiliṅgam tatiyekavacanantam, ten’ eva hi ‘atirekappamāṇenā’ ti vivaraṇam katan ti. Tan na; kiñcā pi ‘mattāsukhapariccāgā’ ti ādisu mattāsaddo itthiliṅgo, tathā pi mattan ti napumsakaliṅgam pi bahusu ṭhānesu dissati; tasmā napumsakaliṅgato mattasaddato catutthekavacanassa āyādesse kate mattāyā ti rūpaṃ bhavati, tañ ca bhiiyoso ti nipātapadayogato pañcamiyatthe catutthi ti viññāyati. Keci pana ‘bhiiyoso mattāyā’ ti ettha ‘so puggalo mattāya madana-*

¹ This is Buddhaghosa’s exegesis; cf. Smith: Spk ad S I 49,11: Spk ad S I 24,19 = Sv ad D I 211,12.

² cf. S II 210,25.

³ Ja IV 14,2.

⁴ Smith: Sv ad D III 185,16: tiṇato pi uttarim.

⁵ Dhp 290a.

⁶ Dhp-a III 449,5.

tāya¹ bhiiyo’ ti attham vadanti. Taṃ sāsane pahāradāna-sadisam ativiya na yujjati.

[When the fourth occurs] in the sense of the third² [case suffix the term *sampadāna* may apply]: ‘But we are not honoured in respect of Dhanañjayā’, that is to say, we are not honoured by queen Dhanañjayā. By the word *ādi* ‘etc.’ [is indicated that the technical term *sampadāna* applies] also [when the fourth occurs] in the sense of the fifth [case suffix], for this usage ‘*bhiiyoso mattāya*’ is a usage of the fifth, like in the usage: ‘But he who considers cold and hot as no more than grass’. There this [word] *bhiiyoso* is a particle (*nipāta*) synonymous with the linguistic item *bhiiyo* which is a particle expressing the sense of *atireka* ‘surplus; excess; remains’, just like the particle *yāvade* is synonymous with the linguistic item *yāvadeva* here in: ‘I, monks, as much as indeed (*yāvade*) I strive to separate myself from desire, separate myself from bad phenomena’. But in this respect one should not say that it has not been seen before that the teachers have taught explicitly that *bhiiyoso* is indeed a particle, because, with regard to numerous particles which have not even been taught explicitly, it has been attested in the Śāstra by the teachers that they are indeed particles. For in the case of ‘[there should not be harm,] O Sakka, to anyone on my account (*maṃkate*)’ *maṃ* is a pronominal word expressing the thing used in the sense of [the pronominal stem] *amha-* [while] *kate* is a particle. Therefore, without creating doubt — in the case of *bhiiyoso mattāya* the meaning is to be understood as *mattato bhiiyo* ‘more than so much’, just as in the case of *tinā bhiiyo*

¹ Bm *madanatthāya*.

² This is how I understand Aggavaṃsa’s intention here, although the phrasing is admittedly extremely ambiguous. One may as well translate ‘when there is the sense of the third’ or ‘in the sense of the third’. Pāṇini uses the expression A 1.4.85 *ṭṛtīyārthe*, ‘when there is the sense of the third [case suffix]’.

the meaning is *tinato bhiyyo* ‘more than grass’ — ancient authors explain the meaning by means of the third case suffix as in *bhiyyoso mattāya*, that is, ‘through extraordinary measure’, with reference to this meaning alone, for the fifth case ending sometimes has the same sense as the third, as in the case of *mattāsukhapariccāgā* (ablative) ‘from renouncing small pleasure’, for the meaning is ‘through (instrumental) the renouncing of small-measured pleasure’. [Objection:] Some, however, would say about this that in [expressions] such as *mattāsukhapariccāgā*, since the word *mattā* has feminine gender, so also in the case of *bhiyyoso mattāya* this [form] *mattāya* has feminine gender and ends in a singular third case suffix; and that is why he explains it by *atirekappamāṇena* ‘through extraordinary measure’. [Reply:] No. [For] although the linguistic item *mattā* has feminine gender in such [expressions] as *mattāsukhapariccāga*, [the form] *mattam* with neuter gender is still seen in many instances; therefore, in as much as the substitute *-āya* is made for the singular fourth case suffix after the word *matta* with neuter gender, the form *mattāya* occurs, and so the fourth case suffix [occurs] in the sense of the fifth due to the construction with the particle *bhiyyoso* — thus it is to be understood. [New objection:] But with regard to *bhiyyoso mattāya* some declare that the meaning is *so puggalo mattāya madanatāya bhiyyo* ‘he (so), that is, the individual, is more than *mattā*, that is, [more than] intoxication’.¹ [Reply:] This is highly unacceptable in this Śāstra, [and] just like giving a slap [in the face].

Aggavaṃsa now ventures to show that words with a fourth case ending appearing in the sense of another case ending can assign what they signify to the category *sampadāna*. In general, Aggavaṃsa here

¹ Or, with v.l. *madanatthāya*, ‘for the intoxicating’ (dative of purpose)?

tries to account for problematic usages, normally not more than one, by basically saying that anything can stand for anything and loosely talking about one case suffix occurring in the sense of another.

First is the instrumental, and his example may indeed call for an assignment to the *sampadāna* category, although I can see no problem in a *karāṇa* assignment. Incidentally, the commentary partly incorporated in Fausbøll’s *Jātaka* edition states (Ja III 98,16): *Dhanañjayāyā’ ti karaṇatthe sampadānam*. To say that the *sampadāna* occurs in the sense of the *karāṇa* is a peculiar juggling with categories and shows how loosely some Pāli authors dealt with these notions.

Next Aggavaṃsa turns to the word *ādi* ‘etc.’. He says that by including this word in the rule he meant to indicate that the name *sampadāna* applies also when there is the sense of the ablative case suffix. His whole issue here is the expression *bhiyyoso mattāya*. Notably, *Kaccāyana* here reads only *bhiyya*, followed by *sattamyatthe* ‘when there is the meaning of the seventh [case suffix]’, a term which is taken up by Aggavaṃsa later. All the *vutti* has to say on the issue is: *Bhiyyappayoge: bhiyyo somattāya* [sic]; *iccevamādi*, ‘when there is usage of *bhiyya* [as in] “*bhiyyoso mattāya*”, and so on in the same manner’. Aggavaṃsa’s inclusion of *ādi* and, as will be clear later, the fifth and sixth as well as the seventh case ending thus seems to be his own project.

Now my view here is that it is definitely of more interest to find out what Aggavaṃsa thinks *bhiyyoso mattāya* means than to state reasons for what we may think it means. Still, this is such a *tour de force* that it seems necessary to clear the ground a little bit. The form *bhiyyoso* is roughly translatable as ‘for the most part’, in some places ‘to a greater extent’. As for the expression *bhiyyoso mattāya*, two solutions immediately present themselves. If we take *bhiyyoso* as a genitive of the corresponding Sanskrit *bhūyas*, we may translate ‘to the measure of something greater’. If we take it as an adverb formed with the suffix *-śas*, commonly added to numeral or quantitative stems, and thus equivalent to Sanskrit *bhūyaśas*, we may translate ‘to a measure in a greater way’. Edgerton remarks (BHSD): “*bhūyasya*, °*syā*, °*so*, *bhūyosya*, with (in

Mv rarely without) mātrayā (instr. of Skt. mātṛā), or once mātṛām, = Pali bhīyoso-mattāya, adv. or adverbial phrase, in *especially high degree*. The common BHS expression is bhūyasyā (instr. fem. of Skt bhūyas-) mātrayā, e.g. SP 23.1; LV 321.17; Mv ii.345.2 (vs, prob. read with v.l. °sya m.c.); exceptionally bhūyasya (a m.c. ?) mātṛām (so mss., Senart em. °am) Mv ii.338.13 (vs.); ... in SP 71.10 (prose) ed. with Nep. mss. has the usual bhūyasyā mātrayā, but Kashgar rec. bhūyaso (intending Skt. °śo; cf. Pali bhīyoso) mātrayā.” It could, of course, be an instrumental, and we would have to translate something like ‘for the most part with respect to measure’, but I doubt whether this is genuine Sanskrit usage and not a back-formation from Pāli or some other Middle Indo-Aryan dialect. J. Brough, with reference to Dhṛ 290a *mattāsukha-pariccāgā* quoted by Aggavaṃsa above, remarks (1962:229): “In addition to its more usual meanings, *mātṛā* is widely recognized by the Sanskrit lexicographers in the sense of ‘property, household goods, worldly possessions (*paricchade, dhane*).” I abstain from speculating on the possible implications this could have for the interpretation of the forms in question here, since it was obviously not in Aggavaṃsa’s mind.

Aggavaṃsa himself proceeds as follows. He first identifies *bhīyoso* as a *nipāta* ‘particle’, synonymous to the particle *bhīyo*, just as the contracted form *yāvade* is synonymous to *yāvadeva*. From this he proceeds to suggest that *bhīyoso mattāya* is to be understood as *mattato bhīyo* ‘more than so much’, thus assuming an ablative case ending for *mattāya*. Why he suggests this solution I am not able to tell. It is of course possible, but not terribly convincing.

To this the objection is raised that elsewhere we meet with the feminine *mattā*, so that in *bhīyoso mattāya* the word *mattāya* is in the instrumental case. It is not clear what case ending he would ascribe to *bhīyoso* under this alternative, but it might be thought of as instrumental as well. This would accord with the forms attested in BHS and thus represent an apparently common interpretation. Aggavaṃsa refutes this objection, though, claiming that the neuter *mattam* is also met with, as

attested also in BHS, and so, he says, the fourth case suffix *-āya* occurs in the sense of the fifth after *bhīyoso*. This is Aggavaṃsa’s final view.

The second objection put forward consists in the fanciful *nirvacana* analysis *so madanatāya bhīyo* which implies that *mattā* is taken to be an abstract feminine noun derived from \sqrt{mad} ‘be intoxicated’. This is rejected by Aggavaṃsa straight away as no more than a slap in the face, a view with which one is inclined to agree.

Aggavaṃsa’s view, then, is that in the expression *bhīyoso mattāya*, *mattāya* is a dative form where, in construction with *bhīyoso* which he conceives of as a particle, the fourth case suffix occurs in the sense of the fifth. This problem occurs only because he takes *matta-* as neuter. If it is taken as feminine, there would be no problem. Also, he has a problem with the *tiṇābhīyo* example where there is no dative. In sum, it seems that Aggavaṃsa has not quite understood the construction, and the whole exercise is the result of that.

2.6.1.11 *chaṭṭhiyattha, sattamiyattha, etc.*

(698,17–699,2) *Chaṭṭhiyatthe ca: “mahato¹ ganāya bhattā me”² Sattamiyatthe ca: tuyhañ c’ assa āvikaromi, tassa me Sakko pātur ahoṣi. Sāratthe ca vattabbe catutthī vibhatti bhavati, sārattho nāma uttamatto cintāpanattho vā: desetu bhante Bhagavā dhammaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ, tesam phāsu, etassa pahineyya, yathā no Bhagavā vyākareyya, tathā tesam vyākariṣāmi, kappati samaṇānaṃ āyogo, amhākaṃ maṇinā attho, “bahūpakārā bhante Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī Bhagavato”³ “bahūpakārā bhikkhave mātāpitaro puttānaṃ”⁴ icc evamādi. Tathā ādisaddena bahusu akkharappayogesu catutthiyā pavatti*

¹ Smith 133,7: *ita Bm h.l. et Ce Bm Sd § 554 (Ce 613,26), cf. 135,12 [= ganāya bhattā ti]; Ce Be ns J mahā-*

² Ja V 363,12.

³ M III 253,20.

⁴ It 110,10.

veditabbā, taṃ yathā: “upamaṃ te karissāmi”¹, dhammaṃ vo ... desissāmi,² “ko attho supanena te”³, kim attho me buddhena, kaṭhinassa dussam, āgantukassa bhattaṃ icc evamādi. Tatiyatthādisu cā ti casaddaggaṇaṃ avuttattha-samuccayatthañ c’ eva sampadānagahaṇatthañ ca; Kaccāyane pana sattamyatthesu cā ti casaddaggaṇaṃ vikappanattavāggahaṇānukaddhanattham⁴ eva.

Also [when the fourth occurs] in the sense of the sixth [case suffix the term *sampadāna* may apply]: ‘Supporter of my great flock’.⁵ Also [when the fourth occurs] in the sense of the seventh [case suffix the term *sampadāna* may apply]: ‘And indeed I show it to you’; ‘for me here the Śākya has become manifest’. Also when the sense of *sāra* ‘most excellent bit’ is to be expressed, the fourth case suffix occurs, the meaning of *sāra* namely being the meaning ‘best’ or the meaning ‘reminding’: ‘Venerable Noble One, make the monks think about the doctrine’; ‘for their best’; ‘one should send to him’; ‘just like the Noble One would explain to us, in the same way I shall explain to them’; ‘practice is the essential thing for Śramaṇas’; ‘for us there is need of a jewel’; ‘O venerable one, Mahāpajāpati Gotamī is of much service to the Noble One’; ‘monks, a mother and father is of much service to their children’ — and so on in the same manner. Thus, by the word *ādi* ‘etc.’, the function of the fourth [case suffix] is to be understood in many a linguistic usage, as for example: ‘I shall make you a parable’; ‘[monks,] I shall teach you the doctrine’; ‘what need have you for sleep’; ‘what need have I for the Buddha’; ‘cloth for a Kaṭhina-cloth’;

¹ MI 148,35.

² cf. M III 37,11.

³ Ja IV 84,22.

⁴ Kacc: *vikappanattam vā*°.

⁵ This example and the translation will be discussed below.

‘food for those who have arrived’ — and so on in the same manner. The mention of the word *ca* ‘also’ in the phrase *tatiyatthādisu ca* does indeed serve the purpose of adding the sense of something that has not been stated as well as the purpose of mentioning the *sampadāna*. But in *Kaccāyana*, when he says *sattamyatthesu ca* ‘also in the sense of the seventh’, the mention of the word *ca* is only for the sake of referring back to a previous mention in rules through the word *vā* in the sense of option.

Aggavaṃsa’s first example, *mahato gaṇāya bhattā me*, intended to illustrate a dative used in the sense of the genitive, is problematic. I strongly suspect that he has put this in only to make the number of cases complete. The Ja edition reads *mahāgaṇāya* as a compound, and one might have suspected that the *vigraha* giving *mahato* was done by Aggavaṃsa himself to find an example which contrasts, but the variant reading indicated in the notes above more or less rules out this possibility. Earlier in the *Saddanīti* (133,7) Aggavaṃsa has explained the phrase as *mama mahato haṃsagaṇassa bhattā* ‘supporter of my mighty flock of geese’. Moreover, one may ask why *gaṇāya* is stated when *gaṇassa* would scan perfectly? One may also wonder whether *gaṇāya* is a feminine form. If it were, that would alter the situation considerably.

The sense of *sāra*, as much of the material here, has been taken over from the *Kaccāyanavutti*. This includes also the example *desetu bhante Bhagavā dhammaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ*, which at first does not seem to fit any of the two meanings he has outlined for *sāra*. But I think there is a way out if one takes *desetu* in the sense of *cintāpana* ‘causing someone to think [about something]; reminding’. Several of these are marginal usages of the dative, and many of them may be summed up as usages of an “ethical” dative, that is, ‘for the sake of the best’. It is also conceivable in some of these examples to take *sāra* in the sense of ‘advantage; profit’.

We also re-encounter an old problem here, in that so many of the examples include pronominal forms such as *me*, *te*, *vo*, etc. which can stand for a number of cases.

That Aggavaṃsa draws heavily on the *Kaccāyanavutti* here is especially obvious from the fact that he quotes from it by name. It is, incidentally, noteworthy that he refers to it as *Kaccāyana*. Now, in that text we read (137): *Atthaggaṇaṇena bahūsu akkharappayogesu dissati*, ‘by mentioning the word *attha* [the function of the fourth case suffix] is to be understood in many a linguistic usage’. Aggavaṃsa has a completely parallel construction, though using *ādi* and not *attha*. Does this indicate that the author of the *Kaccāyanavutti* thinks of *sattamy-atthesu* in the rule as *sattamy[atthe]* and *atthe*? That is to say, does he take these datives as datives of purpose? Finally, the word *ca* in *Kaccāyana*, according to Aggavaṃsa, pulls in a previous *vā* which signifies option. *Kaccāyana*’s use is *only* to do this, Aggavaṃsa’s use is “only” (= especially) to this *and* that.

2.6.1.12 Excursus

(699,2–701,15) *Ettha pana thatvā kiñci vadāma: saddasattha-vidūnaṃ matavasena hi rajakassa vatthaṃ dadāti, Yaññadatto Devadattassa iṇaṃ dadāti ti ādisu sampadānasaññāya na bhavitabbaṃ, saddasatthesu hi yassa sammā pūjābuddhiyā anuggahabuddhiyā vā dīyate, taṃ sampadānaṃ ti vuttaṃ, rajakassa vatthadānañ c’ eva Devadattassa iṇadānañ ca pūjāvasena vā anuggahavasena vā na hoti, accantavacanañ ca na hoti, tasmā sammā pakārena assa dadāti ti sampadānaṃ ti atthena virodha[na]to¹ sampadānasaññā na hoti ti tesam laddhi, ten’ eva rajakāya, Devadattāyā ti ca catutthi vibhatti tehi na vihitā; chaṭṭhi yeva vihitā: rajakassā ti ādinā ti. Ettha asmākaṃ vinicchayo evaṃ veditabbo: yadi rajakasaddo vattha-*

¹ Ce Bm virodhanato; Be ns virodhato.

saddena sambandhanīyo siyā, rajakassa vatthaṃ aññassa kassaci dadāti ti attho siyā, rajako ca sāmī siyā; yadi pana dhovāpanatthāya vatthaṃ rajakassa dadāti ti dānena rajako sambandhanīyo siyā, so rajako kathaṃ sampadānaṃ nāma na siyā dānakiriyāya paṭiggahaṇabhāve ṭhitattā, tathā hi ‘yassa dātukāmo’ ti ca acittikatvā asakkatvā bhikkhussa bhattaṃ adāsī ti ca ādisu pi dātukāmatāmattena vā asakkaccadānamattena vā yo dānaṃ gaṇhissati yo ca dānaṃ gaṇhati, te sabbe sampadānā honti yeva sāsanaṃ yuttivasena; api ca sāsane “atthāya hitāyā”¹ ti tadatthapayogaṃ ṭhapetvā, “dakāya neti”², “saggāya gacchati”³, “asakkatā c’ asma Dhanāñjayāya”⁴, “bhīyoso mattāya”⁵, “gaṇāya bhattā”⁶ ti payogesu vibhattivipallāsanaṃ ca ṭhapetvā namoyogadānaṃ yogādīsu catutthekavacanaṃ āyādeso na labbhati, tena saṅgūttayārūlhe pāvacaṇe buddhāya deti, namo buddhāyā ti ādīni padāni na santi, “buddhaseṭṭhassa’ adās’ ahaṃ”⁷, “namo karohi nāgassā”⁸ ti evarūpāni yeva āyādesarahitāni padāni dissanti, tasmā yaṃ Atthasāliniyā āgataṃ “eko puriso kiliṭṭhaṃ vatthaṃ rajakassa adāsī”⁹ ti padaṃ, tattha rajakassā ti catutthiyā bhavitabbaṃ catutthichaṭṭhinaṃ sabbapakārena sanamvibhattinaṃ sarūpato ṭhitatthāne sadisattā. Tathā hi “aggassa dātā medhāvī” ti imissā pālīyā atthaṃ vadantehi garūhi “aggassa dātā ti aggassa ratanattayassa dātā, atha vā aggassa deyyadhammassa dātā”¹⁰ ti catutthichaṭṭhinaṃ attho vutto. Iti

¹ M I 21,27.

² Ja III 296,21.

³ Dhp 174d.

⁴ Ja III 98,16.

⁵ Smith: ns cit. S II 242,21.

⁶ Ja V 363,12.

⁷ Ap 286,23.

⁸ M I 143,12.

⁹ As 243,10.

¹⁰ It 89,5 and It-a (PTS ed. Bose) II 11,5. Ed. Bose reads *deyyadhammassa dānaṃ* [ulavaṃ katvā].

saddasatthayuttito rajako sāmī hotu chaṭṭhīvibhattivasena vuttattā, sāsanayuttito pana sampadānaṃ hotu catutthī-chaṭṭhīnaṃ avisesena vuttattā¹; katthaci katthaci ṭhāne yebhuyyena pālinayasaddasatthanayānaṃ aññamaññaṃ accantaviruddhattā ca, tathā hi saddasatthe āpasaddo bahuvacanantaṃ itthiliṅgaṃ Bhagavatā āhacca bhāsīte pulliṅgaṃ ekavacanantaṃ; tathā saddasatthe dārāsaddo bahuvacanantaṃ pulliṅgaṃ, pāvacane vacanadvayayuttaṃ pulliṅgaṃ; saddasatthe dhātusaddo ekantapullīṅgaṃ, pāvacane ekantaitthiliṅgaṃ, evamādayo aññamaññaṃ viruddhasaddagatiyo dissanti. Kiñca bhīyyo: saddasatthe Devadattāyā ti catutthī, tad eva Devadattāyā ti padaṃ pālinayaṃ patvā vibhattivipallāsavasena tatiyāpañcamīchaṭṭhīnaṃ atthe catutthī siyā na suddhacatutthī, Yajñadatto Devadattāyā asakkato ti ādinā yojetabbattā “asakkatā c’ asma Dhanañjayāyā”² ti ādisu viya; kiñca bhīyyo: guṇo assa atthi guṇavā ti ettha saddasatthanayena assā ti padaṃ chaṭṭhiyantaṃ bhavati, pālinaye aṭṭhakathānaye ca olokīyamāne atthisaddayogato catutthiyantaṃ yeva bhavati; kathaṃ: “udet’ ayaṃ cakkhumā ekarājā”³, “āsāvati nāma latā jātā Cittalatāvane tassā vassasahassena ekaṃ nibbattate phalaṃ taṃ devā payirupāsanti”⁴ ti imā dve pāliyo assā ti padassa catutthiyantattaṃ sādheti; tatha “cakkhumā ti, sakalacakkavālavāsīnaṃ andhakāraṃ vidhametvā cakkhupaṭilābhakaraṇena yan tena tesam dinnam cakkhu, tena cakkhumā suriyo”⁵, atr’ idaṃ nibbacanaṃ: cakkhu etassa atthi cakkhumā, cakkhū ti ca kassa cakkhu: ālokadassanasamatthaṃ mahājanassa cakkhu, taṃ mahājanassa cakkhu etassa suriyassa

¹ I deviate considerably from Smith’s punctuation in this passage.

² Ja III 98,16.

³ Ja II 33,22.

⁴ Ja III 251,7–9, Ap 41,29–42,1.

⁵ Ja II 34,1–3.

atthi, tena dinnatā ti atthavasena suriyo sampadānaṃ bhavati, na sāmī, dvinnam sāmīnaṃ ettha anicchitabbattā; tathā āsā etissā atthī ti āsāvati, evamñāmikā latā, āsā ti ca kassa āsā: devānaṃ āsā, sā devānaṃ āsā etissā latāya atthi, taṃ paṭicca uppajjanato ti atthavasena latā sampadānaṃ bhavati, na sāmī, dvinnam sāmīnaṃ etthā pi anicchitabbattā — evamādiḥ pālinaye aṭṭhakathānaye ca upaparikkhīyamāne yathāvutto attho yeva pāsamsa, kiṃ saddasatthanayo karissati. Atha vā rajakassa vatthaṃ dadāti ti ettha saddasatthanayena chaṭṭhī hotu, rajakassa hatthe vatthaṃ dadāti ti attham eva mayam gaṇhāma, vacanasesanayassa pi dassanato; evañ ca sati ubhinnaṃ nayānaṃ na koci virodho.

But at this point in the argument we have something to say; for according to the view of the grammarians, in such [sentences] as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’, ‘Yajñadatta gives a loan to Devadatta’ the name *sampadāna* does not apply; for in the science of grammar it has been stated that that to which [something] is properly (*sam* = *sammā*) given with an intention of worship or with an intention of kindness, that is the [*kāraka*] *sampadāna*. [But] neither the giving of the clothes to the washerman nor the giving of the loan to Devadatta is by worship or by kindness; moreover, it is not a complete statement.¹ Therefore — because it is conflicting with the sense of [the term] *sampadāna* [arrived at by the analysis] ‘in the proper (*sam* = *sammā*) way (*pa* = *pakāreṇa*) one gives to it’ — the name *sampadāna* does not apply, such is their view, [and] for that very reason they do not teach the genuine fourth case suffix in *rajakāya* and *Devadattāya*; only the sixth is taught by way of such [forms] as *rajakassa*. In this respect one should

¹ Complete statements would be something like ‘I’m giving my clothes to the washerman, but I want them back clean’ and ‘I’m giving a loan to Devadatta, but I want it back with twelve percent interest’.

know that our opinion is as follows: If the word *rajaka* ‘washerman’ were to be related to the word *vattha* ‘clothes’, then the meaning would be ‘he gives the washerman’s clothes to someone else’, and the washerman would be [assigned to the category of] owner (*sāmi*). If, on the other hand, the washerman were to be connected with [the act of] giving as in ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman for the purpose of making [them] clean’, why then would not this washerman be the *sampadāna* in as much as he has been established in the state of receiving with regard to the act of giving, for thus, in [phrases] such as ‘to whom there is a desire to give’ and even ‘without regard, without consideration, he gave food to the monks’, whether by fact of a desire to give or by fact of giving inconsiderately, he who is to take possession of the gift and he who takes possession of the gift, both of them are indeed [to be assigned to the category of] the *sampadāna* because [that] is proper with regard to the Pāli canon. And also in the Pāli canon, except for the usage for the purpose of something as in ‘for the sake of, for the benefit of’, and except for the convention of exchanging case suffixes (substitution) in usages such as ‘he leads to water’, ‘[few] go to heaven’, ‘but we are not honoured in respect of Dhanañjayā’, ‘for the most part/to a greater extent’, and ‘supporter of the flock’, the substitute *-āya* in the place of the singular fourth [case suffix *-(as)sa*] does not occur in connection with [actions such as] honouring, giving, and the like. Therefore, in the [canonical] teaching approved of by the three councils, statements such as ‘he gives to the Buddha (*buddhāya*)’ or ‘homage to the Buddha (*buddhāya*)’ do not exist. Only statements of such a form as ‘I gave to the best (*°setṭhassa*) among Buddhas’, ‘do reverence to the snake (*nāgassa*)’, lacking the substitute *-āya*, are met with. Accordingly, such a statement as ‘a certain man gave dirty clothes to the washerman (*rajakassa*)’ is met with in the

Atthasālinī; with respect to that, there must be the fourth [case suffix] in *rajakassa*, since the fourth and the sixth are identical in every way in every place where they occur because the case endings *-sa* and *-nam* have the same form. For thus has the meaning of the fourth and the sixth been declared by the teachers when stating the meaning of the canonical passage ‘he who gives to the best / of the best is a sage’ to be ‘he who gives to the best, that is, to the three jewels (the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha)’, or else, ‘he who gives¹ of that which has the property of being such that it can be given’. Thus, let the washerman be the owner (*sāmi*)² by way of fitness in the science of grammar in as much as [the word *rajakassa*] has been stated with a sixth case ending, but let it be the *sampadāna* by way of fitness in the canon in as much as it has been stated without distinction between the fourth and the sixth. Moreover, we get this endless opposition between the conventions of the canonical texts and the conventions of the science of grammar. For example: In the science of grammar the word *āpa* ‘water’ is something which has a plural ending and feminine gender, [whereas] it has actually been uttered by the Noble One with masculine gender and a singular ending³; likewise the word *dārā* ‘wife; womenfolk’ is something which has a plural ending and masculine gender in the science of grammar, [while] in the [canonical] teaching it has masculine gender [but is] constructed with both numbers; in the science of grammar the word *dhātu* ‘element’ is something with exclusively masculine gender, [while] in the [canonical] teaching it is of exclusively feminine

¹ Or, reading with Bose *dānam*, ‘a giving’.

