

Two Letters from Ledi Sayadaw to Mrs Rhys Davids

The following letters, translated from the Burmese, are in the Pali Text Society archives. Ledi Sayadaw provided an explanation in Pāli of the Yamaka which was published with the second volume of that text. His explanation was abridged and translated by Mrs Rhys Davids with help from S.Z. Aung and published in *JPTS* VII (1913–1914), pp. 115–64, together with a list of additions and corrections for the Pāli original (*JPTS* VII (1913–1914), pp. 165–69). Another text by Ledi Sayadaw, this time on the Paṭṭhāna, was translated by S.Z. Aung, edited by Mrs Rhys-Davids, and published in *JPTS* VII (1915–1916), pp. 21–53. The two letters now published were written in 1914 and 1917 in response to various questions from Mrs Rhys Davids about technical points of Abhidhamma. Mrs Rhys-Davids seems to have thought the contents of at least one of the letters was included in the first of these two publications. A handwritten note on the letters says, “Published in *JPTS* 1913–14, & can therefore be destroyed. 21.5.41.” But a second note by Miss Horner questions this: “Verify I.B.H. Doesn’t seem to have been published. 29.10.42.”

Erik Braun and William Pruitt

I. Ledi Sayadaw’s Answers to the Five Questions of the “London Pāli Devī”

Prefatory Remarks

The most venerable Ledi Sayadaw, the well-known eminent writer of Buddhist philosophy in Burma, has entrusted me with his answers in Burmese to the questions by the London Devī [Mrs Rhys Davids] to be translated into English. Before I set my pen to the task I pondered whether I should undertake the work at all or not. Because it is essential that a translator should not only have skill in the art of turning the idioms of one language into those of another, but that he should also have made a wide and careful study of the subject so as to be competent to expand what is over compressed, to condense what is verbose, and to substitute direct statements for indirect allusions. Without possessing much of these qualifications, my translation will not only be less

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intelligible and attractive than the original, but also lower our Venerable Sayadaw's high position. Though I do not feel equal to the task which ought to be handed to an abler writer, I have made up my mind to venture to make a literal rendering to the best of my ability so as to convey the essence of the original. I must also confess that I have not done it very well, even to my satisfaction. But this translation will, I hope, give some light to the London Devī who is not acquainted with the Burmese language. With regard to the lay reader who has no preliminary knowledge of the *Compendium*, the translation will, I am sure, not be of much interest. In conclusion, I must not conceal the fact that I am greatly indebted to U Shwe Zan Aung's *Compendium of Philosophy* without which I would never have been able to undertake this work. I therefore have great pleasure in frankly acknowledging it.

U Nyana
Patamagyaw
Masoyein Taik
Mandalay West
8 July 1914

Namo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammāsambuddhassa.

Q. 1. On page 42 of my *Compendium of Philosophy* it says the mental element of perception (*saññā*) has the function of memorizing. This mental element of perception and the perceived object expired together with the previous thought and its concomitants before the succeeding thought comes into existence. Further, it also concisely says that by the energies of the four different relations of contiguity (*anantara*), immediate contiguity (*samanantara*), absence (*natthi*), and abeyance (*vigata*), the mental element of perception among the mental states that takes part in the memory process in the image reproduced is able to recognize the original object with all its marks which was observed by its predecessors. So please give full details to facilitate a better understanding of the subject.

A. 1. Perception has the function of recognizing. That is to say, when the image is revived, it can discern the original object with its marks and

name. Now, as it is said that both the subject and object are not the same for any consecutive moments in life, it comes about that the previous thought and its mental concomitants together with their object must have expired long ago before the new object and the new subject come into existence. Hence we could conclude that the new mental states would not be capable of recognizing the original object which their predecessors had observed. If they are not capable of recognizing it, then would memory be possible? Would the function of perception be in any way advantageous in recognizing the previous object? The consequence would be that there would be no man in this world who even knows his own name. This, I understand, is the purport of the inquiry.

Some people who adhere to the soul theory would answer the question thus: It is due to the power of *attan* (the inward self or the immortal soul) that past objects are recognized by the present subjects. Though the mental states and objects are always changing, *attan* does not change. It is one and the same on all occasions. So it becomes the standing witness and renders possible the recognition of the past object. In this way, through the main element of their soul theory, they also prove the existence of the immutable soul or self which, according to their view, is entirely separate from the body and the mind of beings.

On the other hand, those who deny the existence of such a soul will answer differently in the following way: The possibility of memory is not due to the power of a permanent self (*attan*) but is due to the energies of four relations (*paccayas*, i.e. *anantara* (contiguity), *samanantara* (immediate contiguity), *natthi* (absence), and *vigata* (abeyance)). By the relationship of contiguity (*anantara-paccaya*) it also comprises the relation of contiguous sufficing condition or *anantarūpanissaya-paccaya*, which is one of two kinds of strong dependence (*upanissaya-paccaya*). Besides these mentioned, the possibility of memory can also be ascertained by the energy of the relation of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*), which is the other kind of strong dependence (*upanissaya-paccaya*). The way in which one mental state

is related to the next through the energy of each of these two kinds of *upanissaya-paccaya* has been explained in my recent work entitled *Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī (Compendium of the Great Treatise)*.¹ So we will here only point out the difference between the two.