² That is, the owner in an owner-owned relationship expressed by a genitive case ending.

³ cf. Sadd 107,21: *Āpasadde ācariyānaṃ līngavacanavasena matibhedo vijjati, ...* ‘concerning the word *āpa* we meet with a difference in opinion among the teachers when it comes to stating the gender, ...’.

gender; onwards in the same manner we meet with verbal patterns which are opposed to one another. What's more: In the science of grammar *devadattāya* is [a word ending in] a fourth [case suffix], [but] that very word *devadattāya*, having received the conventions of the [canonical] teaching, would be [a word ending in] a fourth case suffix in the sense of the third, fifth, or sixth [case endings] by force of the exchange of case suffixes, [and] not a genuine fourth [case suffix], in as much as it is to be related to such [expressions] as 'Devadatta is not honoured by Yajñadatta' just as in [canonical statements] such as 'but we are not honoured by Dhanañjaya'. What's more: With regard to [the grammatical rule] saying that a quality pertains to it (*assa*), hence it is quality-possessing,¹ *assa* is a word ending in a sixth [case suffix] according to the conventions of grammar, but if you look at the conventions of the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās it is simply [something] which ends in the fourth [case suffix] from being connected with the word *atthi* 'is'. How? [For example:] 'He rises, [he who] possesses sight (*cakkhumā*²), the supreme ruler'; 'in the Cittalatā grove a creeper grows by name of *Āsāvati*³; of it (*tassa*, cf. Skt *asya asti*) a fruit is produced once in a hundred years; the gods sit closely around it'. These two canonical statements establish that the word *assa* ends in the fourth [case suffix]. In this respect [it has been stated]:

¹ What he hints at here goes back to A 5.2.94 *tad asyāsty asminn iti matup*, which teaches that the possessive suffix *matUP* (unaccented *-mat*, under certain conditions to be replaced by *-vat*) is added to form derivatives in the sense of 'that is pertaining to it' or 'that is located in it'. A *vārttika* quoted by Patañjali under this rule states that the suffix can only be added when certain meanings, such as censure or abundance, are to be expressed. By rule 8.2.9 *mādūpadhāyās ca mator vo 'yavādibhyaḥ* the initial of the *taddhita* suffix *matUP* is replaced by *v* when the stem to which the suffix is added either ends in or has the sounds *m* or *a* as penultimate, except for members of the *gaṇa* beginning with *yava* 'barley'.

² Formed with the suffix *matUP*.

³ Formed with the suffix *matUP*, *v* replacing *m* by A 8.2.9.

'*cakkhumā* "possessing sight", that is, having scattered darkness for those who live in the entire range of spheres, since by him sight was given to them (*tesam*) by causing them to obtain sight, because of that¹ [he is called] *cakkhumā*, that is, the sun'. [In accordance with A 5.2.94] the semantic analysis (*nirvacana*) here is: 'sight pertains to it, thus [it is called] *cakkhumā*'. But [when you are] talking about sight, whose sight [are you talking about]? Sight is the faculty of sight pertaining to the entire populace, [and] the sun has got that sight which pertains to people, [and] because of this property of having been given [it], for this very reason the sun is the *sampadāna*, not the *sāmī* 'possessor', since it would be undesirable with two possessors here. Likewise [according to A 5.2.94]: 'hope (*āsā*) pertains to it (*etiṣṣā*), hence *āsāvati*', that is, the creeper so named. But [when you are] talking about hope, whose hope [are you talking about]? This hope pertaining to the gods is [directed] towards that creeper; [and] since [the hope] arises towards it, for that very reason the creeper is the *sampadāna*, not the *sāmī* 'possessor', since it would be undesirable with two possessors also in this case. In these and other cases when you examine the conventions of the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, only the meaning as it has been stated [there] is praiseworthy, [so] what will the science of grammar do [= who cares about the grammarians]? Or else, let the sixth [case ending] apply according to the conventions of the grammarians with regard to [a sentence such as] 'he gives the clothes to the washerman', [so that] we understand only the sense 'he gives the clothes in the hands of the washerman' from which also the remainder of the [elliptical] statement is seen. And when it is like this, there is no opposition between the two conventions.

¹ Or, following the *v.l.* of Ja, *tena cakkhunā cakkhumā*, we could translate: 'what sight was given, by that sight [he is called] *cakkhumā*'.

In this quite informative excursus Aggavaṃsa first and foremost contrasts the science of grammar with the word of the Buddha. He begins by bringing up an issue discussed by the Sanskrit grammarians, namely that in a sentence such as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’ the washerman should not be assigned to the category of the *sampadāna* because the clothes are not given with an intention of worship or out of kindness. They are handed over to get clean. The washerman would therefore be the *sāmī* ‘possessor’ in an owner-owned relationship, and the word *rajaka-* would take the genitive case suffix in accordance with A 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* which teaches that a sixth triplet ending, a *ṣaṣṭhī*, is introduced to denote the rest, *śeṣa*. From the previous rules it is clear that this includes any relation, *sambandha*, which is not a *kāraka*-relation.

Since Aggavaṃsa relied on a threefold classification of the *sampadāna* suggested in the *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.129, the following section of Helārāja’s commentary on that very verse is worthy of notice (Hel 332,14):

‘rajakasya vastram dadāti,’ ‘ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadāti’ ityādau tu dadātyartha nāsti | tyāgo hi saḥ | tena ca hānātmakena mamatāvicchedasyākṣepād eva paropayogābhisamdhinā parasvatvāpādanam api svīkṛtam | atra ca tadabhāva iti gaṇo ‘yam dadāteḥ prayogaḥ |

But in such [statements] as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman (genitive)’ or ‘he turns his back to the murderer (genitive)’ there is no sense of giving. For that (= giving) is surrender [of ownership]. And it is because the latter, whose nature is abandoning, implies the cutting off of the sense of ‘mine’ that one who intends service to another agrees even to the establishment of another’s ownership. In this case there is no such thing, and therefore this is a metaphorical usage of [the verb] ‘give’.

Consider also the following passage from the *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikā* at A 1.4.32. The *Kāśikā* states: *anvarthasamjñāvijñānād dadāti-karmaṇeti vijñāyate*, ‘because [the name *sampradāna*] is to be understood as a term which corresponds to its analytical meaning, [the rule] should be understood to mean [that which the agent aims at] through the action/object of giving’. The *Nyāsa* comments (KāśN I:546):

tena dadāteḥ karmaṇā yam abhipraiti tat sampradānam iti vijñāyate | nanv evam api rajakasya vastram dadāti, ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadātīty atra prāpnoti, naitad asti; dānam hi nāma pūjānugrahakāmyayā svakīyadravyaparitāgāḥ parasvatvā-pattih, tac ceha nāsti, ato na bhaviṣyati |

Therefore (i.e., since *sampradāna* is an *anvarthasamjñā*), one should understand ‘that which one aims at through the action/object of giving, that is the *sampradāna*’. But it applies in the case of ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’ and ‘he turns his back to the murderer’ as well. This is not so. For giving is indeed an abandonment of one’s own property incurring ownership by someone else with a desire of worship or kindness. But there is no such thing here [and] therefore it will not be [like that].

It seems to me extremely likely that this passage was known to Aggavaṃsa. Not only is this evident from the phrase *saddasatthesu hi yassa sammā pūjābuddhiyā anuggahabuddhiyā vā diyate*, ‘for in the science of grammar it has been stated that that to which [something] is properly (*sam* = *sammā*) given with an intention of worship or with an intention of kindness, that is the [*kāraka*] *sampadāna*’. Note that the *Nyāsa* here plays on the fact that *sampradāna* is an *anvarthasamjñā*.¹ Aggavaṃsa’s reliance on the *Nyāsa* is, however, also evident from the

¹ cf. section 2.6 above.

fact that Jinendrabuddhi seems to stick to the argument that since *sampradāna* is an *anvarthasamjñā* it is applicable only in connection with verbs denoting giving, and the verb ‘give’ entails transfer of ownership to someone else (*parasvatvāpattiḥ, parasvatvāpādanam*), and the washerman can therefore not be assigned to the category of the *sampradāna*. But this is not the view held by other Sanskrit grammarians. Compare, for example, Kaiyaṭa on the *Bhāṣya* statement (Mbh I:331,3) *evam api karmaṇaḥ karaṇasamjñā vaktavyā sampradānasya ca karmasamjñā | paśunā rudraṃ yajate | paśuṃ rudrāya dadātīti arthaḥ*, ‘even so it should be stated that the term *karaṇa* pertains to the *karman*, and that the term *karman* to the *sampradāna* as in “he sacrifices to Rudra with a sacrificial animal”, that is to say, he gives a sacrificial animal to Rudra’. Kaiyaṭa comments (MbhP II:403):

kaiś cid anvarthasamjñāvijñānād dadātiviśaya eva sampradānasamjñety abhyupagatam | dānaṃ ca svatvanivṛttiḥ parasvatvāpattiparyanteti pratyajñāyi | tadubhayam apy ayuktam | anyatrāpi bhāṣyakāreṇa samjñāyā abhyupagamāt | tathā ca kriyāgrahaṇasya gatyarthakarmanīti sūtrasya ca pratyākhyānam kṛtam | tathā svatvanivṛttyabhāve 'pi dadāteḥ prayogo drśyate — na śūdrāya matim dadyād iti | khaṇḍikopādhyāyas tasmai capeṭām dadātīti ca |

Since [the term *sampradāna*] is understood to be an *anvarthasamjñā*, it is agreed by some [authors] that the term *sampradāna* is [applicable] in the domain of the verb ‘give’ only. Moreover, it is recognised [by them] that ‘giving’ is a cessation of ownership which entails the transfer of ownership to someone else. However, both of these [views] are wrong because Patañjali has agreed [to the application] of the term [*sampradāna*] also in other places. And thus [he] has rejected [the possible] mention of [the word] *kriyā* ‘action’ [in rule

1.4.32]¹ as well as the rule [2.3.12] *gatyarthakarmani* [*dvitīyā-caturthau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani*].² Likewise, even when there is no cessation of ownership, usage of [the verb] ‘give’ is met with, as in ‘one should not give instruction to a Śūdra’ and ‘the *khaṇḍika*- teacher gives him a slap’.

Kaiyaṭa thus denies that the analysis of *sampradāna* as an *anvarthasamjñā* can form a part of any argument claiming that the name is valid only in the context of giving and that a transfer of ownership has to take place. He relies on Patañjali for this view, and adduces two examples to buttress it. Of course it does not follow from this that Aggavaṃsa did not know Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa* and indeed the present passage, but it strengthens the assumption that he did know the *Nyāsa* and probably also Helārāja’s commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* and that he made at least the *Nyāsa* discussion the basis for his claim that this is the view of the grammarians.

Aggavaṃsa does not accept this view and says that if we are dealing with a genitive relation, then the sentence *rajakassa vatthaṃ dadāti* would mean that the clothes belonging to the washerman are being given away to someone else. Instead, Aggavaṃsa claims, the washerman is the *sampradāna* because he receives what is given. He supports this argument by quoting his definition of the *sampradāna* as one ‘to whom there is a desire to give’, taken over from *Kaccāyana*, and a sentence from the canon, ‘without regard, without consideration, he gave food to the monks’ where there is no engagement in the act of giving. This gives him his first, though not quite well-founded, opportunity to contrast the view of the Sanskrit grammarians with what is ‘proper with regard to the Pāli canon’.

¹ cf. above, p. 99 (2.6.1.8).

² cf. above, p. 99 (2.6.1.8). Kaiyaṭa obviously understands Patañjali to have rejected the rule, cf. MbhP II:400: *tasya pratyākhyātāvād ity adoṣaḥ*, ‘[but] there is no fault because this [rule 2.3.12] has been rejected’.

He goes on to buttress this claim, first by saying that all the genuine dative usages are exceptions and that the *substitution* of the suffix *-āya* in the place of the singular *fourth* case suffix *-(as)sa* does not occur in the domain of actions such as honouring and giving. Therefore, he says, there are no statements in the canon where the receiver in the act of giving or honouring takes a genuine dative ending. So, when we meet with the form *rajakassa* in the *Atthasālinī*, we know it has a fourth case ending because, he says, the fourth and the sixth are identical wherever they occur since they have the genitive endings *-sa* and *-nam*. He thus distinguishes between a fourth and a sixth, although they are identical in form.

Aggavaṃsa concludes that in the science of grammar it is suitable to assign the washerman to the category of the *sāmī* 'possessor', since the word *rajakassa* has been stated with a sixth case ending, while in the canon it is suitable to assign it to the category of the *sampadāna*, since there is no distinction between the fourth and the sixth. This is a weak argument indeed. All it amounts to in fact is a claim that since there is no difference between the fourth and the sixth, we can do as we please, and it pleases us to deviate from the Sanskrit grammarians and decide that we are dealing with a fourth case suffix.

Obviously this whetted Aggavaṃsa's appetite. Claiming that there is an endless opposition between the science of grammar and the canon, he goes on to cite random examples of words which show differences in gender and number, differences no historical linguist would find troublesome, and which, if detected by them, the Sanskrit grammarians would have recorded as varieties of usage and dealt with as such.

Further arguments are adduced to substantiate his claim. First he comes up with the form *devadattāya* which, he says, ends in a fourth case suffix. In other words, it is a genuine dative form. But when it is analysed according to the conventions of the canon, Aggavaṃsa tells us, then it becomes a word still ending in a fourth case suffix, but a fourth case suffix in the sense of the third, fifth, or sixth case endings in as

much as case endings are substitutable. His one and only example is *Yajñadatto Devadattāya asakkato*, which is a mere copy of the canonical example *asakkatā c' asma Dhanañjayāya* 'but we are not honoured by Dhanañjayā'. Indeed, a feminine *Dhanañjayāya* can be an instrumental, dative, ablative, or genitive form. But Aggavaṃsa has made it clear before that the name *sampadāna* applies also when there is the sense of the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh case suffixes.¹

Secondly, Aggavaṃsa launches a peculiar attack on Pāṇini's rule 5.2.94 *tad asyāsty asminn iti matup* which accounts for the possessive suffixes *-mat* and *-vat*.² He claims that *assa* is a word ending in the sixth according to the conventions of grammar, but on the evidence of the canon and the *Aṭṭhakathās* it ends in the fourth. He brings in two examples, *cakkhumā* 'possessing sight' and *āsāvati* 'possessing hope' according to an analysis 'sight pertains to it' and 'hope pertains to it' respectively, and claims that these words cannot have possessive meanings. His strategy is to ask whose sight and hope we are talking about. Of course, philosophically speaking there is a problem here. Sight involves the faculty of seeing, an agent of seeing, an object of seeing, and the seeing itself. But Aggavaṃsa's argument for *cakkhumā* is nevertheless awkward. He claims the sun has been *given* sight and so becomes the *sampadāna* and not the *sāmī* 'possessor', that is, he makes the point that the form *assa*, which stands for *suriyassa*, is a dative (donative) and not a genitive. But the *Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā*, from which the example is taken, says 'sight was given to *them* (*tesam*)'. This may become a little clearer by the second example where the creeper *āsāvati* is said to be so called not because it possesses hope, but because hope is directed towards it. Thus hope pertains to the gods but is directed towards the creeper which then becomes the *sampadāna*, in as much as it is not desirable to have two possessors here. One may ask, why not? One may also compare the English 'Cape of Good Hope'.

¹ cf. above, 2.6.1.10.

² cf. above, p. 118, note 1.

Needless to say, these attacks are not terribly convincing, but they are nevertheless quite significant in as much as they seem sufficient for Aggavaṃsa to make his claim that there is an opposition between the science of grammar and the canon. He concludes by saying that the sole authority is the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, and that grammar is practically useless. He admits, though, that if the by now familiar example of the washerman were rephrased ‘he gives the clothes in the hand of the washerman’ there would be no opposition between grammar and canon since the washerman would then be unambiguously the *sāmi* ‘possessor’ of the hand.

2.7 The stable point when there is movement away, etc.:

apādāna

555 Yato apeti yato vā āgacchati, tad apādānaṃ.
*Yato vā apeti yato vā āgacchati, taṃ kāraṃ apādānaṃ aṅgamaṃ
 hoti; apecca ito ādadāti ti apādānaṃ, ito vatthuto kāyavasena
 cittavasena vā apaganvā aṅgamaṃ gaṇhāti ti attho. Keci pana
 apanetvā ito ādadāti ti apādānaṃ ti vadanti; tesam mate ito
 attānaṃ cittaṃ vā apanetvā ti attho. Ayam pi saññā
 sampadānaṃ aṅgamaṃ viya anvatthato rūḥito ca katā ti daṭṭhabbaṃ.
 Taṃ pana apādānaṃ duvidhaṃ kāyasaṃyogapubbakacitta-
 saṃyogapubbakāpagamavasena, tathā calāvadhinicalāvadhi-
 vasena; atha vā [ti]¹ pana tividhaṃ calāvadhinicalāvadhi-
 nevacalāvadhinicalāvadhivasena, tathā niddiṭṭhavisaya-
 uppattivisaya²-anumeyyavisayavasena; taṃ sabbaṃ pabhedam
 upari ekato pakāsessāma. Gāmā apenti munayo, nagarā
 niggato rājā, bhūmito niggato raso, hatthikkhandhā otarati,
 gehā nikkhamati, Sāvathito āgacchati. Apādānaṃ icc anena kv
 attho: ‘apādāne pañcamī’.*

¹ Bm ti; Ce Be ns (con.) taṃ.

² Ce upāttivisaya^o; VP 3.7.136, on which this classification undoubtedly is based, reads upāttivisayam.

‘That from which something moves away, or [for example] that from which something comes, that [*kāraṃ*] is the *apādāna*.’ That from which something moves away, or [for example] that from which something comes, that *kāraṃ* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies. ‘Moving away (*apecca*) from it something takes (*ādadāti*)’, thus [it is called] *apādāna*. That is to say, moving away from it, [that is,] from some thing, physically or mentally, one attains something else. Some, however, say that [it is called] *apādāna* [according to the analysis:] ‘leading away (*apanetvā*) from it one takes (*ādadāti*)’. On their view the meaning is ‘having led oneself or the mind away from it’. One should understand that just like the technical name *sampadāna*, this name [*apādāna*] too is made in accordance with [both its] analytical meaning and [its] conventional meaning. Now, this *apādāna* is of two kinds, according to whether the moving away is preceded by physical contact or whether it is preceded by mental contact; likewise according to whether the starting point is moving or whether the starting point is not moving. Or rather it is of three kinds, according to whether the starting point is moving, whether the starting point is not moving, or whether the starting point is not only moving or the starting point is not not moving; likewise according to where [the movement away] has been directly stated, where it is comprised, or where it has to be inferred. All these subdivisions we shall explain one by one below. [Some examples:] ‘The sages go away from the village’; ‘the king has proceeded from the city’; ‘liquid has come out of the earth’; ‘he descends from the elephant’s shoulder’; ‘he emerges from the house’; ‘he comes from Sāvathī’. What is the use of this thing called the *apādāna*? ‘The fifth [case suffix is added to a nominal stem] to express the *apādāna*’.

Aggavaṃsa here deviates from the *Kaccāyana* definition which runs (125) *yasmād apeti bhayaṃ ādatte vā tad apādānaṃ*, ‘that from which something moves away or becomes afraid is the *apādāna*’. Pāṇini’s definition runs (A 1.4.24) *dhruvam apāye ’pādānaṃ*, ‘the stable point when there is movement away [is called] the *apādāna*’. Aggavaṃsa’s way of phrasing alternative definitions is here almost meaningless.

The source of the twofold division of the *apādāna*, depending on whether the moving away is preceded by physical contact or by mental contact, is uncertain. Note, however, that Kaiyaṭa, commenting upon the *Bhāṣya* at A 1.4.24 states (Mbhp II:388): *jugupseti | saṃśleṣa-pūrvako viśleṣo ’pāyaḥ | sa cātra nāsti | buddhikalpitas tu gaṇa itī bhāvaḥ*, ‘[on] *jugupsā* “disgust”¹: *apāya* “moving away” is disjunction preceded by conjunction, and that does not apply here.² However, [a moving away] imagined by the mind is metaphorical; that is the meaning’. The compound *saṃśleṣapūrvakaḥ* and the idea of an imagined moving away is certainly reminiscent of *kāya-* and *citta-samyoga-pubbako*. The whole context of the discussion is, however, lacking.

The threefold division, on the other hand, stems from the *Vākyapadīya* (VP 3.7.136):

*nirdiṣṭaviṣayaṃ kiṃ cid upāttaviṣayaṃ tathā |
apekṣitakriyaṃ ceti tridhāpādānaṃ ucyate ||*

The *apādāna* is said to be of three kinds: sometimes [it is the one] where the moving away³ is directly expressed, likewise

¹ This stems from the first *vārttika* on A 1.4.24 which suggests that verbs denoting among other things *jugupsā* should be incorporated.

² That is, in the examples adduced by Patañjali, such as *adharmāḥ jugupsate*, ‘he is disgusted by *adharmā*’.

³ *viṣaya* ‘domain’ here refers to the topic under discussion, namely the moving away.

where the moving away is included, and also where the action [of moving away] is implied.

Kaiyaṭa too brings in this threefold division in his commentary on the *Bhāṣya* at A 1.4.24 (Mbhp II:389):

*trividhaṃ cedam apādānaṃ — nirdiṣṭaviṣayaṃ upāttaviṣayaṃ
apekṣitakriyaṃ ceti | tatra nirdiṣṭaviṣayaṃ, — yatra
dhātunāpāyalakṣaṇo viṣayo nirdiṣṭaḥ | yathā — grāmād
āgacchatīti | upāttaviṣayaṃ, — yatra dhātur dhātv-
antarārthāṅgaṃ svārtham āha | yathā ca ‘balāhakād vidyotata’
iti | niḥsaraṇāṅge dyotane ’tra dyutir¹ vartate | yathā vā
‘kusūlāt pacatī’ tyādau | ādānāṅge² pāke pacir vartate |
apekṣitakriyaṃ yatra kriyāvāci padaṃ na śrūyate, kevalam
kriyā pratiyate | yathā — sākāśyakebhyah pāṭaliputrakā
abhirūpatarā’ iti |*

And this *apādāna* is of three kinds: where the moving away is directly expressed (*nirdiṣṭaviṣaya*), where it is included (*upāttaviṣaya*), and where the action [of moving away] is implied (*apekṣitakriya*). Among these, *nirdiṣṭaviṣaya* is where the domain which is defined as *apāya* ‘moving away’ has been directly expressed through a verbal root, as for example ‘he comes from the village’; *upāttaviṣaya* is where the verbal root expresses its own meaning to which is subordinated the meaning of another verbal root, as for example ‘it is lightening from the cloud’; here [the verbal root] *dyut* ‘shine’ occurs in the sense of *dyotana* ‘a flashing’ to which is subordinated [the action of] *niḥsaraṇa* ‘going forth’³; or, for example, in

¹ Corrected from *dyutivartate*.

² So read for *odanāṅge*.

³ That is, *balāhakād niḥsrtya jyotir vidyotate*, ‘having gone forth from the cloud, the lightening flashes’ (cf. Helārāja on VP 3.7.136).

[sentences] such as ‘he cooks from the granary’, where the root *pac* ‘cook’ is used in the sense of *pāka* ‘a cooking’ to which is subordinated [the action of] *ādāna* ‘taking out’¹; *apekṣitakriya* is where the word expressing the action is not heard, the action is only understood, as for example ‘the inhabitants of Pāṭaliputra are more handsome than those of Sāmkāśya’.

Of course, this threefold division is dealt with also by Helārāja in his commentary on VP 3.7.136, but he does not add anything in particular to what Kaiyaṭa has stated, with the exception of one small but significant detail: He talks about the *apādāna* with regard to an *avadhiviśeṣa* ‘a particular starting point’.

Whereas the examples provided for each of the three categories by Kaiyaṭa and Helārāja are perfectly to the point, Aggavaṃsa’s are not. In fact, as far as I can see, they illustrate only the first category. Incidentally, the first two examples are from the *Kaccāyanavutti* on the basic *apādāna* rule, the third from the same text under the following rule.

The final remark, *apādāne pañcamī*, is Pāṇini’s rule 2.3.28, repeated as 607 in the *Saddanīti*, where, incidentally, Aggavaṃsa cites the third example from the *Kaccāyanavutti* on this basic *apādāna* rule (Kacc-v 125).

2.7.1 The cause of fear etc.

556 Bhayāduppattihetu. *Yaṃ bhayādīnām uppattiyā hetu hoti, tañ ca kāraṃ apādānasaññam hoti: corā bhayaṃ jāyati, “kāmato jāyate bhayaṃ”², “tañhāya jāyati soko”³ ti.*

¹ That is, *kusūlād ādāya pacati*, ‘having taken the rice grains out of the granary, he cooks [them]’ (cf. Helārāja on VP 3.7.136).

² Dhṛ 215b.

³ Dhṛ 216a.

‘The cause of the arising of fear etc.’ That which is the cause of the arising of fear etc., that *kāraṃ* too is one to which the name *apādāna* applies: ‘Fear arises from a thief’; ‘fear arises from love’; ‘sorrow arises from desire’.

This goes back to A 1.4.25 *bhītrārthānām bhayahetuḥ* which teaches that the name *apādāna* applies to the cause of fear in connection with verbal roots meaning ‘fear’ or ‘protect’. Aggavaṃsa’s use of *ādi* ‘etc.’ is accounted for by the word *soka* ‘sorrow’ in the last example.

2.7.2 Cooking from the granary and shining from the clouds

557 Yato pacati vijjotati vā. *Yato nīharitvā pacati yato vā niggamma vijjotati, taṃ pi kāraṃ apādānasaññam hoti: kusūlato pacati, valāhaka vijjotati cando.*

‘That from which [one] cooks or [for example, from which something] flashes.’ That from which one takes something out and cooks, or [for example] that from which something goes out and flashes, that *kāraṃ* too is one to which the name *apādāna* applies: ‘He cooks from the granary’; ‘the moon shines forth from the clouds’.

This short passage is quite revealing. Aggavaṃsa has here made a special rule out of the two examples provided by Kaiyaṭa (MbhP II:389), discussed above (2.7). They are also brought forward by Helārāja on VP 3.7.136 (Hel 338,13 foll.), and by Haradatta (KāSP I:537). Aggavaṃsa does not include the context in which these examples are discussed, nor does he add anything. The case may serve as an illustration of how the *Saddanīti* came to be so voluminous. To me a good grammar is a grammar which does not make special rules out of material that can be perfectly well covered by a general rule.

2.7.3 Parādipubbaji etc.

558 Parādipubbajidhātādippayoge. *Yathārahaṃ parā icc ādiupasaggapubbānaṃ jidhātādīnaṃ payoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti; tathā hi ji icc etassa dhātussa parāpubbassa payoge yo asayho,¹ so apādānasaññaṃ hoti, taṃ yathā: buddhamaṃ parājenti aññatitthiyā; bhū icc etassa dhātussa papubbassa payoge yato acchinnapabhavo, so apādānasaññaṃ hoti, taṃ yathā: Himavatā pabhavanti pañca mahānadiyo, Anotattamahā mahāsarā pabhavanti, Aciravatiyā pabhavanti kunnadiyo.*

‘When there is usage of the roots *ji* “conquer; overwhelm” etc. preceded by *parā* etc.’ Also when there is usage of the roots *ji* etc. preceded by [the preverbs] *parā* etc. as appropriate, that *kāraka* is something to which the name *apādāna* applies. So indeed when there is usage of the root *ji* preceded by *parā* he who cannot be resisted is someone to whom the name *apādāna* applies, as for example: ‘Heretics are overwhelmed by the Buddha’. When there is usage of the root *bhū* ‘be’ preceded by *pa*, that from which the source is not cut off, that is something to which the name *apādāna* applies, as for example: ‘Five major rivers arise from the Himavat mountain’; ‘the great lakes originate from the Anotatta lake’; ‘small rivers arise from the Aciravati river’.

The rule itself incorporates A 1.4.26 *parājer asoḍhaḥ* which teaches that the name *apādāna* applies to that which cannot be endured or overcome in connection with the verbal root *ji* preceded by *parā*. Note that there is no *ādi* ‘etc.’ here. Aggavaṃsa has fashioned the previous rule in the *Saddanīti* from two examples adduced by Sanskrit authors. In

¹ So read for Smith’s *asaho*, which I take to be a mere misprint. The *Kaccāyanavutti* (126) reads *asayho*.

the present passage he has included a rule from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in the *vutti*. This is A 1.4.31 *bhuvah prabhavaḥ* which teaches that the name *apādāna* is assigned to the *prabhava* ‘source’ of the agent of taking place, appearing (*bhū*), as for example in *himavato gaṅgā prabhavati*, ‘the Gaṅgā arises from the Himavat mountain’. In the *Bhāṣya* on this rule Patañjali raises the question of how we can talk of *apādāna* here when there is no complete separation. He replies that either a continuous process or a succession is implied, and concludes that this rule can be done away with since the instances which seem to require it are in fact covered by the general rule A 1.4.24.

The whole section *ji icc etassa dhātussa ... pabhavanti kunnadiyo* is taken verbatim from the *Kaccāyanavutti* (126). There the rule and *vutti* speak in general about verbal roots and nouns preceded by preverbs. The omission of this may account for the fact that the whole passage seems repetitive and a bit misplaced in the *Saddanīti*. As it stands, Aggavaṃsa seems simply to include A 1.4.31 on the basis of a similarity to A 1.4.26 where there is assignment of the name *apādāna* in a context where a verbal root is preceded by a preverb. Neither Aggavaṃsa nor Kaccāyana bring up any of the questions raised by the Sanskrit grammarians and their reasons for including or rejecting this rule.

2.7.4 añña etc.

559 Aññādināmapayoge. *Aññasaddādīnaṃ nāmānaṃ payoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti: tato kammato aññaṃ kammaṃ, tato aparaṃ.*

‘When there is usage of nouns such as *añña* “other [than]”.’ Also when there is usage of nouns like the word *añña*, that

kāraka is something to which the name *apādāna* applies: ‘An action other than that action, different from that.’¹

Aggavaṃsa seems again to have jumped into the *vibhakti*-section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī* is the general rule which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem when the *apādāna* is to be denoted. A 2.3.29 *anyārāditartediksabdāñcūttara-padājāhiyukte* then teaches that a fifth case suffix is added also after stems co-occurring with *anya* ‘other than’, *ārāt* ‘near to; remote from’, *itara* ‘different from’, *ṛte* ‘without’, words denoting directions, compounds with *-añc* as the final member, and words ending in the suffixes *-āc* or *-āhi*. In the *Kātantra* (2.4.21) this list is reduced to *diś*, *itara*, *ṛte*, and *anya* (*digitararte’nyaiś ca*). Aggavaṃsa refers to the list as ‘*anya* etc.’, but cf. 2.7.11 and 2.7.16.4 below.

2.7.5 *apa* and *pari* in the sense of exclusion

560 *Vajjanatthāpapariyoge*. *Vajjanatthehi apa pari icc etehi yoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññāṃ hoti: apa sālāya āyanti vāñijā, upari pabbatā devo vassati. Ettha ca suddhanāmānaṃ upasaggehi yogo upasaggayogo nāmā ti gahetabbo, na guṇanāmānaṃ upasaggehi yogo; tathā hi ubhato sujāto putto ti ādisu upasagge vijjamāne pi upasaggayogo nāma na bhavati.*

‘When there is construction with *apa* ‘away from’ and *pari* ‘around’ in the sense of exclusion.’ Also when there is construction with *apa* and *pari* in the sense of exclusion, that *kāraka* is something to which the name *apādāna* applies: ‘The merchants withdraw from the hall’; ‘the deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’. And with regard to this one

¹ This may be a quotation, but it has not been traced.

should understand that the construction of nouns pure and simple with preverbs¹ is indeed *upasaggayogo* ‘preverb-construction’, not the construction of quality-expressing nouns with preverbs. For example, in [a sentence] such as ‘the boy is nobly born (of noble birth) on both sides’, although a preverb (*su-*) is met with, there is indeed no construction with the preverb.

This is an odd passage. It clearly links up with the second *apādāna* rule in *Kaccāyana*, *dhātunāmānaṃ upasaggayogādīsiv api ca*, in particular with the compound *upasaggayoga* ‘construction with a preverb (*upasarga*)’. The phrasing of the *Saddanīti* rule, however, so much reflects A 1.4.88 *apaparī varjane* that it must be more than a coincidence. This rule assigns *apa* and *pari* to the category *karmapravacanīya* when they are used in the sense of exclusion. They are assigned to this category by A 1.4.83 *karmapravacanīyāḥ* which is valid up to and including A 1.4.97. The technical term *karmapravacanīya* denotes particles (*nipāta*) that operate as governing prepositions with regard to both nouns and verbs under conditions specified in each rule. A 2.3.10 *pañcamy apānparibhiḥ* teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a nominal stem co-occurring with any of the *karmapravacanīyas* *apa*, *āñ*, or *pari*. Aggavaṃsa’s examples *apa sālāya āyanti vāñijā* and *upari pabbatā devo vassati* seem reminiscent of this rule. Rule A 1.4.88 is also related to A 2.1.12 *apaparibahirañcavaḥ pañcamyā*. This rule teaches that *apa* ‘away’, *pari* ‘around’, *bahis* ‘outside’ and forms ending in *-añc* optionally combine with nominal words ending in a fifth case suffix to form *avyayibhāva* compounds. For example, *pari trigartebhyaḥ* combine to form the adverbial compound *paritrigartam* ‘around the Trigarta country’.

In any case, Aggavaṃsa’s odd example reflects some acquaintance with the examples of raining known from the *Kāśikā* on

¹ Although in what follows the technical term *upasagga* in some places is better translated ‘preposition’, I shall keep the translation ‘preverb’ throughout.

both A 1.4.88 and A 2.1.12, such as *paritrigartam vṛṣṭo devaḥ* ‘the god rained (= it rained) all around the Trigarta country’. These examples are also met with in the *Candravṛtti* on *Candravyākaraṇa* 2.1.82¹ *paryapābhyām varjane* which clearly could have been Aggavaṃsa’s source as well. His own example *upari pabbatā devo vassati* is odd since *upari* is normally constructed with a genitive in Pāli. Moreover, the Sanskrit rule speaks about *pari*, not *upari*.

2.7.6 *u* and *pari* in the senses of upwards and around

*Uddham̐samantatatth’upariyoge.*² *U icc upasaggena pari icc upasaggena cā ti dvihi upasaggehi yathākkamaṃ uddham̐ samantato ti atthavantehi yoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti: upari pabbatā devo vassati, pabbatassa uddham̐ samantato devo vassati ti attho. Atrāyaṃ viniccayo: u iti ca parī ti ca upasaggadvayaṃ vuttam̐, uparī ti nipātapadam pi atthi; yadi pana upari pabbatā devo ti ettha uparī ti nipātapadam siyā, pabbatā ti avatvā pabbatassā ti vā pabbate ti vā vattabham̐ siyā, evaṃ avacanena viññāyati: uparī ti idam̐ upasaggadvayavasena vuttan ti. Uddham̐samantatatth’uparī³ ti kimattham̐: “vividhāni phalajātāni asmim̐ upari pabbate”⁴ ti ettha uparisaddo nipātattā uddhan ti atthamattam̐ eva dīpeti na uddham̐ samantato ti atthan ti nāpanattham̐.*

‘When there is construction with *u* and *pari* in the senses of *uddham̐* “upwards; above”⁵ and *samantato* “all around;

¹ All references are to the edition of B. Liebich 1918.

² Be ns *uddham̐samantatthupari*^o.

³ Smith reads °*samanta<ta>th’uparī*. He uses the sign <x> to indicate an ‘élément de texte considéré superflu par l’éditeur’. Ce Bem ns all read *samantatthuparī* as they do in the rule itself. Why Smith has not bracketed the *ta* there I do not understand. I suggest that the brackets be ignored.

⁴ Ja VI 564,13.

⁵ Of course *uddham̐* has many semantic nuances; cf. CPD.

completely”.’ Also when there is construction with the two preverbs (*upasagga*) that are the preverb *u* and the preverb *pari* and they are, respectively, meaningful as ‘upwards; above’ ‘all around; completely’, that *kāraka* is something to which the name *apādāna* applies: ‘The deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’, that is to say, ‘above the mountain, all around, it rains’. This is the judgment here: *u* and *pari* are said to be a pair of preverbs, but there is also the particle (*nipāta*) *upari* ‘on; upon; with regard to’. If, however, *upari* is [taken to be] a particle in [the sentence] *upari pabbatā devo [vassati]* ‘the deity rains (= it rains) high up from (= on) the mountain’ instead of uttering¹ *pabbatā, pabbatassa* (genitive/dative) or *pabbate* (locative) should be stated. Since it is not stated thus it is understood that *u-pari* is proclaimed as a pair of preverbs. For what purpose [has] *upari* [been specified] in the senses of *uddham̐ samantato*? In order to make known that the word *upari*, being a particle, as in ‘all different sorts of fruit grow upon that mountain’, explains only the sole meaning ‘*uddham̐*’, not the meaning ‘*uddham̐ samantato*’.

Again the underlying rule is A 2.3.10 *pañcamy apānparibhiḥ* which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a nominal stem co-occurring with any of the *karmapravacanīyas apa, āñ, or pari*. It is clear, however, that Aggavaṃsa includes this section on *u* and *pari* or *upari* on the basis of *Kaccāyana* and the *vutti* thereon. As mentioned above (2.7.5), *Kaccāyana*’s second rule on the *apādāna* includes the requirement that there has to be *upasaggayoga* ‘construction with a preverb (*upasagga*)’, and the *vutti* (126) offers the example *upari pabbatā devo vassati* ‘the deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’. Apparently ignoring the *ādi* ‘etc.’ in *Kaccāyana*, Aggavaṃsa wants to account for the *upasagga*-requirement and the form *pabbatā* in

¹ I take *avatvā* to be a negated absolutive of *vac* ‘speak’.

the *vutti*. His problem, though, is that even though *u* and *pari* are taken as a pair of *upasargas*, we also have the *nipāta* ‘particle’ *upari*, and, consequently, if we had recognised *upari* as a *nipāta* here we should not have the ending *-ā* but the locative *-e* or the dative/genitive ending *-assa*. This goes without saying.

The passage is nevertheless illuminating in that it gives us an indication that Aggavaṃsa feels he has to explain *Kaccāyana* and the *vutti*, reasoning something like ‘I have to explain the canon; *Kaccāyana* and the *vutti* explained the the canon, so whatever is in there I too have to explain’.

2.7.7 *ā* and *yāva* signifying exclusive or inclusive limit

562 *Mariyādābhividhatthaāyāvayoge.* *Mariyādābhividhiatthena ā icc upasaggena yāva iti nipātena ca yoge taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti: ā pabbatā khettaṃ, ā nagarā khadīravanam, ā Brahmālokā saddo abbhuggacchati, yāva Jetuttaranagarā maggaṃ alamkari,¹ “yāva Brahmālokā saddo abbhuggaṅchi”,² yāva Brahmālokā ekakolāhalaṃ jātam.³ Ettha ca ā pabbatā ti ādayo payogā saddasatthanayavasena vuttā, yāva Jetuttaranagarā ti ādayo pana pāḷinayavasena ti vedītabbā.*

‘When there is construction with *ā* or *yāva* signifying exclusive (*mariyāda*) or inclusive (*abhividhi*) limit.’ When there is construction with the *upasagga* ‘preverb’ *ā* or the *nipāta* ‘particle’ *yāva* signifying exclusive or inclusive limit, that *kāraka* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘The field up to [but excluding] the mountain’; ‘the acacia-forest up to the city’; ‘word spreads right up to

Brahmaloka’; ‘he adorned the road as far as the city of Jetuttara’; ‘word spread as far as Brahmāloka’; ‘utter tumult arose as far as Brahmāloka’. And here usages such as *ā pabbatā* ‘up to the mountain’ have been stated by force of the conventions of the science of grammar, [those] such as *yāva Jetuttaranagarā* ‘as far as the city of Jetuttara’, on the other hand, by force of the conventions of the canon — thus it should be understood.

A 2.3.10 *pañcamy apānparibhiḥ* is still in the picture, this time with regard to the *karmapravacanīya āÑ (ā)*. But once again it is obvious that Aggavaṃsa has taken his wording from another rule, namely A 2.1.13 *āñ maryādābhividhyoḥ*. Also, A 1.4.89 *āñ maryādāvācane* is taken by the *Kāśikā* as including exclusive or inclusive limit as in *ā pāṭaliputrād vṛṣṭo devaḥ*, ‘it rained up to Pāṭaliputra’. The purpose of A 2.1.13, however, is to allow for optionally making an *avyayībhāva* compound with *āÑ* as the first member signifying exclusive or inclusive limit. For example, *ā pāṭaliputrāt* ‘up to Pāṭaliputra’ — where, incidentally, the ablative case suffix is assigned by A 2.3.10 — can optionally be made into the adverbial compound *āpāṭaliputram* in the same sense. But rule 2.1.13 has nothing directly to do with *kārakas* or the assignment of case suffixes.

The example *ā Brahmālokā saddo abbhuggacchati* has been taken over from the *Kaccāyanavutti*. From what Aggavaṃsa says it is clear that he is willing to include things on the basis of the grammarians. That he has added *yāva* to the rule is hardly surprising since *yāva* is much more common than *ā* in Pāli.

¹ Smith: cf. Ja VI 592,5.

² Vin III 19,5; Sp I 78,23.

³ Smith: cf. Sp I 95,12.

2.7.8 *pati* signifying proxy or barter

563 *Patinidhipatidānatthapatiyoge.* *Patinidhipatidānatthena [vā]¹ pati icc upasaggena yoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti: buddhama pati Sāriputto dhamma-desanāya ālapati temāsaṃ, ghatam assa telasmā pati dadāti, uppalam assa padumasmā pati dadāti, kanakam assa hiraññasmā pati dadāti.*

‘When there is construction with *pati* signifying *patinidhi* “proxy; substitute” or *patidāna* “barter; exchange”.’ Also when there is construction with the preverb (*upasagga*) *pati* signifying proxy or barter, that *kāraka* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘For a season Sāriputta spoke for the teaching of the doctrine (= taught the doctrine) as proxy of the Buddha’; ‘he gives him ghee in return for sesame oil’; ‘he gives him a blue lotus in return for a red’; ‘he gives him molten gold in return for wrought gold’.

Aggavaṃsa is now probably back in the *vibhakti* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The rule is A 2.3.11 *pratinidhipratidāne ca yasmāt* which teaches that also when there is construction with a *karmapravacanīya* (A 1.4.83, 2.3.8) a fifth case ending is added after a nominal stem signifying *pratinidhi* ‘proxy’ or *patidāna* ‘barter’. But one should also consider A 1.4.92 *pratiḥ pratinidhipratidhānayoḥ* which teaches that the term *karmapravacanīya* (A 1.4.83) applies to the particle *prati* when it signifies proxy or barter. When the particle *prati* has these senses it is constructed with an ablative (A 2.3.11) as in *māṣān asmai tilebhyah prati yacchati*, ‘he gives him *māṣa* beans in return for sesame oil’. Note that in all the Pāli examples *pati*, defined as an *upasagga*, is a

¹ Smith: Ce Bm ns vā; Be om. (ns comp. fecit).

postposition with a dental *t*. All of the examples occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti* (126).

2.7.9 *visuṃ* and *puthu*

564 *Visuṃputhuyoge.* *Visuṃ puthu icc etehi nipātehi yoge ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti: tehi visuṃ, tato visuṃ, ariyehi puthag evāyaṃ jano.*

‘When there is construction with *visuṃ* “separate(ly)” or *puthu* “separate(ly); various”.’ Also when there is construction with the particles (*nipātas*) *visuṃ* and *puthu*, that *kāraka* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘Separate from them’; ‘separate from that’; ‘this person is indeed separate from the Āryas’.

I can see no obvious source for this rule. The *Kaccāyanavutti* attempts to account for the word *api* in the rule, and in doing so says (126): *Apiggahaṇena nipātappayoge pi pañcamī vibhatti hoti dutiyā ca tatiyā ca*, ‘by the mention of *api*, [is taught that] the fifth as well as the second and third [case suffixes] apply also (*api*) when there is construction with a particle (*nipāta*)’. Now the fact that Aggavaṃsa has moved on to deal with two *nipātas* as well as the fact that the *Kaccāyanavutti* very soon after this goes on to deal with *vinā* ‘without’ and *nānā* ‘without; different from’ may have inspired Aggavaṃsa to make a separate case for *puthu* (Skt *prthak*). He classifies this word as a *nipāta*, since in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* *prtak*, *vinā*, and *nānā* are dealt with in the same rule, namely A 2.3.32 *prthagvinānānbhis trītiyā nyatarasyām*. This rule teaches that in addition to the fifth case suffix a third or second (A 2.3.31) may optionally be added after a nominal stem when there is construction with *prthak* ‘separate(ly)’, *vinā* ‘without’, or *nānā* ‘without; different from’. The *Kaccāyanavutti* (126–27) deals with *vinā* and *nānā*.

Aggavaṃsa deals with *vinā* later on (566). Note that *tehi* and *ariyehi* of the examples can be instrumental as well as ablative forms.

2.7.10 *aññatra*

565 *Aññatrayoge pañcamī, tatiyā ca.* *Aññatra icc etena nipātena yoge pañcamī vibhatti hoti tatiyā ca: “nāññatra sabbanissaggā sotthim passāmi pāṇinaṃ”,¹ aññatra buddhuppādā lokassa saccābhisamayo n’ atthi, “tadantaram ko jāneyya aññatra Tathāgatena”.²*

‘When there is construction with *aññatra* “apart from; other than; except; without” the fifth as well as the third.’ When there is construction with the particle (*nipāta*) *aññatra*, [then] the fifth case ending applies, and also the third: ‘Except by abandonment of everything, I do not see any safety for living beings’; ‘there is no comprehension of the truth for the world except by the birth of the Buddha’³; ‘who would know the difference of/from it, apart from the Tathāgata?’⁴

There is no rule corresponding to this in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, nor in *Kaccāyana(-vuttī)*, *Candravyākaraṇa*, or *Kātantra*, and I have found no other source for it. The fact that Aggavaṃsa stresses that we are dealing with a particle (*nipāta*) strengthens the assumption made under the previous rule that he has moved on to deal with *nipāta*-words inspired by

¹ SI 54,4.

² A III 350,3. Smith reads *tadantaram*, so also CPD (s.v. 2 *antara*), for A *tad-anantaram*.

³ Or: Buddhas (pl.): cf. Dh 194 *buddhānam uppādo*, ‘the birth of the Awakened Ones’.

⁴ PTS transl.: ‘But who save the Tathāgata can judge this difference’. I prefer to take *tadantaram* as a compound. One may translate as a *karmadhāraya*, ‘that difference which is it’ = ‘that difference’.

the *Kaccāyanavuttī*. The inclusion of *aññatra* would in that case be on his own initiative.

2.7.11 *rite and vinā*

566 *Ritevināyoge dutiyā ca.* *Rite vinā icc etehi nipātehi yoge pañcamī tatiyā dutiyā ca hoti: rite saddhammā kuto sukham bhavati rite saddhammaṃ rite saddhammena vā, vinā saddhammā n’ atth’ añño koci nātho loke vijjati vinā saddhammaṃ vinā saddhammena vā, vinā buddhamhā vinā buddham vinā buddhena vā.*

‘Also the second [as well as the fifth and the third case endings] when there is construction with *rite* “without; except” or *vinā* “without; except”.’ When there is construction with the particles *rite* or *vinā*, the fifth, the third, and the second [case endings] apply: ‘Except for the true doctrine (*saddhammā* [ablative], *saddhammaṃ* [accusative], or *saddhammena* [instrumental]), from what is there happiness?’; ‘except for the true doctrine (*saddhammā* [ablative], *saddhammaṃ* [accusative], or *saddhammena* [instrumental]), there is no other¹ leader in the world’; ‘without the Buddha (*buddhasmā* [ablative], *buddham* [accusative], or *buddhena* [instrumental])’.

This brings us back to A 2.3.29 *anyārāditarartedik-śabdāñcūttarapadājāhiyukte* which teaches that a fifth case ending is added also after nominal stems constructed with, among other words, *rite*

¹ The text here is problematic in that we have a negation and both *atthi* and *vijjati*. We can translate both ‘there is not; there does not exist’ but one verb would do, and the line scans badly. Smith lists the following v.ll.: *ita* Bm (ns: *vijjati hū so ākhyāt kattā³ phrac sañ // vā / n’atthi vijjati / ma rhi / natthinipāt paṭisedhattha*); Be *n’atthi ’ñño*; Ce *nāñño*. *Kaccāyanavuttī* (126) reads: *natthañño koci nātho loke vijjati*. Note the *natthinipāt* of the *nissaya*. The problem does not affect the point under discussion, though.

‘without’, and to A 2.3.32 *prthagvinānānābhis tṛtīyā nyatarasyām* which teaches that a third, second, or fifth (A 2.3.31) case suffix is optionally added after a nominal stem when there is construction with *prthak* ‘separate(ly)’, *vinā* ‘without’, or *nānā* ‘without; different from’. As noted above, the *Kaccāyanavutti* (126–27) deals with *vinā* and *nānā*. Why Aggavaṃsa has not included *nānā* is hard to tell, but it may be worth noticing two rules from the *Candravyākaraṇa*. Rule 2.1.84 *rte dvitīyā ca* with the *vṛtti* explanation *rteśabdena yoge dvitīyā bhavati pañcamī ca*, teaches that when there is construction with the word *rte*, the second case suffix applies, and also the fifth, and 2.1.85 *vinā tṛtīyā ca*, teaches that in construction with *vinā* the third case suffix also applies in addition to the second and the fifth. The succession of these rules is suggestive, and so is the fact that we meet with only *rte* and *vinā*. The problem is that *rte* is taught only with an accusative or an ablative and that the examples are very different. Aggavaṃsa’s examples for *vinā* occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti*.