The relation of the contiguous sufficing condition (*anantarūpanissaya*) has the power to transmit all the potentialities of each expired mental state to its immediate successor, and thus each successor inherits from its predecessor all the potentialities which continue over a long period of time. As for the relation of the natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*), it has the power to transmit all the potentialities of one expired mental state to the newly arising one which is not its immediate successor but one arisen after a considerable length of time. During the present time, the objects which were seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched, or thought of many years ago, are reflected upon the mind's door under favourable circumstances, even though it may be after a hundred years' interval. Thus the newly arising perception (*saññā*) is able to recognize what its predecessors observed before, and so these creatures are able to remember what they have seen, heard, smelt, etc. Devas, Sakkas, Brahmās, and those whose birth is apparitional, remember their former existences. And also among men, some who are gifted with knowledge of former existences (*jātissaraññā*) remember their former existences. Thus, among the many innumerable objects which were experienced before, if one be either seen, heard, or met with hereafter, all those objects would be simultaneously recognized by the mind. For example, when a man who is born and brought up in England comes to Burma and arrives at Rangoon, he at once notices many things manufactured in England as soon as he sees each of them. So each of the mental elements of

¹“The Buddhist Philosophy of Relations”, *The Manuals of Buddhism* (Rangoon, Burma: Union Buddha Sāsana Council, 1965), pp. 47–49. A third type of sufficing condition is given in that manual: objective sufficing condition (*ārammaṇūpanissaya*), in which the dominant object is the main basis for subjects. Ed.

perception which is included in each past consciousness has the energy of the relation of the natural sufficing condition, and each of the mental elements of perception which takes part in the memory process with all its heritage of the past has the conditioned effect of the relation of natural sufficing condition. The relations of absence and abeyance are here also mentioned in order to answer the questions: How can the expired perception (*saññā*) and its object render service to the newly arising perception?

There is a strong belief that a person who first observed an object and the one who recognizes it must be one and the same person. Having this belief in mind, one is likely to put the question thus: It is said in the philosophy of Buddhism that no subject can be the same for any two consecutive moments in life. Then, how can memory be possible for a person to recognize an object similar to a previously observed object if he is a different being from the one who at first cognized the object?

With regard to this question we will answer from another point of view. It is in the ultimate sense that it is said that no subject can be the same for any two consecutive moments. But according to conventional truth, we would admit that the expired perception and its successor belong to one and the same person. So the two expressions are not in conflict as each is to be understood as being confined to its own type of truth. Here it is explained by means of both ultimate and conventional truths.

The answer made by those who believe in the soul theory is not as difficult to understand as the answer made by those who deny the existence of such a soul, for the former deals with the view that the world has already adhered to, and the latter deals with the verification of things in the ultimate sense, with the transmitting force of the two relations, with the swiftness of the thinking faculty of consciousness, and with the marvellous extensiveness of consciousness — all of which can only be understood by the highly intelligent.

Here ends the answer to the first question.

Q. 2. When the psychic faculty of consciousness comes into play, that is to say, when consciousness is conscious of an object, how many relations are applicable?

A. 2. The state of thinking of an object is simple consciousness. It arises through the very subtle material organs which are generated by our past deeds, either good or bad. Though these materials are generally known as sensitive organs, they merely act as bases for the formation of consciousness, and sensations are entirely lacking in them. They play so important a part that they are universally taken for the senses. But they are really nothing but bases for the formation of senses. The bases are comparable to mothers, consciousness to offspring, and concomitants to grandchildren. Among the six bases, the first five are not so essential as the last because the first five are like the bark of a tree or worthless stones, and the sixth is like the heartwood of a tree or precious stones. Therefore, consciousness that is the offspring of the first five organs is not powerful and cannot give birth to many concomitants. But consciousness which is the offspring of the heart basis is powerful and can give birth to many concomitants. In the non-material world (*arūpaloka*), where there is no material quality to act as a basis, the states of consciousness are also said to be the offspring of bases, for they are generated by the energy of a meditating or cultured mind which has a basis in the lower region of the world. Thus we may answer that the state of thinking about an object rises through very subtle materials or bases.

Let us now turn to a different answer: As we understand the existence of the fire element (*tejo-dhātu*) by its ever-changing characteristic marks of heat and cold, so also we understand the existence of a conscious state of consciousness by its ever-changing characteristic marks of rising and decaying. Therefore it is not necessary to inquire about which original cause this conscious state owes its existence to. But since the existence of states is impossible without some relation or cause, the above question may be posed. There are many different ways to think of objects, such as thinking about or knowing an object of sight

or sound or smell, etc. So we must ask, “Why are these faculties of consciousness or thinking of an object different from one another, and how is each related to its object?” Posing the question this way makes it possible to look for an answer.

Thinking of an object of sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch arises respectively from the five sensitive organs or bases, namely: the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body, which are termed material phenomena originating in volitional acts (*kammaja-rūpa*). Thanks to the presence of these five organs, thinking of objects presented to each organ is associated with separate characteristics for each one. As for thinking of the object of thought (the sixth type of thought), that can also arise in the non-material world (*arūpaloka*) where there is no material basis, so it needs no classification by way of basis.

There are many sensitive materials in the world of matter which can receive sensuous impressions or images of objects, but these materials do not have the faculty of thought which the mind possesses, for mind alone is conscious of the impression taken. For example, the best optical lenses of a telescope might receive light from a distance, but it is surely not conscious of the impression made by the light for it has no faculty of thinking.

Thinking of an object is pure consciousness, which is classified into six types according to the different kinds of object, namely: consciousness of sight, of sound, of smell, of taste, of touch, and of thought (thought here means an object of thought (*dhammārammaṇa*)). Of these, for the formation or arising of consciousness of sight, there must be at least four fundamental sources: the sensitive organ of the eye (*cakkhuvatthu*), the object of sight (*rūpārammaṇa*), light (*āloka*), and attention (*manasikāra*). Note that *manasikāra* is of three different kinds depending on whether it is associated with the object, the sense procedure, or the apperception (*ārammaṇa-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*, *vīthi-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*, and *javana-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*). (1) The first kind is synonymous with the mental property of attention (*manasikāra-cetasika*), which is not meant here. The last two are

respectively synonymous with the two classes of thought: (2) thought turning to the impressions at the five doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana-citta*) and (3) thought turning to impressions at the mind door (*mano-dvārāvajjana-citta*). The attention (*manasikāra*) spoken of here means the former of the two. All four of these are related to consciousness of sight in the following way: The sensitive organ of the eye is related to it by way of basic antecedence (*vatthu-purejāta*). The object of sight is related to it by way of objective antecedent (*ārammaṇa-purejāta*) (“the pre-existence of the object”). The light of fire, the sun, or the moon is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*). And the attention which is consciousness turning to the impressions at the five doors is related to it by way of contiguity (*anantara*). These are the fundamental sources for the formation or arising of sight which does not arise when any one of them is lacking because each of them plays an important part.