2.7.12 *pabhuti*

567 *Pabhutyādyatthe tadatthappayoge ca. Pabhuti-ādiatthe ca tadatthappayoge ca taṃ kāraṃ apādānasaññam hoti:* “*yato ’haṃ bhagini ariyāya jātiyā jāto*”,¹ “*yato sarāmi attānaṃ yato patto ’smi viññutaṃ*”,² *yato pabhuti*,³ “*yato paṭṭhāya*”,⁴ “*īto paṭṭhāya*”,⁵ “*īto paṭṭhāya*”,⁶ “*ajjato paṭṭhāya*”.⁷

‘Also when there is the sense of *pabhuti* “beginning; starting” etc. and when there is usage that has that sense.’ Also when

¹ M II 103,19.

² Ja VI 79,2.

³ Smith: cf. Vv-a 158,2.

⁴ Ja VI 79,11.

⁵ Ja I 78,8.

⁶ Vv-a 157,30.

⁷ Vv-a 246,22.

there is the sense of *pabhuti* etc. and when there is usage in that sense, that *kāraṃ* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies. ‘Since when I, sister, was born of noble birth’; ‘since when I remember myself, since when I am one who had reached the age of discretion’; ‘beginning since when’; ‘starting out since when’; ‘starting out since then’; ‘starting out from here’, ‘starting out from today’.

I am not quite confident about my translation of this rule. Does he intend to say ‘when there is the sense of *pabhuti* or *ādi*’? What is the meaning of *ca* here? Is it to be read twice, so to speak, or does it only connect the two requirements for the name *apādāna* to apply? Does he mean to say ‘when there is construction with *pabhuti* and *ādi*, and when there is usage of words in that sense’? Admittedly, ‘when there is the sense of X and when there is usage in that sense’ does not make too much sense (or, rather, that is exactly what it does). The first examples have the sense of *pabhuti*; *yato pabhuti* has the very word form, and the last four examples have a synonym, *paṭṭhāya* ‘taking X as starting point; beginning with X’. My guess is that the last examples are *tadatthappayoge* but I am not at all sure.

There is no rule corresponding to this in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *Candravyākaraṇa*, or *Kātantra*. Several of the examples occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti*, triggered by the word *ca* in the rule itself. The *vutti* explains (127,1–2): *casaddaggahaṇena aññatthāpi pañcamī vibhatti hoti*, ‘the fifth case ending applies also in other senses by force of the mention of the word *ca* [in the rule]’.

It is interesting to note, however, that Patañjali brings up the word *prabhṛti* in the *Mahābhāṣya* under vt. 6 on A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī* (Mbh I:455,24–456,2): *kārttikyā āgrahāyaṇī māsa iti / idam atra prayoktavyaṃ san na prayujyate kārttikyāḥ prabhṛty āgrahāyaṇī māsa iti*, ‘[take the statement] “Āgrahāyaṇī is in a month from Kārttikī”; here what should be used is not used: “starting (*prabhṛti*) from Kārttikī Āgrahāyaṇī is in a month”’. Kaiyaṭa elaborates on this usage of *prabhṛti*

in his *Pradīpa* (Mbhp II:800): *kārtikyāḥ prabhṛti* / *tata ārabhyety arthaḥ* / *bhāṣyakāravacanāt prabhṛtiyoge pañcamī*, “*kārtikyāḥ prabhṛti*”, that is to say, beginning from that; on [the authority of] the statement of the author of the *Bhāṣya* a fifth [case ending is added] when there is construction with *prabhṛti*. From this it is clear that the usage of an ablative in construction with *prabhṛti* was well established usage among the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.13 The time or distance between two *kāra*kas or actions

568 *Kāra*kiriyānaṃ majjhaṭṭhā kāladdhā ca. *Atthayojanakkamavasena pana dvinnam apādānakammakāra*kaṇaṃ *vā pubbāparakiriyānaṃ vā majjhe* ṭhitā *kāladdhā ca apādānasaññā honti: pakkasmā vijjhati migam, kosā vijjhati kuñjaram, māsasmā bhuñjati bhojanaṃ. Tatra luddako ito pakkasmā migam vijjhati ti atthayojanakkamo kāra*kasena, *kiriyāvasena pana luddako ajja migam vijjhitvā pakkasmā vijjhati ti; esa nayo itaratrā pi.*

‘And also time and distance which stands between *kāra*kas or actions.’ Also, however, by force of the order of explaining a meaning,¹ [words] that signify time or distance [and] occur between the two *kāra*kas *apādāna* and *kamma* or [between] a prior and a posterior action, are such to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘He kills the deer after a fortnight’; ‘he hits the elephant from [the distance of] a *krośa*’; ‘he consumes food after a month’. As far as this is concerned, [in] ‘the hunter kills the deer after a fortnight hence’, there is an order of explaining a meaning by force of *kāra*kas, but by force of action [in] ‘having killed a deer today, the hunter kills [another] one

¹ This is not clear to me. Is it because apparent sequence in reality requires an “order” of explanation ?

after a fortnight’. This principle applies also in the other [examples].

Aggavaṃsa has here incorporated two rules from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, or at least their wording. A 2.3.5 *kālādhvanor atyantasaṃyoge* teaches that a second case suffix (A 2.3.2) is added to a stem signifying time or distance to indicate absolute connection with an action. A 2.3.7 *saptamīpañcamyau kāra*kamadhya then teaches that a seventh or a fifth case suffix is added to a stem signifying time or distance (A 2.3.5) when they occur between one participant of an action and another. The question remains as to the source of Aggavaṃsa’s compound *kāra*kiriyānaṃ, which brings in the alternative of occurrence between two actions. This, and his whole conception of what is at stake here, goes back to the *Bhāṣya* discussion at A 2.3.7 (Mbhp I:446,9–13):

*kriyāmadhya iti vaktavyam / ihāpi yathā syāt / adya devadatto bhuktvā dvyaḥād bhoktā dvyahe bhoktā / kāra*kamadhya itītya *ucyamāna ihāiva syāt / ihastho ’yam iṣvāsaḥ krośāl lakṣyaṃ vidhyati krośe lakṣyaṃ vidhyati / yaṃ ca vidhyati yataś ca vidhyaty ubhayos tan madhyaṃ bhavati || tat tarhi vaktavyam / na vaktavyam / nāntareṇa sādhanam kriyāyāḥ pravṛttir bhavati / kriyāmadhyaṃ cet kāra*kamadhyam *api bhavati tatra kāra*kamadhya ity eva *siddham ||*

[The wording] *kriyāmadhya* ‘occurring between two actions’ should be stated so that [the rule] would apply also here: ‘Having eaten today, Devadatta is going to eat after two days (ablative), [or] is going to eat in two days (locative)’. If only as much as ‘between two actions’ is being stated, [the rule] would apply only here: ‘Standing here, the archer hits the target from [the distance of] a *krośa* (ablative), [or] at [the distance of] a *krośa* (locative)’. That which is between the two, [namely, the distance between] that which he hits and that [place] from where

he hits, is *madhya* ‘between’. Then need this statement be made? It need not be. There is no engagement in an action without something effecting [it]. If there is an interval between two actions, then there is also an interval between the two participants [of it]. In that case, it is fully established by [the wording] *kārakamadhya* ‘between two *kāra*kas’ alone.

As is clear from this, Patañjali considers the addition of *kriyāmadhya* ‘between two actions’ unnecessary. It is clear, however, that the formulation *kārakamadhya* ‘between two *kāra*kas’ caused the Sanskrit grammarians some difficulties. Turning to the *Kāśikā* on A 2.3.7, we find that, with regard to the example *adya bhuktvā devadatto dvyaha bhoktā dvyahād vā bhoktā*, ‘having eaten today, Devadatta is going to eat in two days, or is going to eat after two days’, *kārakamadhya* is understood as *karṣṣaktyor madhya kālah*, ‘the time between two capacities as agent’. Whether Aggavaṃsa thought he faced a problem here and therefore consciously included the element *kiryānam majjhatthā*, or whether he erroneously thought it ought to be included on the basis of the wording *kriyāmadhya* from the *Mahābhāṣya* discussion, is a question that remains open.

2.7.14 *rakkhaṇattha*

569 *Rakkhaṇatthānam icchitam anicchitañ ca.* *Rakkhaṇatthānam dhātūnam payoge, yaṃ icchitam yañ ca anicchitam, taṃ kārakam apādānasaññam hoti: kāke rakkhanti taṇḍulā, ucchūhi gaje rakkhanti, mantino mantena dārakehi piśāce rakkhanti, yavā paṭisedhenti gāvo, nānārogato vā nānā-upaddavato vā ārakkham gaṇhantu,¹ akusalehi dhammehi mānasam nivāreti, “pāpā cittaṃ nivāraye”.²*

¹ Considered by Smith an untraced quotation.

² Dh 116b.

‘In relation to [verbal roots] meaning “protect; ward off”, that which is desired and that which is not desired.’ When there is usage of verbal roots meaning ‘protect; ward off’, that which is desired as well as that which is not desired is a *kāra*ka to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘They ward off crows from the rice’; ‘they ward off elephants from the sugar-cane’; ‘enchanters ward off goblins from children with a spell’; ‘they ward off cows from the corn’; ‘let them take protection from all kinds of diseases or from all kinds of misfortunes’; ‘keep the mind from unwholesome phenomena’; ‘one should keep the mind from evil’.

In *Kaccāyana* (128) this rule appears in the form *rakkhaṇatthānam icchitam*, in the *Kātantra* (2.4.9) as *īpsitam ca rakṣārthānām*, but Aggavaṃsa adduces a larger number of examples. The corresponding rule in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is 1.4.27 *vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ*, ‘in relation to [verbal roots] meaning “warding off; keeping back”, that which is wanted to be obtained [receives the name *apādāna*]’. It is therefore clear that Aggavaṃsa prefers the *Kātantra/Kaccāyana* wording. The additional *anicchitañ ca*, ‘also that which is undesired’, is apparently Aggavaṃsa’s own invention, though it seems based on the issues raised in Pāṇiniya grammar when the *karman* is defined (A 1.4.49) as *kartur īpsitatamam*, ‘that [*kāra*ka] which is most desired to be attained by the agent’. Rule A 1.1.50 *tathāyuktam cānīpsitam* then adds that also that which is not desired but is related to the action in a similar manner is assigned to the category *karman*.

2.7.15 Concealment, wishing not to be seen

570 *Yassādassanam iccham antaradhāyati.* *Yassa adassanam icchanto koci antaradhāyati tattha tattha paṭicchannatthāne bhayena nilīyati, taṃ kārakam apādānasaññam hoti: upajjhāyā antaradhāyati sisso, mātaraṃ ca pitarā*

ca antaradhāyati putto. Idam lakkhaṇam bhayena antardhānam sandhāya vuttam, iddhiyā adassanagamanasamkhāte antaradhāne pana sattamī vibhatti hoti, tassa ca lakkhaṇam upari bhavissati.

‘The one in relation to whom [someone] hides wishing not to be seen.’ The one in relation to whom someone hides wishing not to be seen, in such circumstances keeping [oneself] hidden out of fear in a concealed place, that *kāraka* is something to which the technical name *apādāna* applies: ‘The pupil hides from the master’; ‘the son hides from¹ the mother and the father’. This definition has been stated with reference to concealment out of fear, but in the case of that concealment named ‘going to invisibility’ through magic power, [then] the seventh case ending applies and the definition of this will take place further on.²

A 1.4.28 *antardhau yenādarśanam icchati* assigns the name *apādāna* to the one by whom (*yena*) the agent desires not to be seen when concealment is involved. In *Kaccāyana* (128) the rule is formulated *yena vādassanam*, ‘or the one by whom there is non-seeing’. I find myself unable to explain why Aggavaṃsa has replaced *yena* with *yassa*. The *vā* in *Kaccāyana* is in the *vutti* said to be there to account for usages of the locative case, as in *Jetavane antaradhāyati bhagavā*, ‘the Noble One vanishes in the Jeta grove’. This is a straightforward locative usage. Aggavaṃsa, on the other hand, confines the locative usage to a form of disappearance through magic. More disturbing is the fact that *mātarā* and *pitarā* are clearly instrumental forms. Aggavaṃsa takes them as ablatives. Both examples have been taken over from the *Kaccāyanavutti*.

¹ See comment below.

² § 573 below.

2.7.16 More on the *apādāna*

As in the case of the *sampadāna*, there is also for the *apādāna* a lengthy rule which lists several specific cases and is expanded on at length in the *vutti*. I shall again split up the text into convenient portions.

571 *Dūr'antik'addhakālanimmānatvālopadisāyogavibhatt'āra'ppayogasuddhapamocanahetuvivittapamāṇapubbādiyogabandhanaguṇavacanapañhakathanathokakicchakatipayākattusu ca.* *Dūratthe antikatthe addhanimmāne kālanimmāne tvālope disāyoge vibhatte ārappayoge suddhatthe pamocane hetutthe vivittatthe pamāṇepubbādiyoge bandhane guṇavacane pañhe kathane thoke kicche katipaye akattari ca icc etesv atthesu payogesu ca taṃ kārakaṃ apādānasaññaṃ hoti.*

‘[The technical name *apādāna* applies] also when [there is usage of] *dūra* or *antika*, when there is measurement of distance or time, when there is elision of the absolute-suffix, when there is construction with *disā*, when [something] is completely separated, when there is usage of *āra*, when there is construction with [a word signifying] pure, liberation, cause, separated, measure, or [construction with] *pubba* etc., when there is [usage in the sense of] binding, expressing a property, question, answer, a little, difficult, a few, or no agent.’ When there is the sense of *dūra*, when there is the sense of *antika*, when there is measurement of distance, when there is measurement of time, when there is elision of the absolute-suffix, when there is construction with *disā*, when [something] is completely separated, when there is usage of *āra*, when there is the sense of pure, when there is liberation, when there is the

¹ Smith proposes to read *ārati* presumably because this is the form used by Aggavaṃsa when he discusses this part of the rule in detail (706,20).

sense of cause, when there is the sense of separated, when there is measure, when there is construction with *pubba* etc., when there is binding, when there is the expressing a property, when there is a question, when there is an answer, when there is a little, when there is difficulty, when there are a few, or when there is no agent, when there are [any of] these meanings and usages, that *kāraka* is something to which the name *apādāna* applies.

There is an identical rule in *Kaccāyana* (128), except that Aggavaṃsa has added an *ādi* after *pubba* and inserted *kicchakatipaya* before *akattusu*. The *sutta* covers mainly rules from the *vibhakti* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but draws also on other sources. As in the case of the corresponding *sampadāna* rule discussed earlier, the words in the rule appear out of context and are therefore difficult to translate in any coherent and fully satisfactory manner. Each element will be given a more detailed treatment below.

2.7.16.1 *dūra* and *antika*

(705,8–24) *Dūratthappayoge tāva: kīvadūro ito Naḷakāragāmo, “tato ha ve dūratarāṃ vadantī”,¹ gāmato nātidūre, “ārakā te moghapurisā imasmā dhammavinayā ārakā tehi Bhagavā”,² dūratthe: dūrato vāgamma,³ “dūrato vā namassantī”,⁴ “addasa ... Bhagavantaṃ dūrato va āgacchantaṃ”⁵ — dūratthappayoge dutiyā ca tatiyā ca: dūraṃ gāmaṃ āgato, dūrena gāmena āgato, dūrato gāmā āgato ti attho, dūraṃ gāmena vā, ārakā-saddayoge dutiyā tatiyā ca chaṭṭhī ca: ārakā imaṃ*

¹ Ja V 483,21.

² Smith: cf. S IV 43,15 (ns cit. et Dhp 253d); contra It 91,5.

³ Indicated as an untraced quotation by Smith.

⁴ D III 197,15 ... 202,21.

⁵ D I 179,5.

dhammavinayaṃ, anena dhammavinayena, “ārakā mandabuddhinaṃ”¹ icc evamādi. Antikatthappayoge: antikaṃ gāmā, āsannaṃ gāmā, samīpaṃ gāmā — gāmassa samīpan ti attho; yathāsambhavaṃ dutiyā ca tatiyā ca chaṭṭhī ca: antikaṃ gāmaṃ antikaṃ gāmena, āsannaṃ gāmaṃ āsannaṃ gāmena, samīpaṃ saddhammaṃ samīpaṃ saddhammena, “nibbānass’ eva santike”² — “ārakā ca vijānataṃ”³ ettha pana ārakāsaddo samīpavācako daṭṭhabbo, Bhagavā hi vijānataṃ santike ti attho.

When there is usage [with a word] in the sense of *dūra* ‘distant; far’, then: ‘How far from here is the village of Naḷakāra?’; ‘they say it is indeed further from here’; ‘not too far from the village’; ‘far are those foolish men from this doctrine and the discipline, far from them is the Noble One’. When there is the sense of *dūra*: ‘Having come from very far away’; ‘they pay homage from very far away’; ‘he saw the Noble One approach from very far away’. When there is usage in the sense of *dūra* ‘distant; far’, also the second and the third [case suffixes may apply]: ‘Come afar to the village (accusative)’, ‘come from afar by the village (instrumental)’, that is to say, ‘come from the village from afar (ablative)’; or: ‘come afar (accusative) by the village (instrumental)’.⁴ When there is construction with the word *ārakā* ‘far from; away from’ the second, the third, and the sixth [case suffixes may apply, as well as the fifth]: ‘away from this doctrine and discipline (accusative)’; ‘far away with this doctrine and discipline (instrumental)’; ‘far away in relation to the slow-witted (genitive)’, and so on in the same manner.

¹ Vism-mhṭ ad 201,23–25.

² S I 33,14.

³ Vism-mhṭ ad 201,23–25.

⁴ It seems to me impossible to give adequate translations of these examples. They will be discussed below. In particular I do not think the instrumentals should be translated as above, which is also odd English. I have done it in this way only to achieve a contrast.

When there is usage [with a word] in the sense of *antika* ‘near; proximate’: ‘Near to the village’, ‘close to the village’, ‘proximate to the village’ (ablative), that is to say, ‘proximate in relation to the village (genitive)’. According to circumstances, also the second, the third, or the sixth [case suffixes may apply]: ‘near to the village (accusative)’, ‘near with the village (instrumental)’, ‘close to the village (accusative)’, ‘close with the village (instrumental)’, ‘proximate to the true doctrine (accusative)’, ‘proximate with the true doctrine (instrumental)’, ‘in the vicinity of the very Nirvāṇa (genitive)’. But in ‘and *āraḱā* in relation to those who know’, the word *āraḱā* must be understood to mean ‘near’¹ for the Noble One is in the vicinity of understanding, that is the meaning.

This is ultimately based on two rules in the *vibhakti* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. A 2.3.34 *dūrāntikārthaiḥ śaṣṭhy anyatarasyām* teaches that a sixth, as well as a fifth (2.3.28) case ending, is optionally added to a nominal stem in construction with words meaning *dūra* ‘far; distant’ or *antika* ‘near; proximate’. The standard examples (e.g. *Kāśikā*) are *dūraṃ grāmāt* ‘far from the village’, *dūraṃ grāmasya* ‘far in relation to the village’, *antikam grāmāt* ‘near from the village’, and *antikam grāmasya* ‘near in relation to the village’. The instrumental is here precluded. A 2.3.35 *dūrāntikārthebhyo dvitīyā ca* then teaches that the second case ending is also added after words meaning *dūra* or *antika*. The *ca* is understood by the *Kāśikā* to include the instrumental by *anuvṛtti* from

¹ This is odd indeed. In the commentary on the *Visuddhimagga* (devanāgarī ed. p. 423) we meet with a verse, quoted also Sadd 580,11–12, which begins: *āraḱā mandabuddhinam āraḱā ca vijānataṃ*. I would translate this: ‘Far away from those of slow wit and far away from those who know’. I find it hard to believe that an author would use one and the same word with opposite meanings within the same line of a verse. The reason for Aggavaṃsa’s claim seems to be that the *Visuddhimagga* commentary here is proposing various *nirvacana* analyses of *araha*; cf. Vism-mhṭ, devanāgarī ed. p. 421,6 where *āraḱā* seems to be equal to *āsanne* ‘near’.

A 2.3.32. The requirement from A 2.3.33 that the words in question do not denote a substance (*sattva*) is also understood here. This gives us the examples *dūraṃ grāmasya*, *dūreṇa grāmasya*, and *dūrād grāmasya*, all meaning ‘far away in relation to the village’, and similar examples for *antika*.

Not only can one have an ablative in construction with *dūra* or *antika*, but one can also have ablatives of them, that is, *dūrāt* and *antikāt*. This seems to be the motivation behind Aggavaṃsa’s expressions *dūratthappayoga* and *dūrattha*, where the first accounts for an ablative, and eventually also for an accusative or an instrumental case suffix, added to a nominal stem syntactically connected with *dūra*, and the second accounts for an ablative added to words meaning *dūra*.

It seems Aggavaṃsa has combined the two rules from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* somewhat inaccurately. This is evident from the examples adduced, some of which are rather peculiar. The parallel passage in the *Kaccāyanavutti* (129) begins: *Dūratthappayoge tāva: kīvadūro ito naḷakāragāmo; dūrato vāgamma; āraḱā te moghapurisā imasmā dhammavinayā*. This is all incorporated into Aggavaṃsa’s text, but the *Kaccāyanavutti* continues: *Dutiyā ca tatiyā ca: dūraṃ gāmaṃ āgato dūreṇa gāmena vā; āraḱā imam vinayaṃ anena dhammavinayena vā; iccevamādi*. This is limited to the usage of the second and the third case suffixes, while the inclusion of the genitive seems to be Aggavaṃsa’s attempt at incorporating A 2.3.34. Since *dūraṃ gāmaṃ āgato dūreṇa gāmena vā* are taken from the *Kaccāyanavutti*, it seems likely that the subsequent *dūrato gāmā āgato* is stated to elucidate the meaning of all these expressions. It seems that *gāmaṃ*, *gāmena*, and *gāmā* are meant to be in syntactic agreement with *dūraṃ*, *dūreṇa*, and *dūrato*, respectively. Aggavaṃsa seems to revolt against this when he adds *dūraṃ gāmena vā*. I very much doubt that this is based on textual evidence, but of course I cannot prove this. For the syntactic agreement, on the other hand, there is some justification. In the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 2.3.35 this question is raised by the first *vārttika*. The entire discussion of this rule runs as follows (Mbh I:457,17–23):

*dūrāntikārthebhyah pañcamīvidhāne tadyuktāt pañcamī-
pratiṣedhaḥ || 1 ||*
*dūrāntikārthebhyah pañcamīvidhāne tadyuktāt pañcamyāḥ
pratiṣedho vaktavyah | dūrād grāmasya ||*
na vā tatrāpi darśanād apratiṣedhaḥ || 2 ||
*na vā | tatrāpi darśanāt pañcamyāḥ pratiṣedho 'narthakah |
tatrāpi pañcamī dṛśyate | dūrād āvasathān mūtram dūrāt
pādāvasecanam | ¹ dūrāc ca bhāvyaṃ dasyubhyo dūrāc ca
kupitād guroḥ ||*

'With regard to the teaching of the fifth [case suffix] after [nominal stems] meaning *dūra* "far" or *antika* "near" [there should be] a prohibition of the fifth after that with which it is [syntactically] constructed.' With regard to the teaching of the fifth [case suffix] after [nominal stems] meaning *dūra* "far" or *antika* "near" a prohibition should be stated of the fifth after that with which it is [syntactically] constructed, [as in:] *dūrād grāmasya* 'far away in relation to the village'. 'Or not. No prohibition [need be stated] because [a fifth case suffix] is observed there too.' A prohibition of the fifth is meaningless because it is observed there too: 'urination [should be done] far away from a dwelling-place, [and] washing [one's] feet [should be done] far away [from a dwelling-place]', 'one should stay far away from Dasyus, and far away from an angry teacher'.

The first *vārttika*, then, claims that if we want to say 'far from the village' we can only say *dūrād grāmasya*, with a genitive case ending. This is rejected by the second *vārttika* which claims that usage of the ablative is observed as well. Patañjali provides two examples in evidence of this claim. But no examples are adduced for the usage of two accusatives or two instrumentals.

¹ *Manusmṛti* 4.151ab.

Another source possibly made use of by Aggavaṃsa here is Candragomin. In the *Candravṛtti* on rule 2.1.87 *stokālpakṛcchra-
katipayād asattvārthāt karaṇe*¹ we meet with the following passage:

*dūram grāmāt, antikam grāmād ity avadher eva pañcamī.
dūram grāmasya, antikam grāmasyeti sambandhe ṣaṣṭhī.
dūram gataḥ, antikam gata iti kriyāpye dvitīyā. dūreṇa gataḥ,
antikena gata iti karaṇe tṛtīyā.*

[In] *dūram grāmāt* 'far from the village' [and] *antikam grāmāt* 'near to the village' [we have] indeed the fifth [case suffix added] after [a word denoting] a limit.² [In] *dūram grāmasya* 'far in relation to the village' [and] *antikam grāmasya* 'near in relation to the village' [we have] the sixth [case suffix] to express a relation. [In] *dūram gataḥ* 'gone far' [and] *antikam gataḥ* 'gone near' [we have] the second [case suffix] to express that which is to be reached by the action. [In] *dūreṇa gataḥ* 'gone by far' [and] *antikena gataḥ* 'gone by near' [we have] the third [case suffix] to express the instrument.

Candragomin thus firstly accounts for *dūram* and *antikam* in construction with words ending in the ablative as well as the genitive, secondly for words in construction with the accusative and the instrumental forms of *dūra* or *antika*, with *dūram* or *antikam*, and *dūreṇa* or *antikena* assigned to the categories *karman* and *karaṇa*, respectively. The latter solution I find difficult to embrace.

2.7.16.2 *addha* and *kāla*

(705,25–28) *Addhakālanimmāne: ito Madhurāya catusu
yojanesu Saṃkassam, Rājagahato pañcacattālīsajojana-*

¹ This is A 2.3.33 which will be dealt with later on.

² *Candravyākaraṇa* 2.1.81 *avadher pañcamī*.

matthake Sāvattihī, “ito kho¹ bhikkhave ekanavutikappe”² “ito tiṇṇaṃ māsānaṃ accayena parinibbāyissāmi”³ icc evamādi.