As for the formation of the consciousness of sound, there also must be four fundamental sources: (1) sensitive organ of ear (*sota-vatthu*), (2) object of sound (*saddārammaṇa*), (3) space (*ākāsa*), and (4) attention (*manasikāra*). Among these four sources, the sensitive organ of ear is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of sound is related to it by way of objective antecedence. Space between the original sound and the sensitive organ of ear is related to it by way of the natural sufficing condition. Attention (*manasikāra*), which is also synonymous here with the impressions at the five doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana*), is related to it by way of contiguity.

Four sources are also necessary for the formation of consciousness of smell: (1) the sensitive organ of the nose (*ghāna-vatthu*), (2) the object of smell (*gandhārammaṇa*), (3) air or motion in its ultimate sense (*vāta*), and (4) attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of the nose is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of smell is related to it by way of objective antecedence. Motion is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition. And attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Four sources are also indispensable in the formation of consciousness of taste: (1) the sensitive organ of the tongue (*jivhā-vatthu*), (2) the object of taste (*rasārammaṇa*), (3) liquid, here it means moisture of the tongue (*āpa*), and (4) attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of tongue is related to it by way of basic antecedence, the object of taste is related to it by way of objective antecedence, liquid is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition, and attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Consciousness of touch must also have four fundamental forces for its formation: (1) the sensitive organ of body (*kāya-vatthu*), (2) the object of touch (*phoṭṭhabbārammaṇa*), (3) extension or the hardness of the element of extension which forms the basis of the sensitive material of body (*paṭhavī*), and (4) attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of the body is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of touch is related to it by way of objective antecedent. Extension is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition, and the attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Finally we come to consciousness of thought, which also must possess the following fundamental sources for its formation: (1) the thought basis (*hadaya-vatthu*), (2) life continuum (*bhavaṅga*), (3) the object of thought — here, in particular, this object should comprise all the six kinds of objects (*dhammārammaṇa*), and (4) attention, which here means the last of the three mentioned above (*manasikāra*). Of these four, the thought basis is related to it by way of basic antecedence. All the expired life-continuums are related to it by way of natural sufficing condition. The object of thought is related to it by way of objective antecedence, and attention is related to it by way of contiguity. These sources, which I have mentioned above, are explained in the commentary.

If it is explained according to the law of relations in *Conditional Relations* (Paṭṭhāna), consciousness of sight owes its existence to the eighteen relations. Which are these eighteen? From the twenty-four relations, if we exclude five conditions (*hetu* (condition), *adhipati*

(dominance), *pacchājāta* (consequence), *āsevana* (succession), *jhāna* (no synonym in English), and *magga* (means)), we get eighteen conditions. Consciousness of sound, smell, taste, and touch owe their existence to those eighteen relations. But consciousness of thought owes its existence to twenty-three relations, putting to one side the condition of consequence (*pacchājāta*).

Here ends the answer to the second question.

Q. 3. If a preceding volition (*cetanā*) determines the activity of the succeeding volition, how would you decide based on the law of relations: Is the existence of the mind of a being free (*adhimutti*) or not?

A. 3. In the definition *ceteṭi ti cetanā*, volition is so-called not because of its determining the succeeding volition but because of its determining its own concomitant properties. It is also the same for volition in the relationships of volitional acts (*kamma*). However, we may say that a preceding volition is related to the succeeding volition by way of contiguity.

As regards the word *adhimutti* we need to deal with it separately from *cetanā*. The word *adhimutti*, which you render as “free will”, does not mean that the will is absolutely unrelated. But it means that while it is interested in one object, a state of mind has no attachment to another object.

There are two kinds of *adhimutti*: inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*) and superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*). The states of mind of some beings are freely interested in worldly objects as they do not know the disadvantages of worldly pleasures and the evil consequences of corruption. They cannot discriminate between good and evil. So their states of mind have no inclination towards the good, and at the same time they have lost mindfulness and repentance. Such a state is called inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*). Those who lead their life taking the lives of others live an unrepentant life, for they do not realize that they are living a life of impurity and consequently no such thought occurs because it would persuade them that they should abandon such types of livelihood and search some other means of right livelihood. Such is also

the state of mind which we call inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*). Similarly, the same holds true for the state of mind of those who lead their life taking what is not given, indulging in unchastity, etc.

On the other hand superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*) means the state of mind that is freely interested in a good object. The state of mind of one who is interested in inferior things is liable to change into a state of mind interested in good objects under favourable circumstances, such as associating with the wise and the good (*sappurisupanissaya*) and hearing the true doctrine of the wise (*saddhammasavana*). The volition which is intent on doing bad actions suddenly inclines towards the superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*) when it associates with mindfulness and repentance. Everyone knows that when the object is removed, the mind changes direction. Associating with the wise, hearing the true doctrine of the wise, and reasoning (*yonisomanasikāra*) are the means by which one can set one's own mind in the right course of associating with good things, and can withdraw from the wrong course of indulging in bad things. Reasoning (*yonisomanasikāra*) here means reasoning by which one can transfer the state of one's own mind from being inferior (*hīna*) to being superior (*paṇīta*).

Here ends the answer to the third question.

Q. 4. How many relations take part in the impact between the objects and the organs of sentience (*pasādarūpas*)?

A. 4. As the commentary mentions, three relations are applicable when the impact takes place between the objects of sense and the organs of sentience: (1) the relation of objective antecedence (*ārammaṇa-purejāta*), (2) the relation of basic antecedence (*vatthu-purejāta*), and (3) the relation of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*).

The organ of visual sentience (*cakkhuvatthu*), a visible object (*rūpārammaṇa*), and light (*āloka*) are the three requisites for forming an impact on the eye. For the other organs, the requisites have been mentioned in the second answer, but in each case *manasikāra* should be omitted.

The presence of the organ of visual sentience with its property of reflecting power, the presence of the visual object within the sensory range, and the presence of light, shedding its rays over that visible object are clearly capable of producing an image of the visible object on the retina or the sentient surface. Owing to the reflection of the image, or in other words, by the impingement of the two physical factors, the current of the stream of thought is interrupted or is perturbed and vibrates for two moments. Then the process of thought which comprises consciousness, turning to an impression at one of the five sense doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana-citta*), etc., such as that shown in the process of the door of the eye, comes into play.

Of the factors mentioned above, light with its faculty of shedding rays on the visible object may sometimes be left out because the retina can reflect the image of the object which may be disposed in a dark room if the optic nerves are very strong. The structures of the optic nerves of Devas, Sakkas, and Brahmās are so powerful that their retina can reflect the image of an object by penetrating forests, mountains, earth, and water which may come between them and the object. The power of the retina in reflecting the image of the object beyond the sensory range becomes by degrees stronger for those celestial beings or for those whose birth is apparitional, according to the grade of their special power (*iddhi*). If the light and the optic nerves of the retina are extremely powerful, everything that comes between the object and the eye is so transparent that it seems nothing has been interposed. It is also the same for the various types of impact on the other sensual organs by the sensible objects.

With regard to the impact with the six different kinds of objects and the mind-door process, a great deal needs to be said about that. However, something has already been said in the first question in dealing with the difference between the two relations. In the *Atthasālinī*, the commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, the learned commentator mentioned six favourable circumstances by means of which objects may enter the avenue of the door of the mind. These six are (1) a previous

external intuition (*diṭṭhato*), (2) an association with a previous external intuition (*diṭṭhasambandhato*), (3) information (*sutato*), (4) an association with (*sutasambandhato*), (5) experience other than (1) and (3) (*viññātato*), and lastly (6) an association with (5) (*viññāta-sambandhato*). *Diṭṭha* here means the five kinds of objects of sense which previously once entered the avenue of the five-door process of thought. *Diṭṭhasambandha* means the past, present, and future objects of the five senses associated with the above. The following is an example to help with understanding this: A man who has seen a bullock in his own country has the image of the bullock reflected upon the door of his mind at the moment he hears the sound of the word “bullock”, which may mean the bullock of the past experience or of a future experience in another country.

Having previously appeared at the five doors, sensory objects are easily reflected upon the door of the mind. Had these objects been apperceived with approval they generally enter the avenue of the door of the mind so often that there is hardly any way to forget and remove them. If the apperception was associated with an excess of hate, revenge, grief, mourning for the loss of beloved wife, children and relations, or despair at the loss of properties, and associated with the fire of worry which burns every moment that there is reflection on what was wrongly done, these objects appear to the door of the mind so clearly that one is unable to forget them or to remove them.

Why are they so strongly attached to the door of the mind? Because the relation of natural condition (*pakatūpanissaya*) here plays an important part. The stronger the objects were associated, the more instantaneously they are reflected at will, though they might be of objects encountered many years ago, for the mind is always bending toward these objects, even as a fish which is taken out of water struggles every moment to get back into the water or even as moths are always striving to enter the flame of a fire burning at night. Even while asleep those objects are watching the life continuum or the stream of being to perturb it at any possible moment they may arise. So no other vision is

seen, even in a dream, except what has been previously experienced. Now no cause should be searched for other than what has been shown in connection with the reflection of objects upon the mind. By simply unveiling the face of the process of thought, these ideas distinctly appear upon the mind.

Then what is meant by unveiling the face of thought? For instance, when a man is fast asleep and perceives some frightful things in his dream, he tries to unveil the face of thought so as to wake up, but all in vain. After some while, however, as soon as the face of thought becomes unveiled, the man wakes up and knows that what he perceived was only a dream, and all thoughts of fear disappear. The unveiling of the face here represents the rising of an apperception during the process of thought at the door of the mind. The exertion to unveil the face is like the perturbed state of the life continuum and the arising of consciousness turning to impressions at the door of the mind. Of the two classes of consciousness of the life continuum and mind-door apprehension, the latter is perturbed by the new object, which it is capable of cognizing. As to the former, though it is in the same way perturbed by the new object, it is not capable of cognizing the new object, but it cognizes its usual object.

Phrased logically, the perturbed state, or the vibration of the life continuum, should be expressed as the anxiety to give up the old object in order to grasp the new one. The presentation of the new object means the entry of the impressions of the new object into the door of the mind. Thus the new object seems to be pressing forward and occupying the place of the door of the mind's object, and so mind-door consciousness falls into a state of hardship as it can neither grasp that new object nor give up one of the three kinds of its usual objects, which are comprised of the past efficient action (*kamma*), the symbol of the past action (*kamma-nimitta*), and the sign of the tendencies (*gati-nimitta*), which are determined by the force of the past action. Here pressing forward means the entry of the impressions of what had been seen before. Let us make this clearer. A man is always capable of perceiving all the things

in his house or things within the reach of his eyes. But while he is sleeping or thinking of something else, he cannot perceive them. Though he does not perceive them, they are not removed away from his presence, and he does not forget, either entirely or temporarily. These objects are always waiting for him to turn his attention to them and are close at hand ready to serve. So when he wakes up, or when he withdraws his attention from something else, he can at once direct his mind toward them and perceive them at will.

Just before sunrise, first the appearance of the aurora is noticed, and then the globe of the sun is seen a little later. Similarly, before the reproduction of the images of the past objects that had been seen a hundred year ago, in the procedure of the process of thought, the indiscriminate impressions of these objects are first reflected upon the door of the mind because the light of not forgetting is supported by the energy of the relation of the sufficing condition. Here, the light does not mean the light of knowledge, but that of perception (*saññā*). This perception disappears and fades away either suddenly or after a considerable length of time. In some cases it remains for the whole term of the object's life. It suffices now to have a fair knowledge of past and future objects by following what has been shown above.

Almost without exception, any and every object is capable of being reflected upon the door of the mind, whether it is real or imaginary. On account of the marvellous faculty of consciousness, initial application (*vitakka*) and the wide spread of the faculties of greed (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*), dullness (*moha*), perplexity (*vicikicchā*), distraction (*uddhacca*), conceit (*māna*), error (*diṭṭhi*), faith (*saddhā*), reason (*paññā*), etc., objects that are real or imaginary, existing or non-existent, are capable of being reflected upon the door of the mind without limit. From the above, it is clear that the representation of objects is a very easy, natural process.