When there is measurement of distance or time: ‘From here, Madhurā, Saṃkassa is at four *yojanas*’; ‘Sāvattihī is at the distance of forty-five *yojanas* from Rājagaha’; ‘at ninety-one *kalpas* before now (= ninety-one *kalpas* ago), monks’; ‘by the end of three months from now I shall enter *nibbāna*’, and so on in the same manner.

The fourth *vārttika* on A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī* (Mbh I:455,11), *yataś cādhvakālanirmāṇam*, states that ‘[a fifth case suffix is added] also [after a stem] from which there is measurement of distance or time’. Patañjali eventually rejects all the *vārttikas* on this rule, showing that the examples are in fact accounted for by A 2.3.28. In the case of the fourth *vārttika*, he explains the examples as elliptical constructions. Thus, *gavīdhumataḥ sāmkaśyaṃ catvāri yojanāni*, ‘Sāmkaśya is four *yojanas* from Gavīdhumat’, is explained by supplying words as follows (Mbh I:456,4–5): *gavīdhumato niḥsṛtya yadā catvāri yojanāni gatāni bhavanti tataḥ sāmkaśyam*, ‘having departed from Gavīdhumat, when four *yojanas* have passed, then Sāmkaśya [is there]’. These usages are thus covered by A 2.3.28. So are the usages exemplified under vt. 5 *tadyuktāt kāle saptamī*, ‘the seventh [case suffix is added] after that which is connected with that [from which there is measurement of time] when time [is expressed]’, and vt. 6 *adhvanaḥ prathamā ca*, ‘also the first [case suffix, in addition to the seventh, is added] after [a word denoting] distance’.

What is of immediate interest here, however, is that the sixth *vārttika* makes Patañjali (Mbh I:455,17–18) allow for the locative forms *caturṣu yojaneṣu* as well as the nominative *catvāri yojanāni*. In

¹ Bm vo.

² D II 2,15: *Ito so bhikkhave ekanavuto kappo*°.

³ D II 106,19–20: °*ito tiṇṇaṃ māsānaṃ accayena Tathāgato parinibbāyissatī ti*.

discarding the *vārttika* he rephrases the locative construction as an absolute locative (Mbh I:456,5): *caturṣu yojaneṣu gateṣu sāmkaśyam*, ‘[having departed from Gavīdhumat,] when four *yojanas* have passed, [then] Sāmkaśya [is there]’. Aggavaṃsa’s first example, *ito Madhurāya catusu yojaneṣu Saṃkassam*, is a close rewording of the *Bhāṣya* example with the locative construction. But he has based his whole rule on a *vārttika* rejected by Patañjali. If he had this from the *Bhāṣya*, one would then have to assume that he has either ignored Patañjali’s rejection of it or not understood what was going on. This could of course more easily have happened if Aggavaṃsa’s source was not the *Bhāṣya* itself but the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa where the examples are discussed. There is another possibility, though. The *vārttikas* appear in the *Kāśikā* on A 2.3.28, together with some of the examples provided by Patañjali. There the legitimacy of the *vārttikas* is not questioned and the rephrasings which do away with the *vārttikas* are not met with. But the examples involving the locative construction are not met with either. These do, however, occur in the *Padamāñjarī* (KāśP II:186) and the *Nyāsa* (KāśN II:186). Aggavaṃsa’s source could thus have been one or both of the commentaries on the *Kāśikā*.

2.7.16.3 *tvālopa*

(705,28–706,6) *Tvālope kammādhikaraṇeṣu*: “*pāsādā saṃkameyya*”,¹ “*hatthikkhandhā saṃkameyya*”,² *āsanā vuṭṭhaheyya icc evamādi; ettha ca tvālopo nāma atthasambhava pi sati tvāpaccayantassa saddassa avijjamaṇatā, tathā hi “pāsādā saṃkameyyā” ti ettha pāsadam abhirūhitvā tamhā pāsādā aññaṃ pāsadam saṃkameyyā ti attho; esa nayo “hatthikkhandhā saṃkameyyā” ti etthā pi, āsanā vuṭṭhaheyyā ti ettha pana āsane nisīditvā tamhā āsanā vuṭṭhaheyyā ti attho; evaṃ kammādhikaraṇeṣu pañcamī vibhatti bhavati, kammādhī-*

¹ S I 95,30.

² S I 95,29.

karaṇabhūtāni yeva vatthūni tvālopavisaye apādānaṃ nāma hontī ti attho.

When there is elision of [the absolutive-suffix] *-tvā*, [the fifth case suffix applies] to denote the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]: ‘[Just as] someone might shift from one platform [to another]’; ‘[just as] someone might shift from one elephant’s back [to another]’; ‘[just as] someone might get up from [his] seat’, and so on in the same manner. But here there is elision of *-tvā* even though there is the arising of [its] meaning, because no word ending in the suffix *-tvā* is met with; for thus, in the case of ‘[just as] someone might shift from one platform [to another]’, the meaning is ‘having mounted one platform, from that platform he might shift to another platform’. This principle [applies] also in the case of ‘[just as] someone might shift from one elephant’s back [to another]’, but in the case of ‘[just as] someone might get up from [his] seat’, the meaning is ‘having sat down on [his] seat he might get up from that seat’. Thus the fifth case suffix applies to denote the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb], that is to say, things are indeed the *apādāna* in the domain of elision of *-tvā* but only when they have the form of the object or the location [of the action].

Just as in the preceding case of *addha* and *kāla*, this is ultimately based on *vārttikas* on A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī*. The first *vārttika* on this rule, *pañcamīvidhāne lyablope karmaṇy upasaṃkhyānam*, states that an addition to the rule should be made that the fifth case suffix applies to express the sense of the object of the action when a word ending in the absolutive suffix *LyaP* (*-ya*) has been elided. The second *vārttika*, *adhikarane ca*, then adds that, in addition to the object, inclusion should be made also of the location. Patañjali gives the example (Mbh I:455,5) *prāsādam āruhya prekṣate prāsādāt prekṣate*, making it

clear that the clause ‘he looks out from the platform’ is short for ‘having mounted the platform he looks out’. The point in stating the first *vārttika* is that this example cannot be accounted for by A 1.4.24 and A 2.3.28 in as much as the platform is not the stable point (*dhruva*) from which there is movement away. This applies also to the examples offered under the second *vārttika* (Mbh I:455,8), *āsanāt prekṣate*, ‘he looks out from [his] seat’, and *śayanāt prekṣate*, ‘he looks out from [his] bed’. As in the preceding case, however, Patañjali rejects these two *vārttikas*, claiming that the examples are in fact accounted for by A 2.3.28 itself. In the case of the examples offered under the first *vārttika*, Patañjali claims that we can say it is the sight which moves away (Mbh I:455,20). The question raised in the *Mahābhāṣya* is how you can talk about movement away here since the sight does not move away once and for all. Patañjali answers that there is movement away, either because a continuous process is implied (*saṃtataṭvāt*) or, alternatively, because a succession is implied (*atha vānyānyaprādurbhavāt*, ‘or else, [because] they become visible one after the other’) (Mbh I:455,21). We face, then, the same problems in tracing Aggavaṃsa’s sources as we did in the case of the previous passage. The *vārttikas* and the examples appear in the *Kāśikā*.

The examples from the *Mahābhāṣya* occur also in the *Candravṛtti* under rule 2.1.81 *avadheḥ pañcamī* which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a word denoting a limit. Candragomin expresses himself briefly: *prāsādam āruhya prekṣate, prāsādāt prekṣata ity avadher eva pañcamī. evam āsane upaviśya prekṣate, āsanāt prekṣate*, ‘[the clause] “he looks out from the platform” [is in fact short for] “having mounted the platform he looks out”, [and] thus a fifth [case suffix] is indeed [added] after [a word denoting] a limit; likewise, [the clause] “he looks out from [his] seat” [is short for] “having sat down on [his seat] he looks out”.’

All the examples adduced in the *Saddanīti* occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti* (129). Obviously, the authors have looked for examples containing such words as *pāsāda* and *āsana*, familiar from the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. But the examples offered are still a bit strange. On

the analogy of forms such as *pappuyya*, *vineyya*, or *vitareyya*, which may be taken as absolutives as well as optatives,¹ *saṃkameyya* and *vuṭṭhaheyya* might even be taken as absolutives, in which case one would have a strange situation indeed, but the context in which *saṃkameyya* appears (S I 94–95) makes this possibility very unlikely. One may note, however, that in the *Saddanīti* passage there is movement from one elephant-back to another, etc. This may involve the problem as to whether an elephant, if moving, can be called *dhruva* ‘the stable point’, but it means that the problems raised in the *Bhāṣya* as to whether there is *apāya* ‘movement away’ do not really arise in the case of the *Saddanīti* examples. These could perfectly well have been accounted for by rule 555, the main rule on the *apādāna*. In other words, in Aggavaṃsa’s case there is no need to account for *tvālopa*. In his case the procedure consists in creating a difficulty, explaining it, and calling it grammar. This, however, gives a clear indication of how heavily he relies on his predecessors, including Kaccāyana.

2.7.16.4 *disāyoga*

(706,6–15) *Disāyoge ca pañcamī bhavati, tattha disā ca disāyogo ca disāyogo sarūpekasesanayena, tasmim disāyoge; ettha ca disāvacanena disattho gahito, disāyogavacanena disatthavācīhi yogo. Tattha disatthavācīhi yoge tāva “ito sā purimā disā ... ito sā dakkhiṇā disā ... ito sā pacchimā disā ... ito sā uttarā disā”*,² *Avīcīto upari Bhavaggaṃ antare, “uddham pādatalā adho kesamatthakā”*,³ *“yato khemaṃ tato bhayaṃ”*,⁴ *yato assosum Bhagavantam. Disatthe: puratthimato dakkhiṇato ti ādi, ettha pana sattamiyatthe topaccayo bhavissati.*

¹ cf., e.g., PED under *vitari*.

² D III 197,1; 198,1; 198,37; 202,7.

³ MI 57,14.

⁴ Ja III 513,21.

The fifth [case suffix] applies also when there is *disāyoga* ‘construction with a direction’; but in this respect, *disāyoga* ‘construction with a direction’ [means] both [a word signifying] direction and construction with [a word signifying] direction, through the principle of single remainder of [elements] which are of the same form¹; when there is that, *disāyoge*. And in this respect, the meaning of *disā* ‘direction’ is understood by the enunciation of *disā*, [while] by the enunciation of *disāyoga* [one understands] construction with [words] expressing the meaning of *disā* ‘direction’. As far as this is concerned, then, when there is construction with [words] expressing the meaning of direction: ‘This direction is east from here, this direction is south from here, this direction is west from here, this direction is north from here’; ‘from Avīcī up to Bhavagga, [namely,] in between’; ‘from the soles of the feet up, from the top of the hair down (= from head to toe)’; ‘from whatsoever thing you have safety, from that there is fear’; ‘whence they heard the Noble One’. When there is the sense of direction: ‘In the east, in the south’, etc. But in this case the suffix *-to* will be [a fifth case suffix] in the sense of the seventh.

After the little detour involving the *vārttikas* on A 2.3.28 we now return to A 2.3.29 *anyārāditarartedikṣabdāñcūttarapadājāhiyukte* which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added, among other things, after stems co-occurring with words denoting directions.² The examples are reasonably straightforward, with the exception of *yato khemaṃ tato bhayaṃ* which lacks any word meaning direction and which I can only translate ‘from whatsoever thing you have safety, from that there is fear’. All the examples occur in the *Kaccāyanavutti* (129), including *puratthimato* and *dakkhiṇato* which are there followed by *pacchimato* and *uttarato*, thus providing the explanation for Aggavaṃsa’s usage of

¹ A 1.2.64 *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*. See below.

² For a full rendering of the rule, cf. 2.7.4 above.

ādi ‘etc.’. But Aggavaṃsa has singled out this latter group, wanting to distinguish between *disattha* and *disatthayoga*. That is to say, when there is *disatthayoga*, an ablative form such as *ito* is used with a word signifying direction. When there is *disattha*, we have an ablative form of a word signifying direction. Why he has not resorted to his previous device of distinguishing, for example, between *dūrattha* and *dūratthappayoga* and has instead resorted to the *ekaśeṣa* principle, is hard to tell. A 1.2.64 *sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau* teaches that among series of linguistic elements having the same form, only one of them occurs as a single remainder if a single case suffix is used. This is the *ekaśeṣa* principle. For example, one cannot say **vrkṣavrkṣau* or **vrkṣavrkṣavrkṣāḥ*, one has to say *vrkṣau* and *vrkṣāḥ* with only one occurrence of the stem. Aggavaṃsa’s application of this principle in the present case is more than dubious.

2.7.16.5 vibhatti

(706,15–20) *Vibhatte pañcamī bhavati chaṭṭhī ca, ettha vibhattaṃ nāma sayam vibhattass’ eva tadaññato guṇena vibhajanaṃ: yato pañītatara vā visiṭṭhatara vā n’ atthi, Mādhurā Pāṭaliputtakehi abhirūpatarā, “attadanto tato varam”,¹ “channavutīnaṃ pāsaṇḍānaṃ dhammānaṃ pavaram yadidaṃ sugatavinayo”² icc evamādi.*

When something is separated (*vibhatta*), the fifth [case suffix] applies, and also the sixth. Here *vibhatta* ‘separated’ is as much as separation, which pertains only to that which is itself separate, through some quality, [and the separation is] from something other than that: ‘Something more exquisite or more distinguished than it does not exist’; ‘the people of Mathurā are more handsome than those of Pāṭaliputra’; ‘a self-controlled self

¹ Dhṃ 322d.

² Mnd Ce 219,18.

is better than that’; ‘this very doctrine of the Sugata is better than the ninety-six heretical views’.

This is A 2.3.42 *pañcamī vibhakte* which teaches that the fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem which denotes something from which something else is set apart (A 2.3.41 *yataś ca nirdhāraṇam*) provided there is separation. The *Kāśikā* explains: *yasmin nirdhāraṇāśraye vibhaktam asyāsti tataḥ pañcamī vibhaktir bhavati*, ‘a fifth case suffix applies after [a nominal stem denoting] that which is the foundation for setting apart with regard to which something is separated’. The example provided is the Mathurā one, where the people of Mathurā are completely distinct from and set apart from those of Pāṭaliputra. Aggavaṃsa has taken the genitive instance from the *Kaccāyanavutti*. In Pāṇiniya grammar there is a distinction here. A 2.3.41 *yataś ca nirdhāraṇam* teaches that a genitive or locative ending is added to that which is set apart, for example the doctrine of the Buddha from the ninety-six heretical views. A 2.3.42 requires total separation, but that may have been the very intention of Kaccāyana with regard to singling out the doctrine of the Buddha from the heretical ones, implying that they do not all belong to the class of all doctrines. In that case we are dealing with religious propaganda, not with grammar.

2.7.16.6 āratippayoga

(706,20–22) *Āratippayoge: gāmadhammā vasaladhammā asaddhammā ārati virati paṭivirati, “pañātipātā veramaṇī”¹ icc evamādi.*

When there is usage of *ārati* ‘abstinence’: ‘Abstaining from, leaving off, shrinking from country-matters, the ways of the

¹ Khp II 1.

morally low, the ways of the untrue'; 'disgust from destruction of life', and so on in the same manner.

This is problematic. *Kaccāyana* reads *ārappayoga*, and not *āratippayoga*. So does the *vutti* (130) which *Aggavaṃsa* has otherwise copied verbatim with the same examples. This in itself would not present a problem, were it not for the fact that the word *ārati*, as well as the approximately synonymous *virati* and *paṭivirati* met with in the example, and the word *āra* or *ārā* do not seem to mean the same thing. There are several similar words here. I list the immediately relevant ones with their meaning entries from CPD: *āra* = *āraka* (mfn.) 'distant, far from, away from'; *ārakā* (ind.) [= Skt *ārakāt*] 'far from, far off, away from' which according to CPD is used either as an adverb or as a preposition with accusative, instrumental, ablative or genitive¹; *ārā* (ind.) 'far off, far from, remote, distant'; *ārata* (mfn.) 'keeping away from, abstaining from'; *ārati* (f.) 'leaving off, shrinking from, abstinence'.

There can be several explanations of how this confusion came about. I strongly suspect that as a grammatical issue this is ultimately based on A 2.3.29 *anyārādītarartedīksabdāñcūttarapadājāhiyukte*. This rule, as we have seen,² permits a fifth case suffix to be added after a stem that co-occurs with the word *ārāt* 'near to; far from'. Senart, in his translation of *Kaccāyana*, takes the word to be *ārā* 'loin de', translating (132) *arā imasmā dhammavinayā* as 'loin des prescriptions de la religion'. He translates this example only. As far as I can see, we are left with at least the following possibilities: 1) This has nothing at all to do with A 2.3.29 and is an original rule made by *Kaccāyana* and retained by *Aggavaṃsa* to account for the usage of *āra/ārā/ārati*, all meaning 'abstinence'. 2) *Kaccāyana* thought he was dealing with *āra/ārā* in the sense 'far from', and *Aggavaṃsa*, who has already dealt with *ārakā* in

¹ cf. 2.7.16.1 above.

² For a full rendering of the rule, cf. 2.7.4 above.

the context of *dūra*,¹ also covered by A 2.3.29, replaces this with the word *ārati*, either in order to avoid repeating himself or in order to include conveniently this word and its usage with an ablative. 3) Both *Aggavaṃsa* and *Kaccāyana* are wrong, thinking that *ārāt* is synonymous with the words used in their examples. They seem in any case to think not of the word *ārāt* in itself but of any word with the same meaning. 4) It is the case that *ārati* and, one would be forced to assume, *virati* and *paṭivirati* all mean 'far away from', or, at least, that *Kaccāyana* and *Aggavaṃsa* thought these words meant 'far away from'.

2.7.16.7 *suddha-* and *pamocanathappayoga*

(706,22–26) *Suddhatthappayoge: lobhanīyehi dhammehi suddho asaṃsattho icc evamādi. Pamocanathappayoge: "parimutto dukkhamā ti vadāmi",² mutto 'smi māra-bandhanā,³ na te muccanti maccuno,⁴ "mokkhanti māra-bandhanā"⁵ icc evamādi.*

When there is usage of [a word] meaning *suddha* 'pure': 'Purified from, not in contact with, things which are to be lusted for', and so on in the same manner. When there is usage of [a word] meaning *pamocana* 'liberation': 'I declare that he is liberated from suffering'; 'I am liberated from the bonds of

¹ 705,15–17; cf. 2.7.16.1 above. The *Kāśikā* on A 2.3.29 gives the meanings of *ārāt* as *dūra* and *antika*. One may then ask why Pāṇini included it in his rule in the first place. The answer, which has evidently passed *Aggavaṃsa* by, is that A 2.3.34 *dūrāntikārthaiḥ ṣaṣṭhy anyatarasyām* teaches that optionally a sixth case suffix is used with words meaning *dūra* or *antika*. Now, this would undesirably include *ārāt* were it not blocked by A 2.3.29.

² S III 31,23.

³ Smith: cf. Th 680f.

⁴ Ce Be *maccunā*.

⁵ Dh 37d.

Death'; 'these are not liberated from Death'; 'they are liberated from the bonds of Death', and so on in the same manner.

I do not know of any parallel to this in Sanskrit sources, but a similar passage is met with in *Kaccāyana*. Apart from minor variant readings, the *Kaccāyanavutti* (130) differs in offering the example *mātito ca pitito ca suddho*, 'purified motherwise and fatherwise'. This is evidently an adverbial use of the ablative, and Aggavaṃsa was maybe wise in leaving it out.

2.7.16.8 *hetuatthe*

(706,26–707,13) *Hetuatthe: kasmā hetunā*, “*kasmā nu tumhaṃ daharā na miyare*”,¹ *kasmā idh' eva maraṇaṃ bhavissati*, “*yasmā aniyatā kecī*”,² *yasmā-t-īha bhikkhave ... tasmā-t-īha bhikkhave, yaṃkāraṇā taṃkāraṇā*,³ “*kiṃkāraṇā amma tuvaṃ pamajjasi*”⁴ — *aññehi pana lakkhaṇehi hetutthe paṭhamā ca tatiyā ca chaṭṭhī ca bhavati, tā ca kho kiriyābhisambandhe daṭṭhabbā, na pana* “*ko nu kho bhante hetu ko paccayo mahato bhūmicālassa pātubhāvāyā*”⁵ *ti ādisu kiriyābhisambandharahitesu payogesū* — “*na attahetu alikaṃ bhaṇanti*”,⁶ “*kiṃ nu jātiṃ na rocesi*”,⁷ “*yañ ca putte na passāmi*”,⁸ “*taṃ taṃ Gotama pucchāmi*”,⁹ *kena kāraṇena vadesi, yena kāraṇena, tena kāraṇena*, “*atha tvaṃ kena vaṇṇena kena vā pana hetunā*

¹ Ja IV 52,31.

² Abhidh-av 17,10.

³ cf. Sadd 731,13–16.

⁴ Dh-p-a II 268,8, cf. Thī-a 111,25.

⁵ A IV 312,14, D II 107,19.

⁶ Ja V 146,15.

⁷ S I 132,25.

⁸ Ja VI 561,20.

⁹ S I 13,19, Vism 2,2.

anupatto brahāraṇṇaṃ”¹ — “*saddhāya tarati oghaṃ*”² *ettha ca saddhāyā ti ayaṃ saddo hetuattho ti garūhi vuttaṃ* — “*kena Kassapa bālassa dassanaṃ nābhikamkhasi*”,³ “*yena-m-idh' ekacce sattā*”,⁴ *tena nimittena*, “*tena vuttaṃ*”,⁵ “*taṃ kissa hetu*”,⁶ *kissa tumhe kīlamatha*.

When there is the meaning of *hetu* ‘cause; reason’: ‘For what reason?’; ‘why indeed do your young ones not die?’; ‘why shall there be death on earth?’; ‘because of which some undetermined’; ‘since here, monks ... because of that here, monks’; ‘for the cause of which, for the cause of that’; ‘for what reason, mama, are you careless’. According to other rules, however, the first, the third, and the sixth [case suffixes] may apply when there is the sense of cause. Moreover, these [case suffixes] are understood when there is a relation to the action, but not when there is usage bereft of relation with the action in such [sentences] as: ‘What, venerable ones, is the reason, what is the cause, for the manifestation of the great earthquake’. ‘They do not speak⁷ a lie for their own sake’; ‘why is it that [re-]birth does not please you?’; ‘since I do not see children’; ‘therefore I ask you this, Gotama’; ‘why did he say [it]?’; ‘for which reason’; ‘for this reason’; ‘now, by what kind, or rather, for what reason, have you reached this vast forest?’; ‘by faith one crosses the flood’ — and in this respect the word *saddhāya* ‘by faith’ has the sense of cause, thus it has been stated by the teachers — ‘why, Kassapa, can you not stand the sight of a fool?’; ‘wherefore some people [say ...]’; ‘for that reason’;

¹ Ja VI 543,1–2.

² Sn 184a.

³ Ja IV 241,2.

⁴ A II 159,35.

⁵ Ja I 3,25, Sv I 26,10.

⁶ M I 1,17.

⁷ Be ns *bhaṇeti*, Ja V 146,15 *bhaṇāti*.

‘therefore it has been stated’; ‘this is from the cause of what (= why is this) ?’; ‘of what (= why) are you tired ?’

The basis for this is A 2.3.23 *hetau*. This rule teaches that the third case suffix (A 2.3.18 *kartrkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*) is added to a nominal stem when it denotes a cause, *hetu*. The *Kāśikā* offers the examples *dhanena kulam*, ‘a family lineage on account of wealth’, *kanyayā śokam*, ‘grief on account of a daughter’, *vidyayā yaśaḥ*, ‘fame on account of learning’. This is straightforward, but when it comes to the usage of the ablative Pāṇini restricts the optional use of the fifth case suffix to instances where the cause is a property, except in the feminine. The subsequent rule A 2.3.24 *akartary ṛṇe pañcamī* teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23) but not as an agent. The *Kāśikā* offers the example *śatād baddhaḥ*, ‘imprisoned because of [a debt of] a hundred’, as against *śatena bandhitah*, ‘thrown into prison because of [a debt of] a hundred’, implying that the debt has thrown him into prison and thus is to be considered an agent. A 2.3.25 *vibhāṣā guṇe ’striyām* then teaches that a fifth case ending is optionally — or, following Kiparsky (1979), marginally — added to a nominal stem denoting a cause which is a property, except in the feminine. This, in other words, applies to non-feminine abstract nouns. The *Kāśikā* offers the example *jādyād baddhaḥ*, ‘imprisoned because of stupidity’, as against *dhanena kulam* where the instrumental is used since the stem does not denote a property, and *prajñayā muktaḥ*, ‘released by knowledge’, where choice is restricted to the instrumental since the feminine gender is involved.

Pāṇini is thus quite strict when it comes to adding a fifth case suffix to a stem denoting a cause. It is interesting therefore to note a remarkable change in attitude already with Kātyāyana and Patañjali. The *vārttika* on A 2.3.23 *hetau* runs: *nimittakāraṇaheṭuṣu sarvāsām prāya-darśanam*, ‘a general seeing of all [case suffixes] when [there is usage of the words] *nimitta*, *kāraṇa*, or *hetu*’. All three words have meanings within the semantic sphere of ‘cause’, *nimitta* maybe more clearly

distinguishable as the final cause for the sake of which an action occurs, thus tending towards such meanings as ‘purpose’ (*prayojana*) or ‘motive’. Patañjali comments on this *vārttika* as follows (Mbh I:454,19–455,2):

nimittakāraṇaheṭuṣu sarvā vibhaktayaḥ prāyeṇa dṛśyanta iti vaktavyam | kiṃ nimittam vasati | kena nimittena vasati | kasmai nimittāya vasati | kasmān nimittād vasati | kasya nimittasya vasati | kasmin nimitte vasati || kiṃ kāraṇam vasati | kena kāraṇena vasati | kasmai kāraṇāya vasati | kasmāt kāraṇād vasati | kasya kāraṇasya vasati | kasmin kāraṇe vasati | ko hetur vasati | kaṃ hetum vasati | kena hetunā vasati | kasmai hetave vasati | kasmād dhetor vasati | kasya hetor vasati | kasmin hetau vasati ||

It should be stated that all the case suffixes are generally observed when [there is usage of the words] *nimitta*, *kāraṇa*, or *hetu*.