Here ends the answer to the fourth question.

Q. 5. How many relations are applicable when a new feeling (*vedanā*) re-enjoys an old one?

A. 5. When we say that a new feeling enjoys the old one again, we mean to say that we are enjoying it inwardly by recollecting all the worldly pleasures that we once enjoyed with relish. We also mean that we are always delightfully expressing our joys throughout an unlimited length of time. It is by the energy of the relation of a natural sufficing condition that past pleasurable objects and craving (*taṇhā*) have an effect upon the newly arising feeling and craving. In order not to forget previous objects, feeling and craving are also related to the new lustful feeling, lustful apperception, and to their concomitants in the process of the door of the mind by way of object. Being dominated by where the attention is placed, they are also related to by way of objective dominance (*ārammaṇadhipati*) and objective sufficing condition (*ārammaṇūpanissaya*). Only the relations of fundamental importance have been shown, but those relations within the scope of easy investigation are left to the inquirer to apply accordingly as they relate in this matter.

Here ends the answer to the fifth question.

2. Ledi Sayadaw's supplement to the answers for the questions on memory and will (1917)

(Translated by Maung Myo, B.A., Myook, under training, Myaungmya).

1. Objective change is concealed by continuity, resulting in the illusion of identity produced thereby. This may be added to my previous answer to the memory question. This makes it look as if memory is the direct result of hallucination, which is akin to ignorance. It may then be contended that the Buddhas and Arahants, who are entirely free from illusions and hallucinations, would be forgetful of the past. This objection may be met by answering that wisdom presupposes a knowledge of hallucinations and illusions which it transcends. It is on account of their wisdom that they are capable of recognizing past objects as the same in the conventional sense, though not in the philosophical sense.

11. Such Pali terms, as *adhimutti*, *vimutti*, *adhimokkha*, and *vimokkha* denote different degrees of emancipation. Emancipation is either partial or total.

Partial emancipation means freedom from inimical influences. It does not, however, imply freedom from the influences of the productive and supportive *kammas* which are by no means prejudicial to one's interest.

Total emancipation means absolute freedom from all causes or conditions and all relations. *Nibbāna* is the only state that is absolutely free and unrelated in this way. All others are only partially free.

The controversy between free will and determinism in the West is due to a want of a thorough knowledge of the twenty-four modes of relation treated of in the Paṭṭhāna. When these are thoroughly understood, the free-will controversy will disappear naturally. Those who are ignorant of happening by way of causation and of the twenty-four modes of relation look upon the past *kamma* as the only cause that determines our present volitions and actions. But those who understand them are quite convinced that there are innumerable causes, conditions, and influences at work besides past *kamma*. As soon as this knowledge is widespread the controversy will become a thing of the past.

As regards the various points raised in your [S.Z.A.'s] letter concerning my previous answer, I will answer one by one.

First, according to Buddhism, mind and will are conditioned, by *kamma*, mind, climate, or food, and are related in various ways. Hence they cannot of themselves change from bad to good, or vice versa without some influence or other operating from outside.

Second, as our will is partially free, we may be well disposed towards good conduct, either permanently or temporarily, on coming in contact with good associates and on hearing good advice.

Third, the Buddha taught in the Paṭṭhāna that the immoral may be succeeded by the moral.

Fourth, the argument that, if will is free, it is not determined, may be met by the theory of partial freedom as expounded above.

Fifth, a person can only be well disposed towards good when his will has been favourably determined by his past volitions in at least two modes of relations (by way of contiguity and sufficing conditions). But because he is free from what is bad, his will may be said to be also free. Hence our moral approbation (as a moral free agent).

In your illustration of a marionette performance, the puppet, of course, does not deserve praise as acquiring merit. Nevertheless, praise is due to it for the life-like movements executed by the string-puller.

Sixth, determination is not opposed to the theory of free will in Buddhism.

Seventh, it is obvious from the above remarks that the theory of free will is consistent with the belief in the law of *kamma*.

Eighth, in the story of Kākavaliya, the offer of the rice gruel to the Arahant on waking from complete trance was determined not only by his past *kamma* but also by good associations and good advice, well disposing the hero of the story to a good course of conduct in that life. Hence he deserves our moral approbation. The view that if he was under the influence of past *kamma*, he could not possibly help offering such a gift to the Arahant under those favourable conditions is erroneous, just as the theory of past deeds as sufficient causes is.

The three principal theories of predeterminism, creation, and chance are fully expounded in the *Tika-nipāta* of the first book of the Anguttara-nikāya.²

Of these, the first, fatalism, consists in believing that one's happiness or misery, prosperity or adversity, good or bad character are pre-determined by one's *kamma* in a past existence.

The second consists in believing that happiness or misery, etc., is created by the fiat of God. The third is the view that they cannot be traced to any cause but occur in a fortuitous manner. In this *nikāya* the Buddha examined these theories in detail. As a Bodhisatta, in the birth stories of Mahābodhi,³ the stories in the Mahānipāta,⁴ and the birth story

²A I 101–300.

³Ja no. 528.

of Bhūridatta,⁵ he examined these views. The reproach “like the lifeless puppet” is consistent with the Buddha’s spirit of inquiry and scrutiny.

As I am now engaged in writing a new treatise on *vipassanā*,⁶ I cannot now explain the main points of the Buddha’s criticism. But if more information is required, the details of the Western controversy between determinism on the one hand and free will on the other should be presented to me.

The essential point to be borne in mind is that past *kamma* is the main cause and the basic principle of all that takes place in any one existence. Hence special importance is attached to it. It must not, however, be taken that past *kamma* alone brings about happiness, etc. The fact that there are many other causes of what happens, as dealt with in the Paṭṭhāna, may be understood from the example of a tree. The soil, water, etc., are required in addition to a seed. I will repeat a discourse which I preached in Pazundaung some time ago. By the sentence “The King comes” we understand that not only the king but his retinue also comes. This mode of speech is known as the suggestive mode of speech. The following three statements are suggestive :

1. The growth of trees depends upon the seeds.
2. The prosperity of men results from the meritorious deeds performed in their previous existences.
3. All beings, men, gods and Brahmās can attain the four noble paths and their fruition and *nibbāna* only through their past perfections.

In saying that trees grow from seeds, we must bear in mind that they cannot do so without the soil and the water. Only with the help of the soil and the water can seeds produce trees. In the same way, when we say prosperity depends upon past *kamma*, we must understand that it is only the main cause of it. Virtue is like the earth; concentration and

⁴Ja section 22.

⁵Ja no. 543.

⁶This no doubt refers to his *Vipassanā-dīpanī*, written in 1915.

wisdom are comparable to rain water; and past *kamma* corresponds to the seed. Again, rice plants depend on the early rains, middle rains, and late rains for their growth. Virtue may be likened to the early rains, concentration of the mind to the middle rains, but wisdom recalls the final rains.

In the parable Buddhists are cultivators. They cannot attain the fourth path and fruition and *nibbāna* through their past *kamma* alone. They must also observe the precepts, practise concentration, and acquire wisdom.

In the ranks of Buddhists themselves, there are many who hold the extreme view that *kamma* is the only sufficient cause. These erroneous views cannot be dispelled without a knowledge of the *Paṭicca-samuppāda-naya* and the *Paṭṭhāna-naya*. For a detailed examination of them, the reader is referred to the *Sammādiṭṭhi-dīpanī*⁷ which was written by us in Pāli some time ago.

Ledi Sayadaw's Answers to the Five Paṭṭhāna Questions Posed by Mrs. Rhys Davids

Q. 1. *Paṭiccavāre*; page 21, lines 19, 21, 23:⁸ *khandhe [...] vippayuttapaccayā*; this is not a complete sentence. What is omitted? What is the other term in the relation, thus *khandhe paṭicca ... ? ... uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*?

A. 1. In the above question, the sentence should be completed thus: *khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*. Here, it being a *paṭiccavāra*, we at once know that the verb *paṭicca* must be inserted as soon as we see the object *khandhe*. The words *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ, kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ* are the subjects of the preceding sentence in the text and they

⁷Translated from Pāli into Burmese by Ledi Paṇḍita U Maung Gyi, translated into English by the editors of *The Light of the Dhamma*, "The Manual of Right Views", *Manuals of Buddhism*, 1965, pp. 69–100.

⁸References seem to be to a Burmese edition of the *Tikapāṭṭhāna*. See *Tikap* 82, 29, 33, 36.

should be inserted here as well. As regards to the verb *uppajjati*, it is evident that it must also be put here as the principal verb, as it is contained in the hypothetical exposition (*uddesapāli*) *abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati vippayutta-paccayā*.

Yutti or evidence: In the expositions of the Paṭṭhāna relations, there are three main points to be carefully noted, i.e.,

- i. the *paccayadhamma*: the relating thing,
- ii. the *paccayuppannadhamma*: the related thing,
- iii. the *paccaya-satti-visesa*: the specific function of the relation or better the specific relation.

Here the *paccayadhamma* is indicated with the object *khandhe*; the *paccayuppannadhamma* with the subjects *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ, kaṭattārūpaṃ, upādārūpaṃ*; and the *paccayasattivisesa* with the instrumental case *vippayuttapaccayā*. Hence, in order to cope with the hypothetical exposition, every demonstrative sentence (*niddesa-vākya*) should have these three main facts in full, and they should be carefully noted in every relation.

As regards the question, “What is the other term in the relation thus *khandhe paṭicca ... ? ... uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*?”, if there are three facts, namely, 1. *paccayadhamma*, 2. *paccayuppannadhamma*, 3. *paccayasattivisesa*, in full, it may safely be said that the sense is quite clear with its own existing words and no other term is needed to make the sense clearer. But the adopting of more appropriate expressions suitable to a particular person or a country, other than those in the text, would conduct the student most beneficially and readily to the object of his search. Such incomplete expressions as *khandhe vippayuttapaccayā, vatthuṃ purejātapaccayā*, etc., are only met with in the species of *purejāta* and *vippayutta*. The inscription of the Paṭṭhāna text now found in the papers and the palm leaves is not the verbatim exposition of the Buddha, but it is to be believed that it exists only as the first Sinhalese inscribers of the Buddhist canon arranged it. If we were to change the sentence *khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā* into another term, we would,

with reference to its hypothetical exposition, change *khandhe* into *kusale khandhe*, *akusale khandhe*, *vipākābyākate kiriyābyākate khandhe*, etc., or *kusale dhamme*, *akusale dhamme*, etc.; *paṭicca* into *nissāya*, *amuñcivā*, *avinābhāvi hutvā*, etc.; and *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ* into *kusala-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ*, *akusala-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ*, *kiriyābyākata-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ*, *vipākābyākata-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ*, *kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ*. Here, in order to show that only the derivatives are needed and not the four great essentials by the words *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ*, since the *mahābhūtāni* are *paccayadhammas*; (see the sentence beginning *mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ*⁹), the word *upādārūpaṃ* is added to each. It is an easy thing to use different expressions if one grasps fully the meaning of the original sentence, otherwise it may be difficult to do so. The meaning of the word *paṭicca* should be understood as in *putto mātaraṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; *aggi kaṭṭhaṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; *divā āloko sūriyaṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; etc.

Here ends the answer to the first question.

Q. 2. *Paccayavāre*; page 5, lines 5, 14, 16.¹⁰ *vatthum purejātapaccayā* ..., here again the sentence is incomplete. How would the full sentence be written?

A. 2. In this question and in the incomplete sentence *vatthum purejātapaccayā*, the object *vatthum* indicates the *paccayadhamma*, and the instrumental case *purejātapaccayā* indicates the *paccayasattivisesa*. Therefore we at once know that the subject to indicate the *paccayuppannadhamma* and the predicate to complete the sentence are wanting. And whereas the hypothetical exposition *kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo uppajjati purejātapaccayā* and the demonstrative exposition *kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandam paccayā tayo khandhā*; ... *pe* ... *dve khandhe paccayā dve khandhā* are clearly set

⁹Tikap 83,1.