It does not make much sense to translate the rest of the passage, in that all the examples could be translated ‘what is the reason he is staying ?’ or ‘for what reason is he staying ?’ with minor variations. But Patañjali’s point is clear. One can use the nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative, genitive, or locative case suffixes to ask this question. This passage is Patañjali’s entire comment on A 2.3.23. He does not comment at all upon A 2.3.24 and 25.

Now Aggavaṃsa claims that according to other rules, in addition to the fifth case suffix, the first, the third, and the sixth may also apply when there is the sense of cause. Obviously, there is a lot of laxity here, but the *Kātantra* 2.4.30 *hetvarthe* allows only for the instrumental, and one may note that the rule there is formulated exactly as in *Kaccāyana* and the *Saddanīti*. Maybe more interesting is Aggavaṃsa’s statement that these case suffixes are understood when there is a relation

to the action, but not when there is usage bereft of relation with an action. Helārāja (Hel 250,22–23, on VP 3.7.24) points out that the third case suffix taught to denote the *hetu* is an *akāravibhakti*, a case suffix which does not express a *kāraka*. He also says (250,23) that in the example *adhyayanena vasati*, ‘he is staying because of study’, *adhyayana* ‘study’ is the cause (*hetu*) and *vāsa* ‘the staying’ is the effect (*hetumat*, lit. ‘cause-possessing’). He adds (*ibid.*): *tayoḥ sambandhe śeṣaśaṣṭhyām prāptāyām hetau tṛtīyā*, ‘one would expect a *śeṣa-śaṣṭhī* (a genitive prescribed according to A 2.3.50 *śaṣṭhī śeṣe*) to express the relation between them, [but in fact what we have here is] a third [case suffix] to express [the sense of] cause’. Could a statement like this one have prompted Aggavaṃsa to include the genitive *kissa* as a pronoun meaning ‘for what reason’ in its own right and illustrating genitive usage ?

2.7.16.9 *vivecanappayoga* and *pamāṇattha*

(707,13–20) *Vivecanappayoge: vivitto pāpakā dhammā*, “*vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi*”¹ *icc evamādi. Pamāṇatthe: āyāmato ca vitthārato ca yojanaṃ gambhīrato ca puthulato ca yojanaṃ Candabhāgāya pamāṇam*, “*parikkhepatto navasatayojanaparimāṇo Majjhimadeso*”² “*dīghato nava vidatthiyo sugatavidatthiyā pamāṇikā kāretabbā*”³; *tatiyā ca: yojanaṃ āyāmena yojanaṃ vitthareṇa yojanaṃ ubbedhena sāsaparāsi.*

When there is usage of [a word in the sense of (?)] *vivecana* ‘a setting apart; separation’: ‘Set apart from evil things’; ‘[I strive] separating [myself] from desire, separating [myself] from bad phenomena’, and so on in the same manner. When there is the sense of *pamāṇa* ‘measure; measuring’: ‘A *yojana* long and

¹ D I 73,23; Ja 398,16; cf. 2.5.1.10 above.

² Ja I 49,16.

³ cf. Vin III 149,12; IV 279,11.

broad, a *yojana* deep and wide, [that] is the measure of the Candabhāgā [river]’; ‘the Midlands measure nine hundred *yojanas* in circumference’; ‘[a hut¹] having the measure of nine spans according to the span-measure of the Sugata is to be made’. Also the third [case suffix is used]: ‘A heap of mustard seeds a *yojana* long (lit. “by length”), a *yojana* broad, a *yojana* high’.

In the *sūtra* text Aggavaṃsa reads *vivitta* and not *vivecana*. This is the reading also in *Kaccāyana* (128) and the *vutti* (130). Why Aggavaṃsa has changed it, I am not able to tell. I can see no source for the two usages dealt with here apart from *Kaccāyana*. The wording of the *vivitthatthe* section is identical with the one in the *Kaccāyanavutti*, while the *pamāṇa* one presents slight variations in readings, such as the addition of *sugatasāṅghāṭi* after *kāretabbā*. Most notably, the mention of an instrumental usage is not met with in *Kaccāyana* and is therefore probably Aggavaṃsa’s own observation.

2.7.16.10 *pubbādiyoga*

(707,20–25) *Pubbādiyoge: paṭhamatthavācakena pubbasaddena yogo pubbayogo, ettha pubbādigahaṇaṃ adisatthavuttīnaṃ pubbādīnaṃ gahaṇattham, tathā hi visum disāyogo gahito: “pubbe va me bhikkhave sambodhā”*,² “*ito pubbe nāhosī*”³

¹ The context (Vin III 149,12; IV 279,11) says: ‘[a monk is having a hut (*koṭi*)] made which is to be constructed (*kāritabbā*) with the [proper] measure (*pamāṇikā*, Buddhaghosa *ad loc.*: *pamāṇayuttā*): in length nine *viddhatīs* ...’. Aggavaṃsa seems, oddly, to have taken one sentence and added the words *pamāṇikā kāritabbā* from a previous one. There is no way of telling that *ā* is feminine without the word *koṭi*.

² A I 258,24.

³ Smith: cf. Sn 955a.

“*tato param paccantimā janapadā*”,¹ *tato aparena samayena, tato uttari*² *icc evamādi*.

Also when there is construction with *pubba* etc. [The compound] *pubbayoga* [means] construction (*yoga*) with the word *pubba* expressing the sense of *paṭhama* ‘previous; first; prior to’, [and] in this respect the mention of *pubbādi* serves the purpose of mentioning words such as *pubba* which function in a non-directional sense, for thus construction with *disā* has been mentioned separately³: ‘Before my enlightenment, monks’; ‘prior to this it did not exist’; ‘beyond that are the border countries’; ‘in the course of time from then (= later on)’; ‘more than that’, and so on in the same manner.

This is met with in *Kaccāyana* but only the first example occurs in the *vutti*. I am not aware of any direct parallel in Sanskrit sources, but the fact that Aggavaṃsa here distinguishes this usage of *pubba* in the sense of ‘prior to’ from the meaning ‘east’, which would fall under *disāyoga*, brings us back to A 2.3.29 *anyārāditartedikṣabdāñcūttarapadājāhiyukte*. Immediately after *dikṣabda* ‘words denoting directions’ we find *añcūttarapada* ‘[compounds] with *-añc* as the final member’. Clearly this is not what Aggavaṃsa is talking about, but it may nevertheless be worthwhile to consider the following remark on this in the *Mahābhāṣya*, which in fact is all Patañjali has to say on the entire rule (Mbh I:456,7–8):

¹ Vin I 197,22; Sv I 173,11.

² Smith reads *uttari*<ṃ> and indicates that this is a quotation from Vin IV 80,18. Vin IV 80,18, however, reads: *tato ce uttari paṭiganheyya*, ‘if he (a monk) were to accept more [food] than that ...’.

³ cf. 2.7.16.4 above.

añcūttarapadagrahaṇam kim arthaṃ na dikṣabdair yoga ity eva siddham | ṣaṣṭhy atasarthapratyayena [2.3.30] iti vakṣyati tasyāyaṃ purastād apakarṣaḥ ||

What is the point in mentioning *añcūttarapada* ‘[compounds] with *-añc* as the final member’? Is this not in fact established by *dikṣabdair yoge* ‘when there is construction with words denoting directions’? [No.] He (= Pāṇini) is going to state [rule 2.3.30] *ṣaṣṭhy atasarthapratyayena* ‘a sixth [case suffix is added to a nominal stem] co-occurring with [another stem ending in] a suffix with the sense of *atasUC* (A 5.3.28)’. This [statement, namely, *añcūttarapada*] is a prior removal¹ of that [rule].

Since many words ending in *-añc* denote direction, Patañjali asks if we cannot manage by the expression *dikṣabda* alone. The answer is negative in as much as the subsequent rule A 2.3.30 accounts for the fact that words ending in suffixes with the sense of *atasUC*, for example *prāk* or *dakṣiṇataḥ*, are constructed with words taking a genitive ending: *dakṣinato grāmasya* ‘south of the village’. Kaiyaṭa makes a relevant point in his commentary on the above passage from the *Bhāṣya* (MbhP II:800):

atha sadhryaṅ devadattenety adikṣabdārtham añcūttarapadagrahaṇam kasmān na vijñāyate? ucyate — dikṣabdāsāhacaryād añcūttarapadasyāpi dikṣabdasyaiva grahaṇam nānyasya ||

Now, why is it not recognised that the mention of *añcūttarapada* is for the sake of [words] which are not direction-denoting words, as in *sadhryaṅ devadattena* ‘together

¹ Lit. ‘a drawing away; removal’. There is a *v.l.* *apavādaḥ* ‘exception’.

with Devadatta' ? It is replied that because of its association with [the word] direction-denoting words, one understands *añcūttarapada* words as well, only if they are direction-denoting words and not other.

Could it be that a mere awareness that words which also have senses other than 'direction' have been dealt with under a separate heading made Kaccāyana include *pubbayoga* separately and that then Aggavaṃsa, using his skills and his knowledge of the canon, elaborated on this by inserting an *ādi* 'etc.' and adducing several more examples ?

2.7.16.11 *bandhanatthappayoga*

(707,25–27) *Bandhanatthappayoge bandhanahetumhi iṇe: satasmā baddho naro raññā; tatiyā ca: satena baddho naro raññā icc evamādi.*

When there is usage in the sense of *bandhana* 'binding; imprisonment', [that is,] when there is debt which is the cause (*hetu*) of imprisonment: 'Because of a hundred [pieces] the man was imprisoned by the king'. Also the third [case suffix is used]: 'Through [debt of] a hundred the man was imprisoned by the king', and so on in the same manner.

This is A 2.3.24 *akartary rṇe pañcamī*. As mentioned above (2.7.16.8), this rule teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23) but not as an agent. It is obvious that Aggavaṃsa has merely elaborated on the standard examples known from the Sanskrit tradition, such as *śatād baddhaḥ*, 'imprisoned because of [a debt of] a hundred'. With slightly less elaborate examples Kaccāyana (130) states in a similar fashion: *satasmā bandho naro* and *tatiyā ca: satena vā bandho*. This is a clear example of how cautious one must be in assuming that what we read in

Kaccāyana and the *Saddanīti* is genuine Pāli usage. Not only have the rule and the examples been taken over from the Sanskrit tradition, the rule has also been distorted. The word *akartari* in the rule serves the purpose of contrasting the ablative usage against the instrumental: *śatena bandhitaḥ*, 'thrown into prison because of [a debt of] a hundred'. This usage implies that the debt has thrown the man into prison and accordingly is to be considered an agent. The usage of the instrumental would thus have nothing to do with the *apādāna* on the view of the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.16.12 *guṇavacana*

(707,27–708,1) *Guṇavacane: paññāya vimuttimano,¹ issariyā[ya]² janam rakkhati rājā, silato nam pasamsanti.*

When there is expression of a property: 'With his mind set on release because of [the fact that he has] wisdom'; 'because of [his] being the lord, the king protects the people'; 'they praise him because of [his] virtuous conduct'.

Again, Aggavaṃsa follows the order in *Kaccāyana*. This brings us back to A 2.3.25 *vibhāṣā guṇe 'striyām*, mentioned above (2.7.16.8). This rule allows for the optional — or, following Kiparsky (1979), marginal — addition of a fifth case suffix (A 2.3.24) to a nominal stem that denotes a cause (A 2.3.23) and expresses an attribute or property (*guṇa*), except in the feminine. According to Pāṇini, then, this applies to non-feminine abstract nouns. The *Kāśikā* offers the example *jādyād baddhaḥ*, 'imprisoned because of stupidity', as against *dhanena kulam* where the instrumental is used since the stem does not denote a property, and *prajñayā muktaḥ*, 'released by knowledge', where choice is restricted to the instrumental since the feminine gender is involved. This,

¹ Kacc-v *vimutta*°.

² Bem ns *issariyāya*; Ce Kacc-v *issariyā*.

however, does not prevent Aggavaṃsa from adducing the example *paññāya vimuttimano* which contains the very same feminine noun *paññā*. Whether one ought to conclude from this that in Pāli, as indeed in classical Sanskrit, there is no such restriction, or that Aggavaṃsa and Kaccāyana before him simply had not fully understood their Sanskrit sources is hard to tell.

Of more interest is the odd fact that under the heading *hetuattha* (2.7.16.8, above) Aggavaṃsa seems to deal very strictly with *hetu*, the sole exception possibly being *saddhāya*, whereas under *guṇavacana* he includes all other causal ablatives. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* they go together: optionally or marginally one adds an ablative case suffix to a stem expressing a *hetu* when there is a *guṇa*. The principle according to which Aggavaṃsa has selected his examples seems also a bit dubious. He has a thousand examples of ablatives in Pāli, but takes some and says they are ablatives because he is dealing with properties. In other words, he forces the map on to the terrain, the map being given by the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.16.13 *pañhakathana*

(708,1–15) *Pañhakathanesu: kuto 'si tvaṃ, kuto bhavaṃ — Pāṭaliputtato; ettha ca kathanaṃ nāma vissajjanaṃ, yaṃ pana Kaccāyanappakaraṇe pañhe tvālope kammādhikaraṇesū ti ārabhitvā abhidhammaṃ sutvā abhidhammā pucchanti abhidhammaṃ abhidhammena vā, vinayaṃ sutvā vinayā pucchanti vinayaṃ vinayena vā, evaṃ suttā geyyā veyyākaraṇā gāthāya udānā itivuttakā jātakā abbhutadhammā vedallā icc evamādi ti ca vuttam, tathā kathane tvālope kammādhikaraṇesū ti ārabhitvā abhidhammaṃ sutvā abhidhammā kathayanti abhidhammaṃ abhidhammena vā, vinayaṃ sutvā vinayā kathayanti vinayaṃ vinayena vā, evaṃ suttā geyyā veyyākaraṇā gāthāya icc evamādi ti ca vuttam, tam tvālope yeva vattabbaṃ,*

pañhe ti ca kathane ti ca tvāloparahitappayogavasena visuṃ vattabbaṃ idha pana visuṃ vuttam.

In the case of questions and answers: ‘From where [have] you [come]?’ ‘From Pāṭaliputra.’ And in this respect [the word] *kathana* ‘telling’ [does] in fact [mean] ‘answer’. But since in the *Kaccāyanappakaraṇa* — after it is first stated that ‘when there is elision of [the absolutive-suffix] *-tvā* in a question [the fifth case suffix applies] to express the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]’ — it has been stated that ‘having listened to Abhidhamma, he asks from Abhidhamma (ablative), or about Abhidhamma (accusative), or by way of Abhidhamma (instrumental); having listened to Vinaya, he asks from Vinaya (ablative), or about Vinaya (accusative), or by way of Vinaya (instrumental); likewise, from Sutta, from Geyya, from Veyyākaraṇa, from Gāthā, from Udāna, from Itivuttaka, from Jātaka, from Abbhutadhamma, [and] from Vedalla,¹ and so on in the same manner’; likewise — after it is first stated that ‘when there is elision of *-tvā* in an answer, [the fifth case suffix applies] to express the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]’ — it has also been stated that ‘having listened to Abhidhamma, he answers from Abhidhamma (ablative), or about Abhidhamma (accusative), or by way of Abhidhamma (instrumental); having listened to Vinaya, he answers from Vinaya (ablative), or about Vinaya (accusative), or by way of Vinaya (instrumental); likewise, from Sutta, from Geyya, from Veyyākaraṇa, from Gāthā, and so on in the same manner’, then one should only state *tvālope* ‘when there is elision of *-tvā*’, and *pañhe* ‘when there is a question’ and *kathane* ‘when there is an answer’ should be stated

¹ i.e., the nine divisions of canonical scriptures.

separately by force of usage free from the elision of *-tvā*; but here [in the *Saddanīti*] it is stated separately.

Aggavaṃsa here accuses Kaccāyana of having muddled things up by introducing the issue of *tvālope*, elision of *-tvā*, where it does not belong, that is, by stating *pañhe tvālope* and *kathane tvālope* in the *vutti* under the heading *pañhakathana* from the rule. This criticism may be just, but it is easy to see how Kaccāyana's reasoning came about. First of all, Kaccāyana has already dealt with *tvālopa* separately, so the formulation of Aggavaṃsa's criticism is not entirely accurate. Moreover, the fact that Kaccāyana reintroduces it in the context of ablatives in questions and answers is, as will be clear in a moment, fully logical although it rests on a misconception of what sort of questions and answers we are meant to be dealing with.

The whole *pañhakathana* issue has its basis in the third *vārttika* on A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī*. Kaccāyana and, following him, Aggavaṃsa have previously dealt with the fourth and then the first and the second *vārttikas*.¹ Why these appear in such a random order is hard to say. Now, the third *vārttika* on this rule states (Mbh I:455,9): *praśnākhyanayoś ca*, 'also when there is a question or an answer'. Patañjali remarks (455,10): *praśnākhyanayoś ca pañcamī vaktavyā // kuto bhavān / pāṭaliputrāt*, 'the fifth [case suffix] should be taught also in the case of a question or an answer: "From where [have] you [come] ? From Pāṭaliputra"'. Patañjali later rejects this *vārttika*, as we have already seen him do with the others.

Turning, then, to the criticism levelled against Kaccāyana, let us first of all consider a statement from Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* here (MbhP II:798): *kuto bhavān iti / kriyāyā abhāvād anapādānatvaṃ manyate*, '[with regard to the example] *kuto bhavān*, "from where [have] you [come] ?", [the author of the *vārttika*] thinks that because there is no [verb denoting an] action [here] there is no property

¹ cf. 2.7.16.2 and 3 above.

of being the *apādāna* [either]'. So, because a verb denoting an action is lacking, these instances of question and answer cannot be accounted for by A 2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī* since the *apādāna* definition (A 2.3.24) contains the requirement *apāye* 'when there is movement away'. This, according to Kaiyaṭa, is why Kātyāyana has formulated the *vārttika*. This also implies that in order to do away with the *vārttika* all that is needed is to imagine that a verbal form has been elided. Patañjali does this by means of assuming the elision of a finite verb (Mbh I:455,22–23): *idam atra prayoktavyaṃ san na prayujyate kuto bhavān āgacchati pāṭaliputrād āgacchāmīti*, 'here that which should have been used is not used: "From where do you come ?" "I come from Pāṭaliputra" [would be the complete statement]'.¹

Instead of using a finite verb Kaccāyana solves his problem by supplying an absolutive form.¹ It may in fact be the case that Kaccāyana has really understood Kātyāyana's intention with regard to these *vārttikas*. The problem is that Kaccāyana tries to account for a usage of the ablative in a completely different type of question and answer, such as *abhidhammā pucchanti* 'they ask from (about) Abhidhamma'. But if he wants to use the idea of the *vārttika* to account for this, and to explain the construction as one where a verbal form has been elided, it seems to me perfectly logical that he supplies an absolutive form: *abhidhammaṃ sutvā abhidhammā pucchanti*, 'having listened to Abhidhamma, he asks from (about) Abhidhamma'.

To sum this up, although Kaccāyana has failed to account for the type of question and answer intended by the author of the *vārttika*, he has tried to account for a type of question and answer where usage of the ablative, as well as the accusative and instrumental, occurs. It may even be dubious whether the ablative forms in his examples could be said to express the *apādāna*. The *Mahābhāṣya* passage is quoted verbatim in the

¹ In his edition Senart gives *sutvā* and *ākadhītvā* only as variant readings. Aggavaṃsa quotes *Kaccāyana* with the absolutive *sutvā*. Whether absolutive forms are actually stated or not does not make much difference since their inclusion is obviously Kaccāyana's idea anyway.

Kāśikā where the *vārttika* is not rejected. The example *kuto bhavān* etc. occurs in the *Saddanīti* but not in *Kaccāyana*, so Aggavaṃsa has most likely taken it over from some Sanskrit source and fashioned a similar example himself. This leaves us with a peculiar situation where *Kaccāyana* has made an attempt to account for a grammatical feature in the Pāli language by means inherited from the Sanskrit grammarians, whereas Aggavaṃsa, although he may in one sense be on firm ground in his criticism of *Kaccāyana*, has merely taken over a rule and an example from the Sanskrit and not adduced or explained anything that has to do with Pāli at all.

2.7.16.14 *thokatthādi (thokakicchakatipaya)*

(708,15–21) *Thokatthādisu appatthavacane pañcamī tatiyā ca; yadā hi dhammamattam adhippetam na dabbam, tadā thokādīnam asatvavacanatā, yadā pana thokena visena mato ti ādinā dabbam adhippetam, tadā tesam satvavacanatā: thokā muccati, appamattakā muccati, “kicchā laddho piyo putto”,¹ katipayā mutto, thokena appamattakena kicchena katipayena, icc evamādi.*

When there are the senses of *thoka* ‘a little’, etc., the fifth [case suffix] and also the third [apply] to express the sense of *alpa* ‘a little’. For when a quality alone is intended, not substance, then the property of denoting a non-substance pertains to *thoka* etc., but when a substance is intended by such a sentence as ‘killed from a little poison’, then the property of denoting a substance pertains to these [words]: ‘Is released easily’; ‘is released by a mere trifle’; ‘[our] dear son, obtained with difficulty’; ‘got off narrowly’; [or with instrumental case endings:] easily, with a

mere trifle, with difficulty, narrowly, and so on in the same manner.

This is based on A 2.3.33 *karāṇe ca stokālpakṛcchra-katipayasyāsattvavacanasya* which teaches that to the stems *stoka* ‘a little’, *alpa* ‘a little’, *kṛcchra* ‘difficult’, and *katipaya* ‘some’ when they do not denote a substance, the third case suffix is optionally (A 2.3.32 *prthagvinānānābhis tṛtīyānyatarasyām*) added as well as the fifth (A 2.3.28) when it expresses the *kāraka karāṇa* ‘instrument’. The rule occurs also in the *Candrvyākaraṇa* (2.1.87): *stokālpakṛcchrakatipayād asattvārthāt karāṇe*. Aggavaṃsa has obviously borrowed from the *Kāśikā* here (Kāś II:190): *yadā tu dharmamātram karanatayā vivakṣyate na dravyam, tadā stokādīnām asattvavacanatā*, ‘but when there is a wish to express a mere quality and not a substance through the property of being the instrument, then the property of expressing a non-substance pertains to *stoka* etc.’. This is followed by the examples *stokān muktaḥ, stokena muktaḥ*, ‘released easily’, etc. With regard to the requirement that these words be *asattvavacana* ‘expressing a non-substance’ for the third and the fifth to express the *karāṇa*, the *Kāśikā* offers the example *stokena viṣeṇa hataḥ*, ‘killed by a little poison’. Here only the instrumental case is applicable. Aggavaṃsa has borrowed the example, but failed to understand its implication. He has also failed to take in the fact that the rule concerns the words mentioned when the fifth or the third case suffixes express the *kāraka karāṇa* and not the *apādāna*. Aggavaṃsa instead formulates the requirement that when there are the senses of *thoka* etc., the fifth case suffix as well as the third apply to express the sense of *alpa*. This does not exactly betray any deep understanding of what is at stake for the Sanskrit grammarians, nor does it convincingly account for anything genuinely characteristic of the Pāli language.

¹ Ja VI 87,15 and 19.

2.7.16.15 *akattari*

(708,21–23) *Akattari akārake nāpake hetumhi: katattā upacitattā ussannattā vipulattā uppannaṃ hoti cakkhuvīññāṇaṃ¹ icc evamādi.*

[A fifth case suffix is added] provided [it is] not expressing the agent, [that is,] provided [it is] not expressing a *kāra*, being [merely] something which serves to indicate, when [it is] expressing a *hetu* ‘cause’: ‘Visual cognition comes into being from the fact that [something (*kamma* ?)] is performed, heaped up, lofty, and extensive’, and so on in the same manner.

This is obscure, and I am not fully confident of my translation here. *Kaccāyana* has only the word *akattari* followed by the same example. *Aggavaṃsa* follows suit, but adds a few words with a morphology and a syntax which are not immediately clear. I am inclined to believe, however, that *Kaccāyana* felt he was left with ablatives of cause he has to account for and a bit of a Pāṇini rule, namely A 2.3.24 *akartary ṛṇe pañcamī*. As mentioned before, this rule teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23 *hetau*) but not as an agent.² Indeed, *Kaccāyana* is not talking about debts here, but he could easily have taken over the non-agency requirement and the implied *hetau* ‘when it expresses a cause’, which one necessarily has to read also into his own rule. It seems to me, then, that *Kaccāyana* and after him *Aggavaṃsa* must have reasoned something like this: We find usages of the ablative where it expresses a cause; but where it merely gives us an indication, there the cause does not participate as an agent in bringing something about and so the case suffix cannot be added to express a *kāra*. It serves merely to explain that there

¹ Indicating this example as a quotation, Smith adds the following note: *cf.* (D III 146,1 +) Vibh 297,28 Dhs § 556.

² *cf.* 2.7.16.8 and 11 above.

are things which seem to have no direct cause but still come into being and that is indicated by the things which act as causes. There is no question of something being a *kāra* or an agent, but rather of explaining that something comes into being. The framework provided by A 2.3.23–24 could easily be taken over to account for this.

Obviously *Aggavaṃsa* did not think the single word *akattari* made the picture sufficiently clear. To improve on this he heaps up certain key-words. The word *hetumhi* certainly refers to A 2.3.23 *hetau*. The words *akāra* and *jñāpake* are strongly reminiscent of the vocabulary used by *Helārāja* in discussing the *hetu* and the difference between *hetu*, *kāra*, and *lakṣaṇa*. *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.24ab defines the *hetu*: *anāsrīte tu vyāpāre nimittam hetur iṣyate*, ‘the final cause (*nimitta*) which is independent of [any particular] operation is accepted as the *hetu*’. In his commentary on this verse, *Helārāja* twice¹ uses the word *akāravibhakti* ‘a case ending which does not express a *kāra*’. This is in any case how I think the word *akāra* in the *Saddanīti* passage should be understood. The words *jñāpaka* and *jñāpakatva* each occur twice,² and *Helārāja*’s commentary on this verse ends (Hel 255,11): *svarūpabhedena kriyānirvartakam kārakam, sāmānyena janako hetuḥ, jñāpake lakṣaṇam iti*, ‘a *kāra* is that which brings about an action by taking on different forms, that which is a progenitor in general is the *hetu*, [and] when it [merely] serves as an indicator (*jñāpaka*) it is a sign (*lakṣaṇa*)’. The word *jñāpaka* ‘something which serves to indicate’ is a technical term in *vyākaraṇa*. Based on supposed implications which result from internal analysis of the rules of grammar, a *jñāpaka* is a structural argument through which a valid interpretation can be inferred and justified. In other words, when seemingly conflicting features occur in the grammar, one should look for some other feature which indicates the valid interpretation on the basis of consistency and a unified system. I am not sure that the technical *jñāpaka* is all that relevant here; the question of *lakṣaṇa*, *hetu* etc. has to do with interpreting A 1.4.84 etc. All I want to point out is the

¹ Hel 250,22; 251,2.

² Hel 251,8; 255,11 and 251,16; 253,1, respectively.

similarity in vocabulary between the *Saddanīti* here and Helārāja. Of course I do not claim that Aggavaṃsa has necessarily taken his words directly from Helārāja, I only try to illustrate that these words occur frequently in discussions of issues similar to those which Aggavaṃsa tries to raise.

2.7.16.16 Final remarks on the *apādāna*

(708,23–709,18) *Ādisaddena ye amhehi anupadiṭṭhā apādānapayogā, te payogavicakkhaṇehi yojetabbā. Idāni tesam apādānānaṃ kāyasaññogapubbakādivasena pabhedam kathayāma: gāmā apenti munayo ti ādisu hi kāyasaññogapubbakassa apagamanassa vijjamānattā gāmādi apādānaṃ kāyasaññogapubbakam nāma, pāṇātipātā viramatī ti ādisu pana cittasaññogapubbakassa apagamanassa vijjamānattā pāṇātipātādi apādānaṃ cittasaññogapubbakam nāma; tathā dhāvataḥ hatthimhā patito amkusaggaho ti ādisu hatthiādi apādānaṃ calamariyādabhūtattā calāvadhi nāma calañ ca taṃ avadhi cā ti atthena, pabbatā otaranti vanacarā ti ādisu pabbatādi apādānaṃ niccalamariyādabhūtattā niccalāvadhi nāma niccalañ ca taṃ avadhi cā ti atthena, imehi dvīhi pakārehi vinimuttam buddhasmā pati Sāriputto, “kāmato jāyate bhayan”¹ ti ca ādisu buddhādi apādānaṃ n’evacalāvadhiniccālāvadhi² nāma avadhibhāvena agahetabbattā, evam apādānaṃ duvidham tividhañ ca bhavati. Puna taṃ tividhañ ca niddiṭṭhavisayādivasena; tattha gāmā apagacchatī ti ādi niddiṭṭhavisayaṃ nāma apādānavisayassa*

¹ Dh 215b.

² Smith gives the text here as *n’eva calāvadhi na niccalāvadhi*, but compare this with 701,24–25 where he gives the three divisions as *calāvadhiniccālāvadhinevacalāvadhiniccālāvadhivasena* as a syntactic compound. If in the present passage we are not dealing with a compound, there are no problems, but the whole parallelism with the preceding would be lost.

kiriyaṅvisesassa niddiṭṭhattā; kusūlato pacati, abhidhammā kathayati, valāhakā vijjotati ti upattavisayaṃ nāma, valāhakā niggamma vijjotati ti ādinā upādeyyo ettha kiriyāviseso; Mādhurā Pāṭaliputtakehi abhirūpatarā ti anumeyyavisayaṃ nāma, Mādhurā Pāṭaliputtakehi ukkaṃsiyanti kenaci guṇenā ti anumeyyo ettha kiriyāviseso, upattavisayo viya na niyato kocī ti ayam assa upattavisayato bhedo ti.

By the word *ādi* ‘etc.’ [is everywhere indicated] that those usages of the *apādāna* which have not been taught by us should be included by people who are skilled in usage. Now, among these *apādānas* we proclaim a division according to [whether the going away] is preceded by physical contact, etc.¹ For in such [sentences] as ‘the sages go away from the village’ such an *apādāna* as the village is indeed preceded by physical contact since the moving away is found to be preceded by physical contact. But in such [sentences] as ‘he abstains from killing living creatures’ such an *apādāna* as shooting living creatures is indeed preceded by mental contact since the moving away is found to be preceded by mental contact. Likewise, in [sentences] such as ‘the elephant-driver has fallen from the running elephant’ such an *apādāna* as the elephant is indeed the moving starting point since it appears as an exclusive limit which is moving, in accordance with [its] meaning [as a *karmadhāraya* compound]: ‘it is moving and it is a starting point’. In such [sentences] as ‘the forest-dwellers come down from the mountain’ such an *apādāna* as the mountain is indeed the non-moving starting point since it appears as a non-moving exclusive limit, in accordance with [its] meaning [as a *karmadhāraya* compound]: ‘it is non-moving and it is a starting point’. Not included under these two categories is an *apādāna*

¹ cf. 701,23 foll., 2.7 above.

such as the Buddha in [sentences] such as ‘Sāriputta [taught the doctrine] as proxy of the Buddha’ and ‘fear arises from love’ which is indeed [the *apādāna*] where the starting point is neither exclusively moving nor non-moving because of the fact that it cannot be grasped as a starting point. Thus the *apādāna* is of two kinds and of three kinds. But it is also of three kinds according to whether the scope (i.e., the moving away) is directly stated, etc. In this respect, such [a sentence] as ‘he moves away from the village’ has indeed the scope (i.e., the moving away) directly stated because of the fact that a specific action which has the [particular] scope of the *apādāna* [namely, moving away,] is directly stated. [In such sentences as] ‘he cooks from the granary’, ‘he asks from (about) Abhidhamma’, [and] ‘the lightning flashes from the cloud’ it is indeed the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) is comprised. In this case a specific action must be comprised through such [a statement] as ‘having gone forth from the cloud the lightning flashes’. [In such a sentence as] ‘the people of Mathurā are more handsome than those of Pāṭaliputra’ it is indeed the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) has to be inferred. In this case a specific action must be inferred [through such a statement] that ‘by some quality the people of Mathurā are elevated (*ukkamsīyanti*) from those of Pāṭaliputra’; nothing is specified as in the case of the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) is comprised, [and] that is where this one differs from the one where the scope is comprised.

In these last remarks on the *apādāna* Aggavaṃsa first of all covers himself by pointing out that the word *ādi* ‘etc.’, so frequently resorted to, serves to indicate usages of the *apādāna* which he may have omitted but which should be included by people who know of such usages. To look for unknown usage is a sound principle in linguistics, explicitly resorted to by Patañjali among others. But to talk of usages of

the *apādāna* again betrays and indeed epitomizes the fact that he does not discern between the *kāraka apādāna* and the ablative case suffix.

The rest of the passage is devoted to repeating the various classifications of the *apādāna* and to fulfilling the promise he gave at the beginning that he was going to explain all these subdivisions one by one below (*tam sabbam pabhedam upari ekato pakāsessāma*). He has not mentioned them in the meantime, and although he gives some adequate examples one may wonder where he would fit in a lot of the material he has discussed in the meantime. The categories he makes fall in three groups: The first according to whether the *apādāna* has been preceded by physical or by mental contact (*kāyasamyogapubbaka* and *cittasamyogapubbaka*), the second according to whether the starting point is moving, non-moving, or neither exclusively moving nor non-moving (*calāvadhi*, *niccalāvadhi*, and *nevacalāvadhinicalāvadhi*), and the third according to whether the scope, the moving away, is directly stated, is comprised, or has to be inferred (*niddiṭṭhavisaya*, *uppattivisaya*, and *anumeyyavisaya*). These divisions and their possible origins have been discussed above (2.7), so I shall not repeat myself here.

2.8 The location: *okāsa (adhikaraṇa)*

572 *Yo ādhāro tam okāsam. Yo kattukammasamavetanam nisajjapacanaṅṅādikiriyānaṃ ādhārakaṅṅāthena ādhāro, tam kārakaṃ okāsasaṅṅānaṃ hoti. Bhuso kiriyāṃ dhāretī ti ādhāro, so eva tāsam kiriyānaṃ patīṭṭhānaṅṅāthena okāsattā okāsam nāmā ti vuccatī, tathā hi kaṅṅe nisīdatī Devadatto ti ettha kaṅṅo Devadattaṃ dhārento taṃsamavetaṃ āsanakiriyāṃ dhāretī, thāliyaṃ odanaṃ pacatī ti ettha thāli taṅṅulaṃ dhārentī¹ taṃsamavetaṃ pi pacanakiriyāṃ dhāretī. Yajj evaṃ kattukammānaṃ eva padhānavasena kiriyādhārasambhavato tesam eva okāsasaṅṅāya bhavitabban ti. Na bhavitabbaṃ.*

¹ Ce Be ns *dhārayantī*.

Kasmā. Paṭiladdhavisesanā mattā, tasmā paramparāya pi kiriyādhāraṃ kaṭādikam yeva okāsaññam labhatī ti avagantabbam. So 'yam okāso catubbidho: vyāpiko opasilesiko sāmīpiko vesayiko ti. Tattha vyāpiko nāma sakalo pi ādhārabhūto attho ādheyyena patthaṭo hoti, taṃ yathā: tilesu telaṃ, ucchusu raso, dadhimhi sappī ti; opasilesiko nāma paccekasiddhānam bhāvānam yattha opasilesu upagamo hoti, taṃ yathā: kaṭe nisīdatī ti; sāmīpiko nāma yattha samīpe sāmīpikavohāraṃ katvā ādhārabhāvo vikappīyati, taṃ yathā: "Sāvattiyam viharatī",¹ Gaṅgāyam vajo ti. Patañjalīnā² pi vuttaṃ³: catūhi pakārehi atattha so ti bhavati, katthaci taṃ ṭhānavasena: mañcā ukkuṭṭhiṃ karontī ti, katthaci samīpasena: Gaṅgāyam ghoso, Kurusu vasatī ti, katthaci taṃsahacarabhāvena: yaṭṭhi pavesaya, kunte pavesayā ti, katthaci taṃ kiriyācaraṇena: Abrahmadatte Brahmaddatto 'yam iti; vesayiko nāma yattha aññatthābhāvavasena desantarāvacchedavasena vā ādhāraparikappo, taṃ yathā: bhūmisu manussā jalesu macchā ākāse sakuṇā ti. Sabbo pi cāyam padhānavasena vā patikappitavasena vā kiriyāya patitṭhā bhavati ti okāso ti vutto. Yam pan' ettha vuttaṃ kattukammasamavetanāṃ kiriyānam ādhāro ti, taṃ bhīyyo khaggamhi obhāso ti ettha katham yujjati ti ce. Yujjat' eva; yathā hi bhūmisu manussā ti etasmim payoge vasantī ti kattusamavetaṃ vasanakiriyā avijjamānā pi vacanasesanayena āharitabbā hoti, evam etaṃ⁴ bhīyyo khaggamhi obhāso ti etthā pi ahoṣi ti kattusamavetaṃ kiriyā avijjamānā pi vacanasesanayena āharitabbā va hoti, loke hi katthaci katthaci vohāraviseya sesam katvā vācam bhaṇati;

¹ A I 1,1, etc.

² Smith reads *Pātañjalīnā* indicating that this is the reading met with Ce Bm ns. I do not find this reading convincing, though, particularly since the correct *vṛddhi* form of the name would be *pātañjala*. I have therefore emended to *patañjalīnā*.

³ cf. Mbh II:218,14–19; cf. also Mbh I:332,1–3.

⁴ Smith: *ita* Ce Be; ns *evam esā*; Bm *evam eta > evam eva* ?

tathā hi koci ekam gehe patiyattaṃ khīraṃ pāyetukāmo tvam geham pavisa, pavisitvā khīraṃ pivā ti vattabbe vacanasesam katvā pavisa khīraṃ ti āha, sāsane pi dissati "yesam ayyānam sūciyā attho, aham sūciyā"¹ ti ca yassa pañhena attho, so mam pañhena aham veyyākaraṇenā ti; tasmā ettha samsayo na kātabbo.

‘That which is the support [in time and space], that [*kāra*] is the *okāsa*.’ That which is the support (*ādhāra*), in the sense of that which is a supporter (*ādhāra*) of actions such as sitting down or cooking which are inherent in the agent or the object, that *kāra* is something to which the technical name *okāsa* applies. ‘Strongly (*bhuso* = *ā*)² it supports (*dhāreti*) the action’, thus [it is called] *ādhāra*, [and] that very [*ādhāra*] is called the *okāsa* ‘occasion’ because it actually is an occasion [where something happens] in the sense of support of these actions, thus it is stated. For thus, with regard to [the sentence] ‘Devadatta sits down on the mat’, the mat supporting Devadatta supports the action of sitting which is inherent in him, [and] with regard to [the sentence] ‘he cooks rice in the pot’, the pot supporting the rice supports the action of cooking which is also inherent in it (= the rice). If so, since the possibility of supporting the action [exists] in a primary way only for the agent and the object, the name *okāsa* should be applied only to these ? It should not be applied [only to these]. Why ? Because

¹ Smith: *vide* Vin IV 167,4 (*cf. supra* 344 note f).

² The word *bhuso* is a problem. One thing is certain, namely that it is part of a *nirvacana*, semantic analysis, where it explains the preverb *ā* of *ādhāra*. This is clear from the *Saddanīti* itself: *aggho ti c' ettha āsaddo bhusatthe upasagga-padam* (689,26–27), and *ākāro pana rasso hoti, ā bhuso caritabban ti accharam* (861,20–21). This implies that it ought to be an adverb, but it looks like a nominative adjective. I have taken it to be the equivalent of Skt *bhrśa* ‘strong; powerful’. One could explain it as *bhusaso* with a syllable lost, but this is not very convincing.

it is being used in a technical sense. Therefore, although indirectly, the mat etc. which is something that supports is indeed something with regard to which the technical name *okāsa* obtains; thus it should be understood. This *okāsa* is of four kinds: *vyāpika* ‘pervading; in absolute contact’, *opasilesika* ‘caused by [close] contact’, *sāmīpika* ‘caused by nearness’, [and] *vesayika* ‘belonging to a [particular] domain’. In this respect, *vyāpika* is indeed [where] the whole thing which is the support is coterminal with the thing to be supported, as in ‘the oil [is] in the sesame seeds’, ‘the juice is in the sugar cane’, ‘the butter is in the curds’; *opasilesika* is indeed where there is contact, that is, going near, of entities which are established individually, as in ‘he sits on the mat’; *sāmīpika* is indeed where, making up this term *sāmīpika* in the sense of *samīpa* ‘near; nearness’, the state of being the support is imagined, as in ‘he dwells in (= in the vicinity of) Sāvatti’, ‘a cattle-fold on (= in the vicinity of) the Gaṅgā’. It has been stated also by Patañjali: In four different ways does [this word] *so* ‘this; that’ apply to something which is not that: [1] sometimes by force of [the relation of] standing in it, as in ‘the cots/benches are making a cry’; [2] sometimes by force of [the relation of] nearness, as in ‘the cow-shed is on (= in the vicinity of) the Gaṅgā’, ‘he dwells among (= in the vicinity of) the Kurus’; [3] sometimes through the condition of association with it, as in ‘fetch the sticks, fetch the spears’¹; [4] sometimes by doing the actions of it, as in the case of someone who is not Brahmadaṭṭa ‘this is Brahmadaṭṭa’²;

¹ I take *kunta* to mean ‘spear; lance’, not ‘bird’ as in PED. Here the sticks and spears are used to indicate those who carry them.

² There are several discrepancies between this passage and Mbh II:218,14–19. By way of example, instead of *Kurusu vasati* Patañjali offers the example *kūpe gargakulam*, ‘the Garga family lives on the well’, for *taṃkiriyačaraṇena* Patañjali has *tāddharmyāt* ‘by the relation of the quality of it’ and offers a slightly more subtle example: *jaṭī brahmadattaḥ* ‘the man with the matted hair is Brahmadaṭṭa’, meaning that he is like Brahmadaṭṭa and worthy of the same

vesayiko is indeed where there is imagination of a location, either by force of the condition of not existing elsewhere, or by force of being cut off from another region, as in ‘human beings are [located] on the earth’, ‘fish are [located] in the water’, ‘birds are [located] in space’. Nevertheless, all this is said to be *okāsa*, because there is support of an action either by force of its being primary or by force of its being imagined. But since in this respect it has been stated that it is the support of actions that are inherent in the agent or the object, then how does that obtain in the case of [a sentence such as] ‘more splendour in a sword’? It does indeed obtain. For just as in the usage ‘human beings are on the earth’ the action of dwelling, even though it is not met with [in the statement], is to be taken according to the convention that the rest of a statement [is to be supplied] as inherent in the agent [of the verb] *vasanti* ‘are dwelling’, likewise [in] this [statement] ‘more splendour in a sword’ here too¹ the action inherent in the agent [of the verb] *ahosi* ‘was’, even though it is not met with, is to be taken according to the convention that the rest of the statement [is to be supplied]. For here in this world, in whatsoever domain of usage, one utters

treatment. The well-known example is *siṃho mānavakaḥ*, ‘the boy is a lion’. G. Gren-Eklund (1986) has pointed out the difference between the Aristotelian and Indian conceptions of metaphor. According to Aristotle, the word *a* meaning A is used in the meaning B. The Indian view is roughly that for the thing A is used not the word *a* but the word *b*. The transfer takes place in the denotation, that is, on the side of words. With regard to the passage from the *Mahābhāṣya*, in a sentence such as *mañcāḥ krośanti*, ‘the cots are crying’, *mañcāḥ* ‘the cots’ are *tat* ‘it’ and the children who are the ones really crying are *atat* ‘not it’, not with regard to reality, only with regard to the expressions used. As pointed out by Gren-Eklund (*ibid.*:91), Aggavaṃsa makes use of the *Mahābhāṣya* passage on *tat/atat* not to show *upacāra*, transfer of meaning, but in connection with the *okāsa*.

¹ I take *etaṃ* to refer to the statement but it does not link up syntactically with the rest. It is almost as if he has changed construction before and after the quotation (*evaṃ etaṃ ... etthā pi*). It is of course possible to emend, but nothing falls in place easily; cf. *v.ll.* indicated in the text above.

speech constructing the remainder (*sesa*). As for example, someone wishing to make [someone] drink some milk made ready in a house, when he should state ‘you go into the house [and] having entered drink the milk’, does state, constructing the remainder, ‘go in to the milk’. This is indicated also in the teaching [of the Buddha]: ‘Those noble ones for whom there is use for a needle, I [supply] with a needle’¹ and ‘he who is in need of [asking] a question, he [supplies] me with a question, [and] I [supply him] with an explanation’. Therefore, doubt need not be raised in this respect.²

First of all, one may wonder why he uses the term *okāsa* here and not *adhikaraṇa* which is the term he has been using earlier in the work.³ The answer seems obvious in that the parallel rule in *Kaccāyana* (141) runs: *yo dhāro taṃ okāsaṃ*. The second puzzling feature is that after the definition of *okāsa* has been given, Aggavaṃsa offers a *nirvacana*, semantic analysis, not of *okāsa* but of *ādhāra*, the word used to define it. This peculiarity has in fact been taken over from the Sanskrit grammarians.⁴ The word *ādhāra* was firmly established in the context of the *adhikaraṇa* by Pāṇini’s definition A 1.4.45 *ādhāro ’dhikaraṇam*.

The discussion of whether the *adhikaraṇa* can really be called a *kāraka* in that it does not directly participate in the action but is only connected with it by being the location of the agent or the object, goes back at least to the *Vākyapadīya*. Patañjali does not comment on A 1.4.45. The relevant verses read as follows (VP 3.7.148–49):

¹ Vin IV 167,4 *sūciḥarena* ‘needle-case’ (of an ivory worker).

² That is, since one has to supply the remainder even in these cases.

³ e.g. Sadd 10,28; 68,30.

⁴ Thus the *Kāśikā* on A 1.4.45 gives *ādhriyante ’smin kriyā guṇaḥ ity ādhāraḥ*, reflected in the *Padamāñjarī* (KāSP I:560) *ādhriyante ’smin kriyā ity ādhāra iti* and the *Nyāsa* (KāSN I:560) *ādhriyante kriyāguṇā asminn ity ādhāra iti*.

karṭṛkarmavyavahitām asākṣād dhārayat kriyām |
upakurvāt kriyāsiddhau śāstre ’dhikaraṇam smṛtam ||
upaśleṣasya cābhedas tilākāsakaṭādiṣu |
upakārās tu bhidyante saṃyogisamavāyinām ||

That which [both] indirectly supports the action separated [from it] by the agent or the object, [and] assists in accomplishing the action is called *adhikaraṇa* in the science of grammar. And there is no difference in [the type of] contact with regard to the sesame seeds, space, or the mat. But the ways of assisting [in bringing about the action] differ in [the contact being] *saṃyoga* ‘conjunction’ or *samavāya* ‘inherence’.

Helārāja offers the examples *kaṭe āste* ‘he sits on the mat’ and *sthālyāṃ pacati* ‘he cooks in the pot’, which are met with in the *Saddanīti* as well. In fact, there are striking similarities between what Helārāja says here and bits and pieces of the *Saddanīti* discussion. There is nothing like a quotation, nothing like a coherent identical statement, just a large number of identical words and a general flavour of similarity. This of course makes it hard to come up with any solid claims. By way of example, the *Saddanīti* has *paramparāya pi kiriyādhāraḥ*, while Helārāja has *paramparayā kriyādhāraḥ* (Hel 348,13). Helārāja (Hel 349,1) defines *upaśleṣa* as *ādhārasyādheyena sambandhaḥ*, ‘the relation of the support with that which is to be supported’. Discussing the *vaiśayikam adhikaraṇam* he states (349,8): *ananyatrabhāvas¹ cātra viśayārthaḥ | evaṃ jale matsyaḥ ity ādhārapradeśāpekṣayā caitad aupaśleṣikam adhikaraṇam*, ‘and the sense of *viśaya* “domain” here is: being in that [domain] and in no other; thus “fish are in the water”, with regard to the place of support this is an *aupaśleṣika-adhikaraṇa*’. This is similar to *vesayiko nāma yattha aññatthābhāvavasena desantarāvachchedavasena vā ādhāraparikappo, taṃ yathā: bhūmisu*

¹ Emended from *ananyatra bhāvas*. I prefer to read this as a compound.

manussā jalesu macchā^o, ‘*vesayiko* is indeed where there is imagination of a location, either by force of the condition of not existing elsewhere, or by force of being cut off from another region, as in “human beings are on the earth”, “fish are in the water” [etc.]’. Helārāja even makes a distinction between a real contact and a mental or imagined one, referring to the latter as *kalpita* (349,7). Other significant terms occur as well, such as *samaveta* (Hel 348,10), *samavāyin* (Hel 349,2), and, not to forget, the term *sāmīpya* (349,11–12): *gaṅgāyāṃ gāva iti gaṅgāśabdaḥ sāmīpyāt pradeśavṛttir¹ ity aupāśleṣikam adhikaraṇam*, ‘in “the cows are [located] on the Gaṅgā”, the word *gaṅgā* functions in the sense of place because of nearness, and thus [it is] an *aupāśleṣika-adhikaraṇa*’.

This leads directly to the fourfold classification of the *okāsa* suggested by Aggavaṃsa. Clearly it seems to have been taken over from Kaccāyana. Most Sanskrit sources suggest only three, leaving out *sāmīpya*. Thus Patañjali on A 6.1.72 *saṃhitāyāṃ* states (Mbh III:51,8): *adhikaraṇam nāma triprakāraṃ vyāpakam aupāśleṣikam² vaiṣayikam iti*, ‘the *adhikaraṇa* is indeed of three kinds, *vyāpaka*, *aupāśleṣika*, [and] *vaiṣayika*’. The same classification is met with in the *Padamañjari* (KāśP I:561) and the *Nyāsa* (KāśN I:562), with *abhivyāpaka* for *vyāpaka*. It is also met with in later works such as the *Siddhāntakaumudī* (on A 2.3.36) and its commentaries, the *Bālamānoraṃā* and the *Tattvabodhinī*. But Jñānendrasarasvatī,³ the author of the *Tattvabodhinī*, remarks (SK I:694): *nadyāṃ āsta ityādyartham sāmīpikam adhikaraṇam caturtham api ke cid icchanti*, ‘for the sake of such [statements] as “he sits on the river” some teach also a fourth [type of *adhikaraṇa*, namely,] the *sāmīpika*-

¹ So read for °*vṛtir*.

² So read for *aupakṣepikam* in the third edition of Mbh, revised etc. by K.V. Abhyankar. This must be a mere misprint since Kielhorn’s original edition reads as above with no *v.l.*

³ Probably early 18th century, although tradition has it that he was requested by Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita, the author of the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, to write a commentary upon it. Were this the case, Jñānendra would of course be a contemporary of Bhaṭṭojī.

sāmīpika-adhikaraṇa’. The *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra¹ gives this fourfold classification (PK 80): *aupāśleṣikaḥ sāmīpiko viṣayo vyāpta ity ādhāras caturdhā*. This could be what Jñānendra had in mind since Bhaṭṭojī heavily attacked Rāmacandra and therefore Jñānendra was most probably familiar with his work. As noted above, Helārāja merely brings up the notion of *sāmīpya* ‘nearness’ in the context of *aupāśleṣika*. The *Rūpāvatāra* of the pre-Aggavaṃsa Sinhalese Buddhist Dharmakīrti² suggests a fourfold classification of the *adhikaraṇa* (ed. M. Rangacharya 1916:162,12–13): *sa ādhāraḥ aupāśleṣika-vaiṣayikavyāpaka-pratyāsatti-bhedatvān caturvidhaḥ*, ‘this *ādhāra* “support” is of four kinds, by being divided into *aupāśleṣika*, *vaiṣayika*, *vyāpaka*, and *pratyāsatti* “proximity”’. He adds (162,17–18): *pratyāsattiḥ sāmīpyam — gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, ‘*pratyāsatti*, that is to say, *sāmīpya* ‘nearness’, [as in] “a cow-shed on the Gaṅgā”.’ The term *sāmīpika* seems to have caused Aggavaṃsa some unease, since he comes up with the rather peculiar statement *samīpe sāmīpikavohāraṃ katvā*, ‘making up this term *sāmīpika* in the sense of *samīpa* “near; nearness”’.