¹⁰Tikap 115,4f., 14, 18.

forth, we have no doubt in supplying the incomplete sentence with the subject *khandhā* and the predicate *uppajjanti*. The complete sentence will then run as: *khandhā vatthum paccayā uppajjanti purejātapaccayā*. It should be paraphrased with reference to the preceding sentence thus: *khandhā cattāro kusalā vā akusalā vā vipākakiriyābyākātā vā khandhā vatthum hadayavatthurūpaṃ paccayā paccayaṃ katvā kāraṇaṃ katvā purejātapaccayā hadayavatthuno purejātapaccayasattivisesena uppajjanti pātu bhavanti*.

Here ends the answer to the second question.

Q. 3. *Pañhāvāre*: page 227, lines 11, 12, *anantarūpanissayo*, *pakatūpanissayo*;¹¹ *pakatūpanissayo*: here as sometimes elsewhere, out of the two of the three subdivisions of *upanissayapaccayo* (*ārammaṇūpanissayo* being the third) only the third is taken in the specific relation referred to. I would ask: What are we to conclude with respect to the second *anantarūpanissayo*? This is stated with *pakatūpanissayo*, but no use is made of it. Why is it stated?

A. 3. Here in the text, in the aforesaid page and line, the hypothetical sentence runs as follows: *adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa upanissaya-paccayena paccayo*. It assumes that the state accompanied by painful feeling is the *paccayuppannadhamma*, and *upanissaya* is the *paccaya-sattivisesa*. Now, the tactile cognition and the twin consciousness rooted in hate which are accompanied by painful feeling, being never conscious of an object pleasurable cannot obtain the *ārammaṇādhipatipaccaya*, that is, they do not become the *paccayuppannadhamma* of it. And *ārammaṇūpanissaya* is synonymous with *ārammaṇādhipati*. Therefore the *ārammaṇūpanissayapaccayo* is not mentioned in the text.

As regards the two *paccayas*, *anantarūpanissaya* and *pakatūpanissaya*, the former is synonymous with the ordinary *anantarapaccaya*. Therefore the exposition of the *anantarūpanissaya* must be the same with those of the *anantara* and *samanantara* whose expositions have

¹¹Tikap 165.4.

already been mentioned in the text below (see page 222, line 28).¹² For this reason it is not necessary to mention them again along with the *pakatūpanissaya*. But if we are to reproduce it here in the form of *anantarūpanissaya* it will run as follows: *adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo. āvajjanaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo*. Here the “turning towards the five doors” is the *paccaya-dhamma* and the four mental aggregates of tactile cognition accompanied by painful feeling are the *paccayuppannadhamma*; and the determining consciousness or the *voṭṭhabbana-citta* in the sense-door-process or the mind-door cognition in the mind-door process is the *paccayadhamma* and the four mental aggregates of apperceptions rooted in hatred are the *paccayuppanna-dhamma*.

Here ends the answer to the third question.

Q. 4. *Sukhāya vedanāya* ... p. 234, line 10¹³ ... *pe* ... Here should come the *Paccanīyaṃ*, but there is here no *na-hetu* nor any other *na-*. What is the right title for this section (down to p. 235, line 3¹⁴)? What is its object?

A. 4. Here, although we do not see any *na-*, we may no doubt assign the title *Paccanīya-naya* to this section. For this section is indicative of or is intended to enumerate the contents of *nava* expressed in the *Paccanīya-saṅkhyāvāra* as *na-hetuyā nava*, *nārammaṇe nava*, etc., which we will meet with at the end of this section p. 235, line 3. This type of exposition is also met with on pages 130, 131,¹⁵ and there called the *Paccanīyuddhāra*. This is a preliminary enumeration of what is obtainable in the *Paccanīyavāra*. The obtainable *nava* are, to wit, 1. *sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo sukhāya vedanāya sam-*

¹²Tikap 326.5f.

¹³Tikap 327.2f.

¹⁴Tikap 327.5.

¹⁵Tikap 190f.

payuttassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, saḥajāta-paccayena paccayo, upanissayapaccayena paccayo, kammaṇapaccayena paccayo. 2. *sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, ... pe ...*, etc., (down to page 235, line 3). In this statement there is something to be more especially understood. It is the concise statement reducing the twenty-one *paccayas* obtainable in the *Vedanā-tika* into four, viz, *ārammaṇa*, *saḥajāta*, *upanissaya* and *kamma*. And the twenty-one *paccayas* obtainable are those other than the *purejāta*, *pacchājāta*, and *vippayutta*. In this *Vedanā-tika*, both the *paccaya-dhamma* and the *paccayuppanna-dhamma* are only the mental aggregates accompanied by feeling. Those of *purejāta* are materials and mentals respectively; those of *pacchājāta* are mentals and materials respectively; and those of *vippayutta* are materials and mentals and vice versa respectively. Therefore these three *paccayas* are excluded in the *Vedanā-tika*.

How the twenty-one *paccayas* come under the heads of the said four *paccayas* is as follows: By the expression *ārammaṇapaccayena* we get one *paccaya*, that is mere *ārammaṇa*. By the expression *saḥajāta-paccayena* we get, excluding the *vippayutta* out of the fifteen species of *saḥajāta*, another fourteen *paccayas*, viz, *hetu*, *adhipati*, *saḥajāta*, *añña-m-añña*, *nissaya*, *kamma* (only *saḥajāta-kamma* is meant), *vipāka*, *āhāra*, *indriya*, *jhāna*, *magga*, *sampayutta*, *atthi*, and *avigata*. By the expression *upanissaya*, we get another six, that is to say, *anantara*, *samanantara*, *upanissaya*, *āsevanā*, *natthi*, and *vigata*. Now we have altogether twenty-one. By the expression *kammaṇapaccayena* we get another one, that is *nānākkhaṇika-kamma* alone, *saḥajāta-kamma* being taken in the *saḥajāta*. But this last one should not be taken separately, for the name *kamma* has already been mentioned in the *saḥajāta*. Thus it reduces the twenty-one *paccayas* that are obtainable in the *Vedanā-tika* into four as we see in the nine themes, in the *Paccanīyuddhāra*. And with reference to these nine themes or sentences, *na-hetuyā nava*, *nārammaṇe nava*, etc., are set forth. It means that in the *paccanīya* of *hetu* nine themes and their expositions are obtained. How? *sukhāya*

vedanāya sampayutto dhammo sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa na-hetu-paccayena paccayo, ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo. sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena cittena dānaṃ datvā, sīlaṃ samādiyivā, uposathakammaṃ katvā, sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena cittena taṃ paccavekkhati assādeti abhinandati, taṃ ārabha sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto rāgo uppajjati diṭṭhi uppajjati.