Of linguistic importance is the fact that Aggavaṃsa interprets *Sāvathiyāṃ viharati* not as ‘he dwells in Sāvathī’ but as ‘he dwells in the vicinity of Sāvathī’, and *Kurusu vasati* not as ‘he dwells among the Kurus’ but as ‘he dwells in the land where the Kurus live’. Helārāja (Hel 349,11–12) ascribes the Gaṅgā in *gaṅgāyāṃ gāvah*, ‘the cows are [located] on the Gaṅgā’, to the category of *aupāśleṣika* but gives *sāmīpya* ‘nearness’ as the reason for this. Aggavaṃsa’s latter example may have been inspired by Helārāja (Hel 349,9) *gurau vasati*, ‘he lives with the teacher’, where the teacher is ascribed to the *vaiṣayika* category.

¹ Late 14th or early 15th century.

² Cardona (1976:285) brings forward facts which suggest a date of about 1100 for Dharmakīrti. Certain inscriptional evidence could push the date back even further. Dharmakīrti was thus certainly earlier than Aggavaṃsa.

2.8.1 Magic locations

573 Yatth' iddhiy' antaradhāyati. *Yasmiṃ thāne koci iddhiyā antaradhāyati, taṃ thānabhūtaṃ kāraṃ okāsa-saññaṃ hoti: "sā devatā antarahitā pabbate Gandhamādane",¹ Jetavane antarahito Bhagavā,² "tato so dummano yakkho tatth' ev' antaradhāyatha",³ app ekacce maṃ abhivādetvā antaradhāyimsu.⁴ Ādhāraṇalakkhaṇaṃ okāsa-kāraṃ.*

'Where one disappears through magic powers.' That location where someone disappears by magic powers, that *kāra* which consists in the location is something to which the technical name *okāsa* applies: 'That deity has vanished on the Gandhamādana mountain'; 'the Noble One has vanished in the Jeta grove'; 'then that discouraged Yakṣa vanished on that very spot'; 'and again, having saluted me, they vanished on that very spot'.⁵ And the *okāsa-kāra* has as its defining characteristic *ādhāraṇa* 'supporting'.

This is a peculiar little rule. Most probably it springs out of a misunderstanding which goes back to *sutta* 570 (2.7.15 above). A 1.4.28 *antardhau yenādarśanam icchati* assigns the name *apādāna* to the one the agent does not wish to be seen by when concealment is involved. This is straightforward, and so are, as far as I can see, the locative usages in the examples here which do not call for any special attention whatsoever in as much as they are highly ordinary instances of the *adhikaraṇa* and of the locative case suffix. But Aggavaṃsa thinks

¹ Ja VI 92,17.

² Smith: *vide* A I 64,32.

³ Sn 449cd.

⁴ Smith: *ita suppl.* D III 206,12, *cf.* D III 205,23–24.

⁵ See below.

otherwise, probably puzzled by the word *antardhi* 'concealment; disappearance' in Pāṇini's rule and the usage of *antardhāyati* in all the examples. The semantic range of this verb should not make these difficult to distinguish, but Aggavaṃsa seems to reason that since in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* *antardhi* is mentioned only in connection with the *apādāna* a special rule should be stated to account for the occurrence of the verb *antaradhāyati* in an *adhikaraṇa* context.

The example *app ekacce maṃ abhivādetvā antaradhāyimsu* calls for a brief remark in that it seems at first hand more natural to take *ekacce* as plural of *ekacca* in the sense of 'some' and not as a locative singular. The text of the *Dīgha* referred to by Smith (D III 205,24 foll.), however, adds several times the words *tatth' eva* 'on that very spot'. But one should note that the example given above is not identical with the *Dīgha* reference. Moreover, according to the PTC the form *antardhāyimsu* occurs only here and at S I 148,10–11 in the entire canon. So who made the changes, or how do we account for the discrepancy?

Here ends the *kāra*-section proper. The rest of the *kāra* section deals first with what is expressed by the vocative and the genitive, and then with the assignment of case suffixes in a manner somehow similar to the *vibhakti* section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. But I should like to include also as a final passage the one immediately following Aggavaṃsa's discussion of the *apādāna* in which he groups *kāras* according to common ranges of applicability.

2.9. Common domains of applicability

(711,5–23) *Iti chakāraṃ pakāsitaṃ hoti.¹ Idāni samānavisayaṃ kāraṃ vuccate: Yo yattha yena yaṃ vā karoti, tāni kattuokāsakaraṇakammāni: puriso araṇṇe hatthena kammaṃ karoti, sabbattha kattā netabbo. Yaṃ yassa yattha vā deti, tāni kammaṃ sampadān'okāsāni: dānaṃ*

¹ Smith has kept this sentence with the preceding paragraph. I think it should be read together with the following sentence.

bhikkhussa adāsi,¹ *dānaṃ bhikkhumhi deti*,² “*yattha dinnam mahapphalam*”.³ *Yato yattha jāyati, tāni apādān'okāsāni: “yasmā so jāyate 'gini”*,⁴ *corā bhayaṃ jāyati, “yattha so jāyati dhīro*”.⁵ *Yaṃ yattha yato vā gaṇhāti, tāni kamm'okāsāpādānāni: brāhmaṇaṃ hatthe gaṇhāti, “Maddim hatthe gahetvāna”*,⁶ “*nāgaṃ gahetvā soṇḍāya*”,⁷ *ācariyassa santike sippaṃ gaṇhāti*,⁸ *ācariyupajjhāyehi sikkhaṃ gaṇhāti. Garū pana sattamīvisaye purisassa bāhāsu gahetvā, bodhisattassa muddhani cumbitvā ti udāharitvā kammani sattamīvibhattuppattiṃ vadanti. Taṃ Maddim hatthe gahetvānā ti ādikāya pāliyā dassanato purisaṃ bodhisattan ti ca vibhattim vipariṇāmetvā thāne yeva sattamī ti gahetabbaṃ. Iti samāsato samānavisayaṃ kārakachakkaṃ pakāsitaṃ hoti.*

Thus the group of six *kāraḥ* has been explained. Now it is stated that the set of six *kāraḥ* have common domains of applicability: The one which, where, by which, or on which one acts, those are the *kattar*, *okāsa*, *kaṇa*, and *kamma*: ‘The man does an act in the forest with his hand’. Everywhere [here] the *kattar* is to be applied.⁹ That which, to whom, or where one gives, those are the *kamma*, *sampadāna*, and *okāsa*: ‘He gave a gift to the monk’; ‘he bestows a gift on the monk’; ‘where, when given, [a gift] bears great fruit’. That from which [or] where [something] arises, those are the *apādāna* and *okāsa*: ‘That from which that fire arises’; ‘fear arises from a thief’;

¹ Smith: (Cp I 2:7c).

² Smith: (Cp I 4:9b).

³ Sn 191d.

⁴ Ja IV 26,17.

⁵ Dh 193c.

⁶ Ja VI 570,9; Cp I 9: 50a.

⁷ Cp I 3: 5a; 9: 20a.

⁸ Smith: (Ja I 285,18).

⁹ i.e. *puriso karoti, puriso araṇṇe karoti*, etc.; cf. ns quoted Sadd 711, note 6.

‘where that wise one is born’. That which, where, or from which one takes, those are the *kamma*, *okāsa*, and *apādāna*: ‘He takes a Brahman by the hand’; ‘taking Maddī by the hand’; ‘taking the elephant by the trunk’; ‘take the skills in the vicinity of the teacher’; ‘he takes the precepts from the Master and Preceptor’. But in the domain of the seventh [case suffix] the teachers proclaim the occurrence of the seventh case suffix to express the *kamma*, adducing the examples: ‘taking by the man’s arm (= taking the man by the arm)’; ‘kissing on the head of the Bodhisattva’. Now, since a canonical teaching such as ‘taking Maddī by the hand’ is seen, and by first changing the case ending [in] *purisaṃ* (accusative) and *bodhisattaṃ* (accusative) [to *purisassa* and *bodhisattassa*], the seventh [case suffix] is understood to express location only. Thus, in a summary way, the set of six *kāraḥ* with common domains of applicability has been explained.

Aggavaṃsa here suggests a grouping of *kāraḥ* according to their common domains of applicability. They fall into four groups, but, as far as I can judge, in a rather arbitrary way. Is he talking about types of actions, like \sqrt{kr} , when those four *kāraḥ* especially appear, the agent always being present? The first group consists of the *kattar*, *okāsa*, *kaṇa*, and *kamma*. Probably all he wants to say here is that the *kattar* ‘agent’ is always there. Otherwise one would have to assume that he points out four *kāraḥ* as basic and therefore belonging to one and the same group. I find this rather unlikely. I think this highlighting principle applies also in the three remaining instances. The second group is formed when one is *giving to* or *bestowing on*, involving the *sampadāna* and the *okāsa*, as well as the *kamma* which I take to refer to the thing given here, and, of course, always the agent. Thirdly, things can arise *from* something or *in* a place, involving the *apādāna* and the *okāsa*. And fourthly, one can take something, the thing which participates as the *kamma*, *in* or *from* a place, involving the *okāsa* and the *apādāna*. This

must imply that he takes *sonḍā* 'the trunk' in the example *nāgam gaheṭvā sonḍāya*, 'taking the elephant by the trunk', to be either the *apādāna* or the *okāsa*. One wonders whether such classifications were common in more popular grammatical works such as the *kāraḱacakra* literature.

According to Aggavaṃsa, then, there are alternatives. Sometimes you can have an ablative, sometimes a locative. He then points out a disagreement with the teachers, which I take to refer to earlier grammarians, Sanskrit or other. Someone says that you can have a locative case suffix to express the *kamma* 'object', because there are instances where the item we regard as the object is in the locative. The difference amounts to 'kiss the head' as against 'kiss on the head', or, more precisely, 'kissing the Bodhisattva on the head' as against 'kissing on the head of the Bodhisattva'. Aggavaṃsa says we have to assume *purisassa* and *bodhisattassa* are accusatives, only someone has changed the case endings. This is not exactly being attentive to varieties in usage. There is a considerable difference between explaining a phenomenon and explaining it away.

3. Conclusions

It hardly needs to be stated that drawing conclusions on the basis of a detailed examination of only a small part of the *Saddanīti* is hazardous. Still, some conclusions seem unavoidable. Since I have gone into considerable detail above, I shall limit myself here to some observations of a rather general nature.

What kind of a grammar is the *Saddanīti*, then? Judging on the basis of the *kāraḱa*-section, I find it hard to join the chorus of unrestrained praise. The technical framework of this section is unconvincing. There is no attempt at economy, and no rule here has any effect on any other rule so that material can be added endlessly. In this way it is open-ended and little distinction is made between what is really important and what is not. The situation may be different in sections dealing with morphology, where one would expect rules to feed each

other so that stems are building up gradually. The *kāraḱa*-section, at any rate, does not betray much of a system. Aggavaṃsa has superimposed at random terminology, techniques, and material from the Sanskrit grammarians, more often than not in a rather confused and confusing manner. One need only point to the way he deals with the *bhāvaprayoga*, the impersonal passive construction, which Aggavaṃsa claims requires a construction with a word in the nominative case, to the term *kāraḱa* itself and his confusing divisions of it, or to his vain attempt at providing examples of *ātmanepada* usages of the verb *sapa* 'curse' in order to conform to a distinction made by the Sanskrit grammarians.

For Pāṇini the introduction of *kāraḱas* is a technical device serving a distinct theoretical purpose in the derivation of correct linguistic forms. For Aggavaṃsa they serve no such purpose. The *kāraḱa* concept serves to give names to the various participants in actions as expressed in a sentence and in this way it could work as a useful tool in sentence analysis. This possibility, however, breaks down when Aggavaṃsa constantly blurs the distinction between *kāraḱa* and *vibhakti*. In fact, he treats *kāraḱas* as a subset of *vibhaktis*. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the abstract syntactic level of *kāraḱas* is introduced in the derivational process to secure the correct distribution of *vibhaktis*, case endings and verbal endings. Aggavaṃsa's lack of distinction here reflects his absolutely mechanical way of proceeding.

It is quite clear that the material presented in the *Saddanīti* is not very original, with the exception of instances where there is an apparent conflict with what the grammarians say and usages met with in the canon. The term original may in many of these instances be synonymous with peculiar.

This leads us to the question of sources. In addition to the non-Vedic rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Aggavaṃsa has incorporated not only all the *Kaccāyana* rules but also most of the material from the *Kaccāyana-vutti*. His outspoken criticism of *Kaccāyana* (2.7.16.13, above) seems off the mark and shows that for all his erudition Aggavaṃsa was not a very creative thinker. In this context he refers to the *Kaccāyanappakarāṇa* by

name, and later also to Patañjali (2.8, above). Did he in fact have access to the whole of the *Mahābhāṣya*, though failing, as he did, to make good use of that storehouse of material? It seems quite likely that he did since he makes use of very different sections of that text for varying purposes, and incorporates several of the *vārttikas* into his own rules. Whether he knew the commentary of Kaiyaṭa is a more difficult question. He seems to have known some parts of it or of a very similar commentary. But there are problems here. Bhartṛhari wrote a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. Only a small part of this *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* has survived, and that in a single manuscript. We do not even know whether it was ever completed. But it is clear that Kaiyaṭa knew it and that he stood in a tradition intimately connected with Bhartṛhari's work. So, did Aggavaṃsa know of Bhartṛhari's commentary, did he know of it through Kaiyaṭa, etc.?

The influence of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, though, has been established beyond doubt. Aggavaṃsa draws heavily on this source, particularly, as we have seen, when he can make use of it for the purpose of classifications. But when that is said, one should remember that the *Vākyapadīya* is a storehouse of other people's opinions. We therefore face the problem of what is original in the *Vākyapadīya* anyway. It seems clear, however, that Aggavaṃsa had access to the *Vākyapadīya* itself. This is evident from the fact that he knew of and made use of Helārāja's commentary.

Aggavaṃsa was definitely familiar with a tradition going back to the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. It seems likely that he knew of the *Nyāsa*, possibly also of the *Padamañjarī*.

Although Aggavaṃsa seems to have known of the *Cāndravākyakaraṇa* of Candragomin, it is clear that he did not rely upon Buddhist Sanskrit grammars in any significant way. It should be kept in mind, however, that the *Kātantra* is said to have left traces on *Kaccāyana*. A much heavier task is to establish whether or not he was influenced by less known — or, for that matter, lost — works, as for example the *Kāraṅgamaṅdhoddyota* by the tenth century Buddhist

grammarian Rabhasanandin. Such random works might have come to him by coincidence, or views and ideas may even have been transmitted to him orally by his fellow monks.

Now it is impossible not to have some sympathy for Aggavaṃsa's position, namely the fact that he had to cope with the expressions met with in a given corpus of texts, including postcanonical works. Aggavaṃsa knew his canon quite well, and the strength of his work is the vast supply of examples he provides. Still, we meet with the problem that many of his examples are constructed or taken over from the Sanskrit grammarians. In fact, he incorporates whatever he can from Sanskrit sources, be it grammatical problems or examples. He goes as far as making a rule out of two examples which occur in Helārāja's *Vṛtti*, in Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*, and in Haradatta's *Padamañjarī* (2.7.2, above). Rich in material though it is, this makes the *Saddanīti* a dubious source for 'un pali d'intérêt linguistique' (Smith 1928:VI).

Instead of summing up, let me present my view of the situation by contrasting two passages, one from the *Mahābhāṣya* and one from the *Saddanīti*. Both passages deal with the relationship between words and meanings. For the Sanskrit grammarian Patañjali meaning determines usage, and grammar deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about (Mbh I:464,15–21):

*nanu ca naitenaivam bhavitavyam / na hi śabdakṛtena
nāmārthena bhavitavyam / arthakṛtena nāma śabdena
bhavitavyam / tad etad evam dṛśyatām artharūpam evaitad
evamjāṭīyakam yenātrāntareṇāpi puruṣaśabdaprayogaṃ rājani
so 'rtho gamyate / kiṃ punas tat / svāmītvam / kiṃkṛtam punas
tat / svakṛtam / tad yathā / prātipadikārthānām kriyākṛtā viśeṣā
upajāyante tatkrītas cākhyāḥ prādurbhavanti karma karaṇam
apādānam sampradānam adhikaraṇam iti / tās ca punar
vibhaktīnām utpattau kadā cin nimittatvenopādīyante kadā cin
na /*

But now this need not be like that.¹ For meaning should indeed not be fashioned by words, words should indeed be fashioned by meaning.² Let it be viewed like this: The very nature of meaning³ is of such a kind that even without usage of the word *puruṣa* ‘man’, that meaning [namely, *rajñah* ‘of the king’] is understood with regard to [the word] *rājan* ‘king’. What, then, is that [meaning]? Ownership. [And] what, then, is that fashioned by? [It is] fashioned by *sva* ‘itself’. The reason is that special qualities of the meanings of nominal stems come into being fashioned by actions, and fashioned by those [qualities] designations arise, [namely,] *karman*, *karāṇa*, *apādāna*, *sampradāna*, and *adhikarāṇa*. And these, again, are sometimes offered as the cause for the arising of case suffixes, [and] sometimes not.

Aggavaṃsa’s task, on the other hand, is to derive meaning from the usage encountered in a corpus of texts by analysing constructions on the basis of *sādhana*s (= *kāraṇas*) (69,2–11):

*Idha payogesv atthesu ca viññūnaṃ pāṭavatthaṃ
sādhananāmaṃ pakāsitam; tathā hi dunnikkhittasādhanehi
padehi yojitā saddappayogā dubbodhatthā honti, sunikkhitta-
sādhanehi pana padehi yojitā subodhatthā honti. Tasmā
payogā sādhanamūlakā; attho ca payogamūlako. Payogānu-*

¹ The specific context is the claim that in the phrase *rajñah puruṣaḥ*, ‘the king’s man’, one should add a genitive ending also after the word *puruṣa* ‘man’ just as it is added to *rājan* ‘king’. The genitive case suffix indicates that *rājan* is the *viśeṣaṇa* ‘qualifier’ in a ‘qualifier–qualified’ relationship. Details need not concern us here.

² cf. also Mbh I:362,17–19. In that context Kaiyaṭa remarks (MbhP II:510): *pratyāyayīṣitārthapratipādanāya śabdaprayogāt*, [“words should be due to meaning”:] because words are used to communicate the meaning which is desired to be conveyed’.

³ The word *artharūpa*, lit. ‘the form of meaning’ is glossed *arthasvabhāva* ‘the nature of meaning’ by Kaiyaṭa (MbhP II:510).

rūpaṃ hi aviparītaṃ katvā atthaṃ kathanasīlā “yācito va bahulaṃ cīvaraṃ paribhuñjati appaṃ ayācito”¹ ti evamādisu sādhanavasena gahetabbesu atthesu aññesu c’atthesu paṭutarabuddhino paṇḍitā yeva ekantena Bhagavato pariyattisāsanadharā nāma hontī ti veditabbaṃ.

Here the term *sādhana* has been promulgated for the sake of the skill of the learned with regard to usages as well as meanings. For it is the case that linguistic usages have meanings that are hard to understand when they are constructed with words whose *sādhanas* are badly laid down, while they have meanings that are easy to understand when they are constructed with words whose *sādhanas* are neatly laid down. Therefore usages are rooted in *sādhanas*, and meaning is rooted in usage. For those [learned] who are in the habit of analysing the meaning in that they make [it] adequate according to usage — only those learned, whose intellect is very sharp with regard to meanings that can be grasped by means of *sādhana*[-analysis] such as in ‘only he who is invited receives a robe often, he who is not invited, rarely’² and even with regard to other meanings,³ [only

¹ A II 87–88, 90–91; III 33, 130–31.

² This seems to be the sense, *bahulaṃ* going either with *cīvaraṃ* in the sense of ‘plenty of’ or as an adverb with *paribhuñjati*, and so the *sādhana* expressed would be *kamma*, that is, *yācito* is to be interpreted as the object of the action denoted by the verb *yācati*, although he appears as the agent of the action expressed by the finite verb *paribhuñjati* with regard to the rest of the sentence. The idea seems to be that only someone asked or invited enjoys or accepts something, whereas someone who is not invited or asked does not. The rather odd example — odd in the sense that *kamma* would be the interpretation of *yācito* which certainly comes to mind first — is probably chosen by Aggavaṃsa either because he simply wants to say that past participles are to be interpreted as *kammasādhana* in general, or because *yācito* is *kammasādhano* but seems to have no bearing on the rest of the sentence in as much as it appears as *kattar* with regard to *paribhuñjati*, or because past participles often have to be interpreted as active in late Pāli and hence as *kattusādhana*.

those] are completely in possession of the teaching of the doctrine of the Blessed One; thus one should know.

Here Aggavaṃsa makes it quite clear that he has a canon to account for and that in fact one's ability to do so determines the degree to which one is in possession of the Buddha's doctrine. Aggavaṃsa's relationship to the canon and what he considers the word of the Buddha is made even more explicit in the long excursus at the end of the *sampadāna* section (2.6.1.12, above). There, through a series of attacks on the views of the Sanskrit grammarians, Aggavaṃsa attempts to contrast the science of grammar with the word of the Buddha. These attacks are not terribly convincing, but nevertheless quite illuminating. They provide Aggavaṃsa with sufficient ammunition for him to make his claim that there is an opposition between the science of grammar and the canon. His conclusion is that the sole authority is the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, and that grammar is practically useless.

So, if this is his attitude, why does Aggavaṃsa slavishly follow the Sanskrit grammarians when the issues they deal with do not really suit the Pāli language at all, when he has to hunt high and low in the canon to find something he can use, and when he discards grammar completely in favour of what is stated in the canon and in the Aṭṭhakathās? Indeed, such slavish parroting is not the ideal way of writing a grammar of the Pāli language. But here, I think, we have a clue to the question of what purpose was served in composing the *Saddanīti*.

Aggavaṃsa's purpose is to show that the language of the Buddha, for him Pāli, is every bit as organised as the prestigious Sanskrit. But by applying the framework of rules developed by the

³ That is, the meanings of words which are not susceptible of *sādhana* analysis. The *nissaya* as quoted by Smith (69, note 2) gives the example *yevāpana* 'whatever else', an adjective formed as a syntactical or irregular compound from the phrase *ye vā pana* (*ye* as Māgadhism for *yam*), that is, 'those who go around saying *ye vā pana*'.

Sanskrit grammarians he tried to force a mould onto his Buddha-language which that language is not able to sustain.

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Abbreviations and literature:

For Pāli texts the abbreviations are those used in the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*.

A = the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini.

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- Hel = Helārāja’s commentary on VP, *kāṇḍa* 3, part 1, ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1963. Ref. to page and line.
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- JV = *Jainendravṛtti* of Abhayanandin, ed. Shambu Nath Tripathi and Mahadeo Chaturvedi, Varanasi, 1956. Ref. to *vṛtti* under *sūtra* number.
- Kacc(-v) = *Kaccāyana(-vutti)*. Ref. to page in ed. E. Senart, *JA* 1871.
- Kāś = *Kāśikāvṛtti* of Vāmana and Jayāditya, ed. with the *Nyāsa* of Jinendrabuddhi and the *Padamañjarī* of Haradatta by Dwarikadas Shastri and Kalikaprasad Shukla, 6 vols., Varanasi, 1965–67.
- KāśN = Jinendrabuddhi’s *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikā*, in Kāś.
- KāśP = Haradatta’s *Padamañjarī* on the *Kāśikā*, in Kāś.
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- MbhP = *Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa, ed. Vedavrata, 5 vols., Gurukula Jhajjar (Rohatak), 1962–63. Ref. to vol. and page.
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- PK = *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra, ed. Muralīdhara Miśra, vol. 2, Varanasi, 1977. Ref. to page.
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- SK = *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, ed. with the *Bālamānoramā* of Vāsudeva Dikṣita and the *Tattvabodhinī* of Jñānendrasarasvatī by Giridhara Śarmā Caturveda etc., 4 vols., Varanasi, 1958–61. Ref. to vol. and page.
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- vt. = *vārttika*.
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WHY IS A KHATTIYA CALLED A KHATTIYA ? THE AGGAÑÑA SUTTA REVISITED

In a recent article¹ I have argued that the myth of the origin of society presented in the *Aggañña Sutta*² (AS) is satirical, and that the satire is based on Vedic texts. There is another instance of this which unfortunately I noticed too late to include it in that article.

The myth purports to account for the names of the four *vaṇṇa*, using etymological derivations which, I argued, parody the etymologies (*nirukti*) found in the brahminical texts (where they reveal to initiates the hidden nature of things). The word *khattiya* is said (p. 93, para. 21) to originate from the expression *khettānam pati*, "lord/owner of the fields". This seems a less than perfect fit to the story that has led up to it: the first ruler has been agreed on (*sammata*) to keep order, in exchange for which service he is to receive a share of the rice crop, but there is no suggestion that he will own the fields.

In the brahminical ceremony of royal consecration, the *rājasūya*, the anointing (*abhiṣeka*) of the king is performed to the accompaniment of several *mantras*. One of these sacred formulae is either *ṣaṭrāṇam ṣaṭrapatir asi*, "Thou art the power-lord of the powers", or the same in the imperative: *ṣaṭrāṇam ṣaṭrapatir edhi*, "Be thou the power-lord of the powers". The AS has parodistically turned *ṣaṭra*, powers, into *ṣaṭra*, fields: further evidence for my theory that the Buddhist text is based on knowledge of brahminical texts, and satirises them.

The *rājasūya mantra* is found in at least five brahminical texts which might be as old as the AS: the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*,³ the *Taittirīya*

¹ "The Buddha's Book of Genesis ?", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 35, 1992, pp. 159–78.

² *Dīgha Nikāya sutta* xxvii, in the PTS edition Vol. III, pp. 80–98.

³ 1,8,14h. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā with the commentary of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara Miśra*, ed. A. Mahadeva Sastri and K. Rangacharya, Delhi 1986 (original ed. *Mysore Govt. Oriental Library Series* 1895), Vol. III, p. 183.