In a similar manner it should be shown in full of all the themes and their expositions not connected with the *hetupaccaya*, that is, distributing severally the twenty *paccayas* with the exception of *hetu*. We do not deal with them here fully lest it should become too lengthy. In this book of Paṭṭhāna, the first chapter, *Paccayaniddesavāra*, and the *Pañhāvāra-vibhaṅga* are the most important ones, and the expositions contained in these chapters alone should be taken as the original verbatim exposition of the Buddha himself; others, i.e. *Pucchā-vāra*, *Saṅkhyā-vāra*, *Ghaṭanā-vāra*, *Paccanīya-vāra*, etc., are those of the *Mahātheras* who are exceptionally versed in the doctrine of the Abhidhamma. Only those who have thoroughly studied and understood the analytical expositions of the contents (*mātikā*) of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, i.e., *Tika-padas* and *Duka-padas*, as well as the *paccayadhammas* and the *paccayuppanna-dhammas* of the twenty-four relations can walk their way through these *vāras*, otherwise they will feel like they are wanderers in some unknown region, groping their way without any success. However, if the student has understood well only what is said in the *Paccayaniddesa* and the *Pañhāvāra* of the *Tika-* and *Duka-padas*, though he is not able to acquire the knowledge of all the *vāras*, he may be said to have acquainted himself with the *Paṭṭhāna*.

Here ends the answer to the fourth question.

Q.5. What exactly is meant by ... *tīṇi* ... in the abbreviation used in the printed edition, for example, on page 266, line 4,¹⁶ and lower again? Does it refer to the *eko khandho ... tayo ... dve?* or to any three

¹⁶See Tikap 328. E^c does not include the word *tīṇi*. Ed.

propositions concerning dhamma ... *āhārapaccayena paccayo*, etc., etc.?

A.5. In this question *tīṇi* refers to any three propositions concerning dhamma. On page 266, line 4, the *tīṇi* refers to the following three propositions: 1. *vipākadhammadhammo vipākadhammadhammassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* 2. *vipākadhammadhammo nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* 3. *vipākadhammadhammo vipākadhammadhammassa ca nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammassa ca āhārapaccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ ca rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* Here *vipākadhammadhammā* are moral and immoral states that have effectual properties. *Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā* are *kriyācitta*, *rūpa*, and *nibbāna*. Thus we have three propositions in the *āhārapaccaya*, as *vipākadhammadhamma* causally relates either to itself or to *cittajarūpa* or to both. Wherever numerals are met with it is to be understood that they refer to the propositions which should be constructed according to the relation concerned and with reference to the *dhammas* of *Tika-* and *Duka-padas*.

Here ends the answer to the fifth question.

In Buddhism the teaching of the Buddha is of two kinds, viz, teaching regarding the person (*puggalādhiṭṭhāna-desanā*), and teaching regarding the subject (*dhammādhiṭṭhāna-desanā*). Almost all of the Suttanta discourses which are delivered regardless of the subject but suitable to the hearer and, as far as his knowledge is concerned in respect of gaining the Paths, belong to the former, and all the Abhidhammical expositions which are propounded to all their intents and purposes and in many ways as much as can be obtained, regardless of the hearer or the extent of his knowledge in gaining the Paths, belong to the latter. Therefore those who wish to gain the Paths in this present life should search out from the many Suttanta discourses such as *Nidāna-*

vāra-saṃyutta, *Khandhavāra-saṃyutta*, *Salāyatana-saṃyutta*, etc., the discourse most suitable to their taste, and from these, acquiring the knowledge of how to discriminate the mental and material qualities as to their relation by way of cause and effect, and also gaining the methods of how to proceed with the exercises of insight, should work out their salvation. The discourse on the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is capable of gaining the knowledge of cause and effect, and is also efficient for gaining the Paths. The exposition of the *Paṭṭhāna-naya* being a *dhammādhiṭṭhāna-desanā* is beyond the extent of the knowledge of the hearers. It is most advantageous to the Ariyan disciples in promoting the growth of the *paṭisambhidā* knowledge. But the study of the philosophy of the Abhidhamma to a learned *puthujjana* [“ordinary person”] in this life is not without any effect, for his knowledge of the Paths and Fruitions, which he shall receive from future Buddhas will be decorated with the knowledge of *paṭisambhidā*. The philosophy of Abhidhamma in Buddhism is the recreation-ground for intellectual minds. It gives delight to scientific men of other religions. It can also resist the interference of foreign religions. Those who are well trained in it cannot be tempted by any other religion. On these accounts I have written a book called *Paramattha-saṅkhepa* (a rhythmical Burmese translation of the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*), which even the girls can learn easily in four or five months. I have also written a book called *Sadda-saṅkhepa* in rhythmical form which also helps a beginner learn Pāli in five or six months. A rhythmical book entitled *Vinaya-saṅkhepa*, for the bhikkhus, has also been written, and it helps the bhikkhus to know easily all the rules and duties of a bhikkhu in two months’ time. I have also written many other books called *dīpanīs* in plain Burmese on many subjects which I thought important in Buddhism for the general public and these spread all over Burma.

Ledi Sayadaw

5th Waning Kasôn, 1279 B.E. (1917 A.D.